Letters and Commentary

To The Editors

Sirs

I was pleased to hear that the Army is to receive a fine battle tank. Being a naval officer, my enthusiasm might come as a surprise to some people. Indeed, many observers did not share my satisfaction. Some critics questioned why the Australian Army needed tanks at all. They argued that we have not used tanks since Vietnam and that Asia is, in any event, not ideal tank terrain. The last point is contradicted by the reality of the Japanese advance in World War II down the Malayan Peninsula. Other critics derided the choice of an American tank model, the Abrams, over the British Challenger and German Leopard.

I believe that many of the tank critics are misinformed or have not thought their arguments through logically. Suggesting that, because something has not been used for a long time, it is not required is akin to tearing the fire detectors out of houses because there have been no fires. Most of the ADF’s future military operations are likely to be undertaken in conjunction with its traditional ally, the United States, whom we have fought alongside since the battle of Hamel in World War I. The Abrams will give Australian ground forces valuable interoperability with the US military. Indeed, having the same tank as the US Army and Marine Corps confers obvious advantages in maintenance, supply and operational lift. The Royal Australian Navy requires tanks simply because future ADF operations will be joint and tri-service in character. The RAN can bombard land positions or restrict enemy manoeuvre by blockade, commerce raiding and by controlling amphibious access. Similarly, the RAAF can deliver high-precision weapons and destroy an array of land targets. But of the three services, only the Army can occupy land through ‘boots on the ground’. Moreover, many operational headquarters are located on land.

It is important for critics of the tank decision to understand that, for a modern Army, tanks represent an essential capability in the all-arms ground force inventory—rather like submarines in the modern navy’s arsenal. The RAN has six submarines; the Army will receive about sixty tanks. These are small numbers and they represent basic capability. And basic capability is what Australia has lost in the vital area of naval aviation. With the demise of HMAS Melbourne in 1982, the Navy was forced to discard its valuable core skills and capabilities in maritime fixed- and rotary-wing aviation, force projection and in strategic presence. These are capabilities and skills that take years to develop and that are not lightly relearnt. It is for this reason that I am pleased that the Army has been able to retain and to modernise its core armoured warfare requirement.

Lieutenant Tom Lewis, RAN

Canberra

To The Editors

I am writing in response to the article ‘Chaos and Predictability: A Critique of Effects-based Operations’ (EBO) by Brigadier Justin Kelly and Lieutenant Colonel David Kilcullen which appeared in the Winter 2004 edition of the AAJ. Their article is a timely reminder of the limitations of EBO, especially in conventional warfare where the fog of war makes an effects approach difficult to calibrate. There are, however, several issues arising from the article that warrant further examination, particularly in the Australian context.

Kelly and Kilcullen point out that the use of any physical force may unleash unintended consequences. Indeed, when physical force is a primary source of the effects, the consequences can be very costly. If EBO are about ‘shock and awe’, as in Iraq in 2003, then Australia can only ever aspire to be a peripheral player in such high-end military operations. However, if the Chinese strategist, Sun Tzu, is correct in arguing that the skilful leader subdues his enemies without fighting, then physical force really should be a last resort. With this point in mind, EBO should not be considered only from the viewpoint of conventional warfare. Australian operational experience in recent years points to the need to be prepared to generate effects in operations short of war that involve significant constraints on the application of force.

In contrast to the US armed forces, the Australian military has always been forced to observe restraint and to maximise effectiveness because of its small size and lack of resources. Thus, while Kelly and Kilcullen are correct to point out that EBO has its limitations, for a middle power such as Australia, an understanding of effects still has relevance—particularly should Australia ever again lead a regional multinational coalition as in East Timor. The article’s observation that the development of a cultural-military-economic model for EBO lags behind contemporary developments in information technology is true. However, the current Australian Defence Force (ADF) does recognise the need in many operations to coordinate the efforts of a wide range of government agencies. Recent governmental decisions suggest that efforts to coordinate security concerns have been elevated to the national level under the direction of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. This process is a result of recent experience in mustering whole-of-government responses to regional crises such as the one in the Solomon Islands.

A clear definition of EBO is important in any debate over their merits. Kelly and Kilcullen employ the ADF definition of effects being the ‘physical, functional or psychological outcomes, events or consequences that result from specific military or nonmilitary actions’. With its focus on direct and indirect attack and on the psychological as well as the physical dimension of conflict, effects-based thinking has much in common with theories of manoeuvre warfare and the indirect approach. These are concepts that the Australian Army has grappled with both in theory and in practice.

The International Force in East Timor (INTERFET) in 1999 saw a prototype of Australian effects-based thinking being applied, with several government agencies working towards the objective of harnessing a spectrum of capabilities in order to maximise national power. Arguably, in the Australian context, EBO are more akin to the INTERFET approach, where the application of manoeuvre operations concepts adapted for the information era demonstrated how military tactics and television images can interact to generate the effects required to achieve the liberation of East Timor.

Australia has been working at further refining such an approach with the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI). In the Solomon Islands, Lieutenant Colonel John Frewen commanded military forces that deployed in considerable strength at the outset in order to enable RAMSI to achieve its nation-building objective. Lieutenant Colonel Frewen—working in conjunction with a Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade mission head, an Australian Federal Police deputy commissioner, and with representatives from AUSAID—was aware of the need to generate effects from a whole-of-government perspective. In measuring the significance of RAMSI, one should not forget that, at the beginning, the mission’s success was not a foregone conclusion.

Regarding the war on terror, Kelly and Kilcullen are right to highlight the impact of the ripple effect of operations. Again, there are parallels with Australian experience—particularly in counterinsurgency in South-East Asia in the 1950s and 1960s—although the new form of terrorist insurgency is transnational and therefore significantly more difficult to manage in terms of an effects-based approach. For the Australian Army, necessity often has been the mother of invention, as means have been sought to generate disproportionate effects, or ‘punches above weight’, in order to compensate for lack of resources.

On balance, then, perhaps there is a distinctive ‘Australian Way’ in EBO or information-era manoeuvre that recognises from the outset not just a military but a political or whole-of-government approach. Whenever Australia has played a lead role in regional operations, its military commanders have sought to understand the details of the operational environment and the likely effects of their actions. Armed with that understanding, they have applied primarily non-kinetic and often nonmilitary means to achieve political objectives. To date, the Australian focus on effects tends to be more about effective leadership than about kinetic-based coercion.

Australia’s outstanding operational record in recent years suggests that the ADF’s specific experience is worthy of wider reflection. With a track record of measured, understated but firm, culturally-attuned and successful operations, there may be a particularly ‘Australian way’ of generating effects in operations short of war that should be more closely considered. As the critique by Kelly and Kilcullen makes clear, we should carefully think through the application of concepts such as EBO from an Australian perspective. However, in order to do so, Australian military practitioners must first study and understand their own military history.

Lieutenant Colonel John C. Blaxland

Canberra