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Actionable Concepts for Future Dismounted Combat Teams

Journal Edition
Volume 17 Number 1

Abstract

This article describes our approach to developing and employing concepts to guide innovation efforts and investment for future dismounted combat teams, including a discussion of two possible future concepts. Our approach is underpinned by the philosophy that innovation should be guided by clear, conceptual aiming points in order to achieve step change in combined arms capability. We suggest this requires concepts to provide sufficient detail for a tactical setting, link to strategic guidance, and undergo a process of evaluation and refinement. We acknowledge that there is a clear tension between developing future combat team concepts that are too detailed and prescriptive, which could stymie innovation, and an abstract, non-specific approach that could lead to ad hoc or incremental advances in capabilities. Enduring efforts to trial, analyse and update concepts periodically will assist to alleviate this tension.

Introduction

Robotics, artificial intelligence, nanotechnology, and advances in biotechnology are but a few emerging technology areas whose influence on contemporary society remains opaque. Despite the challenges involved in assessing the influences of these technologies, it is imperative that the ADF is watchful for key changes in the character of warfare and takes advantage of new opportunities as they emerge.

This article describes measures underway between Army Headquarters (AHQ) and the Defence Science and Technology Group (DSTG) to explore emerging technologies. It covers three important issues. First, actionable concepts are described as a mechanism to convert creative thinking into aiming points for capability exploration. Second, two concepts to explore emerging technology adoption are described to demonstrate the current state of actionable concepts for dismounted combat. Third, this article explains how the concepts are enacted in practice through the Combat Application Laboratory (CAL) at the Combat Training Centre (CTC) in Townsville. Together, the actionable concepts and the CAL provide a means to iteratively inform concept and capability development as part of a connected learning process.

Actionable Concepts

DSTG and the Dismounted Combat Program (DCP) at AHQ collaborated to develop two concepts for future dismounted combat teams. The study explored post-2030 dismounted infantry operations in support of Army in its preparations for ‘advances in sensing, precision attack, and decision-making that will alter the character of future conflict engagements’.1 The developed concepts intend to inform the transformation of dismounted combat capabilities by providing a conceptual aiming point suitable to evaluate and guide new technologies at the earliest opportunity.

The collaborative project developed actionable concepts. By actionable concepts we refer to transformative concepts that can link strategic guidance into tactically actionable outcomes. The strategic guidance applied to the first actionable concepts developed were Accelerated Warfare,2 Army’s Robotic & Autonomous Systems Strategy3 and the Land Operational Concept Document. These strategy documents provide long-term descriptive guidance but lack the detail and prescription needed to convert meaningful change into practice. Understanding and contextualising the risks and opportunities posed by emerging technologies requires well-articulated aiming points for future combined arms capabilities. Accordingly, the key objectives are to provide conceptual aiming points that will guide industry engagement and experimentation efforts.4 Such conceptual aiming points are important for several reasons:

i. Step change in combined arms capabilities will be required for the future operating environment5

ii. Resources are limited

iii. Combat capabilities are complex

iv. The number of potential combinations of new technologies contributing to the tactics, techniques and procedures that realise ‘capability’ is potentially paralysing. Too many ideas and too many unknown implications prevent a clarity of purpose for robustly assessing and validating options and future capability decisions.6

Actionable concepts seek to bridge the gap between potential and realisation; however, the nature of the future operating environment and the rate of technological innovation remains uncertain. Consequently, although actionable concepts are necessarily specific to support their practical application, their aim remains explorative: i.e. ‘begin with a question, an idea or a problem’ and ‘co-exist with other alternative ideas’.7 Note that we started with the problems of an ‘advanced engagement’ battlespace and developed multiple concepts for future dismounted combat within this context. Though the aim is producing a number of flow-on concepts for technology-enabled future combat teams capable of operating across a range of scenarios, these should not be seen as the concept. As our understanding of the future environment changes, so too should our concepts of fighting within it. Land Capability Analysis (LCA) at DSTG is developing an enduring relationship with the DCP to ensure actionable concepts will be updated periodically as new insights and results are obtained. Although it is expected that central design principles will be enduring, the specific make-up of future Combat Team (CT) designs will be iteratively assessed and updated based on experimentation results.8 A prescriptive, reductionist approach is avoided as this would stymie independent innovation. An abstract, non-specific approach is also avoided to ensure transformative, rather than iterative, innovation and capability development.

Building Actionable Concepts

The study applied a systemic design methodology that combined several analytical methods within a creative, participatory co-design exercise to generate novel and explorative concepts for the post-2030 close-combat force.9

The development of actionable concepts for future dismounted combat was guided by the question:

How will combinations of new and emerging technology transform the battlefield engagement capability of dismounted infantry in close combat?

A focus on dismounted close combat best facilitated the initial design process through a focus on a specific set of challenges. However, a key aim was to develop future combat team designs and concepts that are adaptable. Two concepts resulted from the systemic design process:

i. Semi-autonomous combat team (SACT)—integrating a variety of uncrewed systems to boost capabilities at section level linked via a ‘combat cloud’10

ii. Skirmishing mist—a top-down approach based on small independent teams operating disconnected, disaggregated, and decentralised while coordinating and delivering decisive multi-domain effects.11

Both concepts feature paradigm shifts encompassing deep levels of adaptation in recognition that technology insertion and incrementalism is an inadequate response to the forecasted future operating environment. Following from anticipated technological maturity by 2035, combined with the enduring complexity and uncertainty of the environment, a starting assumption was that humans remain integral to close combat and that it remains a ‘collision between two living forces’—that is, close combat is not reduced to ‘robot wars’. To best facilitate rapid assimilation and immersion by participants, four scenarios based on historical analogues featuring unsupported dismounted operations against an advanced 2035 adversary in complex terrain were employed, specifically Tropical Battlefield (Borneo), Urban Battlefield (Marawi), Subterranean Battlefield (Cu Chi and Toronto), and Isolated Positions (Airmobile Entry).

Semi-Autonomous Combat Team

The SACT concept emphasises the integration of a variety of uncrewed systems (UxS), aimed initially at substantially boosting section-level capabilities as the smallest tactical building block possessing independent command and control (C2), fires, and manoeuvre roles, then extending upwards following a ‘bottom-up’ design process. The enhancements take four main forms:

i. A multi-platform, layered, self-organising, persistent field of sensors

ii. Armed small/medium semi-autonomous uncrewed ground vehicles (UGV) equipped for direct engagement and fire support, capable of movement and engagement

iii. Small indirect capabilities organic to the section (via precision guided munitions and loitering munitions) with larger variants available at platoon level. This enables precise engagements and on-call cut-off without reliance on other echelons

iv. Expendable ‘breachbots’ capable of undertaking high-risk roles, such as initial assaults.

At the core of this concept is a ‘combat cloud’ that enables human coordination and supervision of this diverse collection of UxS platforms and capabilities. Although individual intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and UGV platforms are assumed capable of significant levels of semi-autonomous operation within the time frame, supervision remains necessary—and providing a critical safeguard and ensuring compliance with the laws of armed conflict. The combat cloud infrastructure—including data servers, core processing capabilities, and network bearers—is hosted within the section by UGV, providing responsive, resilient and reasonably assured C2 for the large number of UxS platforms, enabling the immediate levels of supervision required in contested electro-magnetic spectrum (EMS) environments.

Leveraging the combat cloud, a persistent, adaptive and self-managing ISR field surrounds each section, providing increased awareness of the battlespace and facilitating cued engagement by remote platforms. The various other UxS platforms in turn provide a robust and layered set of direct and indirect engagement capabilities capable of considerable overmatch when compared to a conventionally equipped section. Combined, the ISR field, armed UGVs and organic indirect fires enhance

engagement capability and lethality, significantly enabling the section to maintain an extended standoff simultaneous with greater firepower. Human section members reach across this standoff and act through their UxS platforms as platform operators and mission supervisors first, before they directly assume risk themselves.

The additions and adaptations at the section level translate upwards to inform the structure and behaviour of a full CT. The new CT structure retains comparable to the present-day form, outside of relatively minor alterations such as the extensive use of UxS. Specifically:

  • A SACT retains the structure of three sections per platoon and three platoons per CT.
     
  • Sections comprise two similar fire-teams, comprising a fire team sub-commander and two specialists, one each for platforms (UGVs) and systems (ISR / combat cloud). Each fire team controls a portion of the section’s UxS assets and can detach to function independently, providing further flexibility.
     
  • An autonomous fire support section (AFSS)—comparable to a manoeuvre support section (MSS)—provides self-deploying mortars, heavier loitering munitions, and other heavy weapons as appropriate. An AFSS falls under each platoon HQ, equipped with three medium UGVs fitted accordingly.
     
  • CT HQ holds a reserve of medium armed UGVs controlled by the Company Sergeant Major.
     
  • CT HQ roles remain comparable to the present but with reduced personnel.
     
  • The exception is Signals, which expands in light of the considerably increased need for command, control and communications (C3), electronic warfare, and cyber.
     
  • Other related tasks, such as the recovery of enemy platforms for data/ intelligence extraction and exploitation, will also require additional specialist personnel.

Self-assessment and tabletop wargaming of the concept highlighted the following:

  • The shift to human-machine teaming relies heavily on levels of supervised and delegated autonomy. This carries with it the need for appropriate levels of supervision and follow-on implications for human cognition. The level of autonomy and supervision requires further, more detailed analysis.
     
  • Humans are no longer ‘first, last, and always’—a significant change in approach from close combat. The concept features humans acting extensively through other platforms to direct the close fight, before engaging in it themselves where necessary. This, in turn, alters numerous tactical behaviours and assumptions.
     
  • The inclusion of expendable UxS moves SACT several steps towards an abundance mindset facilitated by the more risk-tolerant UxS platforms. This contrasts sharply with scarcity and casualty aversion mindsets present today.
     
  • Logistics remains a major limiting factor, however, though this is ameliorated by the extensive adoption of autonomous logistics systems. The full report explores this issue in greater depth.
     
  • As a gauge of effectiveness, subject matter experts involved in the design process suggested that the expected increases in capability and lethality were likely to result in the offensive operations ratio shifting from 3:1 (with conventionally equipped forces) to 1:3. This is supported by the increases in survivability achieved through dispersion.
     
  • The reality of an increasingly observed and sensor-saturated battlefield demands a matching shift in tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs). Operating above the general detection threshold is unavoidable due to the size and the number of platforms employed. Instead, the concept aims to stay below the ‘targeting solution’ threshold through inducing and sustaining ambiguity.

Skirmishing Mist*

The skirmishing mist concept embraced the idea of a professional guerrilla Army operating disconnected, disaggregated, and decentralised. Small independent teams operating below detection threshold would infest the terrain, from which remote strikes and direct action could be taken throughout the depth of the battlespace. This conceptual work was considered of greater utility to future forces tasked with screening, reconnaissance, and area denial.

The operating paradigms developed for this concept were:12

  • Skirmish to set favourable conditions for decisive action by manoeuvre elements
    • The concept is not the sole solution to everything; it is a key element of a brigade joint task force capability
       
  • Operate disconnected, disaggregated and decentralised
    • Ability to operate in small modular teams that can survive the destruction of other groups
    • Ability to move and fight dispersed—the invisible water droplet, concentrating for specific operations to overwhelm a weaker enemy (cloud formation), then dispersing again (evaporation)
    • Ability to operate for long periods without orders (local decision-making) or direct communications with other groups, reducing the communications and electronic signature of the team and improving its survivability.
       
  • Operate below the detection threshold
    • Ability to deliver pervasive awareness and cueing—being intelligence driven through strong ISR capabilities to find and fix
    • Ability to ‘infest’ the terrain by blending with the physical, social, informational and electronic environments (the enveloping mist)
    • Ability to control and manage signature by exploiting deception and concealment—hiding in plain sight
    • Ability to conduct remote strike capabilities to engage the adversary

* The discussion of the skirmishing mist concept is drawn directly from Ref 11. For further details, please see the full report.

  • Do not hold terrain but destroy, disrupt, degrade, deny and deceive the adversary
     
  • Only rise above the detection threshold and strike (multi-domain) for high pay-off
     
  • Coordinate with adjacent teams and reach back for collaborative/ synchronised effect
     
  • Achieve time-sensitive attack through rapid effects generation Systematically targeting the linkages and nodes that hold the force together
     
  • Attack the adversary across all domains and locales, with emphasis on info-kinetic manoeuvre
     
  • Carry out enduring attacks and harassment to dislocate, weaken and exhaust the mind of the enemy
     
  • Avoid major combat—do not become decisively engaged in combat.

A conceptual metaphor for this idea is submarine warfare—independent submarine actions and the opportunity for collective attack by several submarines operating under broad direction and limited control. Submarine tactics are ‘dispersion, surprise, strikes where the enemy is weak’, then disappearing and continuing the degradation of enemy morale and resources.13 The concept also echoes, for example, the US Navy’s ‘Distributed Lethality Sea Control’ concept,14 the MITRE Corporation’s ‘Small Unit Operations’ (SUO) concept,15 the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s ‘Mosaic Warfare’,16 and the writings of TE Lawrence.17

The low-signature model requires the small teams to operate for long periods without orders or direct communications with other groups. One-way theatre broadcast was the primary means of higher command communication supported by UAV e-courier systems. Deception and concealment across all sensor bands forms an essential ability of the small teams. A remote strike concept was developed whereby the small teams would tag targets (electronic or biometric) for prosecution by a flying arsenal UAV, smart-mines or remote sentry turrets. Low-signature sustainment was achieved through foraging, local manufacture and UAV-delivered support.

The teams only rise above detection threshold and strike for high-value effect (the decisive blows), either individually or as coordinated teams, enabled by strike reach-back for long-range point and area effects.

The skirmishing mist battalion contains approximately 25 teams under the command of an enlarged battalion HQ reliant on AI-enabled C2 systems to provide effective command and control of the teams. Each team comprises 20 soldiers grouped in five functional cells (four soldiers per cell—command, reconnaissance, pioneer, cyber-electromagnetic activities (CEMA), and strike. The team structure can be adjusted in size and/or augmented with supporting elements delivering psychological operations (PSYOPS), air defence, human intelligence (HUMINT) and medical capabilities, depending on the operation and tactical situation.

Self-assessment and tabletop wargaming of the concept revealed that it:

  • was resilient, persistent, adaptable and flexible across multiple vignettes
     
  • relied on and exploited the strong cognitive capabilities, leadership, flexibility and adaptability of the Australian soldier and officer ranks
     
  • had significant organic find and fix abilities including electronic warfare sense, passive radar, retro reflection detection, and biometric collection and analysis
     
  • supported creation of denial and control zones and engagement of time-sensitive targets by using persistent flying armoury, robotic sentries and smart minefields systems
     
  • would enable operations to remain below discrimination threshold given advanced sensing capabilities and operating adjacent to and interacting with local populations
     
  • had low organic combat mass and was vulnerable to being quickly overmatched if detected
     
  • was difficult to bring together to generate coordinated actions, due to the desire to maintain low communications emissions and due to alternative means latency issues.

Discussion

The two concepts detailed above illustrate substantially divergent approaches to the problem set. One began with relatively routine technology insertion then explored the implications of that insertion on operating concepts and paradigms. The other began with high-level operating concepts shaped by fundamental shifts in the future operating environment — that is, fighting against an above-peer, highly technology-advanced adversary, and new technological capabilities, followed by the development of a more detailed CT structure. This spread of explorative and analytical modes, evolution and revolution, affords an appreciation of the design space insofar as the workshop constraints permitted.

Key similarities between the otherwise divergent concepts offer further insights:

  • The importance of dispersion, standoff, and signature management responses on an increasingly lethal battlefield
     
  • The need for varied and fused sensor technologies to detect enemies in complex and extreme operational environments
     
  • A shift to optional communications between echelons, rather than constant contact; a paradigm of periodic bursts rather than ongoing flows of information
     
  • Leveraging data-ferrying UAV ‘carrier pigeons’, breadcrumbs, hand-off points, and other methods to bolster communications under arduous circumstances
     
  • The utility of indirect fires cued remotely and asynchronously by lower echelons, often from ‘arsenal’ platforms
     
  • Increasing reliance on self-managed UxS operating semi-autonomously with minimal direct human intervention in a wide variety of roles, from communications relays to remote arsenals
     
  • The need for discreet UxS in a hostile/extreme environment capable of acting without detection by an adversary’s own increasingly sophisticated ISR.

Key differences were around sustainment models, the location of firepower and how the dismounted CT effectively opposed approaches to close combat. Skirmishing mist adopts an austere self-sustaining/foraging logistic framework in an attempt to preserve a low-signature posture. SACT meanwhile relies on a sizable increase in protected logistics afforded by the extensive employment of UxS for sustainment, extending mission duration and allowing remote resupply in contested spaces. In term of the locus of firepower, skirmishing mist is reliant on substantial brigade-level fires capability in direct support to achieve its application of a high volume of precision firepower. Alternatively, SACT features a significant increase in section-level organic firepower to minimise this requirement, while still being augmented by greater fire support from other echelons where necessary. In terms of opposing approaches to close combat, SACT seeks primarily to bolster its ability to perform close combat through UxS augmented combat mass, while skirmishing mist opts to minimise the need for close combat in favour of dispersion and disaggregation, with brigade support supplying the bulk of its engagement capability.

Perhaps most telling, however, is that both concepts feature deep levels of adaptation when faced with the future—that is, challenges of the future operating environment are such that a steady incrementalism with little underlying innovative conceptual development is insufficient to achieve the necessary transformation in combined arms capability. While adopting new technology is important, alone it is insufficient to drive a fundamental shift in capability; for this, conceptual adaptation is necessary to transform the way Army operates.

Implementing ‘Actionable Concepts’

The development of the actionable concepts is underpinned by design and analysis methodologies. What is missing is an understanding of the effectiveness of tactical concepts under the conditions of a ‘collision between two living forces’. How do the technologies and people function under uncertainty and in all weather and complex terrain? What combination and volume of resources optimises the performance of the team? What limits exist on the performance across all operational roles, including humanitarian and counter-insurgency missions, compared to a warfighting role against a near peer or overmatch, which these concepts explored? How would these dismounted combat team concepts perform as part of a larger joint coalition force?

The next steps are part of the continuous process of employment and evolution central to actionable concepts. The first step is learning more of the innovative technologies included within the combat team concepts through experimentation and trials, both virtual and live. The second step is learning through evaluation of the operational effectiveness of the concepts at a combined arms level (as part of a larger force) across a broad set of operational roles and environments through modelling and simulation. Technology experimentation and trials will provide insights

into technical feasibility, and combined arms modelling will enable evaluation of operational effectiveness across a broad range of scenarios and force levels that would not be feasible by other means. In so doing, the actionable concepts are guiding innovation and are learning from it, while also being evaluated to ensure progress towards a future force that is adaptable to different operational roles, environments and potential adversaries.

Technology experimentation will initially involve the production of more TTPs to facilitate implementation of the concepts. The DCP is enabling this through the CAL, a platoon sized group at CTC who will be provided with the type of equipment and capabilities that the SACT concept describes. Work has commenced through TTP development workshops, equipment acquisition and simulations to enact the concepts with end users. The DCP’s aim is to progressively develop a user community with sufficient expertise to inform concept iterations and understand requirements for the adoption of robotic and autonomous systems (RAS) in Integrated Investment Plan projects.

Beyond enabling a community of experts, it is also critical that the actionable concepts support a fast rate of learning and iteration between the conceptual design, the users and the modernisation enterprise that develops future capability options. Two elements are key in enabling fast exploration. The first is creating proximity between end users and the development teams in industry and academia who can deliver solutions. The second is creating an ecosystem not tied directly to the force generation cycle in which alternative tactics can be feely explored.

Proximity is critical for ensuring that expertise in the user group aggregates over time and does not fade between engagement opportunities. Traditional approaches to trials and concept development normally occur over extended periods and often engage different user communities. When the capability or equipment under evaluation is well known to the user community, such as an assault rifle, wide but shallow feedback is suitable and compensated for by the depth of expertise in the development community. Where the technology is new to the user community and its use within wider combined arms fighting systems is uncertain, both the user group and the development group lack vital information to optimise fast adoption. Developing deep understandings via actionable concepts or other suitable methods as early as possible is essential.

Enabling a consistent partnership between end users and the development community is needed, but difficult to realise under the rotational conditions of the Army’s force generation cycle. The DCP has sought a partnership with CTC to establish the CAL, largely because it sits outside of the readiness cycle and enables a consistent approach to partnering. CTC’s attributes as a data collection and analysis agency, expertise in contemporary combined arms close combat, and ownership of a threat force platoon designed to explore alternative tactics provided a sound context for practical realisation of the actionable concept and its further development. It is intended that in 2021 the CTC contemporary operating environment threat force (COEFOR) platoon will be equipped with materiel solutions that enable practical exploration of the SACT concept. This starting point will enable more expert user feedback on performance in CTC live exercises against a near peer adversary (the Australian Army as BLUEFORCE), to highlight strengths and weaknesses of the concept. Additionally, the use of the COEFOR platoon helps to analyse the present capacity of the Australian Army to defeat a RAS-enabled threat force.

The time and space to develop knowledge is an important factor of actionable concept success. An ecosystem that enables proximity and partnership supports a more consistent pathway towards knowledge development. Learning from the community of practice will inform concept iteration in LCA while concurrently informing user requirements for future capability acquisition. In this dual approach to learning, the DCP will seek to create the transformation of the dismounted combat capability 2020–2030. The actionable concepts approach is a centrepiece to realisation of this ambition.

In tandem with technology experimentation, LCA will evaluate the operational effectiveness of the actionable concepts force designs, initially at combat team level and eventually as part of larger forces, using mathematical modelling and simulation techniques including wargaming, Bayesian and systems dynamics modelling, and the Combat XXI simulation environment. These approaches can represent a combat team at different levels of fidelity, ranging from highly abstract to very detailed. This flexibility will enable the project team to determine the most appropriate level of fidelity to analyse future technology concepts in a responsive manner. This will allow models that span the scenario space to be developed and validated within a reasonable time period.

Conclusions

The collaborative efforts between the DCP and LCA are underpinned by a philosophy that explorative conceptual aiming points informed by higher-level guidance are critical to guiding innovation efforts and investment. However, the conceptual aiming point must contain sufficient detail to be actionable. If the actionable concepts cannot be readily applied to guide innovative efforts then their impact on future capability development will remain wanting. Furthermore, concept development without evaluation and refinement raises the danger of stymieing innovation rather than stimulating and guiding it. Enduring collaboration between LCA and the DCP, with planned updates to concepts periodically, will support this necessary ongoing evaluation and refinement. In closing, we note that these efforts are still in their early days. Our approaches to concept development will improve over time, as will their application, through the sustained effort and collaboration of LCA and the DCP.

Endnotes

1 TRADOC G-2 Mad Scientist Initiative, 2017, ‘An advanced Engagement Battlespace: Tactical, Operational and Strategic Implications for the Future Operational Environment’, Small Wars Journal, at: https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/advanced-engagement-battlespace-t…

2 Lieutenant General Rick Burr, 2020, Accelerated Warfare: Futures Statement for an Army in Motion (Canberra: Australian Army), at: https://www.army.gov.au/our-work/ army-motion/accelerated-warfare

3 Commonwealth of Australia, Future Land Warfare Branch, 2018, ‘Robotic & Autonomous Systems Strategy’, at: https://researchcentre.army.gov.au/sites/default/ files/2020-03/robototic_autonomous_systems_strategy.pdf

4 TNO Defence, Security and Safety developed a concept maturity levels (CMLs) framework and has employed CMLs to assist in structuring its application of the concept development and experimentation methodological approach over the last decade. The CML framework is a six-level scale that defines the maturity of a concept: CML1 Idea of Concept, CML2 Promising Concept, CML3 Selected Concept, CML4 Refined Concept, CML5 Proof of Concept, and CML6 Implemented Concept. We are focused on developing actionable concepts that sit between CMLs 3 and 4. See, for example, Wouter van der Weil, Marcel-Paul Hasberg, Ingrid Weima and Wim Huiskamp, 2010, ‘Concept Maturity Levels Bringing Structure to the CD&E Process’, Interservice/Industry Training, Simulation, and Education Conference (I/ITSEC) Proceedings, 2547–2555.

5 For a discussion on the importance of innovative concepts for small and medium-sized land forces see, for example, Tim Sweijs, Frank Bekkers and Stephan De Speigeleire, 2018, Playing to Your Strengths: A Different Perspective on Future Capabilities for the Royal Netherlands Army (The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies).

6 Mark Gilchrist, 2018, ‘Emergent Technology, Military Advantage, and the Character of Future War’, The Bridge (The Strategy Bridge), at: https://thestrategybridge.org/ the-bridge/2018/7/26/emergent-technology-military-advantage-and-the-character-of-future-war

7 BRIG Chris Smith, 2018, ‘On Future Thinking and Innovation: How Military Concept Writing Can Unwittingly Suppress Innovation’, Australian Army Journal XIV, no. 1: 121–140.

8 There has been a debate for many years about whether strategy is a result of deliberate planning or rather emerges over time—for example, whether Honda’s entry into the US and UK motorcycle markets in the 1960s and 1970s was the result of deliberate planning or emergent strategy. The takeaway from this long-running debate is that effective strategy development involves both deliberate planning and emergent adaptations over time. See, for example, Ramon Casadesus-Masanell and John Heilbron, 2016, Decision-Making by Precedent and the Founding of American Honda (1948–1974), Harvard Business School Working Paper 17-016. We view actionable concepts in an analogous manner—that is, deliberate guidance through innovative concepts is critical to transform a force but only in tandem with adaptation through bottom-up technological innovation and related experimentation. Overall, we view actionable concepts as defining a ‘left and right of arc’ for bottom-up innovation, not to stymie it but to guide and stimulate it: ‘mission command for technological innovation’.

9 See, for example, Christopher Manning, Ashley Stephens and Matthew Richmond, 2019, ‘A Novel Approach to Informing the Future Land Force: Incorporating Design Thinking and Concept, Development and Exploration Methods’, in S Elswah (ed.), MODSIM2019, 23rd International Congress on Modelling and Simulation, Canberra, Modelling and Simulation Society of Australia and New Zealand, December 2019, at: www.mssanz.org.au/modsim2019/B3/manning.pdf; Brandon Pincombe, Alex Ryan, Nick Kempt, Ashley Stephens, Nikoleta Tomecko, Darryn J Reid and Kim Tang, 2019, ‘Systemic Design of a Force for the Australian Army in 2050’, in Aaron P Jackson (ed.), Design Thinking: Applications for the Australian Defence Force (Canberra: Department of Defence), 27–49, at: www.defence.gov.au/ADC/publications/Joint_Studies.asp

10 Matthew Sawers and Kim Tang, 2020, ‘Semi-Autonomous Combat Team Dismounted Infantry 2030 Concept’, DST-Group-GD-1068 (Commonwealth of Australia).

11 Nicholas Kempt, 2020, ‘“Skirmishing Mist” Dismounted Infantry 2030 Concept”’, DST-Group-GD-1071 (Commonwealth of Australia).

12 The authors acknowledge that the basis for some of these ideas and the language used is adapted from a presentation by David Kilcullen at RUSI Land Conference 2018, The Evolution of Manoeuvre, see Dr David Kilcullen - The Evolution of Manoeuvre: RUSILWC18 on Vimeo (accessed 05/10/2021).

13 Wayne P Hughes, ‘Guerrilla War at Sea: The Submarine’, Britannica (online), at: https://www.britannica.com/topic/naval-warfare/Guerrilla-war-at-sea-the…

14 Commander Naval Surface Forces, Surface Force Strategy: Return to Sea Control (US Navy), at: Surface Forces Strategy (defense.gov) (accessed 05/10/2021)

15 J Cornwall, W Dally, D Eardley, R Garwin, D Hammer, P Horowitz, N Lewis, W Press, J Sullivan, J Vesecky, E Williams and F Zachariasen, 1998, ‘Small Unit Operations’, JSR-97-142 (McLean, Virginia: The MITRE Corporation).

16 Benjamin Jensen and John Paschkewitz, 2019, ‘Mosaic Warfare: Small and Scalable Are Beautiful’, Special Series—Next War, War on the Rocks (December 2019).

17 Thomas Edward Lawrence, 1997 (1935), Seven Pillars of Wisdom (Ware, Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Editions).

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