From Red to Blue: China and Peacekeeping
Abstract
Until the early 1990s Chinese participation in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations was rather insignificant. Since the mid-1990s, however, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has steadily increased its commitment to UN missions and moved from a position of marginality to become one of the main contributors to such missions. China’s participation in UN peacekeeping operations and its growing engagement with the UN in general has become an important component of the PRC’s diplomacy and its efforts to expand its influence in world affairs.
Introduction
Since its founding in 1949 the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) has had a rather marginal participation in UN missions. Military activities in particular were viewed by Beijing with extreme suspicion and a certain amount of disdain. For decades China regarded the world body as nothing more than a front for Western interests and a vehicle by which the United States tried to legitimise its alleged imperialistic and hegemonic policies. Until recently, memories of the Korean conflict in which UN forces under US command confronted the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA), with great loss of life on both sides, remained a point of particular bitterness. However, the past decade has witnessed a remarkable change in the PRC’s attitude toward the United Nations in general and more significantly to peacekeeping missions, an area Beijing once considered taboo.
From Marginality to Centrality
From a position of near-total indifference and outright hostility toward the world body, China is increasingly emerging as one of the organisation’s most active supporters and participants. Well into the late 1980s, Chinas involvement with the United Nations was restricted to the Security Council, where Beijing made full use of its veto power to frustrate and irritate the two superpowers. In recent years, however, Chinas participation and involvement with the United Nations has assumed a far more positive and constructive dimension.
In 1988, China joined the United Nations Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and a year later made its first contribution to a UN mission when it sent twenty civilian observers to take part in the UN mission that supervised Namibia’s independence process. This was followed in 1990 by a small team of military observers to the Middle East, China’s first ever military contribution to the United Nations and the PLA’s first deployment on a peacekeeping mission. The early 1990s marked the beginning of a surge in Chinas participation in UN peacekeeping missions.
In 1992 the PLA deployed an 800-strong military engineer battalion to the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), Chinas first ‘blue-helmet’ contingent. This was followed by smaller detachments to Mozambique between 1993-94; Liberia from 1993-97, and a second commitment to that country in 2003 to present; and further commitments to Sierra Leone and Western Sahara. These operations were followed by a series of expanding and more robust contributions, such as the deployment of fifty-five police personnel to Timor Leste in 2000, Chinas first police participation in such missions. The deployment of a 175 member engineer company and a forty-five person medical detachment to MONUC (Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies en Republique Democratique du Congo) the UN mission in Congo, in 2003, was the country’s first deployment of female personnel.1
Some members of the Chinese contingent played important roles in Timor Leste with a Chinese officer being appointed head of the security detail of the then Timorese Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri, a man widely known for his sympathies for Beijing. Chinese officers also trained the Timorese police in skills such as martial arts and anti-riot techniques. Other contributions by the Chinese, such as teaching local police human rights courses, was viewed with scepticism by some.2 In 2007 China made its second deployment to Timor Leste with ten police officers and three military observers taking part in UNMIT, the UN mission charged with stabilising the country after the May 2006 military crisis.
In 2004 China simultaneously undertook two major force deployments to UN missions, with 125 riot police to Haiti and 185 engineering personnel to Lebanon. In December 2006 China made another major commitment with the deployment of 500 peacekeepers to war-torn Liberia. As mentioned above, Chinas commitment to Liberia started in 1993, lasting through 1997, and then resumed again in 2003—in all Chinese peacekeepers have been serving in that country for more than seven years, an indication of Chinas long-term commitment to UN missions.3 China has also deployed three contingents of troops to southern Sudan since May 2006, with the deployment of the third taking place in September 2007 and consisting of 435 personnel.4
Since 1990 China had deployed 5654 people to UN peacekeeping missions and currently has 1819 military and police personnel participating in eleven UN missions around the globe.5 To manage this growing commitment, in December 2001 the Chinese government created a Peacekeeping Affairs Office at the Ministry of Defense. A month later, China joined Level One of the United Nations Standby Arrangement System, putting at the disposal of the organisation an engineering battalion of 525 members, a medical element of twenty-five members, and two transportation companies of 160 members ready to join UN peacekeeping operations at any moment. Beijing has also been investing in the capabilities of the Peoples Armed Police (PAP) for such missions. A new peacekeeping operations academy is currently under construction in the outskirts of the Chinese capital. The massive centre estimated at the cost of several million dollars is expected to meet the PAP’s growing need for qualified personal to sustain its growing involvement in such missions.6 In 2006 thirty Chinese police officers were sent for peacekeeping training courses overseas, and as of October 2007 the PAP had deployed 177 officers to UN operations.
Perhaps as an indication of Chinas growing confidence and ambitions, the planned academy is also expected to train large numbers of foreign personnel. Considering the lack of alternatives, and Beijing’s generous encouragement, developing nations in particular are likely to send significant numbers to China for such training.7 Taking into account the fact that developing countries contribute the bulk of personnel to most UN operations, with the developed world usually preferring to contribute financially, China is likely to obtain significant diplomatic rewards for such an initiative—Bangladesh, a country where Chinese influence has been on the rise, is the largest contributor of forces to UN missions, and Beijing’s close friend Pakistan is also among the top contributors. The training of foreign peacekeepers in Chinese schools can only contribute to an increase in China’s influence in the United Nations and throughout the developing world.
Until 2006 China was the largest force contributor to UN missions among the five members of the Security Council, a position it lost when France deployed its large force to Lebanon. However, the PRC is likely to regain its lead position, with its planned deployment to Lebanon expected to be its largest ever.8 The PLA plans to deploy a 1000-strong contingent to Lebanon that may for the first time include a combat element. This will be a significant milestone in China’s involvement in UN military operations and is further indication of Beijing’s growing confidence, and perhaps assertiveness, as a world power.
On the financial front, China currently contributes 3 per cent of the costs of all UN peacekeeping missions and is expected to double its contribution in the near term. While the PRC’s financial contributions have grown substantially in the past decade they still pale when compared with the other major powers. For instance, the United States is the main contributor to the UN budget, currently paying for 23 per cent of UN budget needs, while Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom and France make up the rest of the top five contributors. The PRC comes at number seven, behind Italy and Canada and just slightly ahead of Spain. Despite its relatively modest contribution China has made substantial diplomatic gains and is slowly increasing its influence within the world body.
Explaining the Shift
With the end of the Cold War, the United Nations was called upon to police numerous areas of conflict around the world. Some of these, such as Cambodia, were of significant political and economic importance for China. China therefore began to see its participation in certain UN missions as a way to influence events in other countries and territories. It is perhaps no coincidence that Chinas first ever deployment of a ‘blue helmet’ contingent was to Cambodia, a country traditionally regarded by Beijing as being within its sphere of influence. Chinas military deployment to Cambodia was aimed at complementing the political and economic offensive undertaken after the departure of Vietnamese troops, with the objective of China regaining its lost pre-eminence in that country. China fought a brief war with Vietnam in 1978 as a result of the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and subsequent toppling of Chinas murderous client Poll Pot.9 With this invasion China hoped to teach Vietnam a lesson not to meddle in Chinas backyard. However, decimated by the excess of the cultural revolution of the 1960s, the PLA performed poorly and instead of teaching a lesson got a full curriculum from the tenacious and combat hardened Vietnamese. Since Chinas reengagement with Cambodia in the early 1990s, Cambodia has steadily come under Beijing’s economic and political influence.
China also uses its peacekeeping efforts to influence potential new friends on the world stage. In 2004 China deployed 125 riot police to Haiti, a country with which the PRC did not have diplomatic relations because Haiti recognised Taiwan. With the police deployment and other political and economic moves, China intended to influence events in its favour once a new government had emerged after the crisis. Considering that Taiwan’s oldest and most committed supporters are found in Central America and the Caribbean, Beijing’s interest in the area should not be underestimated. Indeed, in the last decade the PRC has been engaged in a major diplomatic and economic offensive to penetrate this traditionally secured Taiwanese redoubt. Beijing obtained its first victory in Central America in July 2007 when, after six decades of diplomatic ties with Taiwan, Costa Rica ditched Taipei for Beijing.10
China’s police deployment to Timor Leste can be seen in a similar context. China was the first country to recognise the territory’s independence in May 2002 and has since been a generous supporter of the fledging state. By participating in the territory’s stabilisation and by continuing its support after independence, the PRC hopes to counter any possible chequebook diplomacy on the part of Taiwan and secure as a friend, however small, a future member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Timor Leste oil and gas reserves are unlikely to have gone unnoticed by the PRC, with Chinas largest oil company, Petrochina, reported to have conducted major seismic studies to assess these potential resources.11
Chinese commitments to Namibia, Liberia and Congo, while not solely motivated by economic interests, were strongly influenced by them. All three African countries are rich in energy resources and other raw materials desperately needed by China to sustain its economic growth. Beijing’s influence in both Liberia and Congo has been on the rise in recent years, particularly in Liberia, where China is reported to have significant investments in the energy sector. In Liberia, Chinese companies have been active looking for oil and other valuable resources such as gold, iron and manganese.12 Beijing has also provided generous financial aid and has assumed the costs of Liberia’s diplomatic mission in Beijing for the next ten years. It is perhaps also worth noting that the deployment to Liberia came just years after that country had broken diplomatic ties with Taiwan and established diplomatic relations with the PRC.
While China’s military and police deployments span the globe, the bulk of its forces have been sent on missions in the African continent. Of the 1819 Chinese military and police personnel deployed in 2007 on UN peacemaking operations, 1512 were deployed to missions in Africa.13 China’s steadily growing demand for energy resources, in particular oil and natural gas, has made Africa an increasingly important component of China’s future economic prosperity. Therefore, in the past decade or so Beijing has intensified its relations with the region in order to consolidate its position in this strategically important area. Its large contributions to UN missions in Africa are a complement to other economic and political measures aimed at furthering its vital interests.
While economic concerns underpin much of China’s strategic manoeuvring, some of its aims are bigger than furthering financial interests. Being a rising world power, China wants to be seen as playing a major and constructive role in the shaping of world affairs in the same way that Western powers do. China is eager to assure the world that its rising power is not a threat and that it can play a constructive role in world affairs.14 By participating in UN missions Beijing seeks to demonstrate its willingness to contribute its growing wealth to the benefit of the UN and the international community at large. Its participation in humanitarian efforts such as disaster relief, support to refugees and infrastructure development helps create the image of benign and humanitarian power and gives credence to its peaceful rise claims. This explains to a large extent its preference for deploying non-combat units such as medical teams and engineers instead of combat troops. In other words, a dragon in blue is much less frightening.
Increased involvement with the UN also allows the PRC to increase its influence in world affairs. Thus China sees its participation in such missions as a way to balance and limit the influence of Western powers, in particular the United States. The Bush Administrations disregard for the United Nations in the run-up to the invasion of Iraq allowed China to capitalise on its UN credentials by portraying itself as a responsible power championing the cause of multilateralism, against US unilateralism and disrespect for international norms. China’s growing contribution, both in terms of personnel and capital, is slowly increasing its influence within the organisation.
In January 2007 the first Chinese official was appointed to a senior UN post when Dr Margaret Chan was elected the director of the World Health Organization (WHO). This was followed in August by the appointment of Major General Zhao Jingmin as Force Commander of the UN mission in Western Sahara tasked with monitoring the ceasefire between the Polisaro Front and the Moroccan Army.15 General Zhao is the first Chinese military officer to command a UN mission, and his appointment shows the PRC s growing influence within the organisation and in world affairs. A final, but important, point to remember is that todays China has the money to afford such activities as peacekeeping operations, and gamble on their possible benefits.
Conclusion
After decades of limited involvement and suspicion toward peacekeeping operations, China is emerging as one of the leading participants and supporters of such missions—as Chinas economic and political power grows, so does the scope of its interests. China can no longer afford to stay at the margins while others shape the world’s agenda, and it is therefore eager to make its presence felt and ensure that its interests are taken into account. It remains to be seen what sort of impact Beijing’s newfound passion for multilateralism will have on peacekeeping operations and other UN missions. Two things seem certain. First, a China that embraces multilateralism within the spirit of the United Nations contributes to an environment far more conducive to peace than a closed and suspicious China. Therefore Beijing’s current enthusiasm for the UN should be encouraged. Second, China will increasingly play a determining role in the outcome of such missions and by doing so increase its influence in world affairs. While China may have interests other than just being a good international citizen that does not preclude it from playing a positive role; indeed national interests are always part of the considerations of any country’s decision on whether to participate in a given mission and by no means are exclusive to China. As Chinas economic power rises so will the scope of its interests and its interests in the affairs of the UN. Beijing’s current enthusiasm for the UN is likely to increase, as a wealthier and confident China is eager to make an impression on the world stage. As noted by PLA Colonel Yang Hua, a peacekeeping expert at the Chinese National Defense University, ‘You will see the blue in us’.16
Endnotes
1 Most of this article is based on information from lectures and visits to PLA and PAP institutions while the author was attending the one year defence and strategy course at the National Defense University of the Peoples Liberation Army (PLANDU) between September 2006 and August 2007 and various informal interviews with PLA and PAP officers.
2 The author worked as an advisor to the East Timorese Defence Department between 2000 and 2002, during which period the Chinese police deployment took place, and personally met many of the PAP officers.
3 Drew Thompson, ‘Beijing’s participation in UN peacekeeping operations’, The China Brief, Vol. 5, Iss. 11, 10 May 2005, accessed at <http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=408&issue_i…
4 United Nations, Monthly Summary of Contributions of Milita ry and Civilian Police Personnel, October 2007, accessed at <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/
5 Ibid.
6 The author visited various PAP installations and attended a lecture given by a two-star PAP general in which the issues were mentioned.
7 Interview with a PAP colonel and instructor at PAP academy, Beijing, 17 May 2007.
8 Bony Ling, ‘China’s Peacekeeping Diplomacy’, International Relations and Institution, Vol. 49, Iss. 1, 2007, p.2.
9 Bruce A Elleman, Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989, Routledge, London, 2001, pp. 284–97.
10 -- ‘China, Costa Rica establish ties at Ambassadorial level’, Peoples Daily, 28 June 2007, accessed at <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200706/07/eng20070607_381690.html
11 Loro Horta and Ian Storey, ‘China’s Portuguese Connection’, Yale Global Online, 22 June 2006, accessed at <http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=7634
12 Interview with Augustine Larmin, Libertan Ministry of Defense, Beijing, 14 November 2006.
13 Data compiled by the author from United Nations, Monthly Summary of Contributions of Military and Civilian Police Personnel., United Nations, New York, October 2007.
14 Ling, ‘China’s Peacekeeping Diplomacy’, pp. 1–4.
15 -- ‘China’s Margaret Chan nominated as next WHO chief’, Xinhua, 8 November 2006; Office of the Secretary General, Press release announcing the appointment of Major General Zhao Jingmin, accessed at <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/sga1089.doc.htm
16 Interview with Colonel Yang Hua, Professor at the College of Defense Studies at the PLANDU, who served in several UN missions as a military observer, Beijing, 6 June 2007.
