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Hard is not hopeless. - General David Petraeus, testimony to Congress, September 2007 The stunning security improvements in Al Anbar province during 2007 fundamentally changed the military and political landscape of Iraq. Many, both in and outside the military (and as late as November 2006), had assessed the situation in Anbar as a lost cause. The “Anbar Awakening” of Sunni tribal leaders and their supporters that began in September 2006 near Ramadi seemed to come out of nowhere. But the change that led to …

The Army has learned a great deal in Iraq and Afghanistan about the conduct of counterinsurgency operations, and we must continue to learn all that we can from our experiences in those countries. The insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan were not, in truth, the wars for which we were best prepared in 2001; however, they are the wars we are fighting and they clearly are the kind of wars we must master. America’s overwhelming conventional military superiority makes it unlikely that future enemies will …

These problems (of guerrilla warfare) are of a very long standing, yet manifestly far from understood—especially in those countries where everything that can be called ‘guerrilla warfare’ has become a new military fashion or craze. - B H Liddell Hart 1 Introduction Liddell Hart’s words seem as relevant today as when first published in his book Strategy . Since the terrorist attacks on the United States of 11 September 2001 and the subsequent invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, a tsunami of ideas about the …

From the 1960s to the 1980s stopping Communist-backed insurgents was an important part of American strategy, so counterinsurgency was an important mission for the US military, particularly the Army. Even when most of the Army turned its attention to large-scale warfighting and the operational art following Vietnam, special operation forces preserved some degree of capability. In the 1980s American involvement in El Salvador and a spate of insurgencies around the world linked to the Soviets and Chinese …

These reflections are based on a limited experience in Vietnam and in many cases may be old stuff to more experienced soldiers. In order to succeed in this type of war all soldiers must be: (a)   Physically fit . This in my opinion is the most vital part of training as the terrain and climate are severe enough without the Viet-Cong (VC) opposition. The present standard of physical fitness in the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) is low; as a result exhausted soldiers quickly fall prey to the VC. (b)   …

George Packer, The Assassins’ Gate: America in Iraq , Faber and Faber, London, 2006, 467 pp. Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq , Penguin Books, Camberwell, 2006, 482 pp. Bob Woodward, State of Denial: Bush at War, Part III , Simon & Schuster, New York, 2006, 560 pp. In the aftermath of President George W. Bush’s now evidently premature ‘mission accomplished’ speech from the deck of the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln on 1 May 2003, journalists, historians and military …

Abstract As the last veterans of Australia’s involvement in the First World War pass away, this article outlines the history and evolution of Australia’s first and finest Army formation, the 1st Division. From the generals to the privates, from Australia, Egypt, Gallipoli and France, the long-term impact of these soldiers and leaders on both Australian military and civil institutions has been profound. Indeed, their actions and sacrifices are imprinted on the national psyche, although, as the author …

Abstract This article is based on the author’s oration on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the Australian Defence Force Academy. He examines the history of the Academy and compares it to the early years of the Royal Military College Duntroon. He then suggests ways to enhance ADFA’s reputation and utility to the wider community. To Lead, To Excel: this motto guards the entrance to the Australian Defence Force Academy 1 (ADFA) which, in 2006, marked twenty years since the first graduates were …

Abstract The author examines the claims about the importance of the emerging generation as they enter the workforce, Generation Y. The Australian Army, he states, need not adapt itself to the ‘unique’ characteristics of Generation Y—they are like any other group of young people, not the ‘generational shift’ that popular opinion presents. He finds more assertion and hyperbole than evidence and fact in many of the claims by and about Generation Y. Introduction The movement of what has been dubbed Generation …

Abstract Operations in urban environments are a persistent feature of military affairs. As Western technology has outstripped our adversaries, they have adapted to use this most complex terrain, limiting the utility of Western firepower and destructive force. This article examines several aspects of this dilemma from the perspective of New Zealand’s Army and suggests avenues of further development. Introduction The future of warfare is likely to become increasingly complex. Adversaries will employ …