‘Team learning’ refers to a set of shared understandings, practices and processes that occur within a team as a collective and, fundamentally, can provide solutions to difficult operational problems. For example, when LTCOL (retired) Bruce Cameron was asked what his most important leadership lesson was, he answered: [N]ot to be predictable. Four tank squadrons were deployed to Vietnam between 1968 and 1971. Each of them trained using exactly the same tactical drills (contact, defile and mine). By the time …

Introduction Project Land 400 Phase 3 aims to introduce into service an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV). This will replace Army’s aged armoured personnel carrier (APC) capability, which has been in service since 1965. The IFV acquisition provides Army’s infantry with enhanced firepower, mobility and protection to enable them to fight, win and survive close combat in the contemporary threat environment. However, discourse on the acquisition has often suffered from a poor and incomplete understanding of the …

The Australian Army’s understanding and employment of both surprise and deception are poor. This is despite both concepts being used extensively and to devastating effect in contemporary conflicts. It is telling that the effective use of surprise and deception almost invariably occurs when playing the enemy as the opposing force during major exercises, when the aversion to risk and imprisonment by doctrine is temporarily suspended. This deficiency is due in no small part to the lack of education and …

Introduction Understanding defeat is vital to understanding the Australian Army approach to warfare. Land Warfare Doctrine 1 states that the Army denies and defeats threats to Australia and its interests. [1] While the 2020 Defence Strategic Update modified the terminology somewhat, [2] to defeat an enemy is still central to the Army’s purpose. Yet, despite its importance, doctrine is strangely quiet on exactly what defeat is, and how it relates to other warfighting concepts.  For example, doctrine exhorts …

Introduction Change is a constant in war. But the chaos of constant change can be minimised by the act of planning. Doctrine advises that, to be effective, planning must facilitate movement through the adaptation cycle more quickly than the enemy. [1] This proposition is often mistaken for implying that success in war demands only quick adaptation. This conclusion is a misconception that tends to unnecessarily constrain military thinking. Success in war is dependent on the achievement of superior …

If a military force and its leaders have failed to prepare themselves and their forces with honesty, imagination, and a willingness to challenge fundamental concepts, then they will pay a dark price in the blood of their sailors, soldiers, marines, and airmen. Williamson Murray, ‘US Naval Strategy and Japan’ [1] [W]hat people think cannot be separated from the question of how they think. Azar Gat, A History of Military Thought [2] Introduction Australia’s geopolitical circumstances are changing. [3] The …

[I]n Burma our Armies are advancing on the wings of the Allied Air Forces. [1] Introduction The campaign in Burma during the Second World War provides an excellent case study of the vital importance of air power to the eventual defeat of a determined adversary. The quote above from Air Chief Marshal Keith Park highlights the interdependence of the land and air forces in Burma. Some have argued that this interdependence was the closest integration between the services achieved in any theatre of war. [2] Air …

The traditional security benefits conferred by Australia’s geography have been considerably reduced by the development of a Chinese long-range strike system capable of threatening Australian cities. [1] The myriad technologies that constitute this system can be applied across all domains and usually in combination. An understanding of these potential threats spurred assessments in the 2020 Defence Strategic Update and Force Structure Plan (FSP20) which signalled the requirement for greater Australian …

*This article was originally published inVolume 12 of the AAJ in May, 1950113 In time of peace no nation, with the possible exception of Russia, can afford to maintain at full strength the armed services required for the conduct of a war of the first magnitude. The most that can be done is to maintain an organization which does not impose an unsupportable strain on the national economy and which, at the same time can be expanded rapidly when war becomes imminent. So far as the Army is concerned the …

NB: This article originally appeared on The Forge on 29 January 2021. It is reprinted here with the author’s permission. Slowly and progressively over the last decade, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) has become less religious. Although religion, particularly Christianity, is a part of many military customs and traditions and was once a routine part of ship and barracks life, the connection that Defence members have to any faith has decreased to a level where the majority of officers, sailors, soldiers …