To What Extent Has the Theory and Practice of Military Command Changed in the 21st Century?

From Plato to NATO, the history of command in war consists essentially of an endless quest for certainty.^[1]

Warfare has both changed and remained surprisingly similar over the last century. The interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan led the Western world to believe that conflicts in the 21^st century would be characterised by stabilisation, intervention and avoiding the human costs suffered during the two world wars and the Vietnam War. The Russo-Ukrainian War has shown this not to be the case, with thousands of casualties per day and trench warfare resembling the wars of the 20^th century. However, it has also exhibited how modern technology can be utilised for military means—for example, the proliferation of commercial drones and the prevalence of electronic warfare. Technological developments in weaponry, communications and other fields in the 21^st century have changed the character of war. Given that command is one of the eight tactical functions of war, it would be prudent to examine how command in particular has evolved since the turn of the century. This essay will do so by first defining the concept of command and then using that definition to analyse how the theory and practice of command may have changed. While there are multiple areas that could be explored, this essay will look specifically at the requirement for decentralisation, leadership, multinational interoperability, the location of command posts (CPs) and the potentials of artificial intelligence (AI). This essay asserts that, while the practice of command may have changed, the underlying theory of command remains unchanged.

Defining Command

British Army doctrine defines command as ‘the authority vested in a member of the armed forces for the direction, coordination and control of military forces’.^[2] This definition is insufficient for the purpose at hand; it fails to encompass the root requirement for command in militaries and the components through which command is effected. Also, ‘authority vested’ implies that the existence of command is contingent on its formal recognition as a concept. However, command systems have been present in some form since the first violent conflicts between two or more groups of humans in the Stone Age.^[3] Therefore, an accurate definition of command should identify the underlying mechanisms that are at play. Although military historians and academics have frequently studied leadership, tactics and strategies, little study has explored command and its associated systems and decision-making processes.^[4] In order to circumvent this obstacle, this essay will define military command through the process of conceptualisation, identifying the underlying constants of military command throughout history; in essence, it will seek to determine the nature of command.

It is uncertainty in war that naturally draws out the practice of command from those in charge of armies. One should imagine two hypothetical, evenly matched armies facing each other in battle. On the basis of identical size, materiel and technology, neither army should win or lose but, in reality, one will. The reason for this is the presence of uncertainty. Grauer explains that any organisation, military or civilian, faces uncertainty due to three factors: the size of the organisation, the sophistication of its technology or cognitive processes employed and the rate of change in the external environment.^[5] In the military context, this final factor can be broken down into four further uncertainties. The first is the presence of a thinking enemy, who will deliberately disrupt a military’s activity in unexpected ways. The second is that the naturally degrading effect of combat on the human soldier means that a plan may not necessarily be completed as directed. The third is Clausewitz’s concept of the ‘friction’ of the battlefield, which can naturally inhibit or obstruct activity. The final uncertainty is chance. To distinguish this from friction, Grauer gives the example of the US Navy’s aircraft carriers coincidentally being out at sea rather than in Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941.^[6] It is this myriad of uncertainties (size, technology, the enemy, human soldiers, friction and chance) that can mean the difference between victory and defeat.

To be successful, a military must do what it can to either inhibit, mitigate or cope with uncertainty. It achieves this through designing and employing a command system appropriate to the uncertainties present.^[7] There are two methods to adapting command systems: ‘differentiation’ and ‘decentralisation’. Differentiation increases the levels of hierarchy in an organisation, which reduces the cognitive load of a commander at the expense of a longer passage of information. Decentralisation increases the responsibility of junior commanders, which allows them to reduce uncertainty at the lowest levels but means less control for higher commanders.^[8] Larger organisations will benefit from increased differentiation regardless of centralisation. Conversely, in a more uncertain operating environment, organisations should increase decentralisation but disregard differentiation. Finally, as technological sophistication increases, organisations should increase both differentiation and decentralisation.^[9] If a military applies differentiation and decentralisation correctly to meet the types of uncertainty present, then its command system will be more effective. This is known as ‘contingency theory’. It provides a logical explanation for the genesis of command systems in armed forces: they are efforts to minimise uncertainty.

Next, this essay will analyse the actions that a command system will take to mitigate, inhibit or cope with uncertainty. Van Creveld defines command as ‘a function that has to be exercised, more or less continuously, if the army is to exist and to operate’.^[10] This function comprises gathering intelligence, processing it to understand the situation, selecting objectives, designing courses of action, disseminating orders, and coordinating the execution of the plan.^[11] Each stage in this process demands the effective management of information.^[12] Pimlott’s definition of command echoes this informational nature: ‘the assessment and dissemination of information needed to direct military force’.^[13] To that end, the ability of a command system to manage information effectively will impact its fighting power accordingly.

The final element that must be examined to conceptualise command is leadership. Theories differ on the relationship between command and leadership; leadership is either a subordinate component of command or an entirely separate concept. British doctrine identifies leadership as one of three functions of command, the other two being control and decision-making.^[14] Anthony King’s ‘Command in the 21^st Century’ reinforced this view.^[15] By contrast, Gary Sheffield argues that leadership is only concerned with inspiration and motivation, while command is a separate managerial function.^[16] However, leadership must be a subordinate function of command. Given that leadership has the capacity to motivate soldiers in the face of danger, it can be the difference between a commander’s plan going as intended or failing. Michael Howard describes his experience of respected commanders arriving on the battlefield and dispelling fear and fatigue among soldiers.^[17] In this way, leadership inhibits the uncertainty that the human factor poses in war. As this is the purpose of command, strong leadership can be seen as integral to effective command rather than separate.

A general theory of command can now be formed. Its purpose is to reduce the uncertainty of battle. A command system will be structured and decentralised appropriately to manage that uncertainty. It must be effective at managing information that it receives, processes and disseminates. Leadership should be considered as a subordinate function of command. These concepts will guide the analysis of any changes to the practice of command during the 21^st century.

Decentralisation of Command and Control

A cornerstone of both the British and Australian armies’ command philosophy is the idea of ‘mission command’, which aims to decentralise decision-making to the lowest possible level.^[18] This decentralised approach allows junior commanders to seize the initiative wherever possible during battle.^[19] The philosophy was necessary in the 20^th century, when communication systems were too limited for the scale and pace of operations. As a result, a central commander could not retain as high a degree of decision-making authority.^[20] This environment was evident during the Falklands campaign. Radios were insecure and so the 3 Commando Brigade commander issued orders prior to battle in person. He would specify what he wanted his subordinates to do but not how they should do it.^[21] Had he not done so, the battalion commanders would have had to await a face-to-face meeting with him on the battlefield or risk using their radios to request updated orders. Both options would have increased the uncertainty posed by the thinking enemy and risked failure.

Since then, communication systems have improved significantly. With this improvement, the requirement for decentralisation should in theory decrease. However, the complexity of warfare has also increased. In Iraq during the 2000s, US generals McChrystal and Mattis exercised mission command to counter the complicated operating environment. McChrystal used technology to form a network of subordinate commanders to ensure shared understanding, united efforts and coordinated activities. Mattis religiously adhered to mission command’s tenet of a clear intent and developed shared understanding through rehearsal of concept (ROC) drills. Mattis knew this would achieve speed, which was critical to deposing Saddam Hussein.^[22] Both commanders exhibited the principle of mission command known as ‘unity of command’.^[23] Mission command continues to be vital now. This is evident in Ukraine, where both sides have struggled to communicate due to the overcrowding of the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS).^[24] This means that militaries will need to be prepared for limited communication, however sophisticated their technology may be. Mission command can provide a mitigation for loss of communications and allow EMS usage to be rationed. In the sense of decentralisation, therefore, little has changed in both the theory and practice of command. If warfare continues to increase in complexity and the EMS remains as crowded, command systems will need to remain decentralised to manage the increased uncertainty.

Requirement for Leadership

Leadership acts as a function of command in its ability to reduce the uncertainty that the human soldier poses to a military; if a commander can motivate their soldiers to carry out their orders, then the plan is more likely to succeed. In Vietnam, both the ANZAC and the American leadership faced challenges in sustaining morale and the willingness to fight amongst the ranks. The ANZACs mitigated this problem by providing leave centres and amenities in base camps and fostering relations with the local South Vietnamese population. The American leadership were less successful in mitigating low morale, which likely contributed to the deterioration of operational progress. However, by the Gulf War, the US military authorities had learnt the importance of maintaining morale and achieved this through communicating a clear political purpose and ensuring massive combat superiority before risking soldiers’ lives.^[25]

The importance of fostering a political purpose and a will to win among soldiers is evident in the Russo-Ukrainian War. On the Russian side, high casualty rates and inconsistency in the rationale behind the invasion have led to extremely low morale. Russian soldiers have shown an unwillingness to follow orders. Meanwhile, on the Ukrainian side, the purpose was initially clear and persuasive: they were defending their sovereignty.^[26] However, as Ukraine has failed to prevent Russian advances, reports of low morale and desertion have increased.^[27] This decrease in morale coincides with a shift in public opinion towards the war: in February 2022, 73 per cent of Ukrainians believed that their country should fight until victory; but in October 2024, this had shifted to just 38 per cent.^[28] It is possible that a declining political purpose has contributed to Ukrainian soldiers’ lack of a will to win. On both sides, however, it is evident that a will to win can impact the outcome of military operations. An effective command system should seek to raise morale to prevent it undermining the execution of plans. This is possible through strong leadership.

With the increased complexity of the 21^st century operating environment, leadership is shifting from a leader-centric model to a follower-centric model, in which subordinates are educated and collaboration with other subordinates is encouraged.^[29] British doctrine highlights the value of followership, which has proven to be a force multiplier when employed properly. In this system, followers maintain high energy to perform and a will to win, primarily because they have a sense of purpose. However, followership is only achieved through effective leadership.^[30] It requires leaders to be humble and accept loyal dissent.^[31] By maintaining a will to win, a culture of followership is more likely to ensure that a command system operates effectively.

Multinational Interoperability

Multinational alliances have occurred frequently throughout recent history. In the Vietnam war, the ANZAC battalion group responsible for the Phuoc Tuy province was subordinate to a US brigade.^[32] During Operation Desert Storm, the British 1^st Armoured Division was fully integrated into the US VII Corps and approximately 100 UK officers worked in the US CENTCOM.^[33] In Iraq between 2006 and 2009, the UK-led Multi-National Division South East (MND SE) was subordinate to the US-led Multi-National Corps—Iraq (MNC-I).^[34] More recently, in 2024, NATO’s Very High Readiness Joint Task Force consisted of the UK’s 7^th Brigade with force contributions from eight NATO allies.^[35] Western allies, in particular European nations, have increasingly depended upon multinational task forces to mitigate their national militaries’ deficiencies. The UK acknowledged this in its Defence Command Paper 2023, in which it called NATO the ‘cornerstone’ of UK defence.^[36] If multinational alliances are going to become more commonplace and more integrated on operations, then any lack of interoperability will add uncertainty to operations.

Several issues arise with multinational interoperability, particularly a lack of experience operating together, language differences and differing political objectives.^[37] From a command perspective, these factors could impede the effectiveness of multinational forces. A lack of experience operating together is likely to increase the uncertainties posed by friction. For example, a forward passage of lines between two formations of different nationalities would be problematic without substantial rehearsal and a thorough understanding of the control measures. Language differences could impact the ability of a commander to achieve mutual understanding with a subordinate from another nation. Finally, differing political objectives can cause issues by presenting commanders with more than one authority to contend with. In 2007, British Major General Jonathan Shaw was ordered by Permanent Joint Headquarters to carry out Operation Zenith, the withdrawal of British forces to Basra Airport, against the wishes of the MNC-I.^[38] This shows how an unclear and non-linear command structure can impede the effectiveness of the system. For multinational alliances to be successful, militaries must ensure that the added complexities are mitigated through suitable and agreed command systems.

Location of Command Posts

The location of a commander in battle can impact the outcome significantly. On the one hand, too close a proximity to the battle can put the commander and their staff at risk of leaving their subordinates without a controlling headquarters. On 28 May 1982, Lieutenant Colonel Herbert Jones, commanding officer of the 2^nd Battalion, Parachute Regiment, was killed when he assaulted an enemy trench to regain his battalion’s momentum.^[39] Although this was a display of commendable gallantry, it left the battalion without its commander for the remainder of the operation. On the other hand, if a commander is too far back, they run the risk of their line of communication failing through chance or malign actors. Furthermore, they are less able to exert leadership and ‘bring their personal presence to bear’.^[40] With the advent of the telegraph and telephone age, commanders could coordinate the battle from far away, but wires laid to achieve this communication were liable to be cut by traffic, shrapnel and enemy saboteurs.^[41] In decisions about positioning a CP, commanders have sought to strike a balance between the CP’s own survivability and the commander’s ability to carry out their role effectively and reliably.

Advances in communication technology have allowed commanders to oversee operations from still greater distances. During the Vietnam War, the commander-in-chief commanded from Hawaii using submarine cables and satellites.^[42] During the Falklands War, the task force commander operated from England via satellite phone.^[43] This trend continued into the 21^st century. In 2014, the commander of US Army Africa supervised a drone strike to kill Al-Shabaab’s chief of intelligence in Somalia from a CP in Italy.^[44] Furthermore, with a relative lack of threat and in pursuit of maximum capability, US CPs in Iraq and Afghanistan grew in size significantly, which increased their signature.^[45] The Russo-Ukrainian war has highlighted the dangers of locating large CPs too close to the front line in a peer-level conflict. By June 2023, the Ukrainians had destroyed several Russian army, corps and divisional headquarters, killing more than 1,500 Russian officers.^[46] This example should prompt commanders to think carefully about how far forward they situate their CPs. With ATACMS having an effective range of 300 km, this would mean a considerable distance to achieve security and survivability.^[47] However, while satellite and 4G communication networks would allow sufficient situational awareness from that distance, the risk of those networks failing through cyber warfare, jamming or overcrowding of the EMS could have a substantial impact on command and control. In the 21^st century, commanders still need to balance their own survivability with (over-)reliance on communication systems.

Decision Support Systems

In recent years, AI has evolved such that it can add value in military command systems; the use of AI in this manner is termed ‘decision support systems’.^[48] The Israeli military has already begun to incorporate AI meaningfully. ‘Habsora’ aggregates data from a variety of sources, such as surveillance data and drone footage, to generate targets of militants’ locations for brigade- or division-level targeting.^[49] ‘Lavender’ sifts through enormous amounts of intelligence from both past and present surveillance sources to identify Palestinians linked to Hamas and pass them on as potential targets.^[50] In the Russo-Ukrainian war, even relatively rudimentary AI in Ukraine’s drones can distinguish between T-72 and T-90 tanks.^[51] Although these systems are far from perfect (Lavender suffers from a 90 per cent misidentification rate^[52]), they prove that AI can be incorporated into command systems. Previously, in order to handle the exponential increase in information from modern operating environments, commanders would have to do one of two things: either increase the size of their staffs or decentralise the authority to act.^[53] Decentralising allows more flexibility and speed at the lower levels but decreases control for the higher commander. Should AI capabilities continue to improve, the capacity to process large amounts of information for decision at higher levels will improve significantly without requiring larger command staffs. This will free humans for higher level tasks.^[54] Furthermore, it is likely that the quality of an AI’s capability will be proportional to the edge that a military holds over its adversary.

Conclusion

Command systems seek to reduce the uncertainty of warfare, in order to maximise fighting power and attain victory wherever possible. The increased pace of warfare, new threats from sophisticated weaponry, and the requirement to operate in multinational alliances across multiple domains have added to this uncertainty. With new technologies, commanders are able to alter the design and employment of their command systems to mitigate that uncertainty. This is evident in the practice of decentralised command, remote CPs and the use of AI since the turn of the century. For these reasons, the practice of command has changed in some ways and will always be subject to change so that it fits the evolving operating environment. Commanders should remain flexible in this sense to maximise their fighting power at all times.

What remains unchanged is the underlying theory of command. Decentralisation is balanced between mitigating uncertainty at the lowest levels and retaining control and clarity for the commander. Strong leadership will always be required to protect the will to fight and minimise the uncertainty of fatigue and fear in soldiers. Multinational alliances may become more commonplace but the theory of command must be applied to mitigate the added friction on interoperability; this means robust command structures, unity of command and clear communication. CPs will always be positioned as far forward as possible to maintain communication and control without undue risk to survivability. Finally, novel decision-support systems may begin to dominate the management of dense information flow, but this is a change to the practice of command rather than its theory. The character of war will continue to evolve and the practice of command must change with it. It can only do so by adhering to the theory of command—‘the endless quest for certainty’—which has not changed; nor will it.

Acknowledgement

This essay is based on a paper selected from student essay submissions to the United Kingdom Intermediate Command and Staff Course (Land). This course exists to educate, train and assess British Army and Royal Marine Majors, instilling a manoeuvrist mindset and intellectual edge essential to winning in war. The views expressed in this essay are not official UK policy and do not represent the official UK view.

Endnotes

^[1] Martin van Creveld, Command in War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 264.

^[2] Land Warfare Centre, Army Doctrine Publication Land Operations Part 3: Command (UK Ministry of Defence, 2022), 1-1.

^[3] Van Creveld, Command in War, p. 1.

^[4] GD Sheffield, ‘Introduction: Command, Leadership and the Anglo-American Experience’, in GD Sheffield (ed.), Leadership and Command: The Anglo-American Experience Since 1861 (London: Brassey’s, 2002), pp. 1–2.

^[5] Ryan Grauer, Commanding Military Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), pp. 30–31.

^[6] Ibid., pp. 36–38.

^[7] Ibid., p. 4.

^[8] Ibid., pp. 27–28.

^[9] Ibid., p. 34.

^[10] van Creveld, Command in War, p. 9.

^[11] Ibid., p. 8.

^[12] Sheffield, ‘Introduction’, p. 2.

^[13] Ibid., p. 1.

^[14] Land Warfare Centre, ADP Land Operations: Command, 1-2.

^[15] Anthony King, ‘Command in the 21st Century’, British Army Review 171 (2018): 23.

^[16] Sheffield, ‘Introduction’, p. 1.

^[17] Michael Howard, ‘Leadership in the British Army in the Second World War’, in GD Sheffield (ed.), Leadership and Command: The Anglo-American Experience Since 1861 (London: Brassey’s, 2002), p. 118.

^[18] Land Warfare Centre, ADP Land Operations: Command, 2-1.

^[19] Land Warfare Centre, Army Field Manual Warfighting Tactics: Part 4 Battlegroup Tactics (UK Ministry of Defence, 2018), 4-1.

^[20] Anthony C King, ‘Mission Command 2.0: From an Individualist to a Collectivist Model’, Parameters: U.S. Army War College 47, no. 1 (2017): 9.

^[21] Julian Thompson, ‘Command at Anzio and in the Falklands: A Personal View’, in GD Sheffield (ed.), Leadership and Command: The Anglo-American Experience Since 1861 (London: Brassey’s, 2002), p. 170.

^[22] King, ‘Mission Command 2.0’, pp. 11–17.

^[23] Land Warfare Centre, ADP Land Operations: Command, 2-1.

^[24] Jack Watling, Oleksandr V Danylyuk and Nick Reynolds, Preliminary Lessons from Ukraine’s Offensive Operations, 2022–23 (London: Royal United Services Institute, 2024), pp. 37–38.

^[25] Robert O’Neill, ‘US and Allied Leadership and Command in the Korean and Vietnam Wars’, in GD Sheffield (ed.) Leadership and Command: The Anglo-American Experience Since 1861 (London: Brassey’s, 2002), p. 193.

^[26] Peter Dickinson, ‘Will Morale Prove the Decisive Factor in the Russian Invasion of Ukraine?’ Atlantic Council (website), 9 March 2023.

^[27] Ivana Kottasova and Kostya Gak, ‘Outgunned and Outnumbered, Ukraine’s Military is Struggling with Low Morale and Desertion’, CNN (website), 8 September 2024, at: https://edition.cnn.com/2024/09/08/europe/ukraine-military-morale-desertion-intl-cmd.

^[28] Benedict Vigers, ‘Half of Ukrainians Want Quick, Negotiated End to War’, Gallup, 19 November 2024.

^[29] Gary M Klein, ‘Overcoming Complexity Through Collaboration and Follower-Based Leadership’, Small Wars Journal, 2 July 2017.

^[30] Centre for Army Leadership, A British Army ‘Followership’ Doctrine Note (UK Ministry of Defence, 2023), pp. 3, 9.

^[31] Klein, ‘Overcoming Complexity’.

^[32] O’Neill, ‘US and Allied Leadership and Command in the Korean and Vietnam Wars’, p. 191.

^[33] Stephen Badsey, ‘Coalition Command in the Gulf War’, in GD Sheffield (ed.), Leadership and Command: The Anglo-American Experience Since 1861 (London: Brassey’s, 2002), p. 213.

^[34] Daniel P Marston, ‘Operation TELIC VIII to XI: Difficulties of Twenty-first-Century Command’, Journal of Strategic Studies 44, no. 1 (2021): 65.

^[35] United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, ‘UK Takes Lead of NATO Rapid Response Force’, Gov.uk, 28 December 2023.

^[36] United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, Defence Command Paper (HM Stationery Office, 2023), p. 61.

^[37] Benjamin F Cooling and John A Hixson, ‘Twentieth Century Allied Interoperability’, Asian Perspective 6, no. 1 (1982): 113–114.

^[38] Marston, ‘Operation TELIC VIII to XI’, p. 73.

^[39] Army Department, ‘Honours and Awards’, Supplement to the London Gazette, 11 October 1982.

^[40] Land Warfare Centre, ADP Land Operations: Command, 5-2.

^[41] Grauer, Commanding Military Power, p. 55.

^[42] van Creveld, Command in War, 239, p. 242.

^[43] Thompson, ‘Command at Anzio and in the Falklands’, p. 160.

^[44] Alexander Kohli, ‘The Commander’s Place on the Battlefield’, The RUSI Journal 169, no. 4 (2024): 78.

^[45] Milford Beagle, Jason C Slider and Matthew R Arrol, ‘The Graveyard of Command Posts’, Military Review, May-June 2023: 16.

^[46] Ibid., p. 11.

^[47] Ido Vock, ‘Atacms: What We Know about Missile System Ukraine Could Use to Strike Russia’, BBC News (website), 21 November 2024, at: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cx2nrlq1840o.

^[48] ‘How AI Is Changing Warfare’, The Economist (website), 20 June 2024, at https://www.economist.com/briefing/2024/06/20/how-ai-is-changing-warfare.

^[49] Noah Sylvia, ‘Israel’s Targeting AI: How Capable Is It?’ RUSI (website), 8 February 2024, at: https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/israelstargeting-ai-how-capable-it.

^[50] Noah Sylvia, ‘The Israel Defense Forces’ Use of AI in Gaza: A Case of Misplaced Purpose’, RUSI (website), 4 July 2024, at: https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/israel-defense-forces-use-ai-gaza-case-misplaced-purpose.

^[51] ‘The War in Ukraine Shows How Technology Is Changing the Battlefield’, The Economist, 3 July 2024, At: https://www.economist.com/special-report/2023/07/03/the-war-in-ukraine-shows-how-technology-is-changing-the-battlefield.

^[52] Sylvia, ‘The Israel Defense Forces’ Use of AI in Gaza’.

^[53] van Creveld, Command in War, p. 269.

^[54] Michail Ploumis, ‘Mission Command and Philosophy for the 21^st Century’, Comparative Strategy 39, no. 2 (2020): 214.