War and the Strategist of the Twenty-First Century
Abstract
Although fraught with difficulty, predictions of the exercise of power, and therefore the basis of the nature and conduct of warfare in the twenty-first century, can be found in two general schools of thought: those who believe that there has been, in the wake of the end of the Cold War, a discontinuity and accompanying paradigm shift in the conduct of international relations; and those who believe claims of such a shift are overstated, and that a realist approach will remain the dominant paradigm for the foreseeable future. This article will assess these schools of thought and then advocate that Carl von Clausewitz is the strategist best suited to the nature and conduct of warfare in the twenty-first century.
The Future World - Discontinuity Versus Continuity
Those who subscribe to the paradigm shift argument contend in an increasingly globalised world that a range of factors (including international economic interdependence, powerful transnational corporations, international crime, terrorism, immigration and environmental issues), most of which transcend national borders, are contributing to a significant decline in the relevance of the traditional, Westphalian-based state. Predictions of the demise of the state abound1 with an accompanying belief in the decline of inter-state war and the emergence of new types of conflict that will change the nature of war in the twenty-first century. To commentators such as Martin Van Creveld, ‘interstate war as a phenomenon is slowly but surely being squeezed below the historical horizon’,2 while others like John Keegan go further: ‘it is scarcely possible anywhere in the world today to raise a body of reasoned support...that war is a justifiable activity... it seems just possible to glimpse an emerging outline of a world without war.’3
Even if there are wars, they will not be between mature democracies.4 Rather, conflicts in the twenty-first century will be ‘new’, ‘uncivil’ or ‘internal’ wars between those who are part of the globalised world and those who have been excluded from it (the ‘periphery’).5 Within this periphery new conflicts will often be conducted in failed states with little sense of political coherence.6 Such conflicts are unlikely to lend themselves to resolution through the application of overwhelming Western firepower. Conversely, because of the technological superiority of Western forces, competitors to Western interests in these conflicts will be forced to adopt asymmetric strategies.
The realist approach rejects the majority of the discontinuity argument and believes that the state will remain the dominant factor in the international system, albeit with increasing competition from non-state actors.7 While not totally rejecting the notion of a bifurcated world and the impact this may have on the nature and conduct of future war, this school of thought rejects the notion of a world without war. Coral Bell suggests three distinct but interrelated stages in twenty-first century warfare. The current stage, which she describes as a ‘Jihadists’ War’ is an attritional-style, asymmetric conflict that will last as long as the unipolar world remains. In the medium term, perhaps from around the 2040s, she sees the emergence of up to twelve great powers (although not necessarily mature democracies) that in the long term will develop into a serious challenge to the US hegemon.8 To Bell, the transition from a unipolar to multipolar world will be a period of increased tension where ‘as in the past, it will make conventional war between the great powers much more likely than at present.’9 If conventional war is possible, realists accept that in the short to medium term irregular, asymmetric conflict, labelled by some as fourth and now fifth generation warfare,10 will be the dominant form of conflict for the foreseeable future and that, despite the hopes and promises of what Eliot Cohen has labelled the ‘technophiles’,11 no technological silver bullet is likely to emerge to decisively win such wars.
Clausewitz - Strategist of Choice
Despite these competing visions, Clausewitz is the strategist of choice in the twenty-first century and in On War he has achieved his ambition to write a book ‘that possibly might be picked up more than once by those who are interested in the subject.’12 Integral to On War, and a telling discriminator between him and other strategists, is the intellectual framework of theory that pervades his work. To Clausewitz, theory ‘will have fulfilled its main task when it is used to analyse the constituent elements of war... to define clearly the ends in view’ and that such analysis is ‘meant to educate the mind of the future commander...not to accompany him on the battlefield.’13 Theory is not sacrosanct—it must always be subject to critical analysis and re-evaluation.14
For Clausewitz, war ‘is the continuation of policy by other means’. Therefore, warfare cannot be autonomous from policy: ‘the political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose.’15 The nature of war is characterised by factors such as chance and uncertainty,16 which finds expressions in friction, ‘that force that makes the easy so difficult’17 and the factor that distinguishes real war from paper war.18 Friction is further compounded by the fog of uncertainty.19 Such concepts allude to the importance Clausewitz placed on the human dimension of war. While war may be rational as an instrument of policy, it is the ‘moral elements [that] are among the most important in war.’20 In turn, this points towards Clausewitz’s duality of war consisting of both an eternal and universal objective (logic) and an ever-changing subjective (grammar).21
If war at its highest level is an act of policy, the object of war is an ‘act of force to compel our enemy to do our will’.22 No one should start a war without understanding the political purpose and objective of the war.23 It was the responsibility of the policymakers to set out these objectives—the first and foremost act of the statesman is to determine the type of war.24 The clear subjugation of the military to policy explains the difference between absolute (theoretical) and real war—absolute war was the ideal form of war—total and with no limits on escalation. But as a continuation of policy, restricted by the limitations imposed by policy, the conduct of war moved from the theoretical absolute to real or limited war.25
It is the role of the commander to achieve victory. To Clausewitz, this was achieved, and wars could be won, through decisive battle. At the tactical level, victory in decisive battle is an end in itself. At the policy and strategic level, the tactical victory is the means to achieve favourable policy outcomes. Although preferred, decisive battle is not essential: favourable outcomes can be achieved, even if engagements are not fought.26 To aid the tactical commander, Clausewitz introduced two concepts that have enduring relevance. The Centre of Gravity, ‘the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends’,27 is the point at which ‘all our energies should be directed’ and could include the enemy army, his capital or a stronger ally.28 The culminating point is the second concept: the position at which an attacker can no longer effectively protect himself from counterattack.29
Criticisms of Clausewitz fall into two areas. Those generally supportive acknowledge that some aspects of his theories fall short. He is land centric, weak on the analysis of the enemy, probably more wrong than right in his assessment of intelligence, does not adequately consider the utility of irregular forces or the role of technology and, for such a central part of his theory, the concept of policy is not well developed.30 These criticisms are valid, reflect the context of the environment within which Clausewitz wrote, and tend to deal more with the grammar than the overall logic of his theories.
Other more vocal critics question the validity of Clausewitzian logic. Basil Liddell Hart viewed Clausewitz as the ‘mahdi of mass’ and believed him responsible for the doctrine of the offensive that produced such mass casualties in the First World War.31 More recent critics align themselves with the discontinuity school previously discussed. John Keegan contends that war is not the continuation of policy by other means. Rather, he advances his argument that war is primarily a cultural phenomenon (and therefore not necessarily of an enduring nature).32 Martin Van Creveld, an outspoken critic, believes that the Clausewitzian understanding of war is obsolete (based on his view that Clausewitzian war is exclusively the purview of the state).33 Mary Kaldor, although less strident, has similar criticisms.34 However, critics of the critics have not been silent and suggest that Keegan, Van Creveld and Kaldor are making their case based on a too narrow interpretation of Clausewitz (which was fashionable in the 1970s).35 Of course, Clausewitz believed that theories need to be constantly reviewed: he would probably support the criticism of his grammar but would have been far more sceptical of those who questioned his logic based on what may happen in the future.
Despite such criticisms, Clausewitz’s theory of war has no credible rival or competitor. Although Martin Van Creveld’s lament of the end of strategy is too strong, no other strategist or school of thought has emerged to seriously challenge Clausewitz. Reasons for this vary. Van Creveld contends that most twentieth century theorists concentrated on the how of war and, while fixated with the application of technology, showed inadequate regard for the what and why aspects of strategic thought.36 Others believe, as I do, that there has been steady and slow development in strategic thought, by a range of theorists. However, progress has only been incremental. Space precludes an adequate discussion of such theorists who include, but are not limited to:
• Julian Corbett and his maritime strategy of sea control, which recognises the interdependence of sea and land power as part of a national military strategy
• Basil Liddell Hart and his concept of the indirect approach
• Edward Luttwak and his observation of the inherent paradox of strategy and warfare
• John Boyd’s Observe, Orient, Decide and Act loop, which seeks, through temporal dislocation, to impose strategic paralysis on the enemy, and
• Admiral J C Wylie and his general theory on war with its emphasis on control and the utility of cumulative and sequential strategies.
There is a third reason for Clausewitz’s dominance: ‘On War is the gold standard for general strategic theory. So intellectually inescapable is Clausewitz that...most strategists are all either neo-Clausewitzian...or self-avowedly post- Clausewitzian.’37
Despite this ‘gold standard’ and a lack of serious challenge to his theories, is Clausewitz future proof? Of course, the answer to this is impossible to predict with certainty. However, the question can be addressed by looking back. Written in the first half of the nineteenth century, much of On War remained relevant, and was gaining in influence, throughout the remainder of that century. Throughout the tumultuous twentieth century, the relevance and popularity of Clausewitz steadily increased as theorists and practitioners of war, even with such technologically driven changes to the grammar of war as air power, acknowledged the value of Clausewitzian logic. That Clausewitz’s concepts, more than any other, could survive and even prosper throughout a century of such far reaching changes and tragic conflicts, suggests that Clausewitzian logic is enduring and will continue to provide a cogent and relevant theory, despite the inevitable changes in the grammar of war, for the twenty-first century.
Summary
In predicting the nature and conduct of war in the twenty-first century there is no certainty. Of the competing visions presented, there is convergence to the view that sovereign states will have a reduced influence in an increasingly bifurcated world. However, forecasts of the demise of the state are premature. In the foreseeable future, the realist, state-centred approach will remain the paradigm of international relations, albeit with a significant increase in the number of non-state actors. Conflicts will range across a wide spectrum, from those irregular and asymmetric in nature, where victory is unlikely to be achieved by technological overmatch, up to and including conventional inter-state clashes. As such, given the uncertainty of the future, the human element of warfare and conflict will remain dominant and, despite the hopes of those who believe such conflict is on the wane, war will continue to remain a viable instrument of policy in the twenty-first century.
Given this view of the world—of state and non-state multi-spectrum conflict, often asymmetric in nature and where clear victory is unlikely to be delivered by technology, of uncertainty and the enduring centrality of the human aspects of war—Clausewitz remains the strategist of choice for the twenty-first century. Despite incremental and gradual, albeit worthy, contributions by a select few to the school of strategic thought, there are no rivals to Clausewitz. He is the only theorist that provides us with the what, why and, to a lesser extent, the how of war in a comprehensive and cogent general theory. This does not mean that Clausewitz is the one-stop shop for strategy for the twenty-first century—the prudent practitioner, for each strategic dilemma presented, must weave together threads from throughout the school of strategic thought to come up with the best solution. However, Clausewitz is an essential part of any such consideration. His critics seem to get bogged down into narrow interpretive issues and often forget that Clausewitz, especially in respect to the grammar of war, was a product of his times. Tellingly, none of his critics have effectively challenged the veracity of his logic. The vision of the world for the remainder of this century is of continuity in the essentials of war. So far, Clausewitz’s logic transcends time, and despite his contention that ‘in strategy everything has to be guessed at and presumed’38 there is every likelihood that Clausewitz will be the strategist of choice for the twenty-first century and beyond.
Endnotes
1 ‘the type of political organization known as the state...seems to be coming to an end’, quoted in M Van Creveld, ‘Through a glass, darkly: some reflections on the future of war’, Naval War College Review, No. 53, 2000, p. 42; J Mathews, ‘the absolutes of the Westphalian system...are all dissolving’, quoted in S Walt, ‘Waiting for Mr X’, Foreign Policy, Spring, 1998, p. 36.
2 Van Creveld, ‘Through a glass, darkly: some reflections on the future of war’, p. 40.
3 J Keegan, A History of Warfare: What is War? Vintage Books, New York, 1994, pp. 56–58.
4 C Dandeker, ‘A farewell to arms? The military and the nation-state in a changing world’ in J Burk (ed), The Military in New Times: Adapting Armed Forces in a Turbulent World, Westview Press, Boulder, 1994, p. 119.
5 M Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era, Polity Press, Oxford, 1999, pp. 69–70.
6 D Snow, Uncivil Wars: International Security and the New Internal Conflicts, Lynne Rienner Press, Boulder, 1996, pp. 98–99.
7 A Stolberg, ‘The international system in the 21st century’ in J Boone Bartholomees Jr, (ed), US Army War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy, USAWC, Carlisle, 2007, p. 13.
8 C Bell, ‘Asymmetric wars’ in S Hopkins (ed), Asymmetry and Complexity: Selected papers from the 2005 Rowell Seminar and the 2005 Chief of Army’s Conference, Land Studies Centre Australia, Canberra, 2007, pp. 5–13.
9 Ibid., p. 13. See also E Mansfield and J Snyder, ‘Democratization and war’ in RK Betts (ed), Conflict After the Cold War, Second edition, Longman Press, New York, 2002, pp. 335–47.
10 TX Hammes, ‘Fourth generation warfare evolves, fifth emerges,’ Military Review, May–June, 2007, pp. 14–24.
11 E Cohen, ‘Technology and warfare’ in J Bayliss et al (eds), Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies, Oxford Press, Oxford, 2002, p. 236.
12 C von Clausewitz, On War, M Howard and P Paret (eds), Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1989, p. 63.
13 Ibid., p. 141.
14 Ibid., pp. 156–59.
15 Ibid., p. 87.
16 Ibid., pp. 85–86.
17 Ibid., p. 121.
18 Ibid., p. 119.
19 Ibid., p. 101.
20 Ibid., p. 184.
21 C Gray, Another Bloody Century: Future War, Phoenix Press, London, 2006, p. 313.
22 Clausewitz, On War, p. 75.
23 Ibid., p. 579.
24 Ibid., pp. 605–08.
25 Ibid., pp. 77, 579–81.
26 Ibid., p. 181.
27 Ibid., pp. 595–96.
28 Ibid., p. 595.
29 Ibid., p. 528.
30 Gray, Another Bloody Century: Future War, pp. 100–09.
31 M Van Creveld, The Art of War: War and Military Thought, Cassell Press, London, 2000, p. 175.
32 Keegan, A History of Warfare: What is War, pp. 5, 12.
33 M Van Creveld, The Transformation of War, Free Press, New York, 1991, pp. ix, 212.
34 Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era, pp. 20–25.
35 H Strachan, ‘A Clausewitz for every season’, The American Interest: Policy, Politics and Culture, Vol. 2, No. 6, 2007, p. 35.
36 M Van Creveld, ‘The end of strategy?’ in H Smith (ed), The Strategists, Australian Defence Studies Centre, Canberra, 2001, pp. 122–23.
37 C Gray, Modern Strategy, Oxford University Press, New York, 1999, p. 182.
38 Clausewitz, On War, pp. 178–79.
