Decision-Making at the Tactical Level

Abstract

This article has been written to address the poor application of planning processes by junior commanders. Decision-making is explored through the biological functions of the human brain to understand what occurs at the fundamental level of decision. This will demonstrate how junior commanders can harness this knowledge to improve their military decisionmaking. The article explains the importance of both analytical and instinctive processes that occur during decision-making, concluding that appropriate training methods build experience and improve the speed and accuracy of military decision-making. In achieving this outcome, the IMAP and CMAP remain relevant planning tools.

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If I always appear prepared, it is because before entering an undertaking, I have meditated long and have foreseen what might occur. It is not genius where revea.ls to me suddenly and secretly what I should do in circumstances unexpected by others; it is thought and preparation.

- Napoleon Bonaparte

Introduction

The Australian Army employs the military appreciation process (MAP) as its rational decision-making tool to support commanders at all levels make timely and appropriate decisions.¹ At the tactical level of command,² the MAP has three distinct variations that are applied dependent upon several variable factors. These factors are: the size of the staff (if any) available to the commander, the time in which a decision is required, and the size of force being manoeuvred.³ These three variations are the Staff MAP (SMAP), the individual MAP (IMAP) and the Combat MAP (CMAP).⁴ This article will focus on the relationship of the IMAP and CMAP which is generally the domain of commanders operating at Combat Team level or below.⁵

The Australian Army’s Combat Training Centre (CTC) is responsible for evaluating the Army’s performance in collective training. As part of this function, CTC releases an annual training trends report that identifies both positive and negative trends in training performance observed across all training conducted by CTC for the previous 12-month period. CTC categorises collection in functional categories. One category is junior leadership. For the purposes of this article, junior command describes leaders at section and platoon/troop levels.

A common trend identified in all CTC trends reports from 2007 to 2011, and shaping as an inclusion in the 2012 trends report, is the poor planning performance of junior commanders. In particular, observations have identified that junior commanders are regularly noted as not using the doctrinal appreciation processes available, not conducting any formally observed planning, often combining orders development and planning into a single task, or employing limited planning in a group fashion but without observable process to the planning.⁶

A number of conclusions can be drawn from these trends. The first hypothesis is that the doctrinal decision-making processes being employed are unsuitable and therefore are not used or are used poorly by junior commanders. The second is that junior commanders do not understand how to employ the doctrinal processes effectively and therefore elect not to use them. The third is that junior commanders are not given enough time to conduct formal planning. The third hypothesis has an impact upon junior commanders’ perceptions of the need to use a decision-making tool. While neither one of these hypotheses is necessarily accurate, they provide a starting point for exploring why the tools are not being employed.

This article will explore decision-making and the use of the MAP by junior commanders for tactical decision-making; it will test the three stated hypotheses and recommend practical outcomes to improve decision-making skills in Army’s junior leaders.

Decision-Making

The MAP is employed as a process that allows a commander to identify relevant considerations to a problem and then balance these considerations against a range of potential actions that could achieve the commander’s intent.⁷ The outcome is that the commander makes a decision on what action he or she is going to undertake.

A person making a decision selects an action based on a range of variables and options available. The critical aspect to making a good decision resides in the appropriate balancing of the variables and options. How then does the human brain interpret, process and select from all the information available the critical criteria to make the best decision?

The critical aspect to making a good decision resides in the appropriate balancing of the variables and options.

How the Brain Makes a Decision

The human brain has developed a unique capability throughout its evolution that sets it apart from other primates and all other known living species: the ability to reason. This ability stems from the enlarging of the frontal cortex of the brain. It is this region of the brain that allows humans to manage rational thought as opposed to instinctive or emotional thought.⁸ A theory that long held sway, dating back to the Greek philosophers Plato and Aristotle at least, was that this cognitive or rational power of decision-making was the crucial difference between humanity and the rest of the fauna on earth.⁹ It was believed that humans made rational decisions because the human brain had learned to control or harness the emotional or instinctive brain.¹⁰ More recent study has found this to quite inaccurate. While the ability for rational thought appears unique to humans, the rational or cognitive brain does not harness or control the emotional brain but in fact works in tandem with it.¹¹ This is true to the extent that the human brain is totally dependent on both the rational and emotional levels of the brains to function effectively.¹² Humans with impairments that prevent either the emotional brain or the rational brain from proper function actually deny that person the ability to make effective decisions.¹³

The Emotional Brain

The emotional brain stores massive amounts of data that informs the body of its decisions through chemical processes.¹⁴ This is exhibited as instinctive impulses such as sweaty hands, fear and excitement. The emotional brain is the database of experiences that are stored and make humans adaptive, learning species. In this sense, failure or negative responses such as pain create the strongest learning experiences.¹⁵ The brain uses dopamine levels to regulate between our positive and negative perceptions.¹⁶ Over time, repeated patterns of behaviour and response set norms and the brain learns to adapt the dopamine response to be appropriate to an experienced situation.¹⁷ An example of this may be seen when conducting repeated abseils. Most people are initially uncomfortable stepping off a cliff as the brain instinctively expects a fall and injury or death. However, repeat exposures often reduce instinctive fear as the brain learns that its expected outcome of a fall was not in fact accurate. This is the emotional brain’s way of learning and adapting to change.

The Rational Brain

The part of the human brain responsible for rational thought is a relatively recent evolutionary adaptation.¹⁸ This adaptation has allowed humans to make decisions based on reason, enabled through cognitive thought.¹⁹ The part of the brain that allows cognitive thought allows us to consider many variables and options against whatever criteria we choose to apply to determine the best outcome or decision.²⁰ Unfortunately, the cognitive power of the brain is limited to approximately five to seven independent thoughts or functions.²¹ As such, our power of rational thought can only cope with a limited number of variables or options, after which it becomes overwhelmed.

The part of the human brain responsible for rational thought is a relatively recent evolutionary adaptation.

The Brain in Tandem

The two parts of the brain’s decision-making faculties work in tandem to produce effective decisions.²² Without both parts functioning properly, the human brain fails to make appropriate decisions and in some cases, can simply NOT make a decision at all.²³ This is because the emotional brain does much more than just make fight-or-flight instinctive decisions. In fact, it is the power of the emotional brain that delivers most of the information we need to make a decision.²⁴ The emotional brain acts as a database of stored experiences. These stored experiences allow the rational brain to contextualise the ‘so what’ of actions and reactions and to compare them against select criteria.²⁵ This information is delivered by the emotional brain as a series of memories, impulses and epiphanies to the rational brain where cognitive thought allows processing of the information against the present situation and the criteria an individual applies to derive the best decision.²⁶

The way the human brain operates is important to understanding how junior commanders make decisions and knowing what shortfalls junior commanders’ may have in their ability to make appropriate decisions. Commanders with a large experience base can draw upon this to assist in making decisions.²⁷ Commanders who lack experience need to compensate for their inexperience or risk making poor decisions. By the very nature of junior commanders being ‘junior’ one can expect that a large experience base is not necessarily available to assist the junior commander to make decisions. This makes a detailed appreciation of the operating environment prior to decision-making important as it will help build the knowledge base from which the emotional brain can draw.²⁸ Through a detailed appreciation, the lack of experience can be in part mitigated by a junior commander.

Military Decision-Making

The Australian Army develops junior commanders to be capable of small team leadership and tactical decision-making. Lieutenant Colonel Chris Smith defines tactics as the proven methods for achieving objectives within a campaign, regardless of the scale of the participating force or the command level involved, concluding that tactics are a set of techniques and procedures applied to achieve operations and are not planned.²⁹ Therefore, when making decisions at the tactical level, commanders analyse the situation to determine the most appropriate combination of tactical techniques and procedures to apply to achieve the desired outcome.³⁰ It is assumed that through training junior commanders have developed a sound understanding of the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) applicable at sub-unit level and below.³¹ Therefore, the decision-making environment for the junior commander is the selection and application of the most appropriate TTP at the right time. What then are the critical considerations that a junior commander must balance to make a good combat decision?

What then are the critical considerations that a junior commander must balance to make a good combat decision?

Detailed Decision-Making

Detailed decision-making requires time.³² Making a detailed decision implies that the variables of a particular problem have been considered and balanced, and that the individual understands the effect change can have upon the variables and can apply judgement as change occurs.

The Australian Army’s doctrinal process of detailed individual analysis is through the IMAP.³³ The IMAP considers the assigned mission, own forces, the area of operations and the broad threat in detail. It also compares a number of potential courses of action open to the commander to allow the benefits and risks of different actions to be considered.³⁴ The process is therefore relatively slow and not appropriate as a quick decision support tool at the point of contact.³⁵ It is, however, an appropriate means to consider all the complex variables from which a detailed understanding of the operating environment can be gained.

Quick Decision-Making

When a junior commander needs to make a rapid tactical decision, such as at the point of contact, there is no time available for detailed analysis and reflection unless the commander is happy to hand the initiative and tempo to the enemy.³⁶ At this point, the commander must rely upon his own experience in the three critical areas of combat decision-making:³⁷

• Knowledge of own force. By the time the force has entered combat, the junior commander must rely on existing knowledge and will have limited time to cover information gaps about force capabilities or the commander’s intent. Time taken to gather additional information will be at the expense of an expedient decision.
• Knowledge of the enemy. By the time the force has entered combat, the junior commander has either seen the potential for engagement with the enemy and understood the enemy’s actions in a wider context, or not. If not, the commander will likely become reactive while attempting to identify this knowledge gap.
• Knowledge of terrain. By the time the force has entered combat the junior commander will only be able to clearly focus on the immediate terrain. The impact of terrain, now part of the area of influence will be a peripheral issue unless it was already considered in detail. If not, it will take further time for analysis, again at the expense of an expedient decision.

These three critical criteria to combat decision-making are part of Australia’s military doctrine as the CMAP.³⁸ The CMAP is the doctrinal means for making decisions under combat stress and refines a commander’s cognitive efforts to only critical information.³⁹ As identified, the considerations the commander will review to make the decision must already be well known; the commander must understand the impact of each of the three elements to make the best decision. This is achieved in a detailed analysis prior to the point of contact. If the commander is lacking knowledge in any area, the pressure of combat stress is unlikely to allow a good decision to be made within an appropriate time.⁴⁰

The CMAP is the doctrinal means for making decisions under combat stress and refines a commander’s cognitive efforts to only critical information.

The Relationship Between Detailed and Quick Decision-Making

Detailed decision-making should be distinct to quick decision-making only through the time taken to make a decision and not by the depth of analysis used to make a decision. However, for this to be the case, quick decisions (combat decisions) must be founded in a detailed analysis supported by the experience of the commander.⁴¹ If quick decisions are not based on a detailed analysis, the result would be hasty decisions and not necessarily good ones.⁴²

This is where an understanding of how the brain works to make a decision is important. The human brain will draw upon the database of knowledge it has stored. Some of that knowledge is experience and the more experience a commander has, arguably the better their decision-making should be.⁴³ Much of the knowledge will be based on analysis the commander has conducted prior to reaching a decision point. This is particularly important for junior commanders who lack significant experience as they will rely more heavily on a detailed analysis.⁴⁴ This knowledge will be stored and accessed when required by the emotional brain. The emotional brain will present this information to the cognitive brain where it is then rationalised and a decision is derived.⁴⁵

It is therefore apparent that good decisions require a combination of analysis and experience—not one or the other.⁴⁶ The relationship then of the IMAP to the CMAP also becomes relatively self evident. The CMAP used on its own, without foundations in a detailed analysis conducted through an IMAP, relies heavily on experience and may very well not lead to a good decision in an appropriate timeframe. The use of an IMAP to conduct detailed analysis at the point of contact, where speed of decision is required, is inappropriate and will not assist the junior commander to make a good decision either. In much the same way as the emotional and rational brain works at a fundamental level, the IMAP and CMAP must work in tandem to allow good decisions to be made through a balance of analysis and experience at the required speed of decision.⁴⁷

Why is the MAP Poorly Employed by Junior Commanders?

Evidence collected from the practical application of the IMAP and CMAP by junior commanders shows that the tools are not widely used.⁴⁸ Earlier in this article I stated three possible reasons:

• The doctrinal tools are unsuitable and therefore not applied by junior commanders.
• Junior commanders do not know how to use the doctrinal tools appropriately and therefore do not apply them.
• Junior commanders are not provided sufficient time to conduct detailed analysis and planning and therefore do not apply them.

In the next section of this article, each of these hypotheses will be reviewed followed by recommendations and outcomes for improving the decision-making of junior leaders.

Doctrinal Tools are Unsuitables

There is conjecture about the types of decision-making tools that are useful to tactical commanders. An often heard retort from junior commanders is that the MAP is not suitable and that they are more easily able to make decisions using SMEAC.⁴⁹ SMEAC is an acronym for the Australian Army’s sequence for the formulation of orders.⁵⁰ Its five headings are: situation, mission, execution, administration and logistics, and command and control.⁵¹ SMEAC is a format for communicating the outcomes of planning and not a series of planning considerations. While experienced commanders may be able to quickly appreciate and then develop orders, they are separate functions. Thinking about the problem allows the solution to be developed and decided upon. SMEAC allows the decision to be communicated, including the practical requirements of execution such as coordinating instructions, specific tasks to force elements and a communication plan between force elements. SMEAC is a product of the decision, not a means to reach a decision.

SMEAC is a format for communicating the outcomes of planning and not a series of planning considerations.

Another popularly cited alternative is recognition primed decision (RPD) technique.⁵² This technique is based on the commander recognising the most appropriate course of action and deciding upon it instinctively.⁵³ To do this, the premise is that the junior commander is a subject matter expert.⁵⁴ This will not always be true by the very nature of the commander being junior. As such, RPD may be useful to some commanders but will achieve varied results depending upon the experience of the junior commander.⁵⁵

There is no substantial argument that supports the position of the MAP as unsuitable. It may not be optimal and there may be better alternatives but that is not the same as the MAP being unsuitable. In fact, the argument in support of the use of RPD actually reinforces the argument that an expert knowledge of the critical fact—own force and mission, the enemy/threat forces and the impact of terrain are fundamental to being an expert and making good decisions. If used correctly, the IMAP is a valid means for junior commanders to mitigate inexperience and still achieve expert knowledge through detailed analysis prior to combat decision-making through the CMAP.

Poor Knowledge of the Tools

It is difficult, without extensive research, to prove what level of knowledge junior commanders or their instructors across the Australian Army’s various training institutions have of the MAP and its utility. The evidence available from the observations collected at CTC shows that those junior leaders who do not demonstrate any use of the MAP at any stage of planning or decision-making often fail to explain why they did not use the tools available or the proponents of its unsuitability.

...  junior leaders who do not demonstrate any use of the MAP at any stage of planning or decision-making often fail to explain why ...

Despite not being able to accurately determine the level of knowledge junior commanders have of the MAP, what is known is that a poor knowledge of the MAP makes the tool cumbersome to use, which would logically reduce its uptake. This is because the steps of the MAP require a combination of professional experience and information ‘fact finding’ to establish useful outcomes.⁵⁶ If the MAP is not understood to a level of instinctive application, it will require cognitive effort to apply. The brain has a limited capacity for cognitive thought, about seven separate thoughts simultaneously.⁵⁷ This means that the process ends up using valuable thought capacity at the expense of the factors relevant to making a good decision.⁵⁸ This is one reason why the process feels cumbersome. While application of the MAP will always assume some cognitive capacity, it should be less than the cognitive capacity required to add order to an individual’s thoughts if no deliberate process was applied. This makes the MAP efficient by comparison to the alternative of using nothing. A level of comfort and instinctive application will only be achieved if the process is practiced regularly and understood thoroughly by the junior commander.⁵⁹

Another factor in the preference for SMEAC over CMAP is that SMEAC is simpler to remember because its name is an acronym of its function, meaning that it takes no extra mental application to determine the steps within the process. By comparison, the MAP is one of several variants (SMAP, IMAP, CMAP), and the ‘what to do’ in each step requires further thought or a checklist to remember, especially under combat stress. Comparatively, the US Army’s METT-TC—Mission, Enemy, Terrain and Weather, Troops and Support Available, Time Available, and Civil Considerations—is an acronym for their equivalent tool to CMAP.⁶⁰ This makes remembering the tool and the steps of the tool simpler than current IMAP and CMAP acronyms. In the Australian Army context this can be cut down further to METD (Mission, Enemy, Terrain and Decision) focusing the decision-maker to the critical combat considerations. This ensures that the process is simple to apply especially under combat stress. SMEAC, which is generally well applied by junior commanders, should commence at ‘Decision’, communicating the outcome of METD and adding appropriate detail to the plan once a course of action is decided.

Regardless of the decision process adopted by the Army, only an expert level of knowledge in the application of the process will make it fluent to the user. An expert level of knowledge will only be achieved through education and experience gained by practical exposure at an individual level.⁶¹ It is therefore a valid argument to suggest that the poor use of the MAP is at least in part relative to the poor understanding junior commanders have of the doctrinal tools.

Lack of Planning Time

An often cited reason for junior commanders failing to apply the MAP is the lack of planning time allocated to them. The use of the one-third planning rule, where a commander uses one third of the available planning time and allocates two thirds to subordinates, is often poorly adhered to.⁶² This means that those at the bottom end of the planning line—junior commanders—are often provided the least amount of time to plan. Ironically, junior commanders are often the least experienced planners and may actually need more time to plan effectively. However, lack of time is not an excuse for not using the MAP. The MAP is designed to be abbreviated by commanders depending upon the time available to plan.⁶³ It is also designed to be started as a process upon the receipt of a warning order and not at the end of the planning by the superior commander or superior headquarters. As such, it is more likely that a poor level of understanding in how to apply the MAP is impeding the use of the tool, rather than a blanket assumption that junior commanders are never given enough time to plan.

... it is more likely that a poor level of understanding in how to apply the MAP is impeding the use of the tool ...

The point of planning timelines brings into focus the critical relationship of the IMAP to the CMAP. Most examples of commanders not adhering to planning timelines occur when commanders are under tactical time pressure and not so much during the deliberate planning phase of an operation prior to commencement of tactical tasks. During the planning phase, commanders are generally afforded the time to conduct a detailed IMAP, if not of their specific mission and tasks, at least of the area of operations, the general threat forces and the terrain (both human and physical). Through the conduct of this deliberate planning, commanders build the knowledge base (expertise) that allows their subsequent decision cycles to become quicker.⁶⁴ Therefore, receiving reduced planning time, while not ideal, still allows an abbreviated appreciation of the critical facts (own forces, threat and terrain) as they relate to the actual task and any situational change since the detailed appreciation was conducted. The outcome is that a detailed appreciation through an IMAP leads to faster decision-making through the CMAP.

Key Outcomes

The key outcomes of this section are as follows:

• The MAP is a suitable decision support tool even if it is not considered optimal.
• Poor knowledge of the MAP is likely reducing its uptake in either the IMAP or CMAP form. This is due to the process being experienced as cumbersome and not instinctive by junior commanders. The result is that the process dominates the practical outcome, making it inefficient and of poor utility to a junior commander.
• Lack of planning time should only reduce the level of detail explored in the commander’s analysis; it should not be an excuse for not conducting analysis.

The result of these findings is that regardless of which decision support tool the Army chooses to invest in, only an expert level of application by junior commanders will allow them to optimise their decision-making.

How Can Junior Commanders' Decision-Making Be Improved?

Improving decision-making skills in junior commanders can be achieved through a balance of professional experience and practice in the application of decision support tools. Professional experience is required to provide greater context to the decisions a junior leader makes. Practice will increase the speed, comfort and technical proficiency of a junior commander using the MAP.⁶⁵

Professional Experience

A junior commander’s professional experience of tactics and tactical decisionmaking is largely achieved through practical exposure. Practical exposure is governed by the types of activities and the length of exposure time an individual experiences. Practical exposure can be achieved through both training and operational (combat) experiences. As operational service cannot be relied upon to provide a suitable experience avenue for all junior leaders (because it cannot be controlled to provide uniform experience and opportunity), only training will be explored as a suitable means for raising the overall standard of professional experience in junior commanders. As such, the next section will focus on creating opportunities for junior commanders to gain experience through training, leaving operational opportunities as a supplement to an individuals professional experience.

A junior commander’s professional experience of tactics and tactical decisionmaking is largely achieved through practical exposure.

Practice Through Training

A fundamental aspect of learning at the individual level is that the brain learns best through error.⁶⁶ Therefore, to maximise the learning of junior commanders it is important for the learning environment to be one that encourages mistakes.⁶⁷ This is achieved by rewarding effort as opposed to rewarding results.⁶⁸ While making mistakes is the best way for an individual to learn, this will not be suitable in all training environments, especially if poor decision-making by a junior commander leads to a loss of trust from subordinates, affecting the junior commander’s ability to lead. Achieving balance between proficiency as a tactical decision-maker and empowering the junior commander as a leader will require consideration of training design and methods.⁶⁹

Reptition in Training

Training at the individual level is a good means of improving the skills of junior leaders without the risk associated with making mistakes during collective training.⁷⁰ It also allows for significantly higher levels of repetition as opposed to a collective training environment. In an individual training environment, a high level of experience can be gained in the use of the doctrinal decision support tools in a relatively short period of training time, which is then transferable to collective training.⁷¹ Three methods for achieving this are:

• Tactical exercises without troops (TEWTS)
• Quick decision exercises (QDE)
• Orders delivery.

In my professional experience I am yet to see these three individual training methods employed in a way that brings tactical decision-making and the use of the MAP together effectively. I believe this could be achieved by using the three methods together as a sequenced training process rather than using each in isolation or assigning greater priority to one over another. In de-linking the three training methods, the cause and effect of a junior commander’s performance from deliberate planning through to execution is difficult to observe and therefore difficult for the junior commander to learn from.⁷² The outcome is that the tactics become subjective and the relative importance of each component of analysis is lost. The second point, the loss of what is important to the commander to make a decision, makes it hard to abbreviate the doctrinal decision-making process, as the junior commander is not experienced enough to know what to abbreviate.

Linking the three individual training methods is relatively simple. A common training scenario must exist across the three training methods and the training must replicate the way we actually plan and conduct operations:

• Deliberate planning phase – Junior commanders read into the TEWT scenario and conduct a deliberate IMAP on receipt of a warning order.
• Issue back brief to senior commander and receive guidance and critique of analysis achieved through the IMAP (concept of operations back brief).
• Initial orders delivery – Delivered by each junior commander in full, based on the IMAP each junior commander conducted during the TEWT.
• Conduct an after action review of orders delivery, including peer critique, enabling learning from error and effort.
• Commence a series of QDE – QDE are based on the deliberate planning and orders previously conducted, which allows the use of the CMAP by junior commanders in response to the tactical problems presented to them. This is specifically designed to allow each individual to see where their analysis and deliberate decision-making was poor, and to enforce consideration of the critical aspects of combat decision-making. A focus on the critical considerations of combat decision-making will be achieved through implementing significant time constraints in the QDE to apply pressure to the junior commander’s decision process. This will also sharpen the junior commander’s awareness of the aspects of their deliberate orders and rehearsals that were critical to execution.
• Quick / radio orders – As part of each QDE, each junior leader must rapidly develop radio orders or quick orders and convey their intent efficiently to their peers through delivery. An excellent way of judging this was demonstrated on the Combat Officers Advanced Course (COAC) where the selected commander issued quick orders while facing away from the other students and the battle map.⁷³ Another student, selected at random, was required to draw a sketch of the commander’s tactical plan on a smart board (battle map overlaid onto the screen) while the orders were delivered. The outcome was obvious as to the detail, precision and speed of the orders that the commander delivered. Again, this style of pressure learning causes mistakes which actually improve learning outcomes and focus junior commanders on critical actions and considerations. With practice, this builds the junior commander’s experience of critical considerations in combat decision-making, allowing them to abbreviate planning and analysis appropriate to the situation.

 A common training scenario must exist across the three training methods and the training must replicate the way we actually plan and conduct operations ...

Conducting individual training in a fashion that links deliberate decision-making processes to quick decision-making processes and links the planning to the orders (execution) allows each individual commander to see the cause and effect of their actions.⁷⁴ This leads to a greater level of understanding of how to make effective decisions and what information is critical to make good decisions.⁷⁵ It can also be conducted repetitiously with few resources, allowing this training to be an efficient means of developing a junior commander’s tactical decision-making skills prior to collective training.

Conclusion

Observations of junior commanders during collective training has identified that they often plan poorly.⁷⁶ A key element of this observation is that junior commanders often make little or poor use of the doctrinal tools designed to aid decision-making. This is a concern for the development of the next generation of middle ranking and senior commanders who will have progressed through their junior command roles without learning how to plan effectively. Correcting this fault is a challenge that the Army must accept and act upon.

Observations of junior commanders during collective training has identified that they often plan poorly.

Improving the decision-making skills in junior commanders is achievable. Understanding how the brain makes decisions provides insight into the application of the MAP at an individual level. This understanding helps draw out the relationship between detailed and quick decision-making, creating relevance between the relationship of the IMAP and CMAP and highlighting the balance between experience and analysis.

The use of the MAP as the Australian Army’s decision support tool remains relevant. While it is accepted that it may not be optimal, the MAP supports mission command and allows consideration of the relevant factors required to make a tactical decision.⁷⁷ Regardless of the decision process adopted by the Army, it is the ability of a junior commander to apply the process instinctively and with the least amount of cognitive effort devoted to the process as opposed to the outcome that is the decisive factor. The ability to make decisions more instinctively will only be gained through professional experience and training supported by an underpinning knowledge base.

As junior commanders often lack experience by the very nature of being junior, training junior commanders to compensate for this weakness through detailed analysis is critical to good decision-making. Repetition (practice) and training that encourages mistakes but equally allows cause and effect to be examined by the individual are key elements in addressing the current weakness. The use of TEWT, QDE and orders remain highly relevant training methods for achieving this outcome but should be developed to provide a sequenced training approach rather than piecemeal training approach as this better supports individual learning outcomes.

About the Author

Captain Scott Holmes is an Infantry Officer in the Australian Army. Captain Holmes graduated from the Royal Military College – Duntroon in 2004 and has served with the Second Battalion Royal Australian Regiment, The School of Infantry, Adelaide Universities Regiment, Headquarters 5th Brigade and the Combat Training Centre Live, where he is currently employed as training analyst. He has served operationally in Timor Leste on Operation ASTUTE in 2006 and in Afghanistan on Operation SLIPPER in 2009. He has a Bachelor of Professional Studies from the University of New England and a Masters of Emergency Management from Charles Sturt University.

Endnotes

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1     LWD 5-1-4 – The Military Appreciation Process, 2009, para 1.4-1.10.

2     R Smith, The Utility of Force, Vintage Books, New York, 2008, pp. 15–17; C Smith, Design and Planning of Campaigns and Operations in the Twenty-First Century, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Canberra, 2011, p. 38.

3     LWD 5-1-4, paras.1.8 and 1.29.

4     Ibid, para 1.29.

5     An Australian Combat Team is a task organised grouping based on the headquarters of a combat arms company or squadron. LWD 1 – The Fundamentals of land Warfare, Land Warfare Centre, 2008, para 4.17.

6     2007 Trends Update, Combat Training Centre, Townville, 2007, pp. 6–7; 2008 Trends Update, Combat Training Centre, Townville, 2008, p. 8; 2009 Trends Report, Combat Training Centre, Townville, 2010, p. 7; 2010 Trends Report, Combat Training Centre, Townville, 2010, p. 10; 2011 Trends Report, Combat Training Centre, Townville, 2012, p. 21.

7     LWD 7-0 – Fundamentals of Education and Training, 2009, para 3.28; LWD 5-1-4 – The Military Appreciation Process, 2009, para 5.2.

8     J Lehrer, The Decisive Moment: How the brain makes up its mind, Text Publishing, 2009, p. 30; D Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow, Farrah, Strauss and Giroux, 2011, p. 37.

9     Lehrer, The Decisive Moment, p. 4.

10    Ibid, pp. 16–17, 107; Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow, p. 8.

11    Lehrer, The Decisive Moment, pp. 24–25; Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow, p. 4.

12    Lehrer, The Decisive Moment, pp. 23–25.

13    Ibid; Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow, p. 7; R Simon, Bad Men Do What Good Men Dream, American Psychiatric Publishing, 2008, pp. 204–05.

14    Lehrer, The Decisive Moment, pp. 39–47, 226–27, 236–37; Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow, p. 21.

15    Lehrer, The Decisive Moment, p. 43.

76    2007 Trends Update, pp. 6–7; 2008 Trends Update, p. 8; 2009 Trends Report, p. 7; 2010 Trends Report, p. 10; 2011 Trends Report, p. 21.

77    LWD 7-0 – Fundamentals of Education and Training, para 3.28.