One of the three pillars of the Australian Army profession is its jurisdiction,[1] a concept which defines the space in which expert military knowledge is applied. It is easy to think of this space as having only operational area or legal boundaries, but the current organisational construct adds a cultural jurisdiction where the Army’s authority to act is also tied to a discrete military identity.
The Army has become a deeply nested organisation within the Defence enterprise; the fulltime Army representing just 15% of the broader portfolio. The twin forces of public policy and private corporatisation have merged and challenged traditional understandings of what is ‘civil’ and what is ‘military’, and military identities are now represented by multiple actors.
Current Dilemmas
Recent debates around civil-military relations and the nature of the military profession highlight the ambiguity that exists within Australia’s military identity. In informal discussions with a range of Defence stakeholders in the civil-military sphere, I have sought to understand how they subconsciously categorise people, things, and acts as either ‘civil’, ‘military’ or ‘civil-military’. In doing so, I have observed that involvement by non-military groups in topics like ‘just war theory’, artificial intelligence, and the ‘military family’ make it increasingly difficult to assign these topics to just one category.
At a September 2025 conference on military identities hosted by The Military Organisation and Culture Studies Group[2], presenters noted the influence of public policy on workplace expectations around military culture and the restrictive effect this can have on military functioning. They suggested that the military needs to operate separately from the civil sector in order to optimise capability. Further, at the AARC’s ‘State of the Army Profession’ seminar in November 2025, I observed arguments both in favour of military professionals broadening their institutional knowledge in support of civil society, as well as assertions as to the operational imperative of them being able to execute military, specialist tasks well.[3]
Where is the Military Identity?
These observations reflect two contradictory influences of the civil sector on the military. First, on the civil-military spectrum there is an overlapping space (or jurisdiction) where civil-military matters thrive. This domain contains language, process and culture that the civil group understands. Further, the domain may exist in a neutral space (neither purely civil, nor military) where civil society indirectly engages with the military. Concurrently, the existence of a porous military boundary has enabled civil ways of functioning to enter the military domain to an extent where they could undermine military capability. This is the democratic dilemma of a relatively small, all-volunteer force with a large public and private support base. It seems a good problem to have, but how does the Army operate in it?
The Army has outsourced many functions to the public and private sectors. But if the Army narrows its professional identity to (for example) the expeditionary force (understood as a force only used for fighting offshore in wars of choice) it risks being marginalised in the national security picture. The rest of the Defence enterprise will be busy flying drones, operating autonomous sea vessels[4], conducting influence operations and building transport infrastructure[5] and not really thinking about the expeditionary force that it fundamentally needs to support. This non-military element of the enterprise, and the broader national support base in general, recruits people into the expeditionary force; dresses, houses and feeds them; equips and pays them; transports, repairs and secures their weapons. Increasingly, it also provides them with intelligence, mobility and communications.
Maturing the Military Figure
Cultural separation between the ADF and society no longer serves a purpose[6], and maintaining it, particularly within one arm of the service (such as Army), risks delaying the evolution of the military figure from the armed professional back to the multi-skilled citizen soldier. With a professional armed force that represents a small percentage of the population, now more than ever, Australia needs to ‘optimise human capital, technology and other resources for national security’[7]. As Army looks to Australian civil communities for ways they could be mobilised to support a fighting or defending force, it remains to be seen whether crossing into non-military cultural jurisdictions compromises the social contract in which the public agrees to forego certain individual freedoms in exchange for collective security (i.e. outsourcing use of weapons to an armed force). However, if Army acknowledges a broader national defence strategy[8] (that incorporates regional partnerships, food and infrastructure security, deterrence, and economic influence), it can mature the Australian military figure into someone who works across private and public sectors. This person has military, intelligence, survival, technical, agricultural and business skills; is more focussed on human relations than drill; and is innovative and entrepreneurial.
Army’s cultural jurisdiction lies first within the larger Defence enterprise. The authority to act lies in an integrated identity, one that is less military focussed, and more concerned with national security. If Army embraces a broader conceptualisation of the military figure, the results will benefit the workforce structure, capability and resilience of the ADF. Achieving this will, however, require some deliberate decisions on Army’s part concerning legacy values, branding and identity, and how Army wants to present itself to the nation. Such a path will require Army to answer the following questions: How far can Army move military functions into the private sector? How can the public service support the Army profession in the execution of military power? How does Army engage with communities that don’t want to work with the military? How does Army engage with groups in the population who represent ‘the enemy’? How does Army communicate military preparedness to the community? And what should a thriving political-military relationship look like in Australia?
These questions can be answered by research. Fortunately, the existence of a broader cultural jurisdiction makes it easier to work collaboratively to resolve such issues. Utilising social science research to identify the boundaries of a new mature military identity is a professional responsibility to support Army’s evolution and is a necessary element within the Australian Army’s pillar of jurisdiction.
Endnotes
[1]Stuart, Simon, The Challenges to the Australian Army Profession: Address by the Chief of Army, (AARC, 2025) https://www.army.gov.au/news-and-events/speeches-and-transcripts/2024-11-25/challenges-australian-army-profession
[2] West, Brad & Cate Carter, Seminar: Contesting Military Identities, 22 Sep 2025, (Military Organisation and Culture Studies) https://militaryculture.org/events/
[3] See for example, McCarthy…
[4] Adamowski, Jaroslaw, UK Navy fleet rebuild will prioritize unmanned systems, chief says, (Defense News, 11 Sep 2025), https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2025/09/10/uk-navy-fleet-rebuild-will-prioritize-unmanned-systems-chief-says/
[5] McDougal, Chris, Without logistics, northern defence is going nowhere, (ASPI 7 May 2025), https://www.aspi.org.au/strategist-posts/without-logistics-northern-defence-is-going-nowhere/
[6] Carter, Cate, Australian Civil-Military Relations: Who Guards the Guardians? (Lowy Interpreter 25 Nov, 2019), https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/australian-civil-military-relations-who-guards-guardians
[7] Amstrong, Mark, Historical Legacy to National Asset: The Australian Army Reserve in the 21st Century (2024), 241
[8] Minister of Defence, 2024 National Defence Strategy - Media Release, (Department of Defence 2024) https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/media-releases/2024-04-17/2024-national-defence-strategy2024
