The Case for Cluster Munitions: Amend or Withdraw from the Convention on Cluster Munitions

Introduction

In December 2022, CNN reported that Ukrainian defence officials had been lobbying for ‘many months’ to be provided with US stocks of Dual Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions (DPICMs). While the request has not yet been satisfied, its existence indicates that Ukraine, despite its considerable military successes against Russia, considers cluster munitions to be necessary in its war effort.[1] By contrast, Australia rejected the use of cluster munitions on 4 December 2008 when Defence Minister Stephen Smith signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM). In doing so, he stated, ‘This new humanitarian treaty prohibits the use of cluster munitions that inflict enormous suffering and damage on civilians’.[2] Explaining the ratification decision to Parliament, Stephen Smith asserted that ‘[t]he government has conducted a thorough policy, legal and technical review of the convention’.[3] The CCM was the culmination of a series of multilateral conferences in Oslo on 22 and 23 February 2007, known as the Oslo Process.[4] Participants at the Oslo Conference cited the enduring and catastrophic effects of cluster munitions unexploded ordnance (UXO) in Vietnam, Southern Lebanon, Serbia and Iraq.[5] Since then, the CCM has achieved 110 states parties and 13 signatories, predominantly concentrated in Western and Southern Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America.[6] Conversely, a state’s decision not to sign the CCM strongly correlates with the holding of cluster munition stockpiles—notably including the United States of America, Russia, Ukraine, China and many countries in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, North Africa and Asia.[7] 

At the time, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) response to ratification of the CCM was muted. The Chief of Defence Force (CDF), Angus Houston, argued only that measures may be needed to preserve Australia’s interoperability with the United States if (as a non-signatory to the CCM) it chose to use cluster munitions.[8] He also observed that Defence’s Strategic Policy and Guidance Branch had overseen the Dublin Diplomatic Conference which negotiated the CCM, and were ‘pretty comfortable with it’.[9] Since Australia’s ratification of the CCM, there has been little reason to revisit its rationale and the tight restrictions it imposes upon the ADF. The intervening period has been an era in which precision-guided munitions have been successfully deployed in small wars of regime change and counterinsurgency. 

The purpose of this article is to challenge the status quo. It comes in response to rapid technological advancements in cluster munitions and their evident military utility in state efforts to remain competitive in response to the resurgence of Great Power competition. The article examines contemporary cluster munition technology and reviews the basis upon which the CCM proscribes their use. Based on this analysis, the article concludes that contemporary cluster munitions are a highly suitable and effective weapon in armed conflict, and that amendment to the CCM, or Australia’s withdrawal from it, is a necessary measure to buttress Australia’s national security.

The Need for Cluster Munitions

Army’s Accelerated Warfare concept describes a future operating environment characterised by increased geopolitical competition and conflict, where the rules-based international order is at threat.[10] Russia’s invasion of Ukraine foreshadows an increased probability that the ADF will be involved in conventional and peer-on-peer conflict in the future. At the time of writing, the Ukrainian army is reported to be firing 2,000–4,000 artillery shells a day in its war with Russia.[11] While it is difficult to verify these reports based on open-source material, Ukrainian and Russian online sources indicate that the use of cluster munitions remains common and particularly effective.[12]

While not strictly cluster munitions, Ukrainian artillery fires have been used effectively to achieve massed area effects in defence against armoured attacks. These systems were instrumental in the defence of Kiev in March 2022. Using tactics of precision direct fire anti-tank rockets against lead vehicles of Russian armoured columns, the massed artillery fire delivered by two Ukrainian artillery brigades destroyed the remainder of the halted Russian columns.[13] Given these tactical successes in area defence operations, it is little wonder that Ukrainian officials have requested DPICM and High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) cluster munitions from the United States, citing their superior lethality and capacity to target increasingly dispersed Russian personnel and vehicles.[14] If states learn from Russia’s mistakes and disperse their forces appropriately, cluster munitions will be increasingly necessary to defend against such geographically separated ground forces. 

Beyond current events in Eastern Europe, this conclusion also applies to states in the littoral, archipelagic region of South-East Asia and the South Pacific, where cluster munitions hold considerable military potential for Australia and its friends and allies. For example, cluster munitions would be highly effective in the denial of large area targets such as air bases and seaports, and in the disruption of dispersed and difficult-to-acquire targets in complex jungle and littoral terrain. In these environments, precision-targeted munitions have considerable limitations. Specifically, generating a target coordinate with high accuracy and reliable inputs such as GPS will be challenged by electromagnetic spectrum operations such as GPS jamming and spoofing.[15] When a weapon system can apply highly lethal area effects across a wide area, an inaccuracy of hundreds of metres will detract significantly less from the effectiveness of the weapon.[16] In the event of a rapidly deteriorating future operating environment, the Australian Army must be capable of employing massed area effects for Australia to remain strategically competitive.

The Effectiveness of Cluster Munitions

Any proposal to revisit the provisions of the CCM needs to be founded on a clear understanding of the specific technical advantages of cluster munitions such as DPICM. DPICM are artillery and rocket munitions which the United States developed in the early 1950s to attack varied target types with fewer munitions expended.[17] DPICM carry anti-personnel grenades and anti-armoured shape charge submunitions in a base-ejecting canister which are dispersed over a wide area.[18] DPICMs have been the subject of mythmaking since the Gulf War, where senior military figures perpetuated a false narrative of Iraqi prisoners reporting their fear of ‘steel rain’.[19] Beyond these myths, however, the reality is that DPICMs have a proven record of operational effectiveness. 

• Area Effects. While there is a paucity of unclassified studies comparing the area effects of DPICM (and other cluster munitions) against high-explosive (HE) munitions, much can be determined from the reported effects radius of comparable weapon systems. Specifically, the in-service HE unitary M107 and M795 rounds have a 100 per cent kill radius of 20–30 and 30–60 metres respectively, according to open-source material.[20] Army’s Land Warfare Pamphlet (LWP) Target Engagement, Coordination and Prediction—Duties in Action provides the classified effects data of both of the in-service HE rounds, M107 and M795.[21] By comparison, field artillery capability analyst Lieutenant Colonel Michael Jacobson attributes a 10-metre lethal radius to each of the 88 submunitions of the M483A1 DPICM, spread over a dispersion area of one to three hectares dependent on height of burst.[22] Further, open-source material reports that M26 rockets deployed previously by the United States Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) spread 644 M77 submunitions across a 200 metre x 100 metre area, with each submunition capable of killing or wounding within a 4-metre radius.[23] While MLRS warheads typically have hundreds of submunitions (which significantly increases the likelihood that some munitions may fail to explode on impact), the M30A1 warhead currently being deployed in Ukraine disperses thousands of tungsten balls over about 400 metres x 200 metres without any secondary detonation required.[24] While achieving significantly greater area effects compared to HE munitions, this characteristic means that the M30A1 warhead is far less likely to offend social and political sensibilities around the risk to civilian communities of UXO. 
• Lethality. The superior lethality of DPICM is clearly demonstrated by testing and research conducted by the United States. Unclassified test results demonstrate that the M449 DPICM achieves a 31.9 per cent likelihood of achieving a casualty—four times the 7.9 per cent likelihood (ICM -the earlier, anti-personnel variant of DPCIM) achieved by an M107 HE round.[25] In another unclassified study, the combat effectiveness of the 155mm Improved Conventional Munition (ICM) (which was the earlier, anti-personnel variant of DPICM) was compared against conventional rounds in Vietnam. The study showed that the 155 mm ICM achieved 1.7 rounds per kill, compared to 13.6 rounds per kill for conventional 155 mm.[26] This fourfold increase in lethality offers a strong basis to argue that cluster munitions are worth any short-term political consequences of amending or withdrawing from the CCM.
• Dual Purpose. The dual purpose and area effects capability of the M483 DPICM by comparison to the HE M107 was proven during live-fire testing conducted by the United States. Table 1 outlines the results achieved by live fire testing against a target of numerous threat types.[27] It illustrates the increased lethality and effectiveness of DPICM against hardened targets such as tanks and armoured personnel carriers (APCs). It also demonstrates the effectiveness of cluster munitions to achieve area effects against small targets (e.g. the six anti-air (AA) guns). Reinforcing the lethality of cluster munitions against armoured targets, Lieutenant Colonel Jacobson states that ‘[g]enerally, 10 or more bomblet strikes are required for an armored-vehicle kill, but a single bomblet can result in a firepower or mobility kill’.[28]

Table 1 Results of live fire testing against a target of numerous threat types

Hits
	Total Rounds	Three Tanks	Six APCs	Eight Trucks	Six AAs	One Jeep	Total Hits
DPICM M483: 155 mm	145	47	69	45	5	7	173
HE M107: 155 mm	432	2	4	2	0	0	8

Assessing the Convention on Cluster Munitions

Australia’s ratification of the CCM in 2008 was driven by the argument that cluster munitions have a disproportionate and inhumane effect on civilians. As observed by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, ‘Cluster munitions have a “wide-area effect”, which makes them inherently inaccurate when used’.[29] During a debate in Parliament over Australia’s ratification of the CCM, Senator Scott Ludlam stated that ‘cluster munitions are one of the most inhumane forms of weapons from a humanitarian, medical and ethical perspective’.[30] As explained by the preamble to the CCM, the concern that the CCM sought to address is ‘the suffering and casualties caused by cluster munitions at the time of their use, when they fail to function as intended or when they are abandoned’.[31] The provisions of the CCM include more detailed descriptions of the threat of indiscriminate casualties caused by UXO, as well as the ongoing post-conflict impacts. 

A cluster munition is defined by the CCM as ‘a conventional weapon that is designed to disperse or release explosive submunitions each weighing less than 20 kilograms, and includes those explosive submunitions’.[32] Article II of the CCM allows for certain munitions that disperse explosive submunitions, provided they meet the following criteria: 

1. fewer than 10 explosive submunitions
2. weighing more than 4 kilograms
3. designed to detect and engage a single target object
4. equipped with an electronic self-destruction mechanism
5. equipped with an electronic self-deactivating feature.[33] 

This definition prohibits the use of DPICM and MLRS cluster rockets, permitting only specific guided sensor-fused munitions.

The basis upon which certain munitions are excluded from the prohibitions imposed by the CCM is largely arbitrary, is exceptionally restrictive and fails to address the problem of UXO. Specifically, the initial three criteria have no relevance to the likelihood that a cluster munition will generate UXO. Additionally, the initial two criteria are entirely arbitrary—raising doubt among academics about their correlation with principles of proportionality and distinction.[34] To illustrate this point, it is instructive to consider several examples. For instance, based upon the CCM’s proscriptions relating to number and weight of submunitions, a warhead containing two 4 kilogram HE guided submunitions is banned by the CCM, whereas another warhead containing nine 4.01 kilogram guided submunitions is acceptable. Equally, the criterion is incongruous when compared with, for example, the potential impact of GBU-43/B Massive Ordnance Air Blast (MOAB) or the 70,000 lb maximum theoretical payload of a B-52.[35] 

Further, the third criterion (requiring that submunitions be designed to detect and engage a single target object) is exceptionally restrictive. Such a constraint is not imposed on any other munition type, meaning that weapon technologies that are arguably more destructive than submunitions (such as high-payload air-delivered bombings and incendiary weapons) are not subject to such restrictions.[36] 

Based on these considerations, the first three CCM criteria should be discarded in favour of more direct and measured restrictions aimed at reducing the spread of UXO. Indeed, the removal of these criteria from the CCM should be a prerequisite for Australia’s continued accession to the CCM. 

Only the fourth and fifth criteria directly address the risk posed by UXO—requiring each explosive submunition to be equipped with an electronic self-destruction and self-deactivating feature. These prohibitions should be tightened through the specification of minimum acceptable failure rates for self-destruction and self-deactivation features of cluster munition types held within a state party’s military’s inventory. Such measures would directly and measurably address the problem of UXO and would strengthen the CCM’s purpose, incentivise improvements to cluster munitions fail-safe technology and disincentivise continued use of less reliable legacy munitions. 

The next part of this paper will review the issues surrounding failure rates of modern cluster munitions and the degree to which such munitions can properly be criticised as having an indiscriminately wide-area effect.

The Problem of Unexploded Ordnance

The problem of UXO is a function of the high failure rate and lack of a self-destruction capability of many cluster munition types. While figures vary, manufacturers often assert a 2 to 5 per cent failure rate, while mine clearance specialists are more likely to estimate figures of around 10 to 30 per cent.[37] Regardless of the actual percentage, it is difficult to pinpoint a failure rate that might be regarded as ‘acceptable’ within the international community. In the absence of clear guidance, the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) provides a useful frame of reference. Specifically, it is arguable that any self-destruction or self-deactivating feature should achieve a measurable failure rate that complies with the rules against indiscriminate use of force that are enshrined in international humanitarian law. To determine what that rate should be, this article uses deductive comparisons. 

In the following section, the failure rate of cluster munitions is compared to that of other HE munitions for which no specific restrictions on use are imposed by treaty. Instead, their use is governed broadly by international humanitarian law. 

• Grenades. The example of grenades demonstrates that despite high failure rates, many munitions remain unrestricted. For example, reporting from India suggests that there exists a 30 per cent failure rate of some grenades.[38] Grenades likely remain unprohibited due to the lower numbers of grenades and low reporting of UXO issues associated with grenades. The example of the grenade could be justly criticised due to the incomparable numbers of submunitions typically employed vis-à-vis hand grenades.
• 2.75 inch rockets. While rockets comprise individual (not sub) munitions, the rapid pace at which they are fired, and their area effect, is broadly analogous with the use of cluster munitions. In Vietnam, early variants of these air-to-surface rockets had a 10 per cent failure rate.[39] Nonetheless, no treaty specifically restricts their use. 
• 40 mm automatic grenade launcher. The 40 mm cartridge of an automatic grenade launcher is comparable to a cluster munition because it is an automatic fire capability with area effects. Leading manufacturer Rheinmetall claims a failure rate of less than 1 per cent for this armament, and its use is not specifically restricted under treaty law.[40]

The examples above indicate that munitions demonstrating failure rates ranging from 1 per cent to more than 30 per cent have not attracted international prohibitions on their use. Taking the most conservative approach, a 1 per cent failure rate would appear to offer a baseline for cluster munitions that could be justified by the Australian Government at an international level. Indeed, the Department of Defense of the United States, a non-signatory to the CCM, instituted a mandatory 1 per cent failure rate ceiling to be achieved for cluster munitions used after 2018.[41]

Notwithstanding that a basis exists to assert a 1 per cent failure rate ceiling for cluster munitions, there are evidently critics of such an approach. For example, Human Rights Watch has observed that ‘[e]ven with a 1 percent failure rate, a single, typical cluster rocket strike would leave about 40 landmine-like duds’.[42] This criticism is based on the view that the whole warhead, rather than the submunition, is the appropriate unit of measure for failure rate, and that any failure rate is relative to the number of submunitions. Such a standpoint, however, is inconsistent with accepted international norms with respect to the use of other conventional munitions. For example, an entire volley of 2.75 inch rockets is not considered to have failed if a single rocket fails to detonate—whereas, based on the position asserted by Human Rights Watch, a cluster munition fails if even one submunition fails to detonate. 

To bridge the divide, this paper proposes a baseline for the permissible use of cluster munitions, founded on a utilitarian ethical judgement that is less arbitrary than current restrictions on size and number of submunitions imposed by the CCM. Namely, any weapon which is more likely than not to result in UXO should be regarded as unethical on the basis of it being indiscriminate. This standard would demand that the sum of the failure rates of all submunitions within a warhead must not exceed 50 per cent. 

Applying this baseline to a hypothetical example, a cluster munition with 100 submunitions, and with a failure rate up to 0.5 per cent per submunition has no more than a 50 per cent probability of leaving just one submunition as UXO. Such a cluster munition would meet the proposed benchmark. Equally, a hypothetical cluster munition with 25 submunitions and a failure rate of up to 2 per cent per submunition would also meet the standard. By contrast, in the case of cluster munition rocket artillery with large payloads (such as M39 Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) and M30 rockets), hundreds of submunitions are delivered in one strike, meaning that the probability of UXO is very high—regardless of technological advances. Considering the M270 MLRS (HIMARS or GMLRS) is the most likely contender for the Land 8113 Long Range Fires project, to remain within the proscriptions of the CCM, this weapon system would still need to utilise only 227 mm or ATACMS unitary and M30A1 ‘alternate warheads’ with tungsten balls instead of submunitions.[43] Placing such a limitation on the capability, however, significantly constrains its potential military utility against armoured targets. Regardless, when applying the proposed scalable 50 per cent UXO baseline to this example, such munitions should remain prohibited. 

Applying a scalable failure rate for cluster munitions, combined with the existing criteria 4 and 5 of the CCM, would considerably enhance the CCM’s potential to address the threat posed by UXO within the international community. Predicated on this reasoning, an international baseline of 1 per cent failure at the submunition unit of measure, and a scalable 50 per cent failure rate at the warhead unit of measure, provides a sound basis for Australia to negotiate an amendment to the CCM.

The Problem of Wide-Area Effects

Area effects are a characteristic feature of both indirect and direct fire weapon systems. While the issue of area effects is not expressly addressed by the CCM, the laws of armed conflict imposes a prohibition on weapons that breach the principles of discrimination and proportionality.[44] Critics of cluster munitions routinely contend that cluster munitions deliver area effects that are so uncontrolled and dispersed that they necessarily breach the prohibition against the use of weapons that are inherently indiscriminate. This part of the paper challenges this assertion.

The CCM imposes several restrictions related to the perceived ‘uncontrolled’ and ‘dispersal’ characteristics of cluster munitions. Specifically, at criterion 1, the number of explosive submunitions is limited to 9, weighing over 4 kilograms. While the basis for this precise specification is unstated, there is a clear implication that any munition that breaches these restrictions in numbers and minimum weight delivers submunitions in a payload that is necessarily indiscriminate or disproportionate. Similarly, criterion 3 requires that munitions are to be designed to detect and engage a single target. This criterion implies that unguided munitions are, by their nature, insufficiently discriminate or controlled. 

However, the requirement for single-target precision is not imposed on any other munition, including munitions of a more destructive nature such as incendiary or high-payload aerial bombing.[45] The payload restrictions also comenumber, wide-area dispersal unstuck when compared to the area effects of the GBU-43/B MOAB or the 70,000 lb maximum theoretical payload of a B-52.[46] These restrictions in the CCM are highly inconsistent with the existing body of LOAC, which does not restrict payload or guidance mechanism, but instead restricts the method of employment and target selection. 

A counterargument is that it is not the weight, number, wide-area dispersal or the unguided movement that is—individually—at issue. But there is more at issue. It is the combination of all these factors that results in unacceptably indiscriminate area effects, particularly in circumstances in which cluster munitions are the product of low-cost and simple production methods. Such production methods generally result in fewer fail-safe measures to improve discrimination. 

A more effective way to contain this accumulation of risk factors is to replace criteria 1 to 3 of Article II of the CCM with tighter requirements around the effectiveness of self-destruction and self-deactivating features (as proposed above). This proposal addresses all concerns raised and their effects combined, in a measurable and direct manner. This would be a clear improvement on the more arbitrary and exceptional restrictions outlined in criteria 1 to 3 of Article II of the CCM. Indeed, such a measure may actually encourage non-ratifying states to accede to the CCM. This is because the wholesale restrictions currently imposed by the CCM on submunitions and payloads do not incentivise the adoption of improved fail-safe technology and deter many states from becoming parties to the CCM.[47] 

Cannon Delivered Area Effects Munition Program

The preceding amendments recommended to the CCM appear to be difficult to achieve in light of current weapons technology. In this regard, an examination of technological developments in the United States is instructive. While not a signatory to the CCM, in 2008 the United States committed to only utilising cluster munitions with a failure rate of less than 1 per cent. In response, the US Army initiated the Cannon Delivered Area Effects Munition (C-DAEM) program to lead the development and trialling of new cluster munitions to meet this requirement. 

Today, the C-DAEM program is considering two key munitions that deliver area effects, with the development and testing phase scheduled for completion by mid-2024.[48] The first is the proximity-initiated submunition round (PRAXIS) which disperses 5 submunitions of pre-formed tungsten fragmentation for highly lethal anti-personnel and light materiel effects.[49] PRAXIS is armed with an Extreme Reliability Tri-Mode Proximity Fuse combining a proximity fuse with 97 per cent reliability, an impact fuse with 98 per cent reliability and a time fuse with 98 per cent reliability.[50] Despite its goal of ‘1 in a million UXO’, PRAXIS will nonetheless contravene the CCM as each submunition is not designed to detect and engage a single target. The other munition under development is the DPICM-XL munition, containing 60 submunitions. The DPICM-XL will have similar effects to the legacy M483 DPICM munitions in defeating personnel and light materiel through to medium armour.[51] Despite having an extreme reliability fuse, this munition will also contravene the CCM because it breaches the CCM’s nine submunition limit and the requirement for single-target engagement.[52]

In the event of a peer-on-peer conflict, Australia should reserve the right to utilise these highly lethal, dual-purpose and area-effects munitions. With advancing technology, the arbitrary and exceptional nature of Article II to the CCM becomes increasingly evident. 

Risks of Withdrawal

The effort to seek amendment or withdraw from Australia’s treaty obligations under the CCM would be no small task for our elected representatives. So it is worth considering the potential risks and mitigations that could serve as a basis to pursue such a change. 

The diplomatic risks of amendment and withdrawal for Australia are significant. China’s recent criticism of the AUKUS submarine deal (despite having its own nuclear submarines) suggests that any Australian decision to withdraw from the CCM and to acquire advanced cluster munitions would prompt further such criticism.[53] While being a producer and exporter of cluster munitions used in Iraq, Israel, Lebanon and Sudan, China has not utilised such munitions itself.[54] Closer to home, Australia’s immediate region has not seen majority support for the CCM, with only three of 10 ASEAN nations and 10 of 18 Pacific Islands Forum nations ratifying or signing it.[55] Even nations with significant UXO remnants in their territory, Vietnam and Cambodia, do not support the CCM.[56] Nevertheless, South Pacific nations—particularly those with a history of nuclear testing in their region—would likely view any Australian decision to withdraw from the CCM with concern. Equally, Indonesia would be expected to criticise any such decision to withdraw, despite its own reticence to proceed from signatory to ratification. Beyond the political implications of condemnation by neighbouring states and global powers, Australia would need to remain cognisant that any move to withdraw from the CCM could potentially encourage other states to follow suit or to proceed further in their own acquisition of low-reliability, high-payload, legacy cluster munitions.

Several factors could mitigate the political and diplomatic consequences of Australia seeking to amend or withdraw from the CCM. Firstly, Australia could commit to adhering to the principle and intention, but not the letter, of the CCM. This commitment could be reinforced by more conservative restrictions than those of its principal ally, the US. Specifically, Australia could commit to withholding the use of rocket and aerially delivered cluster munitions until such munitions are technically able to meet the scalable failure rate outlined above. Secondly, Australia’s commitment to a strict testing regime would assure the international community of Australia’s adherence. Finally, any withdrawal from the CCM would need to be prefaced with a genuine commitment to amending the CCM in line with the recommendations made in this paper.

Conclusion

The case for cluster munitions is predicated on the three distinct characteristics of DPICM: area effectiveness, lethality and dual purpose. The public pleas made by a senior Ukrainian military official in Small Wars Journal for the US to provide DPICMs to Ukraine[57] highlighted the lethality and effectiveness of these weapons, as well as the stakes at play in its war with Russia. 

Within the US-led alliance system, DPICM-XL and PRAXIS are likely to become the ethical, lethal, dual-purpose, area-effect 155 mm munitions of choice from 2024 onwards. The effectiveness and fail-safe technology of these munitions strengthens the case for the Australian Army to acquire them. While it is likely (in the event of a near-peer conventional war) that the United States would return to employing M30 and ATACMS cluster variants from its MLRS, it is not clear that technology would have sufficiently advanced for these MLRS cluster munitions to meet the scalable failure rate outlined above. Therefore, the Australian Army should seek to acquire unitary warheads for point targets and M30A1 warheads for area targets in its LAND 8113 Long Range Fires project.

Australia’s deteriorating strategic circumstances and the increased prospect of Great Power competition in the Indo-Pacific may justify the use of highly lethal, dual-purpose area effects. As the Ukrainians have out of desperation, the Australian Army should advocate for the use of cluster munitions if it is to remain competitive in response to emerging military challenges.

Army Commentary

James Saint’s judiciously researched piece advocating for the revisitation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions comes at a critical point in Australian fires modernisation. The next decade will see the Australian Army procure and realise an unprecedented expansion of its tactical and operational fires capabilities. Moving beyond intimate support to ground forces, the Army will be enabled to execute shaping actions and counter-fires and strike high-value targets. 

Critical to success in the future is not just the replacement of delivery systems or additional platforms; the family of munitions must be modernised and evolved. This paper recognises that progressive advancements in projectile technology now permit a great level of dependability and precision, while maintaining lethality and mitigating the problems of area effects and UXOs. Captain Saint has effectively highlighted that contemporary advancements challenge some of the technical and ethical factors underpinning the initial signing of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, providing a practical justification for a reassessment.

The weapon of artillery is the projectile, not the equipment that fires it. As the Army continues down the path of fires modernisation, understanding the tactical, technical and ethical constraints of our systems is critical. This will necessitate embracing new procedures and technical constraints and, as advocated by Captain Saint, revisiting legacy restrictions to ensure they survive contact in the future battlefield.

Benjamin Gray

Lieutenant Colonel

About the Author

Captain James Saint is an Artillery Officer currently completing a Masters of Strategy and Security with the University of New South Wales.

Endnotes