How are Drones Changing Modern Warfare?

Lessons Learnt from the War in Ukraine

Introduction

Many may not realise that the origin of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), commonly known as drones, dates back almost a century, while modern UAV technology has been rapidly developing in civilian and military contexts over the past four decades. Drones represent the intersection of two important trends in military technology – the precise nature of weapons and the rise of robotics which, when combined, are flown remotely at no risk to a pilot and capable of delivering a lethal payload. The UAVs used in modern warfare has altered the dynamics of military operations, offering unique tactical advantages and enhanced the operational efficiency in various combat scenarios^[1]. Drones have been used for various purposes, including surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeted strikes (see Figure 1). Overall, uncrewed systems represent a transformative advance in military technology, reflecting significant investment and development worldwide. As nations continue developing and deploying these systems, it is crucial to understand their implications and integration into Australian tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs).

Figure 1. Ukrainian soldier prepares to launch a drone (Reproduced with authority of image owner, Oleksandr Volosyanskyi).

In Ukraine, drones have become an important weapon to gain an asymmetric edge over Russian forces. Their availability, rapid development, ease of deployment and use make them indispensable in the military operations on Ukrainian soil. While this technology has altered the character of modern warfare, the UAVs have not had a decisive effect on the adversary to date^[2]. One lesson from the war in Ukraine remains clear – innovations in uncrewed systems are disrupting the way modern warfare is being conducted. It is therefore crucial for the Australian Defence Force (ADF) to understand both the opportunities and limitations that drones bring to inform future doctrine, training, planning, as well as future investments in these technologies that can have an asymmetric effect on the battlefield. This Land Power Forum article is part of a larger project - the first evidence-based research on the lessons learnt from the use of drones in the war in Ukraine – drawing on both Ukrainian and Australian expertise. This article summarises highlights from the research – lessons from the use of drones in the Russia-Ukraine War. 

Historical Evolution of UAVs.

Looking back to the 1960s, the British Commonwealth artilleries recognised emerging drone capability as crucial for target acquisition. Initially used to extend the range of artillery observers, the focus on reconnaissance and target acquisition remained unchanged for decades. In the past two decades, the United States has extensively utilised drones in counterterrorism operations in regions such as Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen, highlighting their capability to execute precise strikes with reduced risk to friendly personnel. In 2020, another notable example was the use of drones in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, deployed for precision strikes and surveillance, significantly impacting the conflict's outcome by providing superior aerial intelligence and striking capabilities^[3]. However, the war in Ukraine has seen the first large-scale deployment of smaller drones by both Ukrainian and Russian forces for real-time intelligence gathering and direct combat engagements, illustrating the tactical versatility of these systems in contemporary conflicts^[4]. This unprecedented use of drones on a large scale in Ukraine offers valuable lessons for Australia. Understanding these lessons is essential for developing future drone capabilities and tactics in warfare.

Technological advancements have allowed drones to become smaller, more agile, and more capable. A decade ago, drones used in Ukraine were rudimentary and primarily used for harassment. However, by 2023, the proliferation of small drones capable of strikes, equipped with small payloads, had become capable of disrupting Russian attacks^[5]. Additionally, the progression beyond electro-optical and infrared capabilities has been significant. Prior to 2015, large platforms like Global Hawk, Triton, Predator, and Reaper were needed for multiple payloads. Following the Russian invasion in Ukraine, however, larger drones proved unsurvivable in a modern, well equipped air defence environment and, as such, were removed from the battlefield. Battlefield aviation (both rotary and fixed wing) was also forced from the frontline. Smaller drones rapidly developed locally – able to both survive below the targetable threshold and to thrive in it – have quickly filled the space. These small drones are now capable of being equipped with multiple payloads, such as electro-optical infrared (EOIR), electronic warfare (EW), or geospatial intelligence payloads. This proliferation of multi-use drones at lower costs represents a significant technological advance.

History demonstrates that technological advancements in a warfare often outpace ethical and regulatory frameworks. For instance, the use in World War I of gas, machine guns, landmines, and cluster munitions were all fielded before any formal ethical or regulatory controls were established. Similarly, UAV technology is advancing rapidly, necessitating proactive engagement to understand and regulate its deployment effectively. The swift integration of these evolving technologies into military operations highlights the need for vigilant oversight and ethical considerations.

Death of Large Drones

Drones are generally classified based on distinct characteristics, such as function, size, payload, geographical range, flight endurance, and altitude^[6]. According to the NATO classification, the drone dynamics in Ukraine have showcased class I and class III drones, where class I drones are less than 150kg, and class III drones are greater than 600kg^[7]. In the war in Ukraine, small military drones – both fixed-wing and rotary, integrated with the ground units – have been commonly used for surveillance, target acquisition, battle damage assessment, and information warfare^[8]. 

Class III drones – large surveillance and strike drones – are useful for gathering information over the lengthy periods of time (i.e., between 12-26 hours, with a General Atomics MQ-9 Reaper now achieving up to 40 hours) and can execute remote strikes^[9]. However, without air superiority, they are vulnerable to air defences, electronic countermeasures, and are expensive to replace ($5m for one Bayraktar TB2). The large drones did not survive once Russian air defence and electronic warfare systems were properly integrated in Ukraine^[10]; while other class III drones (i.e., Russia’s Orlan-10 reconnaissance drone) faced obstacles in providing good quality intelligence due to unreliability of its systems ^[11].

The Turkish-built Bayraktar TB2One is a vivid example of the large (class III) armed military drones that captured Ukrainian headlines and the public imagination in the first days and weeks of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine (see Figure 2). It was used for ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) and tactical strike missions^[12]. The acquisition of Bayraktar TB2 drones was presented as a deterrent against Russia’s aggression, and provided just as important as the supply of Javelin Anti-Tank Guided Missiles^[13]. The TB2s supplemented manned Ukrainian jets and provided the Ukrainian Air Force a ground strike capability that did not endanger its pilots in the critical few days and weeks since the full-scale Russian invasion^[14]. They were used as decoys in the mission to sink the missile cruiser Moskva, the flagship of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet^[15]. One of the last successful employments of TB2 by Ukrainian forces was seen in the battle to recapture Snake (Zmiinyi) Island in the Black Sea in May and June 2022 where TB2s directly targeted several navy vessels and served as a surveillance and targeting platform in the raid against Chornobaivka airport in Kherson region^[16].

Figure 2. Bayraktar TB-2 combat drone belonging to the Ukrainian Army (Photo Credit: Mike Mareen, AdobeStock).

The Bayraktar TB2’s low speed (i.e., 130 km/h) and size (i.e., 12m) made it vulnerable on a battlefield with dense anti-air defence systems and electronic warfare at high density^[17]. As such, the TB2 disappeared over the skies of Ukraine from September 2023 due to the evolving dynamic of the war^[18]. This contrasts with the effective performance of TB2 in Libya, Syria, and during the second Nagorno-Karabakh war in 2020, conflicts without a dense layer of air defences^[19]. Similar scholars from security studies community argue that large drones have limited utility in high-intensity conflicts, and their success depends on the failure of an adversary’s air defence^[20]. 

Displacement of Human Roles & Reducing Human Risk.

Drones displace rather than replace humans on the battlefield. This displacement reduces risk in dangerous situations and preserves human life. Drones can provide greater persistence over various missions, maintaining optimal performance without the limitations of human endurance^[21]. For example, drones, whether ground-based, aerial, or maritime, are still controlled by humans but displace their roles in the surveillance chain, removing them from frontline exposure and risk. 

Drones can and have saved lives. This is particularly important in asymmetric warfare, where an asymmetry in the availability of personnel can mean putting fewer people in harm's way and ensuring a better return on investment in human resources over time. Ukrainian forces have removed the risk to humans by conducting surveillance and reconnaissance with longer range drones that are capable of moving at rapid speed and maintaining their presence for long periods of time. When equipped with multiple sensor packages, these drones have been essential in detecting enemy movements, locations and force compositions during the day or night. Small, class I drones, have changed the operational tempo of artillery, shortening time-critical targeting and firing cycles from about 30 minutes to 3-5 minutes^[22], helping to increase precision and pace of artillery fires and keep soldiers safer in the observer role. Much like harassing and interdiction artillery fire, the presence of drones also disturbs and exhausts Russian forces.  Additionally, UAVs can enhance the capacity of both human and machine teams, optimising performance and effectiveness in various operations. The ability to blend human and machine organisations has led to improved outcomes and operational efficiencies for Ukrainian forces.

Multi-Purpose Use of UAV

Overall, drones have been shown to provide lethality at range, low cost, and with economy of effort that can be used in the air, land and sea. The ability to see farther accurately, coupled with cost savings, has made UAVs indispensable for both Ukrainian defensive and offensive operations^[23]. Apart from the overwhelming use of drones in the air, the war in Ukraine unveiled successful use of the naval drones, and the infancy of the land drones for various purposes.

Naval Drones

Ukraine has effectively employed dual-use technologies, naval drones or unmanned sea vehicles (USVs), to compensate for its lack of an operational navy in its conflict with Russia. For example, the USV “Sea Baby 2024” is manoeuvrable and capable of delivering almost a ton of explosives over 1000km (see Figure 3). Its guidance system includes passive sonar identification and direction finding of underwater and surface objects using a system of hydrophones. Ultrasonic sonars (active sonar) are also included for close range detection, tracking and identification of objects by size. These USVs have been adapted and deployed in the Black Sea region, targeting strategic locations such as Sevastopol in Crimea and extending operations to Novorossiysk, demonstrating their ability to evade Russian defences and pose significant threats to Russian naval assets^[24]. By leveraging off-the-shelf and cost-effective alternatives, Ukraine has disrupted the power balance in the Black Sea, targeting advanced and expensive Russian naval fleet vessels. Reports indicate that Ukraine has used a combination of USVs and missiles to inflict substantial damage, reportedly destroying a third of Russia's Black Sea fleet^[25].

Figure 3. The new Sea Baby 2024 (Photo credit: the Security Service of Ukraine's Telegram)

In the air, Ukraine has developed a range of uncrewed drones capable of operational and strategic strikes against Russian targets, targeting oil refineries, ammunition plants and other symbolic targets^[26]. These drones have survived by avoiding air defence zones, striking deep into the Russian territory. This approach, supported by intelligence, military planning, and emerging capabilities in aerial and maritime drones, continues to evolve and enhance its effectiveness in operations against Russian targets^[27].

Land Drones 

Land drones or unmanned ground vehicles (UGV; ground robots) could be the next frontier in military innovation. In Ukraine, these vehicles have already been operating on the front lines for over a year to carry weapons and explosives, to conduct remote mining and demining, and to evacuate wounded soldiers from the battlefield. The main purpose of these UGVs has been to minimise participation of the Ukrainian forces on the battlefield, helping to preserve lives of Ukrainian soldiers. Use of UGVs is an asymmetric response to the enemy’s numerical advantage. These UGVs have performed tasks such as remotely mining positions and choke points, protecting fiercely contested areas with automatic weapons, and using anti-tank equipment against heavy vehicles, which have also been found vulnerable to UAV drones. UGV development has also focused on logistic and casualty evacuation roles. For example, a multifunctional robot Vepr (KNLR-E), codified to NATO standards, has shown positive outcomes of its use since 2023 (see Figure 4). According to the Minister of Digital Transformations of Ukraine, Ukraine starts mass production of robotic ground platforms. Ukrainian developers have showcased over 140 models of ground robotic systems, with at least 50 systems have undergone testing in operational settings, and 14 meeting NATO standards^[28].

Figure 4. Multifunctional robot Vepr (KNLR-E) (Reproduced with authority from image owner, ‘BRAVE 1’,  LinkedIn). 

Counter-Drone Defences

With the development of uncrewed systems, the measures to counter these technologies are also developing in a rapid innovation cycle. The initial strategy to counter an uncrewed aircraft (UA) involved shooting it down while airborne. However, preventing its launch by targeting its ground components can be also effective. This involves either detecting the ground stations visually or electronically and striking with artillery or drones.

A key countermeasure to prevent drones from reaching their target has been EW – a broad range of activities related to controlling the electromagnetic spectrum – in the form of jammers, spoofers, deceiving enemy communication systems, radar, and other electronic devices. Jamming is conducted by directing a high amount of energy towards the UA to mask the radio frequency control or data signals. Jammers – used by both Ukraine and Russia – sent out powerful electromagnetic signals causing the target drone to fall down, veer off course, or turn around and attack its operator^[29]. For example, in Bakhmut drone operators could not fly further than 500 metres due to Russian jamming or were leaving messages on the adversary drone operators’ screen – ‘Slava Ukraini!’ (‘Glory to Ukraine!’) before downing the drone.

Counter-uncrewed aerial systems (C-UAS) are specifically designed to detect, track, and neutralise UAVs. This can be achieved through detection systems (radar, electro-optical/infrared sensors, and acoustic sensors that identify UAVs in the airspace); jamming devices (portable or fixed); missile weapons (anti-missile systems, air to air weapons); kinetic weapons (shotguns, anti-air machine guns and cannons); directed energy weapons (high-energy lasers or microwave beams can disable UAVs by damaging their electronics or propulsion systems); nets and drone-on-drone technologies (physically intercepting or capturing UAVs)^[30].

Disrupting or neutralising any links relied on by the UAS - such as launch and recovery units, ground control stations, communications equipment, logistics, and supporting systems - can significantly hinder the UAS's operational capabilities. The proliferation of cheap, expendable (class I) drones has created an unfavourable interception curve for traditional air defence platforms. Larger drones with a distinct radar cross-section are easy, slow-moving targets for air defence interceptors and artillery, while traditional air defence has some limitations against small systems. An emerging challenge of counter-drone defence is its cost-effectiveness, where the counter drone system must be cheaper than its target. “Greater investments in EW will be a key part of any counter against the threat of drones.”^[31]

Financial Imperatives

The financial imperatives of using drones are compelling. They offer cheaper alternatives to traditional military systems, creating cost imposition strategies that can burden adversaries financially. In a long and large conflict, cost is key: the fewer resources used to destroy a target, the better. Defeating a $500 drone with a $3M missiles may be effective, but not sustainable. As quantity matters, the more drones a state can produce, the more sustainable its drone operations and the more credible its threat to stay the course^[32]. 

UAVs provide cost-effective alternatives to traditional military systems, offering significant financial benefits. They impose financial burdens on adversaries by requiring them to use expensive countermeasures against inexpensive drones. This cost imposition strategy is critical in modern warfare, where financial constraints play a significant role in the longer term. The cost-effectiveness of these systems underscores their importance in contemporary and future conflicts. Ukraine has demonstrated the effective use of innovation due to necessity, adapting to survive by leveraging new capabilities. When considering the cost of acquisition and transportability of these drone systems, it becomes clear why it is important for countries like Australia to stay abreast of emerging threats and opportunities.

Figure 5. AtlasPRO UAV (Reproduced with authority from image owner, ATLAS UAS)

UAVs enable relatively unsophisticated adversaries to significantly impact high-value assets, exemplifying their role in asymmetric warfare. Drones are cheap and easy to use, allowing adversaries to leverage limited resources to achieve disproportionate effects (see Figure 5). For example, defeating expensive military equipment such as tanks with inexpensive drones demonstrates how UAVs can create credible threats without sophisticated technology. Most Western militaries consist of a small number of very expensive assets. For example, if approximately seventy $20 million Abrams tanks in Australia can be defeated with $700 drones, it means that there is no need to be a sophisticated player to pose a credible threat. 

Rapid Innovation and Adaptation

The rapidly evolving nature of modern warfare in Ukraine necessitates an accelerated cycle of innovation, which currently ranges from a week to approximately three months. New solutions or significant modifications to existing technologies are continuously required to maintain a competitive edge over the adversary. This fast-paced environment underscores the importance of continuous improvement and quick iteration in developing military strategies and technologies. Major General Mick Ryan, in his book War Transformed, notes that: “in war, those who plan and lead the fighting must constantly seek to outthink, out-manoeuvre and to out-fight the other side. New technological innovations are introduced into service, the geography or objectives in the war are expanded or evolved, and new tactical and operational concepts are developed to exploit evolving organisational constructs and achieve evolving theories of victory”^[33]. This concept has been evident in the war in Ukraine. Ukraine innovates (FPV drones with lethal effects), Russia responds (use of ‘cope cages’). Russia acts (the use of Iranian Shahed-136 drones to attack cities and cities infrastructure), Ukraine adapts (answered this attack with the German Gepard air-defence system). 

The evolution of robotics and autonomous systems, in all domains, is a clear example of the adaptation battle. However, as Major General Ryan observes, “not all learning or adaptation in wartime results in battlefield success. This is partly because some institutions are not able to quickly or efficiently absorb new technologies – or ideas. Alternatively, some fail to anticipate the array of future threats or are unable to judge which threats are the most serious. A final cause for adaptive failure is that enemies actively seek to interfere with and degrade their opponent’s ability to learn and adapt”.

The rapid development and deployment of UAV technology requires constant adaptation, innovation and evolution in military doctrines. It is essential to learn from both sides in conflicts like Ukraine and integrate those lessons into tactics, techniques and procedures. The increasing use of uncrewed systems across different domains demands that countries stay up to date with technological advancements. This ongoing evolution impacts investments and preparedness for future conflicts. Any war will stimulate competition, and then, of course, stimulate the arms race. The moment the UAS were used, the counter-UAS systems emerged, and then the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) had to be adapted, etc. The TTPs that worked for the first six months of the war no longer work today – both the platforms used and the tactics that underline the use of those platforms. Hence, it is important to adapt to achieve missions and tasks with the resources at hand, despite the obstacles that the adversary may create, and this has to be done faster than the adversary’s capability to respond – maintain the ‘adaptation battle’^[34].

What next?

UAS will soon be everywhere: on the ground, in the air, above the water, under the water. The future possibility and the next steps of innovations can be associated with artificial intelligence-enabled drones and with the swarming drones. The future of artificial intelligence (AI) in drones is poised to affect various aspects of military and civilian operations. Although, there are debates about the current effectiveness of using AI in drones, key areas where AI promises to make a significant impact include terminal guidance, visual navigation, target detection and swarming. Using AI, drones may react autonomously to changing circumstances and communicate with each other to orchestrate a sortie. UAVs with artificial intelligence already exist and are actively used in the war in Ukraine. For example, the DJI Matrice 300 drone has built-in artificial intelligence, which helps to identify danger from a distance and focus clearly on the target.

Conclusion

Lessons learnt from Ukraine underscore the evolutionary impact of UAS technology in the modern warfare, offering new capabilities and temporary tactical advantages. Modern military forces should integrate these technologies into their doctrines and strategies to maintain a technological edge in contemporary and future conflicts. Understanding and leveraging UAS technology is essential for effective defence in an increasingly complex and technologically advanced world. 

The need for rapid adaptation and innovation is crucial, with future developments in UAS and C-UAS including AI integration, swarming drones, and advanced countermeasures such as cyber warfare and directed energy weapons. Future battles may involve not just platforms but also enemy networks, with agility and adaptability being key to success^[35]. Advanced UAS will feature AI, full autonomy, and rapid decision-making capabilities, enhancing battlefield communication and coordination. In the future, these systems may be integrated with other systems and sensors over ‘a mesh network’ that will inform decisions concerning a drone’s directions, will help locate the targets, and will inform the selection of an appropriate weapon to eliminate the threat^[36]. In response, modern military forces must incorporate the development of UAS and C-UAS technologies into their concepts of operation, doctrines, training, and personnel selection processes.

Acknowledgement

I would like to acknowledge the Australian Army Research Scheme, Department of Defence for supporting the research. In addition, I would like to extend my acknowledgement to all participants in Ukraine and Australia, advisers on this research, and reviewers who made this research possible. I would like to express my sincere appreciation to Oleksandr Volosyanskyi, (Platoon commander of unmanned aerial systems, 68^th Territorial Defence Battalion of Ukraine), Ivan Tolchinsky (CEO of ATLAS), and Brave 1 (BRAVE1 – Ukrainian Defense Tech cluster co-founded by the Ministry of Digital Transformation of Ukraine, the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, the Ministry of Strategic Industries of Ukraine, the Ministry of Economy of Ukraine) for the opportunity to share the photography in this article. 

Endnotes