Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017, ISBN: 978-1-316-62369-5, 344 pp
Written By: Brian N Hall
Reviewed By: Chris Roberts
The thrust of Communications and British Operations on the Western Front, 1914-1918 is that communication systems are at the heart of command and control, and those employed by the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) at each stage of the war had a profound effect on the ability of British commanders to control operations. In addressing this matter, Brian N. Hall seeks to address four issues. First, how flexible was the British command and control system, and to what extent did the British exhibited adaptability? Second, how successful were British commanders in recognising new communications technology, and was it exploited to its full military potential? Third, were there efforts to develop a communications doctrine, and if so, was it proven successful? Fourth, what was the nature of the learning experience within the BEF? Hall succeeds in answering these questions in a deeply researched empirical study, that draws heavily on archival material, and that takes the reader through all of the principal British operations on the Western Front from a communications perspective. In doing so, Hall throws new light on the reasons why many offensive operations during the static trench warfare phase of the war failed to achieve their ultimate objective.
What emerges from this study were the enormous challenges facing the BEF in providing communications in an unprecedented environment. As late as the Franco-Prussian War (1870-71) and the South African War (1899-1902), battlefield commanders had visual oversight of the action they were controlling. This was no longer the case by 1914. The increase in the range and lethality of small arms and artillery, combined with the expansion in the size of armies, made visual oversight of the battlefield impossible. Moreover, the technological advances in communication systems had not kept up with the need to transmit timely information over the ever-growing battlefields. By today’s standards, the means of communication available were rudimentary. In 1914 wireless was in its infancy; it was both bulky and unreliable. The only means of speedy battlefield communications were telegraph and telephone which relied on cables which were prone to being cut by shellfire and ground traffic. Alternative options (involving the use of heliograph, lamp, or flag signaling) depended on clear weather and line of sight. Other means were the use of runners and despatch riders; not only were they slower but they could be killed or wounded while carrying messages. These limitations had a significant effect on commanders’ capacity to influence operations in the chaos of battle. How the BEF sought to improve the flow of reliable information from the battlefield – and the impact this had on command and control – is the book’s primary focus. Importantly, it offers several lessons that are as applicable today as they were a century ago.
Hall begins his investigation by describing the development of the Signal Service, a branch of the Royal Engineers, from its meagre beginnings in 1870 to the end of the Great War, through the lenses of ‘Organization’, ‘Personnel, Recruitment and Training’ and ‘Means of Communication’. These chapters detail the fundamentals of the British Army’s communications capability pre-war, and its considerable development in staffing, field employment, new technology, and the various means of communication employed over the four years of war. Initially, personnel and organisational problems arose after the commencement of hostilities. With a Signal Service of 2,400 men in 1914, the rapid expansion of the British Army, the growing frontage the BEF occupied in France, and the number of casualties suffered at the Front, created severe shortages in trained telegraphists, telephonists, engineers, and linesmen. The solution was to absorb trained General Post Office (GPO) specialists directly into the Signal Service. Together with the adoption of GPO practices and training methods, this approach greatly assisted the Service to meet the growing needs of the BEF. With a high level of outsourcing in the Australian Army, there may be lessons here, including the extent to which civilian suppliers are currently integrated into our logistics and communication systems to effectively support high intensity operations and a significant expansion of Army.
In Hall’s view, the creation in mid-1916 of Deputy Directors of Army Signals (DD Signals) at each of the army headquarters was a key turning pointing in improving the coordination and control of the Signals Service’s activities in the field. This initiative was followed by the establishment of Assistant Directors of Signals (AD Signals) at the corps headquarters. in November 1916. Prior to the creation of these positions, the officers commanding Army and Corps Headquarters Signal Companies were double-hatted with their responsibilities. On the one hand they commanded their companies, and provided the cable and despatch rider communications means within their own headquarters, and to the next level of subordinate headquarters. On the other hand they were responsible for the coordination and control of all communication services and developing means to improve the passage of information across the Army or Corps area of operations. These new appointments and their staffs delivered more effective efforts in addressing the communications challenges facing the BEF. Perhaps there is a lesson here in the modern age where efforts to achieve organisational efficiencies generally involve reducing staff numbers, and giving the remainder a broader workload.
Turning his attention to the provision of communications in the battle zone, and the extent to which they enabled commanders to control the battle, Hall addresses the issue chronologically, devoting a chapter to each year of the war. It is here that he investigates the four questions posed earlier. To do so, he discusses the planning, preparation and employment of the various communication systems used during the major British engagements that occurred in both mobile and trench warfare, and their subsequent performance during the ensuing fighting.
After the Western Front became static, communications in the rear areas were reliable, but those in the battle zone were plagued with problems This was primarily due to the effect of German shelling, which was the principal disrupter of communications, and the limitations of the available means of passing information from the front to the rear. As previously mentioned, the fastest and most reliable means in normal circumstances was by cable telephone, and it was used extensively through all levels of command. However, cables were highly susceptible to being cut. To counter this, the British quickly resorted to burying the cables six feet deep or more, and building in redundancy by various means, including laying it in grid patterns connecting adjoining formations and units to create alternate paths. This measure largely fixed the problem up to the front line but it required an enormous effort in labour. Furthermore, preparations to do so prior to major offensive operations inevitably compromised surprise. This was despite efforts to generate camouflage against German aerial reconnaissance. It was a different matter forward of the front line during offensive operations. Here, cables laid on the surface of the ground were regularly broken during the crucial first days of the attack, resulting in the same problems experienced in mobile warfare - information as to what was occurring was often out of date or not received at all, making it extremely difficult for commanders to have any control over the battle. Timely information was essential to provide commanders at higher levels some control over the events facing them, and to enable them to commit their reserves at the right time and where they were required. Thus the issue confronting the British was how to facilitate the rapid passage of timely information from the units fighting at the front to the rear echelon? Hall provides a comprehensive account of how the BEF sought to overcome this problem.
Drawing on an extensive array of primary sources, letters, memoirs and unit histories, he discusses the communication means employed in each of the major campaigns. All suffered from equipment limitations and human error, while at critical times some broke down under the sheer weight of messages being passed. Through the analysis of previous experience, adaptation, and the arrival of improved technologies, the passage of information improved as the war progressed. It transpired that the greatest success occurred with careful planning in ‘bite and hold’ or limited objective battles. Conversely, considerable difficulties were encountered during hastily planned attacks and mobile operations. Hall argues that the BEF’s communications systems constituted the organic material that helped solidify the British combined arms tactics as a unified scheme. This was especially so when the Signal Service assumed responsibility for artillery communications in late 1916. Combined with the use of various means to facilitate ground to air communication, and the availability of new wireless sets in aircraft and tanks, the BEF was able to considerably improve its capacity for timely inter-arms communications. Difficulties were still being encountered in the last months of the war, but, by the standards of the time, in 1918 the BEF had an extensive communications capability that enabled commanders to maintain the tempo of operations during the ‘Hundred Days’ advance to victory.
Overall Communications and British Operations on the Western Front, 1914-1918 is a story of a learning organisation. The BEF was an army that quickly adapted and innovated to improve its battlefield communications, building duplication and redundancy into its systems using a wide array of means. These ranged from improved technologies to the most rudimentary means. The latter included prearranged codes using flares, carrier pigeons, signaling lamps, metal discs carried by the infantry, and laying out rifles and cloth panels in specified patterns to enable aircraft to determine the advancing infantry’s location. Other methods involved rockets to carry messages to the rear, designated contact aircraft supported by pre-arranged signals between them and the infantry, observation balloons, runners and relay posts, dogs, despatch riders, the extensive use of liaison officers, together with a range of new electronic devices. As wireless sets gradually improved, they were pushed into the battle zone and used more frequently, although, as Hall relates, they still had significant problems which limited their use. Systems for improving the collection and distribution of information were introduced, such as collection points, central report centres, and dropping zones next to divisional and corps headquarters for messages tossed from aircraft. The publication in March 1917 of SS. 148. Forward Inter-Communications in Battle, which was updated in November as SS. 191. Intercommunications in the Field, ‘codified a universal set of communication principles, aimed at improving signals training and communications in battle [and] helped promote a mutual understanding between the Signal Service and the rest of the BEF.’ In addressing the questions he poses in his introduction, Hall answers all four in the affirmative and discusses his rationale in some detail in the book’s conclusion.
This is a scholarly study that will appeal more to the academic history community and specialists than the general reader. It also offers significant insights and lessons for the military professional. Probably, the most important lessons are the need for redundancy and alternative means built into every operational communications systems, the importance of careful communications planning to support operations, and the requirement for effective means to collect and distribute operational information quickly. This study also highlights that commanders ought not to rely solely on the current technologies - that older means are sometimes the most effective in delivering information to commanders. This is something the 2nd BEF confronted in France in May 1940. In a digital age, where we have become accustomed to receiving ‘real time’ information, we may still need other means for passing information, such as despatch riders and drones delivering hard copy messages when the electronic means are disrupted by enemy interference. In undertaking operations, targeting the enemy’s communication systems and nodes should be a major component of the battle plan. More generally, for the military historian, this is an important study that helps explain operational failures and successes on the Western Front, and which drives yet another nail into the coffin of the ‘Lions led by Donkeys’ school of thought.
