Some Reflections on the War in Vietnam

These reflections are based on a limited experience in Vietnam and in many cases may be old stuff to more experienced soldiers. In order to succeed in this type of war all soldiers must be:

(a)  Physically fit. This in my opinion is the most vital part of training as the terrain and climate are severe enough without the Viet-Cong (VC) opposition. The present standard of physical fitness in the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) is low; as a result exhausted soldiers quickly fall prey to the VC.

(b)  Able to shoot well. Soldiers must be able to hit the target with a quick reaction shot. Well-aimed shots over distances exceeding 100 metres will seldom be needed.

(c)  Well led. The junior leaders must be capable of leading small units for varying lengths of time. At present an operation below company level is rare; the normal operation is of battalion size.

In this war the holding of large numbers of troops in reserve has been proved useless as such reserves cannot be brought into action quickly enough to be effective. Therefore reserves should be held at the lowest level where they can be brought immediately into action. Reserves above the regimental level will seldom, if ever, be employed.

Limited vision makes operations similar to moving by night. Thus the great emphasis in training should be on night operations. Limited visibility also greatly restricts the range and type of weapons which can be employed.

The infantry battalion, with air supply every seven days, can operate for up to 30 days without the use of vehicles. Battalion headquarters is usually kept small and normally works efficiently with members carrying all they need on their backs.

It is unsound to despatch ARVN units into unknown areas and expect immediate results because the VC knows the area in the finest detail. Therefore, when ARVN troops move into an area they should spend days—weeks if necessary—learning the area of operations in detail, as this will help overcome the VC’s big advantage. The VC’s knowledge of the country is comparable to one’s knowledge of one’s own home town. If we were to fight an enemy at home the advantage, naturally, would lie with us.

It is wrong to believe that because the VC is believed to have a battalion capability in a particular area that we too must operate as a battalion. The VC needs time to organize its workers into a battalion and this involves loss of security. It is unlikely therefore that at the most more than platoon groups (normally section and less) would be encountered in an area with a VC battalion capability. This of course would be untrue when hard-core battalions are operating in an area.

Battalions must set up Intelligence networks from within their own resources. This can often be achieved by using soldiers enlisted from the area in which operations are being conducted. The conversion and use of VC prisoners is also most effective.

The following technique for searching a village appeared to produce the best results: on moving into a village where the possibility of booby traps was high, the senior members of each household were ordered to stand before their houses. The battalion commander then explained that the discovery of any booby traps in a house would result in a new senior member of the household.

This produced the desired effect, and in five cases the head of the house had pointed out traps left behind by VC which might have led to loss of life. The battalion commander explained that this procedure had been adopted after routine kindness had led to casualties among his troops. The fear of reprisals was well understood by the villagers and brought results.

The staff, in laying down precise times for a unit to arrive at a certain feature, leaves the battalion commander no scope for flexibility or initiative. As a result, during its moves, the battalion fixes terrain features as objectives without worrying about the VC in between. Battalion and company commanders must be allowed a higher degree of flexibility in this type of warfare.

One method employed to obtain advance warning of ambushes was to have a con-verted VC (dressed as a VC) move ahead of the ARVN column. This has resulted in the VC calling out to the convert scout or, at worst, firing, which of course provides the required warning.

The placing of flank protection on the ground in some areas is impossible. Heliborne reserve forces are used to overcome this, and fire support of guns is also effective.

The VC tend to move according to the seasons. During the wet the VC will live on the high ground, as food and water are plentiful. In the dry season food and water shortages force the VC to move down to the streams. This in turn dictates the areas of operations.

The unorganized destruction of crops and villages has achieved little; in fact it has gained VC sympathy. If crops are to be destroyed they must be completely destroyed to a plan laid down by higher headquarters. Food is so abundant in most areas along the Laos border that partial destruction achieves nothing.

The standard of navigation throughout the ARVN is poor and the constant use of smoke and aircraft—twice daily or when called for—to pinpoint positions is obviously of great value to the VC as a means of keeping ARVN movement under surveillance. A map is never seen below platoon level, so the emphasis on navigation must be placed on those who need it. It is time-wasting to train and teach navigation to private soldiers. Concentrated effort should be applied to officers and NCOs.

The ARVN army, for some unknown reason, has adopted the steel helmet for patrolling. This is a useless piece of equipment, of value only as a means of carrying spare water. It is suggested that spare water-bottles be issued and helmets be left in outposts as mortar fire is seldom encountered by patrols. The climate and terrain make water vital to the soldier; to keep fighting fit he must carry two water-bottles. In addition, section waterbottles would be an advantage. At present units camp on streams regardless of the tactical situation.

All arms and services must be able to protect themselves; this involves service troops providing patrols to clear areas round their depots. Great emphasis is placed on the training of all the arms and services in self-protection. The footwear at present in use in the ARVN is most unsuitable for patrolling in the wet season. After about eighteen days on patrol in wet conditions the soldiers suffer from a type of trench foot and many have had to have toes amputated. It is most important in this country that boots have drain holes to let water escape. Australian boots on user trial lacked such holes. In addition junior leaders must be taught to watch and treat any foot problems in their units.

The ARVN places little importance on the loss of ammunition, either in training or on operations. Ammunition is left lying on training centre ranges; on operations clips are hooked all over web equipment, which results in vines knocking the clips onto the ground.

It is a constant battle to persuade battalions to pass back Intelligence information. This of course means that maps are seldom up to date even though each unit has its own Intelligence section which could revise them.

At present the ARVN lacks good leadership, due to the selection of potential leaders on a system similar to that of the French. A man must first of all be politically loyal; second, he must have an education far above the level required in a junior officer. Little account is taken of his ability to lead a platoon in battle. National conscription should allow officers to be selected from soldiers who have proved themselves in combat, and the system of sending civilians direct to Officer training should be limited to a few special cases only.

Few ARVN units are able to operate by night, and the laying of night ambushes is only half-heartedly carried out. Until the ARVN can operate at night as efficiently as the VC there is small hope of winning the war. Training should emphasize night operations. Training centres do in fact carry out limited night training, but presentation is poor as instructors regard it only as an added burden.

The policy of handing out sweets and other gifts upon moving into an area should cease. This creates the wrong impression on the locals; before long they expect continually to receive without giving anything in return. Gifts should be given only to those deserving of reward and senior officers should bear this in mind when visiting an area in which a battalion adviser has probably spent months creating a policy.

In keeping with all other so-called experts on this war, one has to come up with a solution on how to win it. The solution must be simple as it has to be implemented by simple soldiers at the battalion level. Here is mine: when a battalion moves into an area and gets to know it well, patrols of down to three men should constantly operate to harass the VC. This will cause the VC to concentrate for safety: in so doing they will give away security. The battalion can then bring the concentrated VC to battle and destroy them.