Book Review: From the Somme to Victory: The British Army’s Experience on the Western Front 1916–1918
From the Somme to Victory: The British Army’s Experience on the Western Front 1916–1918
Written by: Peter Simkins
Pen and Sword, 2014,
ISBN 9781781593127, 256pp
Reviewed by: Brigadier Chris Roberts (Ret’d) AM, CSC
This excellent book contains eight essays previously written by the highly respected Professor Peter Simkins over the 15 years prior to 2014. He has revised and updated each essay with new material that has become available since they first appeared. In doing so, he tackles some of the myths, both old and recent, about the British Army on the Western Front, which he effectively demolishes based on sound research and erudite analysis—doing so using an understated and balanced approach. Simkins persuades with evidence, analysis and context rather than exhorts with shallow assumption.
Leading off are two very useful chapters concerned with aspects of the historiography of the war. The first addresses the more recent works of historians since 1991 and especially the frontline experience; the second takes a longer view with an instructive discourse on the historiography of the 1916 Battle of the Somme, from the unit and official histories appearing at the end of the war to the academic studies based on archival research leading up to the eve of its centenary. Both are models of balance and thoughtful consideration and ought to be read by those wishing to grasp an understanding of the various schools of thought, why the ‘Lions led by Donkeys’ school was so bankrupt of historical research, and why the revisionists are on firmer ground and gaining the ascendancy amongst those with a strong interest in the war, if not the wider public.
Then follow five chapters covering a specific aspect or action on the Somme; three in 1916 and two in 1918. Dissecting the character, commanders and performance of the New Army divisions during the dreadful 1916 battle, Simkins demonstrates that many performed relatively well, refuting the assertions of historians touting a negative view. This is not to say that all did well—those with the lowest success rate were K4 New Army divisions largely composed of Pals battalions1—but he provides what some historians do not: the context in which they fought and compelling analysis of the evidence and data available.
This approach follows on in his succeeding four chapters: the 18th (Eastern) Division’s capture of Thiepval in September 1916; an interesting study of a very gallant stand over eight days by an outnumbered group of New Army troops isolated in Frankfort Trench in November; the performance of the British divisions at the First and Second Battles of Villers-Bretonneux in April 1918; and the audacious and highly successful recapture of Thiepval and the Ancre heights in August 1918. The eighth and concluding chapter is a fine study of the 12th (Eastern) Division during the Hundred Days.
In all of these essays, Professor Simkins provides the necessary background and lead-up to the battles and the context in which they were fought; and shows conclusively that, while the ‘learning curve’ was uneven, British commanders and their troops quickly adapted after the very bloody nose of 1 July 1916. Above all, he highlights that many British officers at all levels
1 Editor’s note: The Pals battalions of World War I were specially constituted battalions of the British Army comprising men who had enlisted together in local recruiting drives based on the promise that they would be able to serve alongside their friends, neighbours and colleagues (‘pals’) rather than being arbitrarily allocated to battalions. were fine, intelligent commanders who quickly sought answers to the awful problems facing them. In this respect, Simkins disputes the assertion of Tim Travers and Martin Samuels that British command and control was overly centralised. Indeed, most who have read Samuels’ Command or Control? recognise it as a shallow and distorted study that cherrypicks examples, and not even fairly, to support a preconceived idea. Moreover, he simply gets wrong several examples used to shore up his contentions, demonstrating his lack of knowledge of the subject he feels competent to pronounce upon. In fact, British command philosophy as espoused in its doctrine prior to the war was very similar to that of the Germans—a point made very succinctly by the New Zealand historian Christopher Pugsley and one which Samuels ignores.
While Australian historians are quick to recount Villers-Bretonneux as an Australian victory, and Simkins graciously acknowledges the key role played by the 13th and 15th Australian Infantry brigades during the Second Battle, he refutes Monash’s unfair and churlish criticism of the severely depleted and exhausted British units and rehabilitates and places in perspective the part they played alongside the Australians. Indeed, the 5th Australian Division paid them due credit at the end of the battle. In analysing the 12th (Eastern) Division during the Hundred Days, especially its commanders and leaders at all levels, Simkins disputes the views that are critical of the standards of junior leadership during the final stages of the war, using as evidence the success of the division and the exploits of its officers, non-commissioned officers and the boy recruits, who were the bulk of its strength. As a veteran with combat experience, this reviewer was left with nothing but admiration for what these men did. It is sad their story is not more widely told.
Written in a style that flows well and logically and is easily digestible, From the Somme to Victory is another welcome corrective to our knowledge of the British Army on the Western Front in 1916 and 1918. It is highly recommended for those who wish to understand the complexities of what the British Army faced rather than read the works of historians who simply seek to criticise.
