Opinion Piece: Australia, the Grey Zone and National Security

The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting. 

- Sun Tzu, The Art of War

Gray zone conflict must be understood in fundamentally different ways from major warfare.

- Michael Mazarr, Mastering the Gray Zone

The international system, like any dynamic system, is always in a state of flux. Forces of change, whether we are conscious of it or not, are continuously shaping the environment inside and outside nations. Nations respond to these changes in different ways. One significant area of national policy which reveals mainstream thinking around the basic national need of safety and security, and which also reflects ways in which a nation approaches these emotive and physical requirements, is security policy. Although the fundamentals underlying a national security policy remain more or less constant, the strategy changes in the light of the strategic environment. Since Federation, Australia (emerging from an outpost colony of the British Empire to a middle power) has met its fundamental security needs through membership of the Western alliance. Consequently, Australia’s security thinking has been shaped by the realities of the two world wars, followed by four decades of Cold War, and the post-Cold War challenges—most notably terrorism and violent extremism.

However, as international events have shown, security challenges since 9/11 have steadily shifted from the potential of war in a Clausewitzian sense to a state of rising tension, uncertainty and uncontrollability. This environment is diffuse and multi-level and has the potential to erupt into physical violence in a number of geopolitical hotbeds spread across geographical areas of strategic interest to Australia.¹ Therefore, assessing how well Australia is prepared for the security challenges it faces in the 21st century is both timely and pertinent. It is in this context that this article presents some key points regarding a particular group of security challenges that thrive in the zone between peace and war—the grey zone. This article argues that there is a strong need to revisit Australia’s national security and defence policy at a time of emerging grey zone challenges, where having a relatively small but highly capable and modern defence force would neither sufficiently meet nor satisfy all security needs. There is a need to acknowledge the potential and limitations of the Australian Defence Force in guaranteeing the nation’s security. The demand for agility and strategic depth in our understanding of the nature, interlinkage and manifestation of emerging security challenges, such as those involving the grey zone, is high. Therefore, the need for clarity of purpose and direction in Australia’s security and defence policy thinking is premium.

A key feature of international relations post-Westphalia is the oscillation between peace and war. Peace and war describe the condition of the international system at a given time but may not reflect all aspects of the system. In other words, this paradigm falls short of appreciating the seriousness of the variety of challenges that thrive in the international system. Contemporary international relations cannot thus sit comfortably within the binary paradigm of peace or war; it needs to be approached differently. International relations between and among state and non-state actors must be understood as displaying degrees of cooperation and conflict and conceptualised as a system of calibrated engagement and not in absolutes. It is important to note here that peace and war should be appreciated as relative, as there has rarely been a time of absolute global peace or war. In reality, international relations have been practised largely in a space somewhere in between on the peace–war continuum in an environment characterised by unequal distribution of power and scarcity of resources. Grey zone activities have implications for national security and, therefore, comprise an important and inescapable aspect of international relations.

In the lexicon of international relations, the term grey zone is used to describe extreme, competitive state behaviour that is below the threshold of war but distant from peace.² Grey zone activities are characterised by ‘aggression’ and ‘coercion’ without a corresponding escalation to war and have thus been described by some as ‘guerrilla geopolitics’.³ Strategically, the grey zone is closer to war than to peace as it involves coercive behaviour and simmering conflict under the guise of competition. Grey zone activities are an obvious fallout in a highly contested world that is characterised by relentless competition and shifting sources of power and wealth, and such activities often imply conflict between two or more asymmetric powers. However, unlike the state of event horizon that contains a high degree of unknown uncertainty, the dynamics of the grey zone can be understood through its visibility—hence, its recognition as a threat to national security.

The grey zone poses particular challenges to middle powers such as Australia, as they have neither the deterrent effect of a superpower nor the timidity of a small power. Australia’s model of pluralistic democracy that is rooted in a multicultural society is pertinent in this context. The ambitious vison of global engagement projected by Australia’s policymakers will lead to more extensive global connections, increasing Australia’s exposure to potential grey zones not only in its immediate strategic environment but also beyond. The display of China’s growing economic and military influence in the Pacific and its implications for Australia’s strategic environment, which is located in the Indo-Pacific, is a key factor. The geopolitics in Australia’s strategic environment shaped by rising competitive US–China rivalry is likely to create different levels of tension that will impact on Australia’s short and long-term foreign policy and security interests. A recent study published by RAND shows how Australia is already exposed to some grey zone challenges involving China.⁴

No wonder the Chief of Army has identified the grey zone as one of the key challenges of ‘Accelerated Warfare’ and stressed the need to ‘pre-empt, prevent, prepare and respond to emerging threats in a way that avoids this escalation of competition into direct conflict’.⁵ Writers like Michael Mazarr have argued in favour of a new theory of conflict to understand the multifaceted aspects of grey zone challenges.⁶ Thus, it is timely to ask: how should Australia prepare for all degrees of conflict, ranging from grey zone challenges to the outbreak of total war, in its strategic environment? To date, Australia has not exercised enough prudence in planning for a range of scenarios in which it may find itself, and is more exposed to hostile attempts from adversaries in the form of interference, influence, and intervention that is backed by a certain degree of coercion.

The grey zone threatens national security in its multifaceted form (different shades of grey) in a way that can linger indefinitely. As a step towards a fully-fledged war, grey zone activities can be used by the enemy as a subversive tool to weaken its opponent before military force is applied. Grey zone activity can also be a form of retribution from a state that has lost a war. The lesson for Australia’s national security apparatus is to prepare for a future in terms of capability, goals, strategies and tactics, the use of which will involve ‘escalation dilemmas’ for the Australian Defence Force (ADF). These dilemmas can affect decision-making and lead to confusion, which can aid the enemy’s intentions. Therefore, the availability and flow of information that is timely and credible is crucial when operating in the grey zone. This includes protection of information-sharing networks and platforms like social media. The use of such tactics by Russia as it prepared to annex Crimea from the sovereignty of Ukraine is an example of how grey zone activities undertaken by a hostile power can create and exploit information gaps to confuse the other side. In this regard, C4ISR capability on one hand and whole-of-government coordination and seamless decision-making on the other are vitally important to prevent hostile use of information and coercive acquisition of networks.

The need for a whole-of-government effort is further strengthened by the fact that grey zone activities are often hybrid in nature and this requires the involvement of a variety of authoritative actors for a comprehensive response. The recent RAND study mentioned above has suggested a number of options that range from military to diplomatic, informational and economic to respond to grey zone challenges.⁷ A close appraisal of these options implies that a range of actors from different areas of government need to be involved in the decision process. Thus, responding to grey zone activities will involve not only the ADF operating in a whole-of-government space but also other government departments in order to muster the appropriate level of capability that closely fits into whole-of-nation capability which can harness all the elements of national power. Grey zone activities not only involve a degree of ambiguity but also blur the distinction between civilian and military assets in terms of effects and response. This requires coordination between several areas of government. It is no surprise then that the Chief of the Defence Force has described grey zone conflicts as ‘political warfare’.⁸ However, grey zone conflicts are not always fought on the political front: often they are multifaceted and insidious (especially in the context of cyber warfare).

Furthermore, grey zone activities may not be restricted to one geographical area or have a fixed duration. They are usually subtle, dispersed and persistent operations that aim to confuse and subdue the adversary. Versatility will be needed to respond to the multidimensional challenges posed by the grey zone. Hence primary responsibility lies with the government of the day, although the ADF can provide niche capability to respond to such challenges—for example, through advanced ISR systems or Special Forces. The Australian Government’s decision to bolster investment for the Australian Special Forces under Project Greyfin is, therefore, a preliminary step—albeit an important one—in the right direction and the beginning of a process of agile thinking surrounding the multifaceted problem of grey zone challenges.⁹

Grey zone activities usually take place outside the purview of international law or involve deliberate means to circumvent existing legal and/or regulatory frameworks. Therefore, effective use of public diplomacy in support of a rules-based order can be useful to put pressure on potential adversaries in a given strategic setting: giving prior warning to discourage or even prevent an opponent from engaging in grey zone subversive activities. This is not just for achieving the moral high ground; it is using the existing international legal order—its institutions and practices—to gain tactical and strategic advantage. When used effectively through diplomatic channels by decisive actors, international law can be an effective tool that can be used pre-emptively to influence the opponent’s thinking and decision to act. Australia has been a vocal advocate for the preservation of the rules-based order only accepting change through peaceful means, and this line of international public engagement needs to be followed diligently. At the same time, there is also some utility in leading an effort to plug gaps in international legal frameworks that adversely constrain the protection of Australia’s national security and strategic interests, especially in sensitive geo-political areas.

Soft power can have a useful application to build support in the immediate region in favour of such a posture. Building new and resilient networks of mutual trust, sustaining historical alliances, and active engagement through defence diplomacy, police diplomacy (for example, the networking role of the Australian Federal Police in the south-west Pacific countries) and people-to-people contacts are some of the key measures which can add to Australia’s diplomatic strength. This is particularly important when established institutions and practices are challenged by hostile powers through the use of coercive tactics and other measures.

A relevant example is the leadership Australia showed in the wake of the shooting down of flight MH17. In particular, the call to bring those responsible to justice and put diplomatic pressure on Russia was made in partnership with a number of countries, not all of whom were traditional allies. Australia’s recent decision to ‘step up’ its engagement in the Pacific can count as a pre-emptive move to use instruments of soft power to shield its neighbourhood against China’s expansion of influence in the region. This is a timely move to gain strategic advantage in a geopolitical area that can appear as a hotbed for grey zone activities as China speeds up efforts to weaken US power projection in the Asia-Pacific and attempts to place itself in a position of strength through targeted measures such as the Belt and Road initiative.

Grey zone challenges can emerge with little or no warning time. They can put a heavy demand on resources and divert the government’s attention away from the policy priorities of the day. This is precisely what the adversary aims for: to catch a party off-guard. The Chief of Army’s strategic guidance document Army in Motion rightly notes the challenge of ‘compressed strategic warning times’ to respond to ‘surprise and uncertainty’ in the future operating environment. Therefore, response should involve planning in advance using a comprehensive prism of national security strategy that not only identifies (albeit in its classified version) weaknesses and vulnerabilities but also stocktakes all the national power capabilities at Australia’s disposal. Such a document needs to be updated regularly to account for the changes in the country’s security setting. After all, ‘eternal vigilance is the price of liberty’. Agility, resilience, and innovation will be crucial to counter challenges from enemy grey zone activities. The utility of an alliance, military or otherwise, may have limited or no use to fighting in the grey zone, as it can result in an escalation leading to the direct use of physical force, which may not be in the interest of any party.

Perhaps it is also wise to remember that capability and strong alliance may not guarantee prevention of hostile activities, as demonstrated by China’s continued military activities (including creation of new military bases) in the South China Sea. The fear of escalation to war has perhaps discouraged the US and its allies from intervening or even from managing the not-so-benign activities vigorously pursued and aggressively defended by China. Expansion of China’s military power over the South China Sea has created a sensitive grey zone in Australia’s front yard, and uneasiness and tensions surrounding it are likely to continue and increase, as experienced by the crew on HMAS Canberra during Exercise Indo-Pacific Endeavour 2019.

Furthermore, China’s crystalising Belt and Road initiative and the nature and direction of its future has strong potential to create a chain of areas of uneasy peace and tension in the Indo-Pacific region. Strategic planners need to consider creating and using tactical alliances in the region that can be used pre-emptively to reduce the possibility of grey zone challenges not only in a geopolitical sense but also in terms of national security. Traditionally, diplomacy has been the tool to create such protective networks. The ADF’s pursuit of defence diplomacy can be useful in this context. However, there is a strong need to synchronise the ADF’s efforts with those pursued by other areas of government, to bring in the strength of a whole-of-government focus. Given the nature of grey zone activities, a whole-of-government coordinated response can be effective as it can offset the deficiency in separate measures that do not fulfil the common goal or serve the common interest. It is in this regard that Australia needs a broader national security strategy that can provide a clear direction on how to approach current and future challenges involving the grey zone and hybrid tactics.

The emerging security environment surrounding Australia is changing, and grey zone activities (potential and actual and both short and long term) pose an important challenge to Australia’s interests and role in the region. The trends which comprise the paradigm of Accelerated Warfare are only tips of the iceberg. As Australia embraces the space age and invests in significant economic and security activities, its exposure to grey zone challenges will only increase over time. As steady change in climate makes the appearance of an ice-free Antarctica inevitable, we should also take into account the future of the Antarctic Treaty and the potential for vigorous competition among a group of technologically advanced countries over the sharing of its resources.

It is, therefore, prudent to undertake a comprehensive strategic security assessment in order to identify both actual and potential areas of vulnerability. Such an assessment would measure the propensity of Australia’s adversaries in the region who may be engaging in grey zone activities to subdue and weaken the ADF’s force posture. In addition to investing in acquiring capabilities for the three services to fight and win future wars, the need for a strategy to prepare for grey zone challenges as they arise is equally important. Given the very nature of the grey zone, a different approach shaped by a different style of thinking is important. Conventional strategies and weapons will only have limited use unless the tensions escalate to war—a situation where the ADF will undoubtedly lead.

From a planning perspective, grey zone strategies are yet to be reflected by policy. The 2016 Defence White Paper explicitly mentions grey zone activities perpetrated by Australia’s adversaries. The 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper only briefly discusses the challenges of the grey zone while describing it as ‘measures short of war’.¹⁰ The RAND study referred to above, however, discusses a number of grey zone challenges experienced by Australia, which range from diplomatic and military pressure to interference and regional economic dominance as an avenue of coercion.¹¹

However, the views and arguments of influential defence experts continue to be shaped by the macro security challenges, the practicality of whose maturity and the probability of whose manifestation are far from being certain or inevitable. Investment in defence capability over recent years has been almost entirely made in the areas of hard security, with a particular focus on Australia’s commitments as a member of the US alliance. Thus, the introduction of a new Army futures statement, Accelerated Warfare, which acknowledges the complexity and multidimensional nature of the current strategic environment and points to trends that will have significant impact on the policies and interests of Indo-Pacific powers, is both timely and apposite. However, the concept captures only a part of the challenge. The question remains as to how Australia will face these challenges, many of which are likely to assume a grey zone dimension as relentless competition and high-stakes contest between old and new and emerging powers evolve.

It is worth noting again that grey zone challenges are not the ADF’s exclusive burden to carry. But the ADF can certainly contribute significantly to the efforts of defending national interest: it has access to a range of capabilities—human and technological—which it can muster quickly and defend the nation. The idea of an ‘Army in Motion’ is, therefore, a timely reminder of the real need for continuous transformation and betterment in order to keep up with the forces of volatility and uncertainty. After all, as the axiom and later credo of Sir Francis Walsingham (Queen Elizabeth I’s principal secretary and intelligence chief) warns us, ‘there is less danger in fearing too much rather than too little’.¹²

Australia, like any country, is undergoing change but there is no single analytical framework that captures the security implications of these forces. What the concept of grey zone teaches us, at best, is the value in developing a critical appreciation of minute, intricate dynamics and pulses that can transform into big security challenges for the nation. Australia, as an ardent follower of pluralism in its polity, and a society that is heavily reliant externally for its internal prosperity, is particularly vulnerable to grey zone challenges. But it is yet to have a public narrative that draws on the strengths of the myriad elements that comprise its national power. A precondition for its feasibility is having an agreed position on where the nation wants to go. There is a need for Australia’s foreign, security and defence policy to have a fair degree of self-reliance that is expressed confidently yet sensitively, and supported by a proportionate level of power posture and projection.

The question, therefore, is which path Australia should choose to ensure a manageable balance between its power aspirations, security interests, appetite for risk, and defence structure and force posture. This kind of clarity of purpose and direction is essential for responding to the current and future challenges posed by the grey zone in Australia’s strategic environment. This message is perhaps best captured by the following conversation between Alice and the Cheshire cat in Alice’s Adventure in Wonderland:¹³

Alice: ‘Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to walk from here?’

The Cat: ‘That depends a good deal on where you want to go’.

Alice: ‘I don’t much care where ____’

The Cat: ‘Then it doesn’t matter which way you walk’.

Alice: ‘____ so long as I get somewhere’.

The Cat: Oh, you’re sure to do that, if you only walk long enough’.

But in the real world of relentless competition and strategic rivalry, going somewhere may be as bad as going nowhere.¹⁷⁶

Endnotes

1 The impact of this, especially in the domestic context, could not be shown any more clearly than by the transformation of Australia’s domestic intelligence and security apparatus under the aegis of the Department of Home Affairs.

2 Sam J Basch, ‘Understanding the Grey Zone’, 8 May 2018, at: https://www.janes.com/ article/79861/understanding-the-grey-zone-sofexd1

3 ‘Neither War nor Peace: Special Report’, The Economist, 25 January 2018, at: https:// www.economist.com/special-report/2018/01/25/neither-war-nor-peace

4 Lyle J Morris et al., 2019, Gaining Competitive Advantage in the Gray Zone (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation), 122–125.

5 Australian Army, 2019, Army in Motion: Chief of Army’s Strategic Guidance 2019 (Canberra: Australian Army), 12.

6 Michael J Mazarr, 2015 Mastering the Gray Zone: Understanding a Changing Era of Conflict (Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press).

7 Morris et al., 2019.

8 See the keynote address by General Angus Campbell, Chief of the Defence Force, at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute International Conference ‘War in 2025’, 13 June, 2019.

9 ‘Special Forces to Meet Pacific Threat: SAS Fighting Funds to Get $3bn Boost’, The Australian, 12 August, 2019

10 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2017, Foreign Policy White Paper 2017, 24.

11 Morris et al., 122–123.

12 Sir Francis Walsingham quoted in Christopher Andrew, 2018, The Secret World: A History of Intelligence (London: Allen Lane), 158.

13 Lewis Carroll, 1998 (1865), Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland (Chicago, Illinois: VolumeOne Publishing), 89–90. Italics in original.