Book Review: On Contested Shores: The Evolving Role of Amphibious Operations in the History of Warfare

On Contested Shores: The Evolving Role of Amphibious Operations in the History of Warfare

Eds: Timothy Heck and BA Friedman

Marine Corps University Press, Quantico 2020, 

ISBN 9781732003149, 452pp

Reviewed by: Lieutenant Colonel Mark Tutton

On Contested Shores provides a timely analysis of a broad range of historical amphibious operations and future amphibious concepts. The book is heavily contextualised through a United States Marine Corps (USMC) lens, but is nevertheless highly relevant to the Australian Defence Force. Australia, like its neighbours, is vitally dependent upon the surrounding seas and oceans for security and prosperity—we are a maritime nation in a maritime region. Sea routes and ports remain strategically significant for us into the foreseeable future. However, On Contested Shores reminds us that there is far more to amphibious operations than just large-scale amphibious assaults—the Normandy landings or those carried out in the Pacific during the Second World War, for instance. Instead, the editors seek a broader understanding of the full range of amphibious operations—the assault, the withdrawal, the raid, the demonstration, and amphibious support to other operations—and their relevance for the future.

The book is in three sections—two historic and one future. The first section (chapters 1 to 7) provides an analysis of amphibious operations during the age of sail, and the genesis of amphibious doctrine. This section begins with an examination of the night attack on Porto Ercoletto (1555) and the attack by land and relief by sea of the Siege of Leiden (1574) during the Eighty Years War. These examples, in addition to providing the modern practitioner a range of relevant lessons on tactics, techniques and procedures, demonstrate how an amphibious operation can unhinge a broader defensive plan to achieve operational success. Chapter 3 focuses on the birth of amphibious doctrine during the Seven Years Wars (1756–1763) through Thomas More Molyneux and his work Conjunct Expeditions. Molyneux used naval superiority as the assumed starting point for all operational planning, and ‘bounded his understanding of amphibious operations within three headings: the landing, operations ashore, and the re-embarkation’.

The final four chapters of this section address the Delaware River Campaign (1777), the Siege of Vera Cruz (1847) during the US war with Mexico, the Battle of Santa Rosa Island (1861), and the US Navy and USMC in Korea (1871). Of particular interest to contemporary practitioners is the last of these case studies, which examines the ‘interplay between diplomatic and military objectives during peacetime amphibious operations’ and ‘the methods used by the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps’ in a great power competition.

The second section (chapters 8 to 17) covers amphibious operations in the 20th century. This section begins with Estonian amphibious operations in the Eastern Baltic (1918–2020), before turning to the study of Gallipoli and the study of amphibious warfare more generally at the Marine Corps Schools from 1920 to 1933. Such study:

… laid the foundations for the famous island-hopping campaigns of 1942 to 1945, and ensured the Marine Corps Schools provided the United States with leaders able to defend Pacific islands against Japanese landing forces ... and fight the proxies of a triumphant German Reich.

Chapters 11 to 16 focus on an analysis of the Second World War amphibious operations across the European and Pacific theatres. Of particular contemporary relevance is the examination of Operation Weserübung (Germany’s assault on Denmark and Norway), which is delivered through the lens of today’s US Army ‘Multi-Domain Operations’ concept, the purpose of which is the penetration and disintegration of an anti-access area-denial defence.

Chapter 17 concludes the 20th century section with an examination of the Turkish amphibious operation in Cyprus (1974). This case study highlights that while the operation was mostly successful it was not without several challenges. The identification of these challenges reinforces the ‘importance of inter-service interoperability … the difficulty in applying theoretical knowledge in practice … and that the amphibious operation does not end with the landing, but rather needs consolidation and exploitation’.

The final section (chapters 18 to 23) addresses the future of amphibious operations. Heavily weighted towards the context for, and conduct of, US amphibious operations (‘Naval Strategy and the Future of Amphibious Operations’, ‘The Role of Amphibious Operations within the Multidomain Operational Construct’, ‘The Role of Naval Special Warfare in the Great Power Competition’, and ‘The U.S. Marine Corps and Advanced Base Operations’), it offers alternative perspectives through both Chapter 20 (‘Russian Perspectives and Amphibious Assault Potential in the Arctic Near Future’) and Chapter 22 (‘The United Kingdom’s Approach to Amphibious Operations: From the Cold War to the Information Age’).

While all chapters are worthy of careful consideration for the development of Australian concepts and doctrine, it is perhaps the final chapter, on USMC advanced base operations, that provides the most contextual similarity to the situation the ADF finds itself in today. Indeed, as Walker D Mills says in this chapter:

Marine Corps leaders recognised that the Service was not prepared for the challenge of LOCE (Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment) and EABO (Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations). The Marine Corps was optimized for large-scale amphibious operations and counterinsurgency.

On Contested Shores provides a timely reminder that there is a wealth of relevant history on amphibious operations from which we can learn. The lessons are that amphibious operations will continue to be a critical part of military operations into the foreseeable future; and that we must constructively challenge orthodoxy to continuously evolve our thinking (concepts) and application (doctrine and training) to generate relevant and credible ‘Future Ready’ amphibious forces. Simple—but the simplest things are often extraordinarily difficult.