A Commander's Responsibility in the Formation, Development and Training of Today's Combat Team
Abstract
The many pressures and competing requirements of the modern sub-unit commander can easily see the commander’s attention only fleetingly focused on what should be the primary role of his unit: combat. It is easy for a modern commander in today’s corporate governance-driven training environment to comply with the administrative reporting, resource management, risk mitigation and non-linear command structure necessities, and in so doing losing that essential mindset that will enable those he commands to win the fight. The purpose of this article is to look at what our role should be as soldiers, or more importantly as commanders of soldiers, as we prepare to fight and survive on the battlefield of today’s hybrid threat environment.
Peace is an armistice in a war that is continuously going on.
- Thucydides1
Recent history has seen an environment of persistent conflict around the world. Today’s Australian Regular Army has been deploying combat teams2 into this environment to conduct government directed operations. The combat team must be prepared to fight—from peacekeeping, low level and counterinsurgency operations to medium intensity warfighting. This takes a dedicated focus from the field commanders who will lead this organisation on the battlefield.
To command, or more specifically to command in combat, requires a professional mindset that is focused on the task of training the unit to fight, and to fight as a unit. In the paper ‘Future Joint Operating Concept 2030’ it is acknowledged that ‘warfare will remain an exercise in organised violence’.3 We train for war in order to mitigate the chaos of combat. Combat is fast, violent, confusing and bloody and we train our muscles, our thought patterns and our instincts to function in a certain sequence for when our minds turn to panic.
So what do we need to raise, train and sustain an effective, battle ready combat team in today’s Army? The purpose of this article is to discuss the role of the commander and the requirements needed to command as you prepare for and are involved in combat, highlighting that it is the unit4 that is the centre of gravity for tactical battlefield success.
Creating the Combat Team - The Basis for Battlefield Success
Adam Collins: ‘I think some guys are playing at this like it’s a game, but this is real, isn’t it?’
Chris Terrill: ‘It certainly is Adam.’5
A combat team is a unit. To understand what we are dealing with, Colonel D Malone (US Army) gives us a good starting point.
By definition a unit is a whole composed of parts put together to create a single ‘thing’. We need to picture this ‘thing’ in its intended environment—the battlefield. It is there to fight, to destroy the enemy, to seize and hold ground. It is designed to do this, the result of countless centuries of adjusting and adapting to the demands of thousands of battles. In battle, only the fittest survive and this ‘thing’ is the result of all the lessons learned from those battles won and lost. It exists on the battlefield for one reason—to fight. It lives by the simple standard: survive. And survival on the battlefield means you must win.6
To win on the battlefield, to inflict tactical defeat on one’s adversary, the Roman Empire learned that to achieve victory it required a professional, trained army; an army trained to fight as a cohesive force. The spectacle of individual combat had no place on the battlefield; each soldier was a part of something more—their unit, and it was that unit, which controlled the ‘thing’, that would win the battle. This lesson was taught in blood at the hands of the Carthaginian Hannibal Barca at the battles of Trebia, Lake Trasimene and Cannae only to be retaught throughout history by the Huns, the Mongols, the Saracens, Napoleon, the Zulus and the Germans to name a few. The modern battlefield is even more demanding of a unit to operate as one cohesive force. 1st Platoon, Battle Company, 2nd Battalion, 173 Airborne Brigade’s reaction to an ambush in the Korangal Valley in 2007 is an excellent example of this. ‘The reason 1st Platoon did not get wiped out ... was because the men acted not as individuals but as a unit.’7
The spectacle of individual combat had no place on the battlefield; each soldier was a part of something more ...
It must be understood that the combat team is one force. It must be nurtured, trained, employed and rested as a single unit. The sub-elements of the combat team, the troop and platoon organisations that form it, should not be split. From the basic building block of individual soldier skills to high-end collective training, the combat team should train together. The inherent bonds that uniquely exist within a military unit start here as soldiers begin to identify with each other and with their unit, learning the capabilities, both at the personal and unit level, of the different force elements and enablers that form the combat team.
The concept of Mission Command, nested within the Adaptive Army, provides us with the vehicle to achieve success on the battlefield. The foundation of its success lies in trust. Trust in your junior commanders to lead their troops, trust in the soldiers to do their job and their trust in you to lead them well. Richard Winters captured it in assessing the reasons for his company’s success ‘... [we] knew each other’s strengths and weaknesses, we could assign the right men to the proper job. ... my contribution to the success of Easy Company and 2nd Battalion was based on my knowledge of what to expect from each [soldier].’8
Individual and collective competence, trust and understanding takes time to develop and it is time that is critical to the combat team’s success. The end-state of this cycle is the creation of a standard of confidence within each member. The standard is simple: it is the sure knowledge that each soldier and every crew is highly trained and that they belong to a solid, firm, competent, well-trained outfit that knows where it is going and what it has to do. This is the basis of trust—there are no shortcuts to it, it takes time to develop, but is essential to success on the battlefield because at the end of the day ‘... combat is a series of quick decisions and rather precise actions carried out in concert ... the unit that choreographs their actions best usually wins!’9
Commanding in the Combat Team - Injecting the Fighting Spirit
It is not enough to fight. It is the spirit which we bring to the fight that decides the issue. It is morale that wins the victory.
- George C Marshal10
The Defence publication ADDP 00.1 – Command and Control provides us with higher commands definitions of both command and control.11 However, these definitions leave it unclear as to how these two separate but inter-related functions combine at the tactical level to enable effective operations to occur within the combat team or battle group.
Missions today are complex, involving the efforts of many different force elements and organisations to succeed. Couple this with the ever shrinking window of opportunity to take advantage of battlefield situations and it becomes clear the traditional linear approach to command and control cannot be relied upon. The network centric warfare construct necessitates that the command and control model be well understood at all levels as it bypasses the rigid, linear structure that previously aligned command and control with the lines of communication.
Missions today are complex, involving the efforts of many different force elements and organisations to succeed.
Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery said, ‘I do not believe it is possible to conduct operations successfully in the field unless there exists a good and sound organisation for command and control.’12 The dispersed nature of the battlefield coupled with the sheer volume of information coming into the command post, from sources both within and external to the combat team, can easily result in the commander looking in, or rearward, rather than out. As armies progress more and more towards unmanned aircraft and vehicles, electronic sensors and detection, and active defensive suites, the stresses from information volume on decision making will only increase for the modern commander.
To reduce the battlefield complexity and possibility of information overload, the principles of Mission Command must be embraced and the command team enabled to grow in its ability, understanding and confidence through the conduct of drills, rehearsals and independent planning. No spreadsheet exists to tell you your soldiers are trained beyond a basic individual level, yet you—the commander—are solely responsible for ensuring that your men are trained—trained as a unit and trained to win. Pompey Elliot would tell us to bear in mind the consequences of not training properly for the real fight.
Will you be thinking of this good man or that good man dead, wounded or missing and thinking; did I do right in taking this or that action? ... If you have well and truly and zealously applied yourselves to the task of mastering the science and art of war, your conscience atleast will be easy, however heavy your heart; but if you have neglected your opportunities and looked upon your connection with [your unit] as merely a sort of amusement, or a means of attaining some sort of … distinction, then you will be as Judas was, for like him you will have betrayed a sacred trust.13
In its continual assessment of the conduct of operations, the US Army has been reviewing its primary guidance on operations, FM 3-0 Operations, since 2001. The US Army has realised that the threats and nature of the modern battlefield, as highlighted in the Israeli conflicts of 2006 and 2008, are likely to be hybrid in nature. To embrace this they have reviewed their guidance on command and control to highlight the importance of the commander and command, specifically the commander’s ability to exercise command as opposed to the control systems they use.
... the threats and nature of the modern battlefield, as highlighted in the Israeli conflicts of 2006 and 2008, are likely to be hybrid in nature.
On the ground, a well trained command post controls the battle. They monitor (battle track), assess, report and operate in accordance with the commander’s orders and direction. This highlights once more the tenet of trust within the Mission Command framework that must exist to facilitate the decentralised execution of operations. The main command post will most likely be physically dislocated from the commander and, as a result, that command team must be trusted to control the battle while the commander focuses on the current main effort, plans the next operation or attends orders. By extension, Mission Command must also be fostered within subordinate commanders. A clear commander’s intent and adequate allocation of resources within your orders will enable your subordinate commanders to achieve your intent. The ability for your subordinate commanders to process information, take advantage of fleeting battlefield opportunities and make tactical decisions will significantly enhance your ability to effectively command your combat team.
Historically, the separation of command and control is met with resistance due to the misconception that the commander is relinquishing command of an operation to a junior commander. This is obviously incorrect. David Alberts provides us with a better understanding of the nature of the command and control relationship applicable to today’s operational environment. The command function provides the initial set of orders (allocation of roles, responsibilities, resources and setting the conditions), the continual assessment of the situation and possible changes to intent. The control function then determines if the current plan is on track and, if they are required, to make adjustments if they are within the guidelines established by the commander.14 In simple terms, you plan the battle and issue orders for its conduct, and your headquarters team runs (controls) the battle within the guidelines you have set.
The Wermacht understood that the personality of the commander is decisive. Imagination, flexibility, an understanding of the mission, determination, skill in the use of terrain, coolness, and rapid and independent action are essential requirements.15 In short, those entrusted to lead must study their profession to become proficient in tactics and technology. As a professional soldier, as a commander of soldiers, you must be prepared. Before you take command you will have studied and learned as much as you can, enabling you to focus your time in command on developing and empowering your subordinates, for it is they who will ultimately achieve your end-state. In the profession of arms the unit is the soldiers, not the commander. You are simply the caretaker of both the history and the future of the unit for a short while—its successes are theirs, its failures are yours.
The Wermacht understood that the personality of the commander is decisive.
Sustaining the Combat Team - Winning the 'Come As You Are' Battle
The purpose of technology is to equip the man. We must not fall prey to the mistaken notion that technology can reduce warfare to simply manning equipment.
- US Chiefs of Staff, 199716
To develop from the previous section, General Sir David Richards, the British Chief of General Staff, said in his 2009 Annual Defence Lecture ‘Future War’:
if you do not possess the fighting spirit, however good or high-tech your equipment, you will not win against opponents who do, whether they are part of another states army or Taliban style insurgents, however shoddy or out of date their equipment.
The Chief of Army has directed your combat team to be at a certain state of readiness. At any given time you may be given your deployment orders and within that notice to move your troops must be mounted and ready to deploy. General Sir David Richards also warned us that ‘today we are in Afghanistan. Tomorrow
it may be in a rogue state [in the Pacific rim] ..., [or] a central African state with well trained forces ...’ He highlights our dilemma as tactical commanders in that we may be deployed, with little notice, into a situation that constitutes what today is broadly termed a complex political emergency.17 Deploying to fight in these circumstances is the ‘come as you are’ battle. To set the conditions for follow-on forces, be they a battle group or non-government organisation, you must win this battle.
To do this you must train your soldiers to win. The guidance provided by the Foundation Warfighting concept is an excellent platform from which to start. ‘Brilliant at the Basics’, taken in its literal meaning, requires continual, effective and cohesive training. The Special Forces achieve their level of expertise by continually rehearsing the basic drills, just as a professional footballer or cricketer continually practices their basic skills.
Being a warrior and a leader of warriors requires the mental toughness to execute your decisions and tactical plans, no matter what the circumstances.18 The ability to do this comes from thorough training, knowing your soldiers and their capabilities as well as knowing your own. As a leader you must hold yourself to a higher standard in your mastery of the profession of arms. You set the example for your subordinate commanders and are responsible for their professional development and their professional mastery.
You set the example for your subordinate commanders and are responsible for their professional development and their professional mastery.
Underlying this must lay the understanding that you cannot train for every contingency, and as such it is impossible to establish procedures for every situation.19 Therefore, an understanding of the principles within which you will operate will develop the solid base from which trust, that underlying tenet, will grow.
The US Marine Corps gives the guidance that ‘Commanders must ensure that training ... involves all participants. Compartmentalised training, insufficient individual training and failure to conduct thorough unit training creates the conditions for failure’.20 In essence, you must plan your training program thoroughly with a clear end-state and measures of effectiveness. Thorough training builds the confidence of your soldiers in both themselves and their unit. The desired cohesive end-state is highlighted by the differences in the French and British forces as they entered the Crimean War. From their experiences in Algeria, the French had learned the crucial importance of the small collective unit for the maintenance of discipline and order on the battlefield.21
You are preparing to fight, preparing for combat. The training cycle will see you increase your level of readiness over a relatively short period of time, a period measured in months, and as such you must instil that fighting spirit within your unit. ‘Do not expect the combat fairy to come bonk you with the combat wand and suddenly make you capable of doing things that you never rehearsed before. It will not happen.’22
The Combat Team Nested Within Army - Beyond Excel Readiness
Some accounts of fighting ... emphasise the element of confusion, where much depended on the initiative of leaders of small parties, since circumstances obviously prevented senior officers from influencing events outside their own immediate vicinity.23
The standard is to win the first battle—the ‘come as you are’ battle. It is leadership that makes this happen. It is leadership that puts together skill, will and teamwork. Remember that we train for war in order to mitigate the chaos of combat; we train our muscles, our thought patterns and our instincts to function in a certain sequence for when our minds turn to panic. Erwin Rommel reminds us that ‘it is difficult to maintain direction and contact in the front line; the commander can only control the men closest to him’.24 However, your unit must fight as a unit, that single ‘thing’. On today’s dispersed battlefield this requires thorough training, from which is developed the confidence and trust within each member, to choreograph their actions, and win.
A trained unit is not a tangible or visible outcome for higher command to display. No spreadsheet exists that shows you that your unit is ready to fight. But the cost of not training your unit effectively is all too visible in the casualty lists it will produce. Complacency through the conduct and participation in unassessed activities and an over-reliance on technology must not be allowed to gain a foothold in our training ethos. ‘Sweat saves blood’25—you must maintain the realisation that what you train for is real, fought in the field with an experienced enemy that has a say in the outcome each day.
A trained unit is not a tangible or visible outcome for higher command to display.
It is functional leadership that produces the confidence and trust your unit needs. It is this same leadership that ensures that soldiers fight smarter and better. It is operational leadership—command—that determines who wins. And in war, winning is the only standard.26 As we enter into the period of the ‘Army after Afghanistan’, the chance to re-establish the unit cohesion and tactical coordination needed to survive on the battlefield is ours as commanders to seize and apply. Don’t let the individual nature of our recent deployments, as these ‘task forces’ come and go, distract you from your responsibility. It is only by looking beyond the spreadsheet readiness paradigm that inhabits our reporting toolkit that you will be able to develop your combat team into a truly capable fighting force.
How will you know if you have succeeded? True satisfaction comes from getting the job done. Richard Winters again summarised it perfectly by saying:
the key to successful leadership is to earn respect—not because of rank or position, but because you are a leader of character. In the military, [your country] may nominate you as a commissioned officer, but [they] cannot command for you the loyalty and confidence of your soldiers. Those you must earn by giving loyalty to your soldiers and providing for their welfare. Properly lead and treated right, your lowest ranking soldier is capable of extraordinary acts of valour. Ribbons, medals and accolades, then, are poor substitutes to the ability to look yourself in the mirror every night and know that you did your best. You can see the look of respect in the eyes of the men who have worked for you.27
Are you ready?
About the Author
Captain Scott Klima enlisted into the Army in January 2004. Graduating from the Royal Military College – Duntroon in 2005 he was posted to the 2nd Cavalry Regiment and deployed to Iraq with Security Detachment 10 as a Troop Leader and Afghanistan with the Mentoring and Reconstruction Task Force 1 as the Combat Team Second in Command, returning to Afghanistan as the Chief of Operations for Combined Team Uruzgan 1. He is currently posted as the Senior Instructor Gunnery Wing, School of Armour and is studying part-time towards a Bachelor of Professional Studies and a Bachelor of Arts in Military History.
Endnotes
1 Thucydides quotes, <http://www.goodreads.com/author/quotes/957> accessed 29 May 2012.
2 Within the draft LWP-G 3-3-12 Combat Team Handbook a combat team is defined as ‘A combined arms grouping based upon a manoeuvre sub-unit headquarters’ consisting of no more than five force elements. A sub-unit refers to a squadron/ company level headquarters.
3 Future Joint Operating Concept, Department of Defence, Canberra, 25 March 2011.
4 For the purpose of this article, ‘unit’ is used as a general reference term as outlined by Colonel Dandridge M Malone’s definition in Small Unit Leadership, Ballantine Books, New York, p. 42. For ease of reference, the use of ‘unit’ in this article will infer a squadron/company level organisation. Other levels of command will be referred to by name.
5 Chris Terrill, Commando, Arrow Books, London, 2008, p. 74.
6 Malone, Small Unit Leadership, p. 42.
7 Sebastian Junger, War, Twelve (Grand Central Publishing), New York, 2010, p. 120.
8 Dick Winters, Beyond Band of Brothers, Berkley Caliber, New York, 2006, p. 288.
9 Junger, War, p. 120.
10 Nate Allen and Tony Burgess, Taking the Guidon, Centre for Company Level Leadership, Delaware, 2001, p. 105.
11 Command is defined as the ‘responsibility for planning the employment of, organising, directing, coordinating and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions’, while control is defined as the ‘authority exercised over part of the activities of subordinate organisations or other organisations not normally under command, pp. 1–3.
12 Robin Neillands, The Battle for the Rhine 1944, Orion Books, London, 2005, p. 227.
13 Ross McMullin, Pompey Elliott, Scribe Publications, Victoria, 2008, p. 69.
14 David Alberts and Richard Hayes, Understanding Command and Control, Command and Control Research Program Publications, Washington DC, 2006, pp. 57–59.
15 Bruce Condell and David T Zabecki, On the German Art of War, Truppenfuhrung, Stackpole Books, Mechanicsburg, PA, 2009, p. 42.
16 Michael J Askew, Warrior Mindset, Warrior Science Publications, Millstadt, IL, 2010, p. v.
17 Luc Reychler and Thania Paffenholz, Peacebuilding: A Field Guide, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder and London, 2001. The term ‘complex political emergency’ is used here and in recent publications to encompass the diversity of situations that have led to conflict since the early 1990s. It highlights that while conflict, in its essence, remains constant in its violent application, the root causes and by extension their resolution is unique to each emergency.
18 Askew, Warrior Mindset, p. xii.
19 Condell and Zabecki, On the German Art of War, Truppenfuhrung, p. 58.
20 US Marine Corps publication MCWP 3-43.1 – Raid Operations, 3 December 1993, pp. 1–8.
21 Orlando Figes, The Crimean War: A History, Metropolitan Books, New York, 2010, p. 179.
22 Dennis Grossman, On Combat, Warrior Science Publications, Millstadt, IL, 2004.
23 Philip Haythornthwaite, British Napoleon Tactics, Osprey Publishing, Oxford, 2005, p. 52.
24 Erwin Rommel, Infantry Attacks, Zenith Press, Minneapolis, MN, 2009, p. 20.
25 Ibid.
26 Malone, Small Unit Leadership, p. 23.
27 Winters, Beyond Band of Brothers, p. 290
