Defining Land Force Mobilisation

Australia’s strategic environment is deteriorating. The scale, scope, concurrency and intensity of conceived future operational tasks will require some level of land force mobilisation. However, the allocation of resources to, across and between tasks will vary as the strategic context and direction changes. As recognised in the 2023 Defence Strategic Review (DSR), this level of uncertainty combined with a reduction in strategic warning time^[1] requires Defence to increase preparedness, thereby realising ‘tangible enhancement to our warfighting capability and to self-reliance in national defence’.^[2] Specifically, the DSR directs Defence to undertake ‘accelerated preparedness’ across key interest areas including workforce, supply, infrastructure, distribution and posture.^[3] For Army, this represents an opportunity to reflect on what is being asked of its land forces by government to ensure it is prepared. It requires Army to consider lessons from the past to foster greater learning and to elucidate what has changed. It also necessitates that Army rebuild capability ahead of future missions. These are not simple tasks; nor are they finite. They are tasks that governments and militaries have got, and could get, wrong. For example, a 2000 parliamentary inquiry into the Australian Army found: ‘The Army commenced both World Wars fundamentally unprepared. In neither case was the Army adequately prepared for the nature of the conflict or the scale of its commitment.’^[4] The inquiry went on to note that the cost ‘for this inadequate preparation was paid for in Australian lives and reduced national security’.^[5] If Army is to mitigate these very real and devastating risks, while adapting quickly in line with government and Defence guidance, the organisation must have a clear definition of what future conflict, and therefore mobilisation, means for land forces and how it can prepare in the immediate and long term. 

This article intends to inform those tasked with implementing accelerated preparedness so that Army can meaningfully contribute to the integrated force now, and set the conditions required for the future force. It also aims to engage a broader audience across Army on the issue of preparedness and mobilisation, as well as those in the academic community and industry. To do so, the article first examines current understandings of mobilisation, preparedness and scaling. Following an analysis of historic Army commitments and government guidance, it considers the role of land power and highlights possible future strategic scenarios. Next, it reflects on historic mobilisation activities to identify specific challenges and lessons for Army that will enable accelerated preparedness. In doing so, this article presents a mobilisation ecosystem to inform implementation of force structure changes, realise more rapid capability development and focus organisational transformation. These findings therefore support Army’s logic-based approach to force design and support higher levels of Defence preparedness.

Part One—Understanding Preparedness, Mobilisation and Scaling

Preparedness and mobilisation have become topics of sharp focus in public discussions following the series of national emergencies in Australia from 2019 and in light of the Russia-Ukraine War. According to the Australian Government, the Defence response to the 2019–2020 national bushfire emergency (Operation BUSHFIRE ASSIST 2019–2020) was the ‘largest ever mobilisation of the ADF in response to a domestic disaster’.^[6] Approximately 6,500 Australian Defence Force (ADF) members provided support to emergency services across Australia; parts of the Defence estate were repurposed as shelters and joint task force command centres; and Defence assets supported firefighting efforts and rescue operations and transported emergency supplies.^[7] This operation also represented the first ever ‘call-out’ of the Reserves authorised under the Defence Act 1903, whereby members serving part time were obliged to render full-time service for the duration of the order.^[8] On a much larger scale, Ukraine, Russia and the international community have mobilised national resources and defence elements to further their objectives in the war—attaining success through mass as much as battlefield superiority (through people, capability and financial resources).^[9] 

In light of these recent events, several security commentators have called on Australia to reflect on its future mobilisation and preparedness needs, with some going as far as requesting planners to ‘get cracking’.^[10] Answering these calls and the rapidly changing strategic environment, the DSR terms of reference included direction to ‘outline the investments required to support Defence preparedness, and mobilisation needs to 2032–33’.^[11] It also stated: ‘The Review will make recommendations in relation to Defence force structure, force posture, and preparedness over the period 2023–24 to 2032–33.’^[12] The DSR outcomes were deliberately ambitious, with some taking immediate effect. Mobilisation, however, is absent from the list of substantive transformation efforts and from the debate following release of the review. On the other hand, preparedness is considered at length in the DSR, with the document outlining that Defence requires ‘accelerated preparedness’ covering force posture, capability acquisition and a reprioritisation of funding in line with strategic threats.^[13] The reason for the disparity in consideration of mobilisation compared to preparedness in the government’s preeminent strategic document is unclear. Indeed, it invites the question: why is government asking Defence to prepare, but not mobilise?

The answer is a simple one, grounded in the definitional delineation. The term ‘mobilisation’ is generally used to refer to a whole-of-government response to a an immediate (or realised) threat of national significance—as exemplified by both Operation BUSHFIRE ASSIST 2019–2020 nationally and the Russia-Ukraine War internationally. At times, mobilisation may be limited to Defence in practice. At other times, mobilisation may require whole-of-government support. In both instances, however, mobilisation reflects a national endeavour. In the Australian context, mobilisation for Defence is the activity, or process, of transition between preparedness and the conduct of a specific military operation. It is the shift from the force-in-being (FIB) at a minimum level of capability (MLOC) to an operational level of capability (OLOC).^[14] In this context, the decision to mobilise is taken by government, and is given effect by Defence. The ability to respond, however, is based on whether Defence is prepared to do so. Preparedness therefore is the measure that determines whether Defence has the sustained capacity to meet the conceivable operational demand and to accomplish government-directed tasks within a specified time. Underpinning this measure are considerations of ‘readiness’ (ability to respond within a specified time) and ‘sustainment’ (ability to continue meeting directed tasks).^[15] Within this concept, any attempt to achieve the DSR-directed accelerated preparedness requires consideration of the circumstances in which the Australian Government may require Defence and/or national mobilisation to be given effect. 

Notably absent from discussions surrounding mobilisation requirements and Defence preparedness activities is the concept of scaling or scalability. Such an omission may again have definitional origins. Force expansion is generally the term used in tandem with mobilisation^[16]—for good reason. To transition ADF elements to OLOC requires some (and variable) increases in military capability, known as force expansion.^[17] Similar to the distinction between mobilisation and preparedness, scalability is a measure for its counterpart concept: force expansion. Most frequently referenced in relation to technology and engineering practices,^[18] scalability is the ability to deliver acceptable performance as demand grows. For Defence, performance can be measured in terms of organisational outcomes as well as the delivery of military power. Accordingly, Defence will be required to scale when there is increased demand due to operational commitments that strain or exceed the capacity of the FIB. In this context, it is important that Defence leverages technology. Critically, technology can have a force multiplier effect because it can enhance conventional platforms/workforce and, in some instances, replace the need for them entirely. For example, in 2021, Army’s Robotic and Autonomous Systems Implementation & Coordination Office demonstrated that ‘the autonomous leader-follower trucks, that can drive in convoys, reduc[e] the number of drivers required—generating “logistic mass”’.^[19] These advancements underscore the disruptive nature of technologies and the need to consider the generation of land power in new ways. To do so, this article introduces the notion of ‘force-size effect’.

Traditionally, operational demand for land power was assessed based on capability inputs (conventional force compositions). However, as demonstrated above, there are now new ways to achieve a strategic effect or mission that are independent of force structure, size or geographic disposition. This situation shifts force analysis/design from a linear evaluation of capability-to-task (force structures and platforms to achieve a specific operational task) to more innovative thinking about all ways available to achieve the desired output (effect). Applied to the analysis of future force design, the concept of force-size effect can help clarify the size a force needs to be to generate the military power necessary to meet the operational demand. Force-size effect is the level of military power required to meet operational demand based on the known and measurable effect of current capability, also referred to as the FIB. This is a nuanced way to analyse force multipliers in force design. Continuing the previous illustration, employment of autonomous systems may enable Army to enhance the resident land power capability of the FIB by 1.5 times—generating a force-size effect of FIB x 1.5. Conceiving solutions using force-size effect enables Army to mitigate or reduce risks related to the key transformation pillars in the DSR, such as workforce, infrastructure, materiel and force posture, in a resource-constrained environment. Finally, in delineating these terms, Army has an excellent opportunity to qualitatively improve contributions to the integrated force for future operations. Indeed, it is the responsibility of Army to generate land power (preparedness) to meet government-directed Defence objectives in support of Australia’s national interests (mobilisation) at the rate required (scaling).

By conceptualising operational requirements in terms of force-size effect, decision-makers can leverage asymmetric opportunities presented by advancements such as technology or integration with partners. This opportunity can become critical in periods of heightened operational tempo. For example, the international responses to Operation BUSHFIRE ASSIST 2019–2020 and the Russia-Ukraine War highlight the international aspects of mobilisation and the opportunities presented by force integration—particularly for enhancing military power. When Australia faced a national bushfire emergency, the governments of Canada, Fiji, Vanuatu, Indonesia, Japan, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Singapore and the United States all pledged aid and resources in support. This assistance included 450 military personnel. Equally, when Ukraine faced an existential threat from Russia, 41 countries provided some form of humanitarian, financial and/or military support. This assistance amounted to a massive €143.6 billion between 24 January 2022 and 15 January 2023 and ‘made a real difference on the battlefield, and helped the people of Ukraine defend their country from Russian attacks and advances’.^[20] Demonstrating the surge in effort achievable through integration, such commitments will continue to have a powerful influence on the outcomes of crises.

Figure 1. Understanding preparedness, mobilisation and scaling

Part Two—The Role of Future Land Forces in Conceivable Operational Scenarios

In both Operation BUSHFIRE ASSIST 2019–2020 and the Russia-Ukraine War, mobilisation occurred as the result of iterative planning and preparation. In fact, their execution was the culmination of decades of threat analysis, combined with decisions concerning strategic priorities, resources, skill, force structure and facilities. In line with these factors, governments conducted real-world testing and adopted transformation initiatives. This type of planning makes the unprecedented (marginally) predictable, enabling governments to be prepared, to be ready. However, with collapsing strategic warning time and a rapidly changing strategic environment, Australia is confronted by the need to push preparedness beyond current time horizons and to quicken capability development cycles.^[21] Such a shift in thinking requires assessing a future defined by high levels of uncertainty and high stakes for miscalculation. In this future, Australia is confronted by the very real ‘prospect of major conflict in the region that directly threatens our national interest’.^[22] To be ‘ready’ for this prospect requires contemplation of historical mobilisation case studies to understand what has changed and identify lessons learnt. In his 2020 paper considering Australian national mobilisation, Peter Layton highlights the intellectual benefits of considering past case studies and alternative future scenarios to resolve issues of strategic uncertainty.^[23] Layton asserts that this combined approach to mobilisation policymaking and planning reduces uncertainty by projecting the known past onto conceivable futures—mitigating the risks of depending on history repeating itself, while subsuming the wisdom of the past into new approaches and processes.^[24] For Army specifically, mobilisation scenarios reflect three types of historical military commitments, outlined below. In each scenario, land power was mobilised and expanded differently to mitigate variations in operational demand, making considerations of preparedness and scaling similarly distinct.

• Large-scale, prolonged, conventional warfighting (World Wars). Maintenance of readiness forces, requiring mass expansion that levered Universal Service. In the most extreme case, during World War II, the Australian Government met the operational demand with an Army that was 13 times the size of the standing Army prior to mobilisation (FIB x 13). Notably, due to a drain on the domestic industrial base, Army conducted a period of demobilisation in 1943 that reduced the force to 366,000 personnel across six divisions by 1945.^[25]
• Limited conventional warfighting (Korea and Vietnam). Maintenance of readiness forces, requiring expansion to meet deficiencies in the FIB that leveraged National Service. At the peak of this, during the Vietnam War, the Australian Government met the operational demand with an Army that was 1.5 times the size of the standing Army prior to mobilisation (FIB x 1.5), but found it difficult to field a single battalion for operations.^[26]
• Contingent commitments (INTERFET / Middle East / domestic emergencies). Remediation of readiness shortfalls, requiring changes to preparedness rather than surge or expansion. In 2006, at the peak of Army’s commitment to Afghanistan and Iraq, the Australian Government increased the land force by raising two additional infantry battlegroups and essential enablers. This initiative was known as the ‘Enhanced Land Force’. Most other changes occurred within a revised preparedness system that introduced the ‘raise, train, sustain’ model, and integrated Reserve Forces.^[27]

These scenarios represent historic consistencies for land power contributions to national mobilisation efforts.^[28] Across these commitments, there is also commonality among mission-specific land domain tasks. Specifically, Army has generally required:

• Field forces for contributions to regional contingencies and allied operational commitments. A ready force capable of deploying on operations across the spectrum of conflict, domestically and internationally, as required. These forces have been deployed for (broadly) warfighting, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), and maintenance of security and stability in regionally relevant locations, known as theatre gateways. 
• Garrison forces for defence of Australia tasks. These are forces ready to deploy for defence of Australia tasks, vital asset protection, civil defence, route security, administration and training. These forces have provided coastal and anti-aircraft defence, security for internment camps, emergency manning for offshore establishments, and security for Army establishments, as well as for declared prohibited, protected and controlled areas. 
• A training and maintenance organisation to sustain Australian and partner forces. This capability entails a robust support system that underpins field and garrison forces as well as other allied forces. Historically, it has delivered arrangements for increased administration and training of the force, construction of additional works, and acquisition of stores, weaponry, supplies and vehicles by purchase or impressment.^[29]

Though brief, this overview offers a baseline for conceivable future scenarios and land force tasks. Its relevance, however, is not absolute. Any consideration of historical case studies should be tempered by consideration of the unique characteristics of the contemporary security environment. While history is important, over-reliance on it risks neglecting the value of predictive analysis concerning the future operating environment and stymieing efforts to understand ‘the art of the possible’ (in terms of both the nature of the challenges and the available courses of action in response). Therefore, this article combines historical analysis with future-focused analysis. Consistencies between current Australian Government guidance and Australia’s history of national mobilisation demonstrate three possible scenarios requiring the deployment of land capability. These are: (1) HADR tasks domestically and overseas; (2) regional security/stability operations; and (3) major conflict in the region.^[30] Government does not present dates alongside these possibilities; nor does history forecast time horizons for them. The DSR instead outlines three time periods that foreshadow critical planning horizons:

• 2023–2025—Enhanced FIB (for matters which must be addressed urgently and as an immediate priority)
• 2026–2030—accelerated acquisition to the Objective Integrated Force
• 2031 and beyond—delivery of the Future Integrated Force.^[31]

With the multifaceted lessons on mobilisation and preparedness presented by Operation BUSHFIRE ASSIST 2019–2020 and the Russia-Ukraine War, there is a last and critical takeaway for futures analysts and planners: strategic risks, and the mission-specific tasks outlined above, will almost certainly entail some level of concurrency. Both climate change and shifts in the international system have become central components of the current and future operating environment and represent key risks in fatiguing a limited national security capability. They represent concurrent challenges at both the strategic and operational levels. For example, the DSR is unequivocally a maritime-focused strategy, but it has reinvigorated a focus on ‘national defence’ achieved by ‘deterrence through denial’.^[32] Australia must therefore balance tensions between defending its sovereign territory, and doing so far from its shore before a threat is realised. For Army, concurrent tasking is already consuming readiness at rates unsustainable for long-term preparedness—especially for specialist capabilities and platforms.^[33] These challenges reveal the complexity of maintaining a small and capable defence force that can address, or avoid, a range of concurrent strategic risks. It also reveals the need to plan the capability of future land forces^[34] to meet the most dangerous anticipated strategic risk faced by Australia: the prospect of major conflict in the region that directly threatens our national interest.^[35]

Part Three—Army’s Mobilisation Challenge

Every time Australia has contributed to a major conflict it has mobilised its land forces. Army’s history of mobilisation demonstrates the organisation is capable of rapidly moving from a low preparedness base to a significantly expanded and operationally relevant force. However, doing so has required Army to scale on demand, while in conflict, with limited resources. To meet these challenges, Army has leveraged an effective and scalable training system, a balanced force structure and its geographic disposition.

In wartime, training has always been essential to the generation of Army’s scaled workforce^[36] as well as to assure combat proficiency.^[37] For example, in World War II, increasing the size of the land force depended on recruitment and the generation of trained personnel. At this time, the establishment of divisions (other than the original Citizen Militia Force (CMF) divisions) occurred when required and when an acceptable force strength could be achieved. New divisions were therefore raised initially in ‘embryonic’ form, grown from a core base of officers and senior non-commissioned officers. These core personnel were then able to train recruits directly after enlistment, in location.^[38] This expansion occurred in parallel to a fluctuating training continuum where time spent in training was commensurate with an increase in risk tolerance (i.e., when the threat was higher and operational demand increased, training times were reduced). Further, in wartime locations experiencing relatively low operational tempo and low threats of attrition, specialised training, as well as battalion/brigade/division level exercises, was conducted forward in theatre and using coalition-run facilities. For instance, as Japan advanced closer to Australia’s shores, Army required a degree of self-sufficiency in its training continuum and this triggered an exponential expansion in the number and range of training areas/courses/schools domestically. By 1943, a well-developed training continuum enabled the preparation of formations prior to their departure from Australia and insertion into theatre.^[39] In this way, the force generation system was capable of rapidly expanding the force to a small corps of highly efficient officers trained in staff work, a high-quality military college, and a citizen militia.^[40]

Army’s force structure and composition has proven itself to be similarly responsive to operational demand. For example, prior to World War II, no ‘wartime establishment’ existed and the 80,000 CMF accounted for approximately 40 per cent of the wartime establishment—largely based on those structures used in World War I.^[41] This situation soon changed, however, with the mobilised structure (inclusive of the expanded workforce) increasing during the war years to over double the size of the previous standing Army. Based on Australia’s wartime experience, Lieutenant-General Sir John Lavarack subsequently recommended that government should strive for an Army with an establishment two to three times its realised size (FIB x 2 or FIB x 3). Wartime experience also demonstrated the value in expanding recruitment opportunities to a broader cross-section of the Australian population. During World War II, Army recruited (for the first time) significant numbers of Papuans to form the Papuan Infantry Battalions and the New Guinea Infantry Battalions.^[42] Army also approved recruitment of women into an auxiliary force, the Australian Women’s Army Service (AWAS).^[43] The number of women in the AWAS increased commensurate with national mobilisation, rising to an establishment of 18,000 by the end of the war.^[44] Towards the end of the war, other service restrictions were also eased. For example, by 1945, women could serve in major Army headquarters in New Guinea.^[45] The capacity to shift Army’s force structure to meet operational demand and the threat posed represents an essential quality required of the contemporary Army, which demands flexibility as it seeks to manage a growing and expanded force. Generating mechanisms to achieve structural, dispositional and procedural flexibility will therefore be essential to preparing for any scenario that may require mobilisation of land forces in the future. 

The division is the unit of action that has most commonly been used by Army in wartime. In World War I, for example, divisions were seen as essential by the military leadership to ensure Australia ‘might fight as an undivided unit of the British Army’, fearing that without doing so Army’s brigades ‘might be attached to different divisions, and the unity of the force [would] thus be destroyed’.^[46] For both the British and Australian armies, the division originally consisted of three brigades (of four battalions) and other supporting units. By 1940, however, the Australian Army had directed that each infantry battalion comprise a company of reinforcements—thereby ensuring that units were responsible for training their own reinforcements.^[47] In 1943, the Australian divisional structure was changed from the British model to a smaller, more mechanised organisation appropriate for operations in the jungle.^[48] Jungle divisions reflected a shift in strategic direction for Australia, with offensive forces limited to tropical areas. This force composition meant that any redeployment to a non-tropical theatre would necessitate another restructure of the divisional standard.^[49] Reflecting on Army’s predilection towards divisions as a minimum unit of force helps inform future planning. Specifically, natural assumptions around force structure based on historical precedent will need to be tested against the contemporary practice of Australia’s partners, as well as the real demands of the conceivable tasks and the regions into which Army may be deployed in the future.

Relevant to issues of force composition is the matter of geography. During the two world wars, divisions were aligned to Australia’s state and territory boundaries. It was believed (and proven) that raising units on a geographic basis would help generate cohesion within force elements associated with the areas of their origin and their operational tasks.^[50] The only exception to this principle was for specialist trades such as artillery, medical corps and engineers.^[51] Notably, Army oriented its geographic disposition to Northern Australia towards the end of World War II, a disposition that was reaffirmed in the 1987 Defence White Paper. The White Paper established that an increased military presence in this part of Australia would ensure Army achieved greater familiarity and experience within its most likely area of operation, as well as improving its ability to rapidly respond to contingencies.^[52] Consequently, Army’s geographic disposition remains intimately tied to the establishment (preparation) of relationships—through communities, individuals and areas of operation—necessary for land forces to operate in the future.

The lessons from this very simple and deliberately reductionist overview of Army’s history of mobilisation are plentiful. However, this article draws specific attention to only those takeaways that may aid planners and commentators to mitigate future land force mobilisation challenges—those requirements that the organisation can implement now to fulfil the urgent call for accelerated preparedness. The first is simple and an academic cop-out: it is a call to continue this campaign of learning. From this brief investigation into Army’s past, we now have a theory of success to overcome challenges presented by mobilisation. Army has only been successful at mobilising when it was adequately prepared to be relevant to the community, credible in its role, sustainable and efficient, integrated, and flexible in structure and readiness to meet shifting threats. In particular, it fostered geographically relevant civil–military partnerships that enhanced coordination and efficacy in meeting Army needs in both response and scaling. Army also maximised and reinforced relationships internal to the land force that were consistent with those of the joint force, allies and partners. Army was able to do so by leveraging the minimum force required based on a pre-established force structure aligned to warfighting needs. Similarly, Army established and maintained capabilities that supported the breadth of tasks and theatres. Therefore, this article calls for renewed research and debate on these specific mechanisms that enabled Army to move from a low base of preparedness to an operationally relevant force. 

The second lesson is confirmation of the focal role of Army’s expertise and workforce generation system (i.e. the training system) in preparing the integrated force. Following the Cold War, government acknowledged that force expansion was only truly applicable to Army.^[53] Other groups and services are only able to marginally increase force strength. Indeed, long lead times to acquire additional capability create dependencies on the units already on the establishments and equipment they already have; whereas Army can more rapidly expand, significantly increasing force strength through trained personnel, with equipment and most munitions quickly mobilised through domestic production or from overseas suppliers. In this way, ‘the establishment of existing equipment was not the determinant of the force’s ultimate size’ but rather ‘the key factor was [Army’s] maintenance in peacetime of the necessary range of military skills, tactics, command and control, and operational procedures that the force would require for a major conflict’.^[54] Put succinctly, ‘the ability of the force to retain its existing knowledge base and to absorb advances in the military art were the primary controlling factors in the army’s expansion plans’.^[55] In this way, Army is the primary source of expertise in planning large-scale combat operations and the raising and training of large military organisations.

Finally, generating an expanded land force is dependent on an ecosystem of considerations ranging from the operating environment down to those mechanisms that generate expanded capability (see Figure 2). Each element influences preparedness for the Army-in-Being and FIB and the mechanisms required to implement adjustments within extant resourcing and government guidance. Adaptations across the Fundamental Input to Capability (FIC), governance systems, and management of varied recruitment/service obligations will most substantively influence Army’s ability to generate land power at an increased rate.

Figure 2. Army’s mobilisation ecosystem

Generating an expanded land force depends on integrating, coordinating and managing the various FIC, delivered in varied quantities, characteristics and time scales.^[56] These are integral to managing the implementation of changes to land capability, particularly for personnel, training, major systems, facilities and equipment. However, Army has historically focused on those FIC with the greatest impact that are also within the remit of Chief of Army as Capability Manager, due to dependency on Defence or government support for large-scale capability changes. Today, these include training, command and management, major (or in some instances minor) project systems, organisation and personnel. Such changes to the FIC during large-scale combat have often necessitated quicker decision-making cycles and enhanced prioritisation. In response to overriding operational demands, Army has pared back its administrative overheads to include only those that are essential to the facilitation of large-scale combat operations. In parallel, Army has delegated decision-making responsibility to lower levels of command and fostered stronger relationships with other government departments in order to reduce the burden of bureaucracy on the ADF.^[57] While this is impressive when achieved in wartime, if Army is to truly adapt to today’s rapidly evolving security threats, its operating systems need to be optimised for simplicity and efficiency before conflict occurs.  

While efficient systems are important, ultimately the achievement of preparedness requires adequate and consistent resourcing. Interwar armies are generally constrained in recruitment and retention. In particular, Army’s funded force strength is influenced by changing employment practices, employee aspirations and expectations, as well as demographic factors such as age, ethnicity and health.^[58] Further, Army’s traditional recruitment pool and capability investments are impacted by budgetary pressures and societal expectations regarding the role of the military.^[59] To overcome such issues, Army may need to evaluate preparedness initiatives that resolve or mitigate current force issues (such as hollowness), establish and protect an expansion base, and are executed within extant processes and funding. All of the changes proposed in this article are complex and require changes to systems that evolved out of historical and cultural necessity. Changes will not be easy, and reticence to make them will be rife. Nevertheless, the Australian Government has called for these changes, and for their implementation to be accelerated. Army must therefore continue to push for their adoption so land forces are prepared for the fight tonight, while the organisation concurrently sets the conditions for tomorrow.

Conclusion

The 2023 DSR has called for accelerated preparedness. To contribute to this undertaking, Army must improve its capability to fulfil and maintain its responsibilities for national defence while delivering an expansion base for prolonged and concurrent missions. In future, this may require Army to deliver land power at a rate greater than the FIB. To be effective in doing so, Army must remain relevant to the community, credible in its role, sustainable, efficient, integrated, and flexible in structure and readiness to meet shifting threats. Opportunities to realise these characteristics require capability options that resolve current force issues and support expansion within extant resources and processes. In particular, Army can best accelerate its preparedness by adapting the training system, leveraging autonomy and providing essential and transferrable expertise for large-scale combat operations. If these mechanisms are adopted holistically and conceptually, Army will enable the integrated force to mobilise successfully for the conduct of future operations, as and when directed by government. 

About the Author

Hannah Woodford-Smith is a Defence contractor focused on delivering research related to future warfare. She is Director of Woodfordi Group and has a background in open source intelligence, strategy, industry and academia. Hannah has provided support to deployed operations, Army Headquarters and other government organisations. She has publications in cyber security and international relations.

Endnotes