Don’t Mention the War: The Australian Defence Force, the Media and the Afghan Conflict   Written by: Kevin Foster, Monash University Publishing, 2013, ISBN 9781922235183, 168pp   Reviewed by: Tom Hill Kevin Foster’s Don’t Mention the War seeks to explain the lack of objective and erudite reporting on the Afghanistan conflict by the Australian media, arguing that the coverage was characterised by an absence of insight and investigation. Instead, the media were forced to perpetuate the ADF’s strategic and …

Afghan Sun: Defence, Diplomacy, Development and the Taliban   Stuart Yeaman, Boolarong Press, 2013, ISBN 9781922109910, 360pp   Reviewed by: Colonel David Connery Most books reviewed in this journal are written by detached observers and academics. Afghan Sun is different. It is the work of former Australian Army officer Colonel Stuart Yeaman, AM, and is a personal account of the unit he commanded in Afghanistan. This book will primarily interest readers with a connection to the unit or those with a deep …

Canister! On! FIRE! Australian Tank Operations in Vietnam   Written by: Bruce Cameron, Big Sky Publishing, 2012, ISBN 9781921941993, 968pp (two volumes)   Reviewed by: Lieutenant Colonel Scott Winter In November 2012, the 1st Armoured Regiment hosted the official launch of Canister! On! Fire! Australian Tank Operations in Vietnam . A contingent of the regiment’s veterans, led by author Bruce Cameron, MC, joined the men and women of the regiment for the occasion. After a stirring presentation by former …

Abstract The theories of Sir Basil Liddell Hart are a ready staple of Australian doctrine. Indeed they arguably represented the most significant influence on Australian military doctrine between the 1970s and the 1990s, the period in which the Australian Army developed its first independent and operational-level doctrine. This article will examine Liddell Hart’s influence on the Army’s doctrine development and the continuing relevance of his signature theories which espoused two specific military ideas. …

Abstract This paper contends that the three primal constituents of the military art — strategy, tactics and logistics — must be united within the Australian Army’s future concepts. If history is any guide, this will be a significant challenge for the Army’s modernisation and planning. Yet the marriage of these components is not new. Indeed, Baron Antoine-Henri Jomini emphasised the inseparable nature of logistics, strategy and tactics in his classic work The Art of War . Other authors also argue that …

Abstract This article examines the role and use of one of the largest and most flexible sub-units in a combat brigade, the armoured personnel carrier (APC) squadron. It contends that, without a better understanding of all aspects of the combat brigade across the land force, the Army may not utilise its combat assets to best effect. Based on the author’s personal experience, the article explains the best use of an APC squadron and contrasts the armoured mobility of the APC with the protected lift provided …

Abstract Commanders in the Australian Army pride themselves on sound military decision- making based on thorough analysis of the threat, terrain and their higher commander’s intent. Yet this self-assurance is misleading. The employment of existing military planning tools should lead commanders to develop adaptable tactical solutions that account for the vulnerabilities in a given threat system. However, tactical military commanders often do not conduct a detailed appreciation of the threat system or, if …

Abstract Although not deliberate, a significant risk to Army’s operational security is the current use of mobile telephony by senior Army leaders. Senior Army leaders use mobile telephony to receive and provide information that is distilled, timely and accurate, offering an enemy force or a strategic competitor high value information for little effort. Conversely, significant investment has been made to secure Army’s tactical communications, where information is mostly disaggregated and short- term. Some …

Climax at Gallipoli: The Failure of the August Offensive   Written by: Rhys Crawley, University of Oklahoma Press, 2014 ISBN 9780806152066, 384pp,   Reviewed by: Brigadier Chris Roberts (Ret’d), AM, CSM Mounted to break the deadlock resulting from the failed April landings, the August Offensive at Gallipoli was the largest operation undertaken on the peninsula. In the eyes of many contemporaries, and several subsequent historians, it came close to success; an offensive that failed by a whisker to bring the …

The Backroom Boys: Alfred Conlon and Army’s Directorate of Research and Civil Affairs   Written by: Graeme Sligo, Big Sky Publishing, 2013, ISBN 9781921941122, 416pp,   Reviewed by: John Donovan Although Colonel Graeme Sligo has written an interesting story about the Australian Army’s Directorate of Research and Civil Affairs, the real story that needs to be told is that of the directorate’s enigmatic director Alfred Conlon, at least beyond the glimpses into his personality that appear in the book. The …