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In contemporary military doctrine, the operational commander’s intent conveys the end-state, or the desired result, of an overall campaign. This focus is derived from the German Army’s concept of Auftragstaktik (mission-based tactics or, as it is currently termed in Australian Army doctrine, ‘mission command’). In 1940, General Heinz Guderian stated the purpose of the concept with characteristic precision: ‘Good-looking operation orders are immaterial. What counts are clearly stated intentions which can be …

‘La Garde recule! ’ The unbelievable news spread like wildfire through the ranks of the French army... [which] stood momentarily aghast. Sensing his opportunity, Wellington waved his hat, and 40 000 Allied troops, led by Vivian and Vandeleur, swept forward from Mont-St-Jean with a mighty cheer and flung themselves against the dazed ranks of the spellbound Armée du Nord . A moment later, the cohesion of the French army snapped, and with cries of ‘ Sauvé qui peut ’ and ‘ Trahison! ’ unit after unit dissolved …

* This article is based largely on extracts from the author’s book entitled Signals: Swift and Sure—A History of the Royal Australian Corps of Signals 1947–1972, Royal Australian Corps of Signals Committee, Melbourne, 1999. With the Australian Defence Force’s (ADF) heightened operational tempo over recent years, analysis has been focused on the role of traditional combat arms and combat support elements during military deployments. Soldiers have given comparatively little thought to one of the most …

* The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and not those of the British Ministry of Defence or of any other institution. An early version of this paper was first given to the Oxford University Strategic Studies Group at All Souls College, Oxford in November 2002. Until recently, discussions of the relationship between the media, strategy and military culture appeared only briefly, or by inference, in mainstream Western military thought. The neglect of this relationship is remarkable …

The great failing in the US war effort since September 2001 has been the reluctance to comprehend the enemy that America confronts. As long as the anodyne, euphemistic and inaccurate term ‘the war on terror’ remains the official nomenclature, the struggle will not be won. The genesis of the term war on terror goes back to 11 September 2001 when, twelve hours after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, President George W. Bush addressed the American nation and launched a war against …

The al-Qa’ida terrorist attacks on the United States of 11 September 2001 acted as a catalyst in revealing the new dynamics of a global security environment in which radical Islamism has emerged as a violent and dangerous opponent to liberal democracy. These attacks were symptomatic of how, in the latter half of the 20th century a cycle of Islamic radicalism had swept through the Middle East, fuelled by the works of powerful ideologues. One of the most influential of these Islamist ideologues was the …

Among the most significant factors in conducting coalition operations are the national legal considerations that govern the deployment of military forces and the way in which they are employed. Legal factors have a bearing on everything in alliance and coalition operations—from determining basic ‘troop-to-task’ considerations to decisions regarding the targets to be engaged—and the types of ordinance that may be used. It is often believed that, in the heat of battle or in the pressure cooker of operations, …

Since President Suharto’s fall from power in May 1998, the Indonesian armed forces have continued their participation in politics. However, while the military has remained a strong political force for much of the post-Suharto era, a program of reform is now under way in Indonesia that may see the armed forces withdraw entirely from the political process. The central issues in Indonesian civil-military relations can be clearly understood by analysis of the careers of former Generals Wiranto and Yudhoyono, …

‘The era of the strategic corporal is here. The soldier of today must possess professional mastery of warfare, but match this with political and media sensitivity’. - Lieutenant General Peter Leahy, Chief of Army, 18 October 2002 In most modern Western armies, soldiers are expected to be not only technically proficient in warfighting, but also capable of supervising civil affairs, providing humanitarian aid and performing a range of activities relating to order and stability. As networked technologies …

* This article is based on an edited transcript of a presentation delivered by the author to the Australian Chief of Army’s Exercise in Canberra in October 2004. The next six years are likely to be extremely difficult for the US Army both operationally and on the organisational front. This article will concentrate on the organisational changes that the Army is attempting to make in order to meet its many operational commitments. It is important to understand the challenges of the environment that the US …