Primus inter pares vel primos? The Development of the Military Staff in the Australian Army

As war has become more spacious and fighting more intricate, so victory has grown more and more dependent on a system where the leader is supported by a staff and an executive, trained to relieve him of the burden of detailed preparation and administration and to give effect to his plans by a thorough comprehension of his intentions.[1]

Introduction

Military advisors, often grouped as a ‘staff’, have probably existed as long as armies have had commanders. The principal role of the staff is to aid the commander to control military action through the performance of planning, administrative and support functions. Across the Australian Army today, staff exist in the headquarters of battalions, regiments, brigades, divisions, commands and at the service level. However, the structure of these staffs and how they are employed differs widely. The primary reason for this is the unique development path of the staff system in Australia, influenced by its military heritage and shifting alliances. The effect of this continues to be felt today where conflicts exist between the current staff model and staff processes. To appreciate why this has occurred it is necessary to understand the history of the development of the military staff in broad terms and within Australia.

This paper examines the origins and nuances of the military staff system employed by Army. It aims to inform commanders and those serving on, or preparing to serve on, military staffs to enable them to understand why the staff system exists in the form that it does today and how it could be bettered for tomorrow. It examines the heritage of Australian staff approaches, which primarily draw from two different philosophies prevalent in Western militaries. First, it examines the British staff philosophy and its particular characteristics. Second, it explains how the Australian staff system developed over the course of the 20th century. Third, it examines the evolution of the Australian staff system in the early 21st century with the adoption of the Common Staff System, which originated in French staff philosophy. Fourth, it discusses a number of observations on current staff guidance and practice. It concludes by offering three recommendations for further analysis and discussion. 

The British Army’s Staff System

Staffs have existed in the British military since at least the 17th century.[2] In the Napoleonic era, British army staffs were divided into adjutant and quartermaster functions, with the highest-ranking staff officers of each function titled ‘Adjutant General’ and ‘Quartermaster General’. The former dealt with personnel, disciplinary and administrative matters. The latter focused on quartering, provisioning and moving troops. In this period, staff often lacked formal military education and were frequently selected as a result of seniority or allegiance to the commander. Conspicuously absent from the British approach was a chief of staff to coordinate the effort of the two functions, particularly when the commander was engaged on the field of battle.[3] 

The burden of planning battles, allocating resources and making decisions on the field of battle largely fell on the shoulders of the commander. These commanders would, when required, seek advice from subordinate arms commanders, e.g., the leaders of the separate cavalry, infantry and artillery arms. However, ultimately it was the commander who developed the plan and oversaw its execution on the field of battle by ordering the formations of these arms and coordinating when they charged, marched or fired. As the size of armies expanded in the 18th and 19th centuries, the span of command grew to encompass the coordination of multiple battles/actions across one or more campaigns spread across vast distances. Likewise, the complexity of the means of warfare increased. Artillery could be accurately employed beyond the field of battle (e.g., beyond direct line of sight), rail transported armies hundreds of kilometres quickly and the telegraph enabled information to be conveyed rapidly. The thirst of new weapons also added to the burden of supplying and equipping an army. Consequently, managing the preparations for war and commanding and controlling its execution on multiple fields of battle became far greater challenges for a single commander.[4] 

The impetus to improve command and control in the British Army was driven by its performance during the Crimean War of 1853–1856. Britain’s involvement was chequered by intelligence, logistic and planning shortcomings which manifested in poor battle performance.[5] In its wake, the need to professionalise the officer corps prompted the creation in 1858 of a dedicated staff college to educate military officers and, under the subsequent Cardwell Reforms, the abolition of the purchase of officer commissions in 1871. The staff college was important as it enabled the development of a body of officers trained in the general arts and science of war—referred to today as operational planning, intelligence and execution. Graduates were awarded the post-nominal of ‘passed-staff-college’ or ‘p.s.c’ and earmarked for employment in staff roles. However, the number of graduates it produced was insufficient to populate staffs across the entire force, and the influence of the staff in the late 19th century was relatively limited.[6]

This was reflected in the performance of the late Victorian era British Army in the Second Anglo-Boer War of 1899–1902. Most of the headquarters in this war featured ad hoc staffs, which were afforded little opportunity to train together and consequently were unfamiliar with the commander they supported. This situation resulted in poor command and control in the field and high incidences of wastage.[7] In response, a series of investigative reports into the war were undertaken; the Esher Committee Report of 1904 is of most relevance to this analysis. Inter alia it recommended the creation of a trained high-level General Staff to command and control the Army. This was modelled, to a point, on the German General Staff, itself derived from the Prussian staff model. It is important to delineate that the term ‘General Staff’ pertained not only to a collective staff providing the highest headquarters of the army but also to the creation of a ‘Generalist’ staff branch within it. This branch became responsible for performing the operational coordination, planning and intelligence functions to support the commander. The British General Staff was created in 1905 and the staff approach instituted in standing army, corps, division and brigade headquarters during the period of the Haldane Reforms over 1906–1912.[8] 

Importantly, this approach was captured doctrinally in Field Service Regulations, Part II, Organisation and Administration, released in 1909, and the Staff Manual in 1912. The former explained that the staff consisted of three branches:

1. the General or ‘G’ Branch, responsible for operations, intelligence and training
2. the Quartermaster-General or ‘Q’ Branch, responsible for supplies and equipment support
3. the Adjutant-General or ‘A’ Branch, responsible for administration, personnel and discipline.[9]

The G Branch staff officers within this system were termed ‘General Staff Officers’. General Staff Officer Grade 1, or ‘GSO1’ lieutenant colonels were assigned as head of the G Branch in a division, or head of a section (e.g., operations, intelligence or training) in a higher headquarters such as a corps or army. Majors as GSO2s could be in charge of a brigade level G Branch, lead one of the sections in a division G Branch or serve as an assistant in a higher headquarters. GSO3 captains served in assistant roles. Officers of the A and Q branches were assigned different titles. Lieutenant colonels were appointed as Assistant Adjutant General (AAG) or Assistant Quartermaster General (AQMG), and were heads of A and Q branches in a division, or if these positions were combined the individual was titled Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster General (AAQMG). At higher headquarters, they served as heads of an A or Q section (e.g., provost marshal, quartermaster or ordnance). Majors were titled Deputy Assistant Adjutant General (DAAG) or Deputy Assistant Quartermaster General (DAQMG) and were either heads of brigade branches or assistants in higher staffs. Captains were termed Staff Captain Adjutant (SCA) or Staff Captain Quartermaster (SCQ), serving as assistants in their branches.[10] Importantly, except in the highest commands this model did not provide for a chief of staff, with the coordination function falling to the senior officer in the G Branch. 

At the brigade level the senior ‘G’ function officer, a GSO2, was the Brigade Major or ‘BM’. However, given the paucity of staff at this level prior to the First World War (which consisted of the commander, a major and a staff captain), the BM was not only responsible for coordinating the entire headquarters but was also responsible for all operational and intelligence issues. Further, at this level the A and Q branches were amalgamated into one organisation that addressed supply, transport, movements, clothing, maintenance, awards, postings, promotions, medical, chaplains and military police matters. The combined ‘A/Q’ function was led by the staff captain, titled Deputy Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster General (DAAQMG), or simply the ‘DQ’.[11] The small staff was also supported by orderlies, clerks and military police.[12] Importantly, over the course of the two world wars as the military evolved and gained additional capabilities, additional functions and staff were also added. These included a GSO3 as deputy to the BM and an intelligence officer, as well as transport, service corps and electrical and mechanical engineering officers to support the DQ, as shown in Figure 1.[13]

Figure 1. A British brigade headquarters structure circa 1945[14]

At the unit level, infantry battalions, cavalry regiments and artillery brigades[15] were structured along similar lines. The unit’s Commanding Officer (CO), a lieutenant colonel, was provided a major as Second-in-Command and two captains: the Adjutant and the Quartermaster.[16] In barracks, the Adjutant served as the CO’s personal staff officer and was responsible for the ‘A’ functions of administration, organisation and discipline of the unit, particularly recalcitrant subalterns. In the field, as the senior captain the Adjutant also performed the ‘G’ role, receiving, developing and issuing the orders of the CO and, given that the battalion Second-in-Command was generally located in the echelon in the unit’s rear area, controlling the conduct of the unit. The Quartermaster managed the unit’s ‘Q’ functions such as supplying, moving and quartering the unit.[17] Akin to the brigade staff, over the course of the 20th century as the means to wage war grew in complexity at the unit level, additional staff were added to the battalion/regiment staff, such as an intelligence officer, battle adjutant who focused on unit operations, and regimental technical adjutant responsible for the maintenance and worthiness of the unit’s equipment.[18]

From this overview, three defining characteristics of the British system are evident. The first is the absence of a chief of staff in all but the highest of headquarters. The second, is the ‘diarchic’ division of the staff into two components, one primarily concerned with operational and intelligence functions and the other with administrative and supply matters. Third, the British system gave primacy to operational matters over supply and administrative issues. Given these characteristics, it is useful to highlight several strengths and weaknesses peculiar to the British Commonwealth model. 

First, commanders at division and brigade levels had neither a deputy commander nor a dedicated chief of staff, resulting in a relatively flat bureaucracy. The latter role was performed by the ‘G’ Branch GSOI at division and the BM at brigade level. The strengths of this approach were the ease of access afforded to the two functional heads and the direct involvement of the commander in coordinating the work of their staff. Conversely, the absence of a chief of staff meant that there was no redundancy in the event of the commander being absent or incapacitated. At brigade level without an immediately available deputy to assume command, another leader, such as a unit commander who was often physically displaced from the headquarters, was required to do so. In certain cases, this resulted in BMs assuming command while replacement commanders were sought,[19] adding to their already substantial role.

Second, the British staff system’s diarchic reliance primarily on two principal staff officers (PSOs) could prove vulnerable in wartime. Brian Bond’s examination of the British Army staff system noted that at the division level the two PSOs, the GSOI and DAAQMG, were ‘absurdly overworked’, a problem exacerbated by a dearth of trained staff officers.[20] Others noted that the staff of a divisional artillery commander, consisting of a BM and staff captain, was ‘too small to exercise effective control’ over the division’s four artillery brigades.[21] Likewise, at the brigade level, the BM and DQ weathered a significant number and wide range of duties. In a BM’s case, not only were they responsible for receiving, drafting and issuing orders, assigning reconnaissance tasks, interpreting intelligence, conducting planning and coordinating operations; they were also responsible for managing the ‘G’ Branch, the staff itself and siting and moving the headquarters.[22] While the performance of these multitudinous tasks was perhaps manageable with a well-trained, experienced and talented individual in the role; when trained staff were in short supply or lost as battle casualties, the reliance on such individuals could be a point of weakness. In his doctoral dissertation on infantry brigade command during the First World War, Roger Wood noted that the loss of experienced and efficient brigade majors was ‘keenly felt’ and impacted on the ‘efficacy of a brigade’.[23] Given the DQ’s vast remit of administrative and logistic responsibilities, and the importance of these to operations, the loss or incapacitation of these individuals likely resulted in similar adverse effects. 

Furthermore, as the Army rapidly expanded in response to the scale of the fighting in the First World War, this created an 'appalling shortage’ of trained staff officers.[24] In response, many prospective staff received abbreviated training, such as attending expedient junior and senior staff courses. However, there were many who received little formal education.[25] The problem of inadequate staff numbers and training appeared again in the early fighting in the Second World War. Edward Smalley’s examination of staff performance during the fighting in France in 1940 cites poor-quality staff work as a contributing factor in the British Army’s substandard performance. He asserts that as ‘the military situation deteriorated, the staff system and its orthodox military procedures was overwhelmed’.[26] Others note that as the war progressed and staff training was again shortened, the standard of the graduates deteriorated and the staff work suffered.[27] These wartime experiences leave the impression that the British system at lower tactical levels, which employed very few staff, was particularly vulnerable to the loss of key staff and shortages in trained officers. 

Third, the function and status of the ‘G’ staff resulted in a primus inter pares or ‘first among equals’ approach, particularly at lower levels. This approach is a theme found throughout the British Field Service Regulations, as exemplified by the 1939 iteration of Field Service Regulations, Volume I, Organisation and Administration, which states that the BM was not only responsible for the work of the other staff but could allocate it as they saw fit.[28] This relative autonomy was reinforced by the disparity in ranks between the BM and other staff officers, with the operations function ‘out-ranking’ the other functions. In practice, this situation risked the ‘G’ or operations function dominating the other branches and created the potential for operational matters to override all others to the detriment of the broader plan. 

It is important to note that this system, with its inherent strengths and weaknesses and its idiosyncratic appointment titles, served the British Army throughout the majority of the 20th century, including both World Wars. Although its three defining characteristics are consistent throughout this period, the system should not be misconstrued as monolithic. The staff structure and staff processes adapted as new technologies and methods were incorporated into the British Army. Ultimately, the system was replaced in British service in the 1980s, and subsequently in Commonwealth armies such as Australia’s, by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) or Continental Staff System. Before considering this staff system, an examination of the Australian staff approach during the 20th century is necessary to provide context.

The Australian Approach in the 20th Century—Adoption and Adaptation of the British Commonwealth Model

In 1901, the Federation of the former colonies triggered the creation of the Australian Commonwealth Military Forces (ACMF), the antecedent of the Australian Army. Given Australia’s membership of the British Empire, the Australian military was closely aligned with the British Army at this time. This resulted in the adoption of British weapons, equipment and organisations, including staff structures and processes.[29] Consequently, the British or Commonwealth staff approach dominated Australian practice during the 20th century. Australian staff replicated British practice during peacetime as well as during the First and Second World Wars. While the initial command and control of the Australian military rested in the hands of a General Officer Commanding, this was replaced in 1905 by a Military Board. The board was presided over by the Minister for Defence and eventually included a civil member, a financial representative and four military members. Of these military members, the first was responsible for organisation, operations and intelligence, the second personnel and administration, the third supplies and transportation and the fourth fixed defences, arms and ammunition. These military positions corresponded with the generalist, adjutant-general, quartermaster-general and master-general of the ordnance functions instituted in Britain at that time.[30] Separate to this was the position of Inspector General, who provided an independent assessment of the military readiness and effectiveness of the force. In 1909, the position of Chief of the General Staff (CGS) was created. The CGS performed the generalist function, commanded the other functions and conducted liaison with the Imperial General Staff on defence matters. While command of forces during time of war resulted in the creation of a Commander-in-Chief either separate or superior to the general staff, this high-level staff system remained largely intact until a series of reforms that occurred during the 1970s.[31] Figure 2 depicts some of the key senior staff officers of Headquarters Australian Corps during the First World War. 

For the ACMF, the Australian Constitution and the Defence Act affected both its composition and organisation as well as that of the military staff. For almost all of the first 50 years of its existence, the Australian military was predominantly a militia force whose part-time divisions, brigades and units were governed, trained and sustained by a small permanent element. With the exception of certain artillery and engineer capabilities, it did not contain permanent combat units. This differed functionally from the British Army, which contained both full-time/permanent and part-time/militia combat units and formations. In Australia this model was enshrined in the Defence Act 1903 (Cth), which directed that the part-time Citizen Forces provide the basis of the infantry, light horse and field artillery combat arms.[32]  The full-time Permanent Forces existed to provide administrative and training support via cadres of officers, warrant officers and senior non-commissioned officers posted to each unit and formation. Because full-time personnel could not legally be part of the combat arms, this resulted in permanent ‘generalist’ personnel being posted to the Administrative and Instructional Staff, who along with members of the Army service, medical, ordnance, artillery and engineer corps provided headquarters staff and instructors.[33] 

Figure 2. Senior staff officers of the Australian Corps at Bertangles Chateau, 1918. Lieutenant General Sir John Monash KCMG KCB VD, General Officer Commanding, Australian Corps (seated), with (back row, left to right) Brigadier General CH Foott, Chief Engineer; Brigadier General RA Carruthers, Deputy Adjutant and Quartermaster General; Brigadier General TA Blamey, Brigadier General, General Staff; Brigadier General LD Fraser, Brigadier General, Heavy Artillery; and Brigadier General WA Coxen, Brigadier General, Royal Artillery. (Source: Australian War Memorial E02750)

Changes to this approach were driven by the experience gained from the operation and administration of the Australian Imperial Force during the First World War. In 1921, as part of a major reorganisation of the military, a structure mirroring the wartime force was adopted. This incorporated five infantry and two cavalry divisions. To administer this large organisation the Australian Staff Corps and Australian Instructional Corps were created, the latter consisting of permanent quartermasters, warrant officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs). The Staff Corps initially comprised ‘combat arms’ officers drawn from the Permanent Military Forces Administrative and Instructional Staff, Royal Australian Field Artillery, Royal Australian Garrison Artillery and Royal Australian Engineers. In general, the permanent Staff Corps officers filled staff appointments at unit and higher formations while the part-time militia officers filled command appointments, although exceptions to this occurred.[34] However, following the Second World War, changes to the Defence Act led to the creation of a permanent Australian Regular Army and its ascendancy over the militia as the preferred provider of military power. Importantly this enabled the creation of permanent infantry and armour units. These, in conjunction with specialised corps training schools, now generated and administered combat arms officers, warrants and NCOs. As junior permanent officers were also able to graduate into these combat arms corps, the need for a specialised staff corps for combat officers became moot. Consequently, the Australian Staff Corps was eventually removed from Army’s order of battle in 1983.[35] 

The development of an Australian military staff was followed by the development of an Australian staff college. Post-Federation, the growing requirement for skilled administrators and trainers for the citizen force resulted in the establishment of the Royal Military College Duntroon in 1911 to furnish junior officers to it. However, in the absence of a higher-level staff college, small numbers of Australian officers attended the British staff college at Camberley or the British Indian Army’s at Quetta. This situation remained until 1938 when Army formed a Command and Staff School in Sydney to develop mid-senior officers versed in higher tactics, military strategy and administration. This school was subsequently moved to Fort Queenscliff in Victoria and renamed the Australian Staff College in 1946. It was again renamed as the Command and Staff College in 1982, and was eventually absorbed into a tri-service Australian Command and Staff College in 2000. Most recently, in 2019 this college and the Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies (which trains senior-level officers) were amalgamated into the Australian War College, with the Australian Command and Staff Course the mechanism to train mid-level Army staff officers.[36]

Returning to the 1970s, the Hassett Committee was the first of several reviews that led to significant reforms in the staff system at higher levels. This review rationalised the functions of the General Staff and elevated the CGS into an executive function above the others to focus on command of the Army and serve as principal advisor to the Minister for Defence. This led to the creation of a Chief of Operations to assume the operations, training and planning functions of the CGS’s office. In line with this the Adjutant-General, Quartermaster-General and Master-General of the Ordnance became the Chiefs of Personnel, Logistics and Materiel. Around this time the distinction between G, A and Q staff titles was removed, with a generic appointment of ‘Staff Officer’ with three grades entering into use – SO1 (Lieutenant Colonel), SO2 (Major) and SO3 (Captain).[37] The second major change was the abolition of the Military Board under the Tange Review. This ultimately unified the services as the Australian Defence Force (ADF), to be commanded by a Chief of Defence Force (CDF) and controlled by the Chief of Defence Force Staff (CDFS).[38] Under this approach, the CGS was subordinated to the CDF and access to the Minister for Defence became more limited for the other former members of the board. In 1997, the CGS was renamed Chief of Army (CA) in recognition of the role of both command and control during peace and war.[39] 

Amid these higher level changes, at the tactical level brigade and unit staff approaches continued to reflect British staff philosophies discussed previously. These approaches were codified in various staff duties guides, precis and aide-mémoires as well as in Army doctrine issued over the 20th century such as the Pentropic Division (1960), Division in Battle (1971) and Manual of Land Warfare (1977–1995) doctrine series.[40] Analysis of the final doctrinal expression of the British-derived Australian staff approach issued in the 1990s illustrates the influence of British thinking. The Manual of Land Warfare Part One, Volume 5, Pamphlet No 1, Staff Duties in the Field (1995), explained that the staff included:

1. a Coordination element to carry out the detailed coordination work of the headquarters and undertake the necessary action to carry out the commander’s direction, generally consisting of a chief of staff and a coordination section at division level;
2. an Operations Branch responsible for operations, training, plans, intelligence, air support and communications;
3. a Personnel Branch responsible for personnel management issues such as reinforcements, postings and promotions, morale, discipline, welfare, honours and awards; and supervision of medical, dental, psychology, military police, prisoners of war, refugees, pay finance, chaplains, burials, graves, legal, canteens, amenities and philanthropic organisations; and
4. a Logistics Branch responsible for support engineering, movement, transport, postal, materiel management, supply stockholding, maintenance, recovery and other services.[41]

The Manual of Land Warfare explained that the relationship between the commander and the chief of staff was extremely close. In the absence of the commander, the chief of staff was to be prepared to act in the commander’s name, anticipating their full support. The chief of staff worked closely with the senior staff officers to ensure that operational and administrative plans were properly coordinated and that the administrative staff was kept constantly in touch with operational changes. However, it noted that at the brigade level, as no chief of staff was provided for, the BM was assigned the coordination function. Furthermore, it advised that the Operations Branch was the senior branch in the headquarters and thus determined the priorities and the acceptability of the supporting plans of other branches.[42] Notably, and as in British practice, the Personnel and Logistics branches were often combined into one, led by a Deputy Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster General or DQ.[43] Given the retention of terms such as ‘BM’, the absence of a dedicated chief of staff and the diarchic division, this doctrinal guidance demonstrates the enduring influence of British thinking on the Australian staff approach. However, the desire for broader interoperability in the late 1990s, and the growing complexities of staff functions, led to the evolution of the ADF’s, and Army’s, staff system. 

The Australian Approach in the 21st Century—the Common Staff System

In 1997, the ADF adopted at the operational level what it termed a Common Joint Staff System, which emulated the NATO Staff System. The primary reasons given for this were the ability to standardise staff organisations across the breadth and depth of the services; and improve interoperability between America, Britain, Canada and Australia, as well as NATO partners that employed this system.[44] Before examining the application of the staff system in the 21st century, it is useful to understand its heritage.

The system’s origins lay in the French staff model of the late 18th century. This was based on a ‘bureau’ approach in which the staff were divided into multiple departments or functions. Originally, this comprised four bureaux: the first handled administration; the second addressed technical matters such as armaments, engineers and hospitals; the third dealt with operational planning, reconnaissance and communications; and the fourth managed the staff itself. Importantly, these bureaux were coordinated by a chief of staff on behalf of the commander. The efficiency of Napoleon Bonaparte’s Grande Armée in the early 19th century is often credited by scholars to this system. The 1806 Battle of Jena-Auerstedt is a key example of the success of the French approach, which in turn triggered a renewal of the Prussian staff model, that proved decisive during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870.[45] During the First World War, the functions of the bureaux evolved to personnel, intelligence, operations/plans and logistics. Importantly, the French system was adopted by the American Expeditionary Force during the war and subsequently accepted by the United States Armed Forces.[46] While additional functions were added over the 20th century, the primary characteristic of a chief of staff coordinating multiple staff functions has prevailed.

In late 1997, Army implemented the Common Staff System at the tactical level to complement the introduction of the Common Joint Staff System. Training Information Bulletin No 84 (TIB84) introduced the Common Staff System and its benefits, which it explained as:

1. common functional staff structures at all levels of command
2. clear divisions of staff responsibilities along functional lines
3. simplified correspondence
4. easier recognition of staff functions by allies and other military contacts
5. a sense of common purpose between staffs at all levels of command.[47]

TIB84 specified that this system was to be adopted at all headquarters down to battalion level to provide a common and structured approach to identifying staff functions and appointments. This system employed letters to identify the type of headquarters, as outlined below:

C—Combined Staff (multi-national) headquarters

J—Joint Staff (tri-service) headquarters

N—Naval component or headquarters

A—Air component or headquarters

G—Army component or headquarters of division or higher

S—Army headquarters brigade or below

SOJ—Special Operations component of a headquarters.[48]

Numbers added to these letters indicated the function of the division, branch, cell or individual:

0—Command Group and Specialist Staff. This included the executive staff (commander, deputy and chief of staff) as well as specialist staff.

1—Personnel. Personnel staff managed personnel and personnel policy, conducted administration and dealt with prisoners of war.

2—Intelligence. Intelligence staff managed the commander’s intelligence requirements including the location, activities and capabilities of the enemy.

3—Operations. Operations staff assisted the commander by organising, training for and executing operations.

4—Logistics. Logistics staff coordinated logistic advice, and developed and monitored logistics plans including administrative movements.

5—Plans and policy. Plans staff focused on developing options to achieve the commander’s mission and refining these into plans for future operations/contingencies.

6—Communications and Information Systems. These coordinated communications and information systems requirements including network and information architecture.

7—Doctrine and Training. Training staff identified standards, procedures, validation and training approaches to meet readiness requirements.

8—Force Structure and Development. Development staff were responsible for force structure, mobilisation and capability/equipment proposals and changes. 

9—Civil Military Cooperation. This function was responsible for providing advice and liaison to enable planning and preparation with other government and non-government agencies.[49]

A generic divisional structure is shown in Figure 3 below.

Figure 3. An exemplar contemporary Australian Division Headquarters structure based on the Common Staff System[50]

The Common Joint Staff System introduced several important differences to the previous approach. First, within the ‘0’ function the commander was assisted by a deputy commander, assistant commanders and a chief of staff. The deputy and assistants provided for continuity of command in the absence of the commander, and control of specific areas or functions when needed. The chief of staff supervised the staff and ensured timely and efficient inter-staff coordination in order to provide the commander with coordinated staff recommendations. They reviewed staff actions, resolved tasking conflicts and assigned staff duties. In turn, they passed pertinent information and insight from the commander to the staff and from the staff to the commander. Critically, this freed the commander from routine detail, enabling greater freedom to command. In the event that no deputy commander was appointed, the chief of staff assumed this role.[51] A clear advantage of this approach was the redundancy it provided in terms of command. A deputy or at least a dedicated chief of staff was available in the event of the commander being absent or incapacitated to assume command.