How Divergent Views Shaped a Global Conflict
University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, 2025, ISBN 9780700640560, 340 pp
Edited by: Michael P. M. Finch, Aimée Fox and David G. Morgan-Owen
Reviewed by: Chris Roberts
Framing the First World War; How Divergent Views Shaped a Global Conflict is an academic work that is aimed at the academic community rather than the general reader. In a wide ranging introduction, the editors state that they
seek to explore “the gulf between the imagined warfare and the realities of battle” to investigate how the military forces framed the war they were involved in and how those perspectives shaped and influenced the way in which they sought to understand, conduct, and respond to the conflict.
In something of a statement of the obvious, the editors establish that the starting point for these studies by observing that ‘the ways in which military actors saw and perceived war exerted a significant influence over the decisions they made and the actions they took’. (It would have been surprising if they did not in the initial stages of the war.) The editors’ aim is to contribute to ‘developing the history of the First World War across subfields and approaches, rather than in parallel to one another’. By doing so, they ‘[draw] upon the notion of framing in contemporary contexts – past and present’, noting that framing requires ‘us to reflect not only on the object but also on the activity, not only on historical actors but also on ourselves as historians’. Clearly careful to articulate the drivers behind the book’s genesis, and its aspirations, the editors contend that
[v]iewing the First World War from the perspective of multiple frames by which it was interpreted enables us to engage directly with the inherent complexity and diversity of the conflict. The war was fought for different reasons and in different ways, and it was understood along ideological, political, racial, imperial, and gendered lines.
This generous sweep further asserts that ‘existing studies of military mentalities have yet to reflect that variety.’ This last claim is debatable given the enormous amount of literature devoted to the war. However, in embracing this approach, the editors claim the ‘contributors offer new insights upon three key questions’. These are:
- whose knowledge and understanding matter when it comes to understanding the conduct of the war?;
- which forms of knowledge and understanding shaped the conduct of the war, and how did they do so?; and
- How was knowledge and understanding developed and exchanged during the war?
This expansive explanation for the book is reflected in the eclectic range of topics it covers across several academic disciplines. Consequently, Framing the First World War lacks a central theme or focus.
Presented in four parts, each of three chapters, this publication provides an interesting insight into the subjects it coverst. Whether or not several of them meet the stated aims of the book or even deliver on its sub-title (How Divergent Views Shaped a Global Conflict) is questionable. Nonetheless, each is worthy of reading for those with an interest in the specific topics presented. For the military professional seeking to draw lessons or learning from the past, however, many of the chapters will have little relevance as part of that process. This is especially so with the essays in Part I, The Military World as a Social Space.
The initial chapter of Part I, ‘The Ottoman “Military Nation” idea as a motivational notion’, is concerned with the literature written by military officers, religious leaders, and intellectuals. In particular, the focus is on literature that ascribes the idea that the Ottomans were a ‘military nation’ – emphasising the close bonds between the armed forces and the nation. In this argument, the author advances the idea that the armed forces and the nation were one, both culturally and hereditary. This rationalised the necessity for military service, and provided the justification for the citizen’s obligation to the state. Unfortunately, how this shaped the global conflict is not considered.
The second chapter looks at the views of the German military medical elite on handling casualties prior to the war, and, following the unexpected deluge of wounded men, their observations on their actual experience during the conflict. The conclusion is they ‘framed’ it as a great training situation, not only helping doctors improve their medical skills, but also in educating and disciplining soldiers, physicians, and, indirectly, German society. Lastly, is an essay addressing the place of gossip in the social life of the British armed forces. This covers not only that which occurred within the forces themselves, but also between officers and their wives, and between both with politicians. The latter served as an informal channel of communication for expressing views on senior officers and the way in which the war was being conducted. While claiming it played a vital role in the armed service’s constitution, and as an important organising process, the argument is unconvincing.
Part II, Visions of an International Order, provides two fine studies associated with Allied naval strategy during the war. The first examines the use of the naval blockade as an element of economic warfare. After discussing the employment, strategic thinking, and international law on the subject in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the chapter then examines its application and effects during the war. The topic is addressed largely from the approach the Allies took against the Central Powers, and the impact it had on Germany. Countering this, Germany declared the seas around the British Isles as a war zone, employing mines, but more effectively using its submarine campaign against allied shipping, and Britain’s economy. The author concludes that the belligerents abandoned the prewar negotiated law of blockade, and that policies rather than law determined the operation of economic warfare, resulting in a distorted picture of the blockade in the post war period.
From a different perspective is a study of the British effort to establish their preeminence in directing the naval war through cooperation rather than competition. The author argues this was largely successful, especially in the North Sea and the Atlantic Ocean. He traces this success back to the naval cooperation during the Boxer Rebellion, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902, and the Anglo-French Agreement prewar. The last gave the Royal Navy the lead in the North Sea, while the French would predominate in the Mediterranean. Difficulties arose in the latter theatre when the British realised they had given up too much. Difficulties also arose after Italy entered the war, preferring to operate on their own in the Adriatic Sea. When the Entente struggled to limit losses to Germany’s U-boats, the Admiralty sought to assert its dominance in the Mediterranean, using the anti-submarine campaign as the vehicle to seek a unified naval command under British control. In 1918, although the British attempt to establish a British ‘Admiralissimo’ to direct all Allied naval operations was supported by the Americans, it failed due to resistance from the French and Italians. Overall, however, the article found that allied naval cooperation was largely successful.
On a completely different tangent, Part II concludes with a chapter on the networks of resistance in North Africa and India. The discussion largely covers nascent pan-Islamic, communist and nationalist movements against British and French colonialism. While a few small revolts required punitive action (which diverted small forces from operations in the Middle East), overall these networks had limited effects on the conduct of the war. In shaping a global conflict, one is left wondering – so what?
The chapters in Part III, Military Innovation and Training, provide a consistent theme: the transfer of knowledge and learning about trench warfare. The three case studies involve the exchange of information from the French to the Russians; the American Army’s unpreparedness for war; and tactical learning and innovation in the Habsburg army. There are similarities in the experience of the Russians and Americans, but for different reasons. Although the French freely transferred information and Russian officers visited France, it had little effect in the Russian Army due to several reasons. These included a failure to pass the information down the chain of command, cultural and political perceptions that learning from the French Army would undermine the national image of the Russian soldier, as well as differing conditions on the Eastern Front and the approach the Russians took to solving them.
Similarly, American attaches in Europe provided very detailed reports to the United States Army on the changes in warfare in Europe. Nonetheless, when America entered the war in 1917, its army was completely unprepared for operations on the Western Front. This situation largely stemmed from the army’s strategic priorities in the Philippines, the Caribbean, and along the Mexican border, together with President Wilson’s and Congress’s insistence on neutrality, and not to become involved in the European war. Consequently, the reports were not disseminated widely, and officers viewed the developments in Europe through the prism of their own nation’s and service’s priorities. While the strategic planning agencies were preparing for a possible war with Germany, their plans focused on defending the Western Hemisphere. Thus, when Wilson suddenly demanded a massive intervention in Europe, the US army was left scrambling to put an under equipped expeditionary force together.
The Hapsburg armies entered the war with deeply flawed doctrine and training imbued with the ‘cult of the offensive’. That is, with confidence, aggression and willpower, attacking infantry could overcome the increased firepower on the modern battlefield. There was little cooperation between the artillery and the infantry in undertaking offensive action. While the army quickly learned the fallacy of this approach, there was a disconnect between the changes advocated by those at the Front and the doctrine being published by the high command. Eventually, the poor performance of the Hapsburg armies led to German intervention in training and operations. This was resented. Nonetheless, they adopted the German ‘storm troop’ tactics for nominated units, but the only Hapsburg successes were those conducted under German control.
The chapters in Part IV, Strategy, round out the book. The first concerns Anglo-French military thinking pre-war, and the second addresses Italian strategy before the conflict and after they declared war on their former allies. Both reflect the divergent approaches that can be taken by allies, given the focus of their strategic environment. With regard to the Italians, it reminds us that an ally will pursue their own interests when they can, both in joining a conflict and in the focus of their operations during its conduct. The last chapter is a wide-ranging essay on the influence of the First World War on strategy, although it covers the spectrum from strategic views pre-war to the influence of the war on strategic thought in its aftermath.
So, what can military professionals draw from this book? From a political and strategic view, the essay on the naval blockades warns us that despite the rules of international law, nations will conduct their operations in the way that best meets their own interests. Similarly, other essays remind us that coalition warfare does not mean that allies will necessarily cooperate fully, and some will pursue their own interests at the expense of a coordinated approach.
With regard to learning from experience in combat, the chapters in Part III demonstrate that applying those lessons across an army is not as easy as some would suppose. Various factors can intervene in the transfer of knowledge throughout military forces – political, cultural, personal views at higher levels, disconnects across the organisation, and the lack of a central analytic and coordinating body. From the Australian Army’s perspective, it reaffirms the necessity of a central lessons-capture and analysis capability (such as Army’s Battle Lab) for which operational lessons, either from other conflicts or those which the Army is conducting, are swiftly studied and evaluated in relation to the Australian environment. Where the results are applicable, it is essential that the coordination and implementation of relevant lessons to doctrine, adjustments in training, and cultural application are embedded across the Army. It also requires an open mind and a readiness to accept change.
Overall, the essays presented in this book are fine studies of the topics they consider. Each are well worth reading for those with a specific interest in some of them. Nonetheless, in covering such a wide spectrum of academic interests, the publication lacks a central theme, and, as such, it will not satisfy everyone. Rather than purchasing it, this book is one to draw from a library in order to delve into those topics that would interest particular readers.
