The Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have been positioned as the ‘first line of defence’ against a protracted information warfare (IW) campaign launched by Russia. They are increasingly being pulled into the cyber aspects of the Russian Ukrainian conflict. Russia wants to incorporate ethnic Russians and Russian speakers in neighbouring countries into a single Russian state, under the guise of “Greater Russia”. The Baltic states have a history of Soviet occupation and are populated by a large number of Russian speaking individuals. So these countries are particularly vulnerable to misinformation and disinformation campaigns aimed at undermining the stability of the Baltic state societies and their alignment with NATO. The ongoing experiences of the Baltic states provide useful lessons on how nations can strengthen their defences against IW campaigns waged by adversaries.
The Nature of the Russian Threat
Russia’s IW strategies aim to subvert the Baltics states at all levels; their civil society, military and government. The Russian IW campaign is multifaceted and aims to exploit societal tensions, erode trust in democratic institutions, and sow discord within the targeted societies. Russia seeks to exploit the Russian speaking populations within the affected Baltic states,[1] claiming Russia merely wishes to protect Russian national interests and to create a safe ‘Russian world’. This rhetoric is similar to that employed in Donetsk, Luhansk and Crimea, where the protection of ‘endangered’ Russian populations was used as the excuse for a Russian physical intervention.
Russia employs strategies of media manipulation. This is used to establish ‘parallel realities’ through control of the media environment, with Russia limiting traditional Russian language media and focusing on ‘linguistic unity’ created through Russian speaking schools within the Baltic states.[2] Russia also utilises fake journalists to lend credence to these ‘parallel realities’, creating shell websites that mimic legitimate news outlets.[3]
While reaching these Russian speaking populations through traditional media, pro-Russian narratives are now disseminated heavily through social media platforms and messaging applications. These extensive manipulation campaigns all focus on controlling and altering information to suit Russia’s agenda of expansionism. Whether the message is carried via traditional Russian speaking media, fake journalism websites, on social media platforms such as X (formerly Twitter), or messaging applications such as Telegram, Russia’s goal is to erode trust in regional and state institutions within the Baltic states.[4]
Through these information channels, Russia pushes the narrative that the Baltic national governments are ‘fascist’ or ‘failing’ and that regional organisations such as the European Union and NATO are the real aggressive expansionists. These stories are often chaotic and inconsistent by design. Rather than present a cohesive case, Russian propaganda instead seeks to overwhelm and confuse the target audience by peddling conflicting stories that will undermine the public’s capacity to distinguish fabricated stories from honest reporting.[5]
Wagner Case Study
The Russian mercenary group Wagner moved to Belarus in 2023 after a failed attempt to wrest power from the Kremlin in June 2023. The group had been considered Russian elite fighting troops and were heavily engaged in fighting in Ukraine. After the mutiny, a deal was made with Moscow whereby the remaining 5,000 Wagner Group members were relocated to Belarus. Their presence in Belarus was considered a serious source of provocation by its neighbours, Lithuania and Poland. For Lithuania, the Wagner Group’s numbers were higher than those of the Lithuanian army itself. Poland responded decisively by sending two brigades (10,000 troops) to the border with Belarus; Lithuania did not follow suit but increased monitoring of the Lithuanian border.[6]
On Russian-linked Telegram accounts, images of Wagner troops on the Lithuanian border and the Polish Border were shared widely, along with rumours that Wagner troops were being sent to the Suwalki gap or corridor, between Poland and Lithuania. The aim of the online images was to heighten political tension.
Figure 1: Wagner Troops on the Lithuanian Border
Figure 2: Wagner Troop on the Polish Border
By creating fear among countries neighbouring Belarus, Russia aimed to force Poland and Lithuania to deploy more troops to the Belarus border. Doing so would have reinforced the Russian/Wagner narrative that Poland and Lithuania were the aggressors. The images were quickly proven to be false, the disinformation campaign was discredited, the physical threat never materialised, and the Wagner Group was eventually absorbed into the Russian National Guard.
Baltic Responses: A Multi-Pronged Approach
To counter Russian information warfare, the Baltic states have sought to implement comprehensive strategies that draw upon the principles of national unity and strength. Many Baltic governments have restricted the influence of Russian traditional media, shutting down their operations and blocking Russian online platforms.[7] By reducing their populations’ exposure to Russian state media, Baltic states are combating Russian-backed disinformation campaigns by building their own national capacity to resist IW. A number of nongovernmental organisations, academics, and volunteers such as the “Baltic Elves” and Debunk initiative actively debunk online falsehoods and track Russian disinformation campaigns. Through engagement with civil society, the Baltic nations are developing national stories that promote sovereignty, national unity and encourage the development of civic resistance campaigns.[8]
Conclusion
While much has been written about Russian IW campaigns against Ukraine specifically, the Baltics face their own regional challenges, and have responded through whole-of-government and whole-of-society strategies. Ukraine and Baltics nations are not the only countries that encounter Russian IW campaigns. Determined Russian IW efforts have also targeted other members of NATO, European Union countries (especially those in Eastern Europe and Scandinavia), international supporters of Ukraine’s resistance (including Australia) and some smaller states such as Armenia, Georgia and Moldova (who have common borders with Russia or contain Russian ‘peacekeepers’).
In the modern information era, it is evident that every nation may be targeted by IW. It is time for Australia to prepare properly for this scenario. In our recently published Occasional Paper 46 Information Warfare in Ukraine, What Lessons Can be Learned? we present the outcomes of our extensive research into the impact of, and resistance to, Russian disinformation campaigns in Ukraine and the Baltics. We identify some lessons that the ADF, particularly the Australian Army, could implement in response.
About the Author
Distinguished Professor Matthew Warren is the Director of the RMIT University Centre of Cyber Security Research and Innovation and a Professor of Cyber Security at RMIT University, Australia. He is the co-director of the Australian Lithuanian Cyber Research Network. Distinguished Professor Warren is a researcher in the areas of cyber security and information warfare.
He has also attracted research funding from numerous sources, including funding from the Australian Research Council, the Australian Government (Australian Signals Directorate; Department of Education, Skills and Employment; Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade; Department of Defence; Department of Education; Department of Industry, Science and Resources; and Tertiary Education Quality and Standards Agency) and the State Government of Victorian State Government, Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council funding from the UK, EU research funding, funding from the Science Council of Lithuania, and funding from the South African National Research Foundation.
He has authored and co-authored over 300 books, book chapters, journal papers and conference papers. In recognition of Distinguished Professor Warren’s contribution to cyber security he has been twice awarded the Cyber Security Researcher of the Year Award by AISA (Australian Information Security Association) and is a recipient of an ACS (Australian Computer Society) President Award for his cyber security contribution. Professor Warren is a Fellow of AISA and a Fellow of the ACS.
Endnotes
[1] Timothy Thomas. ‘Estonia Reacts: Confronting Russian Manipulation Techniques.’ The MITRE Corporation, January 2020. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/trecms/pdf/AD1141298.pdf.
[2] Elina Lange-Ionatamišvili, ‘Analysis of Russia’s Information Campaign Against Ukraine: Examining Non-Military Aspects of the Crisis in Ukraine from a Strategic Communication Perspective,’ NATO StratCom Centre of Excellence, 2015, https://stratcomcoe.org/cuploads/pfiles/russian_information_campaign_public_12012016fin.pdf.
[3] Brandy Zadrozny. Pro-Kremlin X accounts push fake Fox News articles ahead of debate. NBC News. 18 June 2024. https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/misinformation/-kremlin-x-accounts-push-fake-fox-news-articles-ahead-debate-rcna159301
[4] Michael J. Kelly. "Understanding Russian Disinformation and How the Joint Force Can Address It." 29 May 2024. U.S. Army War College. https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/News/Display/Article/3789933/understanding-russian-disinformation-and-how-the-joint-force-can-address-it/ .
[5] Källkritik Byrån. “Operation Overload.” Check First, June 5, 2024. https://checkfirst.network/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Operation_Overload_WEB.pdf.
[6] Vanessa Vera, ‘Poland plans to deploy 10,000 troops to its border with Belarus’, 10 August 2023, https://apnews.com/article/poland-belarus-border-troops-e4eaf9ad104063453295b22bf05ab31b
[7] Žygintas Abromaitis. ‘Lithuania Blocks Online Access of Sanctioned Russian Media.’ LRT, March 16, 2023. https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/1939384/lithuania-blocks-online-access-of-sanctioned-russian-media.
[8] CRI. “Civic Resilience Initiative,” n.d. https://cri.lt/.
