The Rapid Advance of Uncrewed Aerial System Technology and Operating Concepts in the Russia-Ukraine Conflict

In February 2022, Russian forces streamed into Ukraine under what Russian President Vladimir Putin called a ‘special military operation’ to achieve objectives including ‘denazification, demilitarisation and its neutral status’. The early weeks of the conflict found Russia struggling to achieve its objectives despite many military experts’ predictions that Ukraine would fall quickly. Over two years later, the conflict continues, and uncrewed aerial systems (UAS) have made significant contributions to the militaries of both Ukraine and Russia. There is much to be learned from how UAS have been employed by both nations and the rapid innovation around UAS and counter-UAS operations that has occurred. 

The opening weeks of the conflict featured the amazing success of Ukraine’s tank killing TB2 UAS, a Turkish built medium-altitude long-endurance system. The TB2 was sent behind Russian lines to successfully attack a range of targets including tanks, artillery, ships, logistical trains, rocket launchers and even air defence systems. After seeing videos of TB2 attacks on social media, several defence analysts even ventured to claim that this class of UAS would make armoured vehicles obsolete on future battlefields. 

Unfortunately for Ukraine, Russia adapted and nullified the TB2 relatively quickly. The shootdown of a TB2 in March 2022 along with Russian exploitation of its wreckage led to a better understanding of its capabilities and vulnerabilities. The TB2 is a relatively slow and easy target to engage, like the MQ-1 Predator. However, once Russia fully understood its electromagnetic signatures and communications systems, the TB2 became easy to detect, jam and engage. 

The result has been a nearly complete disappearance of the TB2 from the battlefield. Colonel Valiukh, from Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate, made the following observations at a conference in October 2023, ‘For the TB2, I don’t want to use the word useless, but it is hard to find situations where to use them’. Valiukh further remarked that the last TB2 mission he observed had lasted a mere 30 minutes before the $10 million aircraft was shot down. To continue their early successes from the air, Ukraine’s military needed to evolve its operations and find other ways to employ UAS. 

Ukraine opted to focus initially on leveraging commercial capabilities (such as Chinese built commercial quadcopter drones from DJI and Autel) that could be bought off-the-shelf and employed for military purposes with relatively few modifications. These small UAS are relatively easy to operate, and thousands of Ukrainian pilots have been trained to fly these systems. One of the preferred options has been DJI’s Mavic series, which costs under $7K when fully equipped. 

The Mavic 3 Pro can travel up to 75 kilometres per hour, has a 43-minute flight endurance and can transmit video from 15 kilometres away in an uncontested environment. It is a system originally built for hobbyists or commercial users, yet it is an ideal tool for military surveillance and reconnaissance. A simple modification allows a Mavic to drop a small explosive from altitude. Such explosives are being built in homegrown factories across Ukraine along with wing kits from 3-D printers that improve their accuracy. 

Another novel use of hobbyist technology by Ukrainian forces involves the use of first-person video (FPV) drones built for racing. Flying these drones takes skill, because they can fly up to 250 kilometres per hour and are piloted with virtual reality goggles. Their speed has proven helpful in overcoming kinetic attacks and end-game jamming. Current FPV drones can precisely carry a payload of one kilogram to ranges approaching seven kilometres. The FPV drone threat is small, quick and has been especially deadly when used like a cruise missile against Russian land forces. 

Ukraine’s ‘Army of Drones’ has been extremely successful, as evidenced by October 2023 claims that UAS damaged or destroyed over 220 pieces of military equipment in a single week of operations. Because of their success, countering UAS has been a major focus for Russia. Electronic warfare has always been a strength of the Russian military and plays a critical role in their counter-UAS operations. A May 2023 report from the Royal United Services Institute indicated that Russia placed a major electronic warfare system every 10 km along the frontline, with UAS defeat operations given high priority. The result was a loss rate of 10,000 Ukrainian UAS in a month. Russia has also used electronic warfare (EW) techniques to locate control stations for certain UAS, putting UAS pilots at risk of direct attack. 

In response to Russia’s actions, Ukraine built a sizeable indigenous drone adaptation and production capability. Such measures help mitigate Chinese export controls implemented in September 2023 on UAS-systems or parts bound to Ukraine. Changes made to commercial drones include modifications to radios and electronics that make them more difficult to jam or detect. However, Russian EW systems have been relatively quick to update libraries and adapt to these changes. Even more impressive is the large number of artisanal drone factories that have popped up around the Ukraine. While most electronic systems needed for UAS are imported, many aircraft bodies and parts are manufactured in Ukraine. This allows the nation to better customise systems based on the evolving threat and mission needs. 

This post summarises just a subset of much broader lessons learned around UAS and counter-UAS technology and operations that can be gathered from the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The conflict has proven to be an effective innovation accelerator for both technology and military employment around UAS. Based on lessons from this conflict and other recent employment of uncrewed aircraft, it is clear that the small UAS threat which emerged rapidly over the past decade is a significant and new challenge for military forces that shows no signs of abating. In the Ukraine and beyond, military forces unprepared for this threat have found themselves in combat without air superiority and under threat of attack at times and places of the adversary’s choosing. The Australian Army, and the Australian Defence Force more broadly, need to immediately equip and prepare to face UAS threats across the spectrum of conflict. 

Note: For a more detailed analysis of this topic by Dr Carl Rhodes, please see the newly released Occasional Paper No. 24.