Book Review: Vietnam Vanguard: The 5th Battalion’s Approach to Counter-Insurgency, 1966
Vietnam Vanguard: The 5th Battalion’s Approach to Counter-Insurgency, 1966
Edited by: Ron Boxall and Robert O’Neill
Australian National University Press, 2020,
ISBN 9781760463328, 430pp
Reviewed by: Major Andrew Maher
Vietnam Vanguard is an important work in the documentation of experience, lessons and perspectives from Australia’s experience in the Vietnam War. The book uses a collection of personal narratives, woven together by the editors to provide insight into life in an infantry battalion on operations. Its anecdotes seem timeless, with a hint of the larrikin behaviour for which Australian Diggers are renowned. This gives a sense of comfort, like an old worn horse-blanket, similar to the style of many war novels of this time. For some, this might be positive, reflecting old memories of their own service or experiences. For me, I had hoped for more.
Despite the title, the first two chapters offer little discussion about insurgency and counterinsurgency theory. A ‘theory of victory’ in 5 RAR’s approach is therefore absent from the initial discussion, in particular an explanation of the mechanism of Giap’s vision of ‘People’s War’ and how ordinary peasants were intimidated, coerced or cajoled into supporting the insurgents. Examination of the adversary’s strategy, evidenced through events, is instead annexed. The resultant understanding of 5 RAR’s ‘counter-insurgency’ approach of wresting control of the population from the communists is therefore limited.
Oddly, an article written by the Commanding Officer of 5 RAR, Lieutenant Colonel John Warr, is also annexed and receives almost no reference from within the narrative. This article, published by the Australian Army Journal in November 1967, is excellent in introducing the counterinsurgency approach undertaken by 5 RAR and the lessons learnt through the process. Indeed, the promulgation of such lessons is recognised in Warr’s Distinguished Service Order citation. That this is the final aspect with which the reader engages is most disorientating given the stated purpose of the book.
Vietnam Vanguard might have been far better organised by leading with Warr’s own words about his guidance based upon his understanding of the enemy. If this were followed by the annexed explanation of the Viet Cong’s history of operations prior to the arrival of 5 RAR, the reader would be very well orientated to what comes next. This approach places the tactical vignettes in the appropriate context. Therefore, to those interested in reading this book, I recommend such an approach.
The book only superficially discusses how Australia’s partners in the province pursued their assigned roles, and thus the full picture of the counterinsurgency strategy applied in Phuoc Tuy remains opaque. Indeed, it is not until well into the book that discussion of adviser roles emerges— again, despite the emphasis placed in Warr’s article on the necessity of such presence to prevent Viet Cong control over the population. That these advisers were thrown into unenviable situations by the necessity of operations illuminates further concerns about just how effective unity of effort was through the integration of counterinsurgency forces at the provincial level.
The focus of the book is clearly the aggressive employment of light infantry patrols to hunt insurgents—a focus that is somewhat disquieting in what I expected to be an examination of ‘the 5th Battalion’s approach to counter-insurgency’. Vietnam Vanguard thus prompts the reader to the conclusion that the ‘lessons re-learnt’ conducting counterinsurgency in Afghanistan were in fact ‘lessons not completely learned’ by the Australian Army. In this sense, this book serves as a highly useful addition to the literature, challenging a myth of Australian expertise and informing the debate regarding how Australian counterinsurgency doctrine developed, was applied and evolved—albeit that such a conclusion is an indirect one.
An alternative title for this book, and a useful contribution to understanding the contemporary challenges faced by the Australian Army, would have been ‘Vietnam’s Vanguard: The 5th Battalion’s Challenges in Mobilising for an Ambiguous War’. I say this as the book illuminates the severe equipment and manning challenges created by Defence policies over the post-Second World War period prior to the decision to increase the military commitment to Vietnam. Operations officer Max Carroll notes that ‘several hundred reinforcements’ marched into the unit in January and early February 1966, with the advance party deploying from 20 April 1966. With this single sentence, the scale of the mobilisation challenge—from administration to individual training, to collective training for battalion-level operations—faced by 5 RAR is made evident. This theme is then reinforced by the hundreds of anecdotes from all ranks woven throughout the book.
A further interesting lesson from the book pertaining to mobilisation is that of illuminating the development of officers and NCOs for war. Warr was initially posted into 5 RAR in May 1965 as a Major, having completed staff college, in the Executive Officer role. In January 1966, he was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel and assumed command. Two of 5 RAR’s Majors had completed staff college, one of whom, Max Carroll, was the Officer Commanding Support Company, and therefore he assumed the Deputy Commander role. This pattern of subordinates organisationally being prepared to assume the role of their commander is a common but unstated theme throughout the book.
In Vietnam Vanguard, the editor’s approach is admirable. By spanning broadly and deeply across ranks and trades, the book provides a kaleidoscope of perspectives. This approach illuminates the way in which the complexity of war manifests in a personal way for the individuals involved. This compilation therefore differs from many other books on the Vietnam war, by being more than a top-down reflection of command and strategy, and a bottom-up reflection of trial and trauma. In sum, Vietnam Vanguard commendably presents a holistic reflection of the history of the 5th Battalion’s operations in Phuoc Tuy in 1966.
