Not Hearts and Minds: Civil-Military Cooperation in OBG(W)–3

Journal Edition

Abstract

The Australian Overwatch Battlegroup (West)-3 provided operational overwatch to two Iraqi provinces in 2007. A small but important part of the battlegroup staff was a CIMIC (civil-military cooperation) team that supported the Commander with civil-military liaison and the planning of consent winning activities. The superficial ‘hearts and minds’ commentary that accompanies the public face of CIMIC projects often belies the true extent, nature and contribution of CIMIC. In essence, every CIMIC activity was a calculated attempt to achieve integrated effects in support of the mission. This article describes the CIMIC activity conducted to support battlegroup manoeuvre and identifies considerations for future tactical land commanders.

CIMIC could often provide us with access and influence into areas that were initially wary, bordering on hostile ...

- COL Justin Ellwood

CO OBG(W)–3

Introduction

The Australian Overwatch Battlegroup (West)–3 (OBG(W)–3) provided operational overwatch to the Iraqi provinces of Dhi Qar and Al Muthanna from June to December 2007. A small but important part of the battlegroup staff was a civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) team that supported the Commanding Officer (CO) with civil-military liaison and the planning of consent-winning activities. The popular face of this CIMIC activity is characterised by Public Affairs photos of the CO cutting a ribbon at a school refurbishment opening ceremony and the associated ‘hearts and minds’ commentary. However, this simplistic view belies the true nature and extent of CIMIC activities and their contribution to the achievement of the OBG(W)–3 mission. In essence, every CIMIC activity was a calculated attempt to achieve an integrated effect in support of the OBG(W)–3 mission. This article describes the extent of CIMIC activity conducted to support OBG(W)–3 manoeuvre and identifies some considerations for future tactical land commanders.

Environment

Al Muthanna and Dhi Qar were the first and second Iraqi provinces respectively to transition from coalition security responsibility to Iraqi primacy. Australia had been operating in Al Muthanna since the deployment of the Australian Al Muthanna Task Group–1 (AMTG-1) in 2005 and in Dhi Qar since 2006. These provinces represented a substantial area of operations in terms of both geography and population. The main geographic features were the Euphrates River, which ran through both provinces, and Highway 8, the main supply route for coalition forces running from Kuwait to Baghdad. Coalition forces were based at Tallil airbase located south of the city of An Nasiriyah, adjacent to Highway 8. Both provinces had functioning, if developing, democratic governments and institutions. The Iraqi Security Forces were generally effective and increasingly capable.

The Threat

There were a number of threat elements active in the area of operations during the deployment period. Predominant among these threats were the Shia extremists, primarily the Jaish Al Mahdi militia. Also present, both permanent and transiting, were a number of Sunni extremists. These groups would variously target coalition forces, the Iraqi Security Forces, Iraqi government officials and infrastructure. There was a significant improvised explosive device (IED) threat with regular IED strikes against coalition vehicles, mainly along the main supply route. Tallil was also intermittently targeted by indirect rocket fire. There was extensive criminal activity throughout the area of operations which was sometimes difficult to distinguish from counter-coalition force action. Patrolling OBG(W)–3 elements also encountered unexploded explosive objects, remnants of major combat operations in 1991 and 2003, and ran the frequent risk of road traffic accidents.

Table 1. key provincial statistics¹

OBG(W)–3 area of operations	Al Muthanna	Dhi Qar	Remarks
Area	51,740 km2	12,900 km2
Population	436,825	1,181,725	97% Shia, strongly tribal
Provincial Capital	As Samawah pop 132,000	An Nasiriyah pop 587,000
Provincial Iraqi Control	13 July 2006	21 September 2006
Remarks	rural, desert with urban centres	more urbanised with six major cities	Comparison: Tasmania, pop. 500,000; area 68,000 km2. East Timor, pop. 1,134,000; area 14,874 km2.

Mission

OBG(W)–3’s mission was to provide operational overwatch, within defined boundaries, in order to support the transition to full Iraqi control. This comprised three main tasks:

monitor, mentor and train the Iraqi Security Forces (specifically police and elements of the 10th Iraqi Army Division);
be prepared to support the Iraqi Security Forces if requested by the Provincial government; and
be prepared to assist coalition forces in extremis (i.e. in grave or exceptional circumstances).

The main effort was force protection which overlaid all tasks and was afforded priority consideration.

Given the nature of OBG(W)–3’s mission and tasks, the utility of CIMIC may not be immediately apparent. However, an outline of the critical requirements for CIMIC to achieve its key enabling role affords some clarity to this role. These critical requirements included:

achieving situational awareness and situational understanding throughout the area of operations (including ‘ground truth’, information sources, route reconnaissance, understanding of tribal or political power structures and cultural awareness);
establishing communication links with key Iraqi leaders (government, security, tribal and religious); and
liaising with the numerous civilian and military actors operating in or transiting through the area of operations.

Given the nature of OBG(W)–3’s mission and tasks, the utility of CIMIC may not be immediately apparent.

In addition, many of OBG(W)-3’s key restrictions originated from clauses in the Memorandums of Understanding agreed between coalition forces and the provincial leadership which outlined the transition to Iraqi security primacy for both provinces. The Memorandums of Understanding stipulated that the Provincial government approve, on a case-by-case basis, the movement of coalition forces beyond the immediate proximity of the coalition base at Tallil and the main supply route. At the time, neither the Governor of Dhi Qar nor the Governor of Al Muthanna displayed a positive disposition towards Australian forces, and both would frequently deny requests for those forces to enter major population centres. The reasons for denial varied, but often included political expediency and the desire to minimise the presence of coalition forces and the associated disruption to the civilian population. Fundamentally, CIMIC consent-winning activities provided an acceptable reason (codified in the Memorandums of Understanding) for OBG force elements to be moving throughout the area of operations and engaging key leaders and their communities.

OBG(W)–3 Structure

OBG(W)–3 consisted of around 515 personnel based on the 5th Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment. The battlegroup was organised into two manoeuvre combat teams with a reinforced platoon as a reserve. A combat team was allocated to operate in each province, although on major tasks the battlegroup deployed as a whole.

OBG(W)–3’s operational manning limited the battlegroup to two dedicated CIMIC officers. During all rotations for AMTG/OBG, these officers were sourced from the G9 branch at Headquarters 1st Division, which provided a pool of officers who had completed the CIMIC Tactical Operator Course and, crucially, had experience in CIMIC planning. This small element had proved its effectiveness in previous rotations and, soon after deployment, the CO augmented the CIMIC team with the addition of a captain re-tasked from within the battlegroup and a major (on a part-time basis). The CO recognised that an increase in CIMIC manpower would realise a disproportionate increase in the battlegroup’s effects throughout the area of operations.

The S9 (CIMIC), a major, was primarily engaged in planning, liaison and supporting CO-level key leadership engagement. Each captain was allocated to support the officer commanding a combat team and was primarily engaged in consent-winning activities in project facilitation and liaison. It is important to note that the CIMIC effects were delivered by the whole battlegroup, not just the CIMIC staff.

Each captain was allocated to support the officer commanding a combat team and was primarily engaged in consent-winning activities in project facilitation and liaison.

Planning and Integration Tactical Effects

The CIMIC staff, along with others including intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance; psychological operations; human intelligence; Public Affairs; a Military Transition team; and the ‘Divisional Training Centre’, augmented the battlegroup and provided supporting effects to the overall mission. The effort required to integrate and synchronise the activities of these elements to generate effects in support of the mission was complex and time-consuming. The battery commander who led the Joint Offensive Support Coordination Centre was tasked with this integration role and he developed a planning and synchronisation process that involved the daily meeting of the Joint Effects Working Group. This forum, directed by the Battlegroup Commander, developed the plan that fed the weekly fragmentation order and conducted deliberate planning for specific operations. No CIMIC activity was conducted unless reviewed by the Joint Effects Working Group, integrated with the other effectors and approved by the CO. Every CIMIC activity provided a targeted opportunity to achieve a number of complementary effects. For example, a visit to a project site might offer improved situational awareness and situational understanding through route reconnaissance, interaction with the local population, associated key leadership engagement, psychological operations product distribution, information operations message distribution, and the provision of material for information operations products. For a battlegroup engaged in an overwatch mission, CIMIC provided a key lever for the CO to shape and understand the battlespace.

CIMIC Primary Effects

‘Hearts and minds’ is a common cliche used to describe CIMIC activity, although it is usually a poor descriptor. CIMIC has also been defined as:

The coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the Commander and civil actors, including the national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies.²

‘Hearts and minds’ implies a level of ideological control of the population. It requires a concerted effort to influence a target population across an area of operations. OBG(W) did not possess the mission, mandate or resources to conduct a ‘hearts and minds’ campaign. In the overwatch mission context, ‘hearts and minds’ was the purview of the Iraqi government and its institutions. What the CO OBG(W)–3 required from the CIMIC staff was an enhanced ability to influence, engage and leverage. In other words, CIMIC provided the CO with an improved capability to achieve ‘tactical consent’ from individuals and groups in the areas specifically important to the OBG(W)–3 mission.

‘Hearts and minds’ implies a level of ideological control of the population.

Some of the key effects to which CIMIC contributed included:

Influence. ‘Influence’ primarily concerned achieving consent from target individuals and groups (normally the key leadership). At a minimum, this activity sought to ensure that key leaders understood the reasons for the presence of OBG(W)–3 force elements and tolerated them. Efforts were also devoted to shaping target individuals and groups to view contact with OBG(W)–3 favourably in order to elicit cooperation.
Engage. Engagement was achieved through building relationships with members of the key leadership. CIMIC supported this engagement by providing an incentive for key leaders to meet with OBG(W)–3. This incentive was generated by the prospect of projects and the associated commercial, political and community benefits.
Leverage. Leverage referred to activity aimed at harnessing the resources of another organisation in support of the OBG mission. There were many actors with capability and resources not available to the OBG. The CIMIC team spent time analysing these and planning efforts to take advantage of them. For example, one organisation (a provincial reconstruction team) had water pumps and generators to distribute. The OBG was able to utilise this distribution to achieve an effect in support of its mission.

Practical experience demonstrated that these effects often possessed certain characteristics:

Persistent. The effect of a CIMIC project can extend far beyond the activity itself. While the project may or may not be labelled an Australian project, it will be informally recognised as such by the local community. The community and key leaders also know that Australian forces will probably return to visit the site. Shaping is achieved through the potential for further project work in the area on the clear proviso that the security situation is satisfactory. This provides an incentive to control or report insurgent activity in the vicinity where possible.
Remote. A CIMIC project can create an effect without the necessity for a physical Australian presence. Several projects with a targeted effect were completed in remote corners of the area of operations with a single visit by OBG force elements. These were effected using local contractors and were monitored via various means including unmanned aerial vehicles and reports from key Iraqi leaders. This is an aspect of what Brigadier Roger Noble describes as ‘soft manoeuvre’.³
Low velocity. CIMIC projects can take a long time (an important consideration in the context of a six-month rotation). However, the effect can be immediate as the mere possibility of a project can shape the behaviour of individuals and groups. This effect can then continue through initial engagement to discuss the project’s possibility, the ongoing scoping work, the issue of a contract, the actual work itself, visits to the site to monitor work in progress and a completion ceremony. All of these offer the opportunity to achieve complementary effects through engagement, visits, information operations and collaboration with other actors.
Possibility of unintended consequences. Given the complexity of the human terrain and the interaction between political, tribal, commercial, individual and threat elements, it was difficult to predict the second and third order effects for any particular activity. Some activities did not achieve their intended effect. Likewise, OBG(W) was also vulnerable to the negative influence of unintended consequences from the other actors conducting projects in the area of operations. Unintended effects were mitigated, where possible, through consultation with coalition partners, subject matter experts and local officials as part of a careful planning process before any commitment was made.

It is important to note that the actual effect intended for an activity might be quite different from that communicated in the Public Affairs product. For example, there is a crucial difference between CIMIC and humanitarian assistance. CIMIC resources are not spent where they are most needed by a population (as is the case with humanitarian assistance). They are spent where they will have the most effect in support of the military mission. CIMIC activities are sometimes criticised by those who do not appreciate this difference and do not understand the context of the mission. A project deemed a failure by uninformed external commentators may have actually achieved the effect desired by the CO. Thus, it is important to be wary of critical judgments of the success or otherwise of a consent-winning activity if the mission context, the intended effect and the follow-on activity are not clearly understood.

... there is a crucial difference between CIMIC and humanitarian assistance.

The key operational outcomes to which these effects contribute are:

consent of the targeted segments of the local population,
influence within key Iraqi leadership,
improved freedom of manoeuvre,
enhanced situational awareness, and
enhanced force protection.

Key CIMIC Activities

Key CIMIC activities that worked to achieve these effects included:

Consent-winning activities. These activities primarily consisted of facilitating small-scale civilian infrastructure projects. These projects, each endorsed by the CO, typically ranged in cost from US$20,000 to US$100,000 and included basic school refurbishments, road repair and water reticulation. All these projects were approved, scoped and certified by Iraqi officials. They were designed by Iraqi engineers and built by Iraqi contractors to Iraqi standards. OBG CIMIC staff facilitated contract tender, funding and payment, and ensured that the projects were conducted within the funding regulations. Utilising Iraqi contractors injected money into the local economy and supported business development. Having Iraqi officials responsible for standards increased local ownership and reinforced the legitimacy of the local government. OBG(W)–3 had access to several streams of funding for this type of activity. The first of these was via the Australian government funds managed by Joint Operations Command. The second was the Commanders’ Emergency Response Program provided by the US government via the Multinational Force–Iraq. Both had stringent guidelines for spending and accounting, but were different in scope, process and guidelines. OBG(W)–3 facilitated over eighty projects throughout the area of operations during the deployment. Sometimes the consent-winning activity was conducted by other agencies and OBG benefited through a leverage effect.
Support to key leadership engagement. CIMIC staff supported the CO and officers commanding combat teams in preparing for and conducting key leadership engagement.
Liaison. The CIMIC team played an important part in managing the friendly forces civil-military liaison for the battlegroup. There were numerous coalition actors operating in the area of operations including various organisations and forces from the United States, Romania and the United Kingdom. Most were conducting some type of civil affairs activity that had to be de-conflicted and coordinated with OBG(W)–3 operations. The key civil actors present were the provincial reconstruction teams from the United States and Italy, a number of private security contractors, and organisations such as the United Nations Development Program and AusAid, which visited occasionally. All of these organisations sought linked but not identical goals. Coordination was achieved through a series of meetings, councils and a liaison officer network. Some were led by other actors with OBG(W) representatives as participants, while others were led by OBG(W). There was also a constant stream of individuals and organisations keen to meet with the CO. The CIMIC team acted as the first point of contact for many of these (particularly local Iraqis and civil agencies) freeing the CO for other activities.

The Children-Centric Consent Winning Activity Theme

CO OBG(W)–3 developed a theme that focused on consent-winning activities to benefit children. Typically these were school refurbishments and work on orphanages and community playgrounds. The rationale for these included:

to allow OBG(W)–3 to concentrate the majority of its limited CIMIC resources on a single sector;
these types of projects were generally relatively simple, low risk and within the capability of the OBG(W) CIMIC team;
these projects benefited communities rather than individuals, therefore it was difficult to oppose or attack them;
there was generally a school (or unfulfilled need) in an area where OBG(W) wished to have an effect or an area that was the responsibility of a key leader;
these activities provided a simple theme (investing in the future) for OBG(W) staff to disseminate that was readily understood by local nationals;
this theme (spread by word of mouth) helped shape the local leadership in their requests for assistance and allowed OBG(W) to rebuff other requests; and
these types of projects have particular religious and social significance because of the importance that Islam places on caring for children (particularly orphans).

CO OBG(W)–3 developed a theme that focused on consent-winning activities to benefit children.

The children-centric theme proved to be successful for this mission and in this environment, although it is not a universal template. In this case, the context featured a functioning provincial government, developed (if degraded) infrastructure and a population generally supportive of education. However, the lesson is clear: having a theme appropriate to the mission enabled focused allocation of scarce resources in a way that can be articulated by commanders and understood by the community. This helped de-conflict activities with other civilian actors, support information operations messaging and develop local consent.

Example of CIMIC Support to Battlegroup Manoeuvre

CIMIC was a key enabler for the conduct of Operation HOOPER. The mission for this operation was to gain enduring situational awareness in the six northern cities of Dhi Qar and featured a battlegroup-level patrol conducted over a number of days with multiple key leadership engagements in each location. Prior to this engagement, the local government leadership was wary of the idea of coalition forces visiting major population centres. The region had seen very few coalition force elements since the initial invasion, and the local population was cautious and, at times, hostile towards coalition forces. Only months before, an OBG(W)–2 patrol that had moved through this region had been engaged on multiple occasions by threat forces.

The region had seen very few coalition force elements since the initial invasion, and the local population was cautious and, at times, hostile towards coalition forces.

The CIMIC contribution to this operation featured:

support to a preliminary series of shaping key leadership engagements with tribal, municipal and Iraqi Police leaders conducted at the Tallil base over the course of a week;
rapid CIMIC follow-up to scope and commence projects discussed during key leadership engagement (nine projects, worth a substantial amount, were scoped, funded and commenced within the two weeks prior to the manoeuvre phase of the operation); and
visits to each of the project sites, including into highly concentrated population centres.

The temporal and geographic concentration of CIMIC effort in support of Operation HOOPER realised the following benefits:

pressure on local leadership to assert control over local militia elements;
tangible reinforcement of the information operations message that OBG(W)–3 was a force for good;
enhanced status of Australian forces by rapid follow-through on promises (contrasting with other agencies that had not done so in the past). This type of speed was generally valued by Arab leaders with their cultural tendency to plan in the short term;
assistance in creating the conditions for entry by OBG(W)–3 force elements to visit the project sites and conduct further key leadership engagement;
empowerment of leaders involved in the key leadership engagement by allowing them to take credit for the reconstruction activity (no Australian or coalition signage was placed in the vicinity of the projects); and
CIMIC projects allowed ongoing communication with key leaders as progress was monitored and issues resolved. The project completion also provided a reason to return to the area, re-engage with the leaders and build further situational awareness.

The operation proved a success, with situational awareness significantly boosted through the development of multiple networks and relationships. In addition, targeted populations were positively influenced by successful projects that were inextricably linked to the presence of coalition forces.

Conclusion

OBG(W)–3 conducted a successful mission to provide operational overwatch during its deployment to Iraq. A key contributor to this success was the integration of specialist attachments into the battlegroup. In particular, the inclusion of specialist CIMIC officers and the availability of enabling resources allowed the battlegroup to enhance its ability to achieve tactical consent within the local leadership and population in areas important to the mission. It also allowed a robust civil-military liaison network to de-conflict and coordinate the activities of the numerous civil and military actors operating in the OBG(W)–3 area of operations. CIMIC assisted in the achievement of key effects including influence, engagement and leverage. These effects were often characterised by being low velocity, remote, persistent and subject to unintended consequences. Each CIMIC activity was a calculated attempt to achieve a military effect. They were planned by the battlegroup staff, integrated with other ‘effectors’ and ‘collectors’ and approved by the CO. Ultimately, CIMIC provided the CO with a valuable and effective lever that improved situational awareness and situational understanding, freedom of manoeuvre, force protection and consent, to shape this non-permissive battlespace.

About the Author

Lieutenant Colonel Mark Armstrong is an Army Reserve officer who is seconded to the Queensland Reconstruction Authority following his full-time attendance at Australian Command and Staff College. A Military Police officer, his previous posting was as the G935 at Headquarters 1st Division. Prior to deploying with OBG(W)–3 in 2007, he was the S9 for Headquarters 7th Brigade. In 2009, Lieutenant Colonel Armstrong was the lead instructor for the Joint CIMIC Staff Planners’ Course and instructed at the NATO CIMIC Centre of Excellence. Lieutenant Colonel Armstrong has completed Masters degrees in International Security Studies, Arts (Strategy and Management), Business Administration and Human Resource Management.