Supporting the Government’s efforts in the Indo-Pacific’s Grey Zone

The Grey Zone

Academic literature offers diverse perspectives on the concept of the ‘grey zone’. This is due partly to the fact that the grey zone concept challenges the conventional war–peace dichotomy ingrained in Western political and strategic thinking; grey zone activities defy easy categorisation within this binary framework.^[14] However, amid the diversity of definitions, the grey zone is consistently characterised by volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity, leading to indistinct, opaque and innovative activities.^[15] As discussed by various scholars and analysts, the grey zone essentially involves coercive statecraft activities that blur the line between peace and war, or fall short of war.^[16] For example, Morris et al. define the grey zone as:

an operational space between peace and war, involving coercive actions to change the status quo below a threshold that, in most cases, would prompt a conventional military response, often blurring the line between military and nonmilitary actions and the attribution for events.^[17]

Furthermore, Sanyal contends:

[T]he term grey zone is used to describe extreme, competitive state behaviour that is below the threshold of war but distant from peace. Grey zone activities are characterised by ‘aggression’ and ‘coercion’ without a corresponding escalation to war.^[18]

Some scholars also emphasise the prolonged nature and ambiguous outcomes of grey zone activities. Additionally, commentators argue that these actions entail the use of coercive tactics by both state and non-state actors, operating to advantage below the threshold of conflict and disrupting other entities. In this regard, Sanyal observes that ‘[s]trategically, the grey zone is closer to war than to peace as it involves coercive behaviour and simmering conflict under the guise of competition’.^[19] Examples of grey zone activities are the deployment of paramilitary forces, interference operations, and the coercive manipulation of trade and economics.

For consistency with Australian strategic policy, this article adopts the definitions of the ‘grey zone’ and ‘grey zone activities’ provided by the Australian Government’s 2020 Defence Strategic Update:

Grey zone is one of a range of terms used to describe activities to coerce countries in ways that seek to avoid military conflict. Examples include using para-military forces, militarisation of disputed features, exploring influence, interference operations and the coercive use of trade and economic levers. These tactics are not new. But they are now being used in our immediate region against shared interests in security and stability. They are facilitated by technological developments including cyber warfare.^[20]

... Grey-zone activities are being adopted and integrated into statecraft and are being applied in ways that challenge sovereignty and habits of cooperation. This includes challenges to the long established and mutually beneficial security partnerships Australia has with many countries, including in the Indo-Pacific.^[21]

In defining the scope of the term ‘grey zone’ it is appropriate to distinguish disinformation from misinformation. Disinformation is a fundamental grey zone activity that entails the deliberate dissemination of false, misleading, biased and/or manipulated information, narratives and propaganda by hostile state and non-state actors.^[22] While misinformation also involves the spread of false or misleading information, unlike disinformation it typically stems from unintentional errors or misunderstandings not intended to cause harm. As misinformation is not deliberately orchestrated by any particular state or non-state entity,^[23] this article excludes it from the categories of grey zone activity.

The Indo-Pacific Challenge

A characteristic of grey zone activities is that they are predominantly associated with the activities of revisionist states.^[24] For instance, on a broader global scale, countries such as China, Russia, Iran and North Korea are all identified as revisionist states involved in grey zone activities. However, in the Indo-Pacific region, evidence suggests that China is currently the most prominent state engaged in such activities.^[25] The objective of revisionist states, such as China, is to gradually but fundamentally reshape international norms and the global and regional systems—those systems often referred to as the ‘global rules-based order’ led by the US.^[26] In contrast to the so-called revisionist states, Australia and its allies and key strategic partners (particularly the US) are committed to upholding the global rules-based order. In this regard, Australia places particular emphasis on maintaining order within the Indo-Pacific region.^[27]

The Indo-Pacific strategic environment presents unique challenges to Australia in its efforts to deter grey zone activities, particularly in the cyber domain. The activities orchestrated by Chinese state and non-state actors in the region are the most pressing example. This is because the blurred lines between Chinese state and non-state entities are further obscured by the authoritarian nature of China’s regime, as Chinese non-state actors often maintain affiliations with the government. For instance, i-Soon, a Chinese cybersecurity company linked to the Chinese Communist Party, has been implicated in facilitating government-backed cyber attacks, including espionage campaigns targeting various nation-states, including Australia.^[28] This pattern extends beyond i-Soon, with numerous companies seemingly supporting the regime’s cyber operations in the Indo-Pacific’s grey zone.^[29]

Research Gaps

Based on the literature review conducted for this article, there is an evident research gap concerning how land forces interpret the actions of state and non-state actors who use coercive tactics in the grey zone. The literature emphasises the need for proactive measures to address the challenges posed by ambiguous and non-traditional threats. The elusive nature of international warfare—in particular, that engaged in cyberspace—makes activities in the grey zone increasingly significant yet more challenging to comprehend.^[30] In this regard, competitive intelligence is a crucial element in understanding and countering grey zone activities. It follows that, where information dissemination capabilities are strategically significant, monitoring and analysis tools can be pivotal in navigating the complexities of grey zone activities.

The integration of grey zone activities with land forces is also discussed in the literature, emphasising the need for a more comprehensive approach. However, there appears to be a limited understanding of the function of land forces within the grey zone. This gap is a particular concern considering the growing interdependence and convergence between land forces and other military capabilities. In reality, land forces have the potential to play significant roles in grey zone activities. In this regard, research conducted by the RAND Corporation provides a useful framework to conceptualise the nature of such involvement.

The RAND Corporation has classified grey zone activities into nine distinct categories: (1) military measures (which include war by proxy and military intimidation); (2) information operations; (3) cyber attacks; (4) legal and diplomatic measures; (5) economic coercion; (6) political influence; (7) paramilitary activities; (8) co-opting of state-affiliated businesses; and (9) manipulation of borders.^[31] While land forces may be involved in these activities to varying degrees, the three most likely roles for the Army are information operations (e.g., mass influence activities), military intimidation (e.g., large-scale exercises and provocative actions against allied military assets) and paramilitary activities (e.g., use of militia). The latter two roles have traditionally been adopted by the land forces of many nations. However, it is the integration of information operations into cyberspace that offers the highest potential for future opportunities. For instance, in Russia’s operations in Crimea in 2014, the Ukrainian Army effectively used photographs posted on social media to capture the activities of separatists and the Russian equipment provided to them.^[32]

Based on the identification of research gaps and their relevance to the roles of the Australian Army in the Indo-Pacific’s grey zone, this article is informed by primary research conducted to (1) identify strategic concepts and/or roles that enable the Army to support the national strategy and (2) identify and evaluate specific response options.

Endnotes

^[14] Thomas Lonergan, Ambitiously Grey: Pursuing an Active Australian Military Approach in the Grey-Zone (Sydney: United States Studies Centre, 2024), p. 3, at: https://www.ussc.edu.au/pursuing-an-active-australian-military-approach-in-the-grey-zone.

^[15] Nathan P Freier et al., Outplayed: Regaining Strategic Initiative in the Gray Zone (United States Army War College Press, 2016), pp. 17–18, at: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/925/.

^[16] Thomas Dobbs, Garth Fallon, Sarah Fouhy, Tennille Marsh and Machlan Melville, ‘Grey Zone’, The Forge, 7 October 2020, at: https://theforge.defence.gov.au/2020-perry-group-papers/grey-zone.

^[17] Lyle J Morris, Michael J Mazarr, Jeffrey W Hornung, Stephanie Pezard, Anika Binnendijk and Marta Kepe, Gaining Competitive Advantage in the Gray Zone: Response Options for Coercive Aggression Below the Threshold of Major War (Santa Monica CA: RAND Corporation, 2019), p. 8, at: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2942.html.

^[18] Joyobroto Sanyal, ‘Australia, the Grey Zone and National Security’, Australian Army Journal XVI, no. 1 (2020): 169.

^[19] Ibid., p. 169.

^[20] Australian Government, 2020 Defence Strategic Update (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2020), p. 12, at: https://www.defence.gov.au/about/strategic-planning/2020-defence-strategic-update.

^[21] Ibid., p. 12.

^[22] North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), ‘NATO’s Approach to Countering Disinformation’, NATO (website), 8 November 2023, at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_219728.htm.

^[23] Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, ‘How to Identify Misinformation, Disinformation, and Malinformation’, Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (website), 15 May 2024, at: https://www.cyber.gc.ca/en/guidance/how-identify-misinformation-disinformation-and-malinformation-itsap00300.

^[24] David Carment and Deni Belo, War’s Future: The Risks and Rewards of Grey-Zone Conflict and Hybrid Warfare (Calgary: Canadian Global Affairs Institute, 2018), p. 11, at: https://www.cgai.ca/wars_future_the_risks_and_rewards_of_grey_zone_conflict_and_hybrid_warfare.

^[25] Patrick Mendis and Antonina Luszczykiewicz, ‘China’s “Blue Dragon” Strategy in the Indo-Pacific’, The Strategist, 9 October 2023, at: https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/chinas-blue-dragon-strategy-in-the-indo-pacific/.

^[26] Carment and Belo, War’s Future, p. 2.

^[27] National Defence Strategy, p. 23.

^[28] Max Mason and Andrew Tillett, ‘Leaked Documents Reveal Australia Targeted by Chinese Hackers’, The Australian Financial Review, 26 May, 2024, at: https://www.afr.com/technology/leaked-documents-reveal-australia-targeted-by-chinese-hackers-20240325-p5ff4h.

^[29] Ibid.

^[30] Benjamin Johanson, Special Information Warfare: Evolving Australian and Allied Special Operations Forces to Fight and Win in the Chaos, Australian Army Occasional Paper No. 9 (Australian Army Research Centre, 2021), pp. v–vii.

^[31] Morris et al., Gaining Competitive Advantage, p. 16.

^[32] Michael Kofman, Katya Migacheva, Brian Nichiporuk, Andrew Radin, Olesya Tkacheva and Jenny Oberholtzer, Lessons from Russia’s Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine (Santa Monica CA: RAND, 2017), p. 51, at: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1498.html.

The data collection process undertaken to explore opportunities and to inform strategies for the Australian Army in the context of the grey zone involved sourcing publicly available social media content posted on Twitter (now X), between November 2021 and December 2022, utilising TalkWalker, a social media listening platform. This timeframe was deemed most relevant to this study as it encompassed relevant recent geopolitical developments. These events included the lead-up to and eventual Russian invasion of Ukraine, the ongoing security dilemma between China and Taiwan, and the China–Solomon Islands pact.

Social media monitoring and analysis tools play a crucial role in navigating the complexities of grey zone warfare, as demonstrated by several studies. Andreadis et al.^[33] and Sufi^[34] highlight the importance of these tools in tracking and analysing terrorist activities and cyber threats, respectively. Cárdenas et al. further emphasise their role in detecting radical behavioural traits for national security.^[35] Aupetit underscores the significance of these tools in providing critical situational information during crisis situations.^[36] These studies collectively emphasise the pivotal role of social media monitoring and analysis tools in addressing the challenges of grey zone warfare. The use of AI-assisted social listening tools provides deeper insights into the rapidly evolving and contentious social media landscape, which has become an important area of influence operations in the grey zone.

The data collection resulted in the creation of two main datasets. One had 6,549 entries (full dataset) and the other had 250 entries (engaged dataset) represented by the top 250 posts that received a reaction after viewing.

The data were analysed using Leximancer, a computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software program specialising in text mining and thematic analysis.^[37] Thematic analysis involves systematically identifying and reporting textual meanings, consistencies and patterns in qualitative data. Leximancer detects key concepts and associations between them, forms themes, and visually presents the output in the form of a concept map.^[38]

Endnotes

^[33] Stelios Andreadis, Ilias Gialampoukidis, George Kalpakis, Theodora Tsikrika, Symeon Papadopoulos, Stefanos Vrochidis and Yiannis Kompatsiaris, ‘A Monitoring Tool for Terrorism-Related Key-Players and Key-Communities in Social Media Networks’, 2017 European Intelligence and Security Informatics Conference (2017).

^[34] F Sufi, ‘Social Media Analytics on Russia–Ukraine Cyber War with Natural Language Processing: Perspectives and Challenges’, Information 14, no. 9 (2023): 485. 

^[35] P Cardénas, B Obara, G Theodoropoulos and I Kureshi, ‘Analysing Social Media as a Hybrid Tool to Detect and Interpret Likely Radical Behavioural Traits for National Security’, 2019 IEEE International Conference on Big Data (2019).

^[36] M Aupetit and M Imran, ‘Interactive Monitoring of Critical Situational Information on Social Media’, 14th International Conference on Information Systems for Crisis Response And Management (2017).

^[37] Violetta Wilk, Helen Cripps, Alex Capatina, Adrian Micu and Angela-Eliza Micu, ‘The State of #digitalentrepreneurship: A Big Data Leximancer Analysis of Social Media Activity’, International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal 17, no. 4 (2021): 1899–1916.

^[38] Ibid.

As shown in Figure 1, the concept map reveals six primary themes identified by the Leximancer analysis. These themes provide valuable insights that form the basis of the key recommendations presented in this article and are discussed below.

Unpreparedness

‘Unpreparedness’ emerged as an overarching theme within the dataset. In this context, unpreparedness denotes the lack of readiness on the part of the state when confronted with specific events. The data revealed a widespread lack of preparedness among states to effectively deal with grey zone activities. A representative finding illustrative of states’ known inability to deal with ambiguous threats was shown in a post on X:

China is subjecting Indonesia to maritime grey zone tactics as competitive acts between states [fall] short of all-out warfare in the North Natuna Sea. China pursues these objectives in the knowledge that Indonesia will fail to respond properly.

The heightened vulnerability associated with states’ unpreparedness for grey zone activities can be illustrated by the Taiwanese military’s lack of readiness to respond to Chinese jets entering their airspace. For instance, one tweet read, ‘Taiwan scrambles fighters to warn off 29 Chinese aircraft’, with the term ‘scrambles’ carrying particular significance.

Grey Zone Attacks

This theme emphasises the use of unconventional tactics, such as disinformation, to disrupt various domains, particularly the cyber domain. It also highlights the need for states to enhance their cyber readiness to respond to and prevent grey zone activities in this domain. Illustrating this theme, one tweet stated:

The so-called grey zone between war and peace in #cyberspace has been increasing for some time now, and this has some clear implications for organisations and their cyber-risk exposure.

This theme highlights the perceived challenge of halting grey zone activities, a dynamic that is illustrated by this social media post:

China will never do a direct act, but who will stop it from doing grey zone warfare? It would start troubling Taiwan one way or the other … It’s a given.

Strategic Objectives

This theme centres on strategic factors considered essential for achieving particular objectives, such as anticipating the strategic aims of adversaries. This is reflected in the prominence and interconnectedness of concepts such as ‘negotiations’, ‘escalation’, ‘presence’, ‘engineer’, ‘strategy’, and ‘adversary’ evident in social media content. Notably, social media users have commented that the tensions can be reduced by aiming to enter negotiations between nations about nuclear weapons. Its relevance is illustrated in this tweet: ‘India is witnessing trailers of future conflicts, and its adversaries will continue their efforts to achieve their strategic aims.’

Unresponsiveness to Activities

This theme highlights the persistent failures of states worldwide in addressing grey zone activities. It reflects the prominence and interconnectedness of concepts such as ‘spike activity’, ‘renewed activities’ and ‘responding’ within social media content. As identified by the NDS, the current global strategic environment is the most challenging since World War II.^[39] Our research provides evidence to support this. For example, in the context of unresponsiveness to activities, social media users mentioned the Trellix Advanced Research Center predicting an increase in cyber attacks that would ‘renew’ geopolitical tensions in the year 2023: ‘Trellix anticipate spikes in geopolitically motivated attacks across Asia and Europe, hacktivism fuelled by tensions.’

Repeated Security Breaches

This theme highlights the recurring nature of grey zone activities. It suggests that security breaches that have occurred will continue occurring, as they are repetitive in nature and are not one-off, further enhancing the escalation or spike in grey zone activities. It was shown in social media users’ comments about China’s use of grey zone tactics against Taiwan on a ‘repeated’, recurring basis—for example, ‘Taiwan calls China’s repeated nearby military activities “grey zone” warfare’.

Readiness Failure

This theme highlights the inability of states to adequately protect their national security against grey zone activities. This theme suggests that despite a nation’s readiness plans, unforeseen readiness failures do occur in the process of strategising and planning, exposing vulnerabilities in a nation’s security. This is reflected in the prominence and interconnectedness of concepts such as ‘anticipation’, ‘monitoring’ and ‘failure’. Notably, the number of social media user-generated content items about China’s grey zone activities towards Taiwan have also increased in the recent past—for example, ‘Renewed spike in Chinese air force activity’.

Endnotes

^[39] National Defence Strategy, p. 5.

Unlike its approach to projecting military forces (e.g., developing capabilities such as long-range missiles and special forces), the Army has not clearly defined what role it can play to best support the Australian Government to compete in the grey zone. This is largely because action in the information domain, where most grey zone activities have been focused, is largely driven by joint (e.g. Defence’s Cyber Command) or even national strategic or national intelligence strategy and actions. Even in the non-information domain, many of the initial actions may be undertaken by other government agencies such as the Department of Home Affairs, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Australian Signals Directorate. However, we suggest that there are important particular and appropriate roles that the Army can play.

Informed by a literature review, examination of relevant defence policy guidance, and insights gained from social media data analysis, the following recommendations inform the Australian Army decision-makers of the potential for a land force capability to play a pivotal role in effectively shaping, deterring and responding to grey zone activities within the Indo-Pacific region.

Recommendation 1

The Australian Army can play a leading role in relevant contexts to deter disinformation in the Indo-Pacific’s grey zone. This strategic pivot is supported by the fundamental shift in Australia’s defence strategy outlined in the Australian Government’s 2024 NDS, which identifies deterrence as the primary strategic defence objective^[40] and emphasises the increasing challenges posed by grey zone activities, such as disinformation and cyber attacks.^[41] The results of the social media content analysis—particularly as they relate to the key themes ‘Unpreparedness’ and ‘Grey Zone Attacks’—highlight the urgent need for this strategic shift to occur. As outlined above, an overarching theme is the widespread unpreparedness of states to respond to grey zone activities despite the prevalence of such disruptive activities across various security spheres, including the cyber domain. The outcomes of the literature review support the proposition that the Australian Army can play a critical role in addressing grey zone activities, particularly through information operations and the integration of cyber capabilities.

One possible option to bolster the Army’s role in countering disinformation is to capitalise on the capabilities of the Australian Army Intelligence Corps (AAIC). Specifically, there is scope to enhance close collaboration between the AAIC and Australia’s regional military partners to focus more actively on reconnaissance, intelligence and surveillance to combat disinformation in the Indo-Pacific region.^[42] The Army is an appropriate organisation to foster such connections because it remains the dominant branch in the defence forces of less developed Indo-Pacific nations like Indonesia.^[43] The fact that such collaboration is warranted is supported by strategic analysts such as Dobbs et al., who suggest that the ADF should enhance its ability to counter grey zone activities through investments in personnel, doctrine and training.^[44] Furthermore, Dobbs et al. argue that the ADF should contribute to niche capabilities by training covert and military forces and conducting joint training with partner nation forces.^[45] The Army’s suitability to lead this initiative is underscored by its philosophy of ‘Good Soldiering’, which emphasises key values such as people, preparedness, profession, potential and partnerships.

To give effect to this recommendation, the Army could consider deploying a dedicated permanent force of AAIC personnel to work with close regional partners in order to enhance intelligence sharing and to facilitate joint training exercises. Such a partnership would take the form of an ongoing security presence rather than being centred around participation in biennial events such as Exercise Talisman Sabre. A partnership of this nature would have the added benefit of serving as a component of the Army’s forward presence structure, thus signalling Australia’s commitment to strategic deterrence.^[46] Importantly, this approach aligns with the NDS imperative that the ADF contribute to the collective security of the Indo-Pacific region through collaboration with partners.^[47]

In terms of partnerships, besides the initial priority accorded to alliance members like the US and New Zealand, the Army can build on its strong longstanding relationships such as those with the Five Power Defence Arrangements members (Singapore, Malaysia, UK) and Pacific island nations, before moving on to relationships with more recent partners from newer security arrangements like the Quad (India, Japan) and then moving on to newer partners in the Indo-Pacific region (e.g. Vietnam).^[48]

The primary focus of the collaborative effort would be to field an Australian military capability that continuously deters disinformation and prevents recurrent security breaches. In this regard, the Army may wish to consider the establishment of a rapid response team. Such a team would focus on promptly addressing the surge in disinformation during periods of heightened grey zone activities, such as when maritime disputes arise between countries—for example, China and Indonesia in the North Natuna Sea. Once the partnership has been successfully established among Australia’s closest regional partners, it could be expanded to include a broader range of nation-states from within the Indo-Pacific. Building on this initiative, the Army could consider adapting the training and development programs for all regional land forces to help address the growing challenge posed by the full-spectrum nature of grey zone activities in modern warfare.

Recommendation 2

The NDS emphasises that technology has diminished Australia’s traditional geographical advantage, leaving the nation susceptible to cyber attacks.^[49] Additionally, the NDS reinforces the significance of the cyber domain, placing it on par with Australia’s traditional domains—maritime, land and air.^[50] The results of the social media content analysis mirror the priority placed on the cyber domain by Australia’s defence strategy. Specifically, the cyber threat recurs within the themes ‘Strategic Objectives’, ‘Unresponsiveness to Activities’, ‘Repeated Security Breaches’ and ‘Readiness Failure’. Furthermore, themes such as ‘Unresponsiveness to Activities’, ‘Repeated Security Breaches’ and ‘Readiness Failure’ highlight shortcomings in Australia’s capacity to effectively safeguard against grey zone activities.

In response to the rapidly evolving threat environment within the Asia-Pacific, this article recommends that the Australian Army assume a more dominant role in the cyber domain. Given that the Army has the highest reliance on human capital in terms of capability development among the three services, it arguably has the most at stake. Further, the Australian Army faces unique challenges in deterring grey zone activities conducted by both state and non-state actors in the cyber domain. This is partly due to the Australian Army’s current role in cyber, which involves (among other things) the secondment of personnel to external government security agencies. Additionally, the Army faces command and control difficulties in the cyber domain, particularly when integrating cyber operations with land capabilities.

There are inherent complexities in effectively tackling grey zone activities, but given the increasingly complex and opaque nature of Australia’s strategic environment, there is no better time than the present to address these issues. While integrating cyber capabilities into the role of a land force is inherently challenging, through debate, innovation and commitment to change, Army can navigate this inflection point effectively and optimise its capabilities in the grey zone.^[51] In achieving this objective, the Army must be prepared to invest more in intelligence systems capable of detecting cyber operations conducted by both state and non-state actors. Such investment would enable the Army to better monitor, analyse and respond to these threats.

The establishment of an army cyber school has benefited the US military and could be similarly advantageous to Australia. The United States Army Cyber School was established in 2015 within the Cyber Center of Excellence at Fort Gordon, Georgia.^[52] Since then, the US Army has successfully attracted some of the world’s leading cyber professionals to serve, either in uniform or as Department of the Army civilians.^[53] A related approach in Australia could complement current joint initiatives such as the ADF Cyber Gap Program, a 12-month online initiative that enhances participants’ skills and employability in the cybersecurity field.^[54] It would also dovetail with existing service-specific initiatives like the Australian Army’s cybersecurity pathways introduced through ADF recruitment programs. Once recruited as cyber analysts, personnel could undertake further training at an Army-led cyber school to provide the professional training necessary to operate effectively as cyber specialists within the ADF.^[55]

As a precursor to establishing an army cyber school, the Army should consider further targeted collaboration with academia and industry. Institutions such as universities have unique perspectives on how to identify, address and train to meet grey zone threats. Leveraging this expertise, the Army has the opportunity to develop collaborative training with universities that have extensive cybersecurity expertise in both offensive and defensive operations in cyberspace. Focal areas of study could include protecting data and networks, utilising net-centric capabilities, detecting threats, responding to cyber attacks, and deploying tools or techniques—whether software, firmware or hardware—that generate cyber effects across all domains.^[56]

Alternatively, if other government agencies and military services have already initiated these efforts, the Army could plug into these initiatives, thereby enhancing the interdependence and convergence between land forces and other forms of military power. The Army has described this convergence of change as ‘Accelerated Warfare’ whereby land forces need to be ready to do more tasks, fight at all ranges, and enable the joint force in every domain. However, this also needs to apply to responding to state and non-state actors that are using coercive means, below the threshold of conflict, to gain an advantage and disrupt other actors as part of grey zone competition.

Endnotes

^[40] Ibid., p. 22.

^[41] Ibid., pp. 6, 14, 15.

^[42] P-S Seet, A Klarin, J Jones, M Johnstone, V Wilk, S Meek and S O’Brien, Expanding Australia’s Defence Capabilities for Technological Asymmetric Advantage in Information, Cyber and Space in the Context of Accelerating Regional Military Modernisation: A Systemic Design Approach (Joondalup, Western Australia: Edith Cowan University, 2024), at: https://doi.org/10.25958/arsh-4072.

^[43] Gregory Vincent Raymond, ‘Naval Modernization in Southeast Asia: Under the Shadow of Army Dominance?’, Contemporary Southeast Asia 39, no. 1 (2017): 149–177.

^[44] Dobbs et al., ‘Grey Zone’.

^[45] Ibid.

^[46] Andrew Carr and Stephan Frühling, Forward Presence for Deterrence: Implications for the Australian Army, Australian Army Occasional Paper No. 15 (Australian Army Research Centre, 2023), p. 2.

^[47] National Defence Strategy, p. 25.

^[48] Seet et al., Expanding Australia’s Defence Capabilities for Technological Asymmetric Advantage in Information, Cyber and Space in the Context of Accelerating Regional Military Modernisation.

^[49] National Defence Strategy, p. 15.

^[50] Ibid., p. 15.

^[51] Albert Palazzo, Land Warfare: An Introduction for Soldiers, Sailors, Aviators and Defence Civilians, Australian Army Occasional Paper No. 14 (Australian Army Research Centre, 2023), p. 42.

^[52] Joshua A Sipper, ‘It’s Not Just about Cyber Anymore: Multidisciplinary Cyber Education and Training under the New Information Warfare Paradigm’, Joint Force Quarterly 100 (2021): 49–57.

^[53] CC Bates and MC Rose, ‘Leveraging Talent to Dominate in Cyber War—An Army Perspective’, in A Farhadi, RP Sanders and A Masys (eds), The Great Power Competition Volume 3: Cyberspace: The Fifth Domain (Springer, 2022), pp. 319–346.

^[54] Susan M Coyle, ‘Australia’s Defence and National Security: How Defence Is Enhancing Australia’s Cyber Resilience’, United Service 72, no. 3 (2021): 13–17, at: https://search.informit.org/doi/10.3316/informit.994572125009732 .

^[55] Geoff Slocombe, ‘Cyber: Cyber Security for the Australian Army’, Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter (2002) 48, no. 7 (2022): 60, at: https://search.informit.org/doi/10.3316/informit.722096500110939.

^[56] ‘17C Cyber Operations Specialist’, U.S. Army Cyber Center of Excellence (website), 1 October 2015, at: https://cybercoe.army.mil/Cyber-Center-of-Excellence/Schools/Cyber-School/Cyber-Courses/Cyber-Operations-Specialist/ (accessed 25 September 2024).

The evolving landscape of grey zone activities indicates that states are by no means the sole source of security threats. Both state and non-state actors employ offensive cyber operations in grey zone activities such as espionage and disinformation.^[57] Consequently, military forces and their personnel must gain a deeper understanding of the actions and developments of non-state actors involved in these activities within the cyber domain.^[58]

This article firmly establishes that grey zone activities in Australia’s primary area of military interest, the Indo-Pacific region, pose significant threats to both Australia’s national security and the region’s prosperity and stability. However, the Army has not clearly articulated its role in supporting the Australian Government’s efforts to compete in the grey zone. The purpose of this article is to enhance the Army’s understanding of its pivotal role in shaping, deterring and responding to grey zone activities in the Indo-Pacific region. Specifically, it has identified strategic concepts and roles that could enable the Army to better support the national strategy; and it has presented and evaluated specific response options.     

By investing in intelligence systems capable of detecting cyber operations conducted by both state and non-state actors, and by enhancing the role of the AAIC, the Army can enhance its capabilities in detecting, understanding and responding to the latest developments in digital influence activities. By collaborating further with academia and industry, the opportunity exists to gain a deeper understanding of how state and non-state actors operate in cyberspace and how to effectively respond to and deter these activities. Thus, the insights and recommendations provided in this research paper can guide decision-makers in the Australian Army, inform policies, and contribute to shaping the Australian Government’s strategies to deter grey zone activities in the interconnected and technology-driven Indo-Pacific region.

Endnotes

^[57] National Defence Strategy, p. 15.

^[58] P-S Seet, A Klarin, J Jones, M Johnstone, H Cripps, J Sharafizad, V Wilk, D Suter and T Marceddo, Opportunities and Challenges Posed by Disruptive and Converging Information Technologies for Australia’s Future Defence Capabilities: A Horizon Scan (Joondalup, Western Australia: Edith Cowan University, 2024), at: https://doi.org/10.25958/0x5j-wd23.