The Implications of Terrorism and Violent Extremism for the Future Australian Defence Force

Abstract

Emerging challenges that are beyond the capability and intent of terrorist actors will require changes to the Australian Defence Force (ADF) counterterrorism (CT) enterprise. The ADF has been developing specialist CT capabilities since the Sydney Hilton bombing in 1978,¹ and has applied these skills to pronounced effect in many international theatres, including East Timor, Iraq and Afghanistan. However, recent operations have seen a transfer of those skills from the special operations force (SOF) to the conventional force and their use in building partner nation capacity. Beyond the necessity of being prepared for terrorist threats, this article defines the current and future challenges of a complex strategic CT environment and the implications for the ADF. This article examines gaps in the public discussion of the ADF’s role in domestic CT, explores developments in Australia’s strategic focus and intelligence tradecraft challenges, and provides some discussion on the influence of culture, ethics and foreign competition on the development of a CT capability.

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Evolving Domestic Counterterrorism Requirements

The continued development of CT capabilities in Australian state police forces will drive a transition of reliance away from their traditional military partner, Special Operations Command (SOCOMD). At the same time, as newly minted federal legislation indicates,² the door is open for state governments to look towards more significant involvement of the conventional elements of the ADF to support a police-led response. The progression from reliance on specialist military capability to law enforcement independence is natural in a democratic society and not something for ADF or public concern.³ Right now, the ADF should seek to understand how it can establish the appropriate force posture, capability and readiness for when it is called to assist.

As Australian police forces demonstrate increased capability and capacity for CT resolution activities, the ADF should expect a corresponding decrease in their reliance on short-notice SOF contingency forces.⁴ Special operations forces are traditionally used to enhance or supplant police resolution forces⁵ when events are of significant scale, complication, or duration. While the 2005 National Counter-Terrorism Plan discussed the methodology for the ADF to support states,⁶ the question of operational primacy was open to interpretation. The New South Wales Police Force response to the 2014 Lindt café siege demonstrated the capability, capacity and primacy of state police⁷—an approach that is in line with incremental changes to federal CT policy. By 2017, the policy expression had changed, noting ADF domestic response capability but clearly articulating the primacy of state police.⁸

The need for a military contingency force to provide depth to a police response remains valid, but SOCOMD could look to increase that commitment in terms of size and readiness. SOCOMD will continue to retain specialist capabilities beyond the scope of state police, such as chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN),⁹ and will continue to be a premier training partner for police CT organisations. A potential transition of SOCOMD effort away from domestic CT, a mission captured under the 2016 Defence White Paper’s first Strategic Defence Objective,¹⁰ will enable a transition of operational effort to the remaining two internationally focused objectives. That transition provides a variety of opportunities for SOCOMD interactions in the region and globally, increased training and exercise exposure with the conventional force, or potentially a reduction of commitments for SOCOMD to focus on internal development and reduction of operational tempo. However, a reduction of SOCOMD’s domestic CT structures could conceal subtle but adverse consequences.

A decrease of SOCOMD’s domestic CT commitment is likely to have an adverse effect on its capability. SOCOMD maintains two Tactical Assault Groups (TAGs): TAG East, generated from the 2nd Commando Regiment in Sydney, and TAG West, generated from the Special Air Services Regiment in Perth.¹¹ These groups provide, among a variety of tasks, domestic CT when required by the Australian Government.^12,13 ‘Force generation’ of a TAG—the process of raising, training, sustaining and rotating it—sharpens the skills needed for domestic CT, namely urban and close-quarter tactics.¹⁴ Simultaneously, this drives force development, including the drive for modern and continually improving equipment, technology and methods. That very process of preparing a force for domestic CT in Australia then allows the provision of training, advice and assistance to international partners. When given the likely characteristics of future operating environments—congested, connected, urban and littoral¹⁵—the skills developed for domestic CT may prove to be those most valuable in future operational deployments.

Regardless of the potentially changing role of SOF, the capacity for broader responsibility across the conventional force is evident. On 27 November 2018, the Australian Parliament passed the Defence Amendment (Call Out of the Australian Defence Force) Act 2018.¹⁶ Developed in close consultation with state and territory governments, the Act provides the legislative framework authorising the ADF to be called out and to use force to resolve incidents of significant violence. As was explored in detail by a recent Australian Army Research Centre paper, the conventional force could now be called out to ‘help the public feel safe, protect critical functions … or otherwise restore public confidence’.¹⁷ Corresponding tasks could include crowd control, protection of critical installations, and logistics support for the movement of personnel and civilians. The implications are broad for the conventional force. ADF units will need to conduct contingency planning, examine training regimes and preparedness, determine capacity and review authorities in order to shape the force to be ready for a wide array of possible tasks. These preparations will not come without a cost, which will need to be weighed against the likelihood and potential impact of a call out.

Shifting Strategic Focus

With the gradual drawdown of ADF combat operations in the Middle East and Central Asia, the ADF is likely to lose some organisational knowledge in terms of operational exposure and experience. Large military operations improve the professional skills of ADF personnel, drive force development and generate global awareness of ADF capability. With a move away from these large, globally relevant operations, the ADF should expect a gradual depreciation in these areas; but this is not new. The 2009 Defence White Paper addressed the depreciation of capability that was likely to result from the drawdown of ADF effort in Afghanistan. The authors highlighted opportunities to pivot operational effort to the near region, alongside the risks of decline in skill, loss of expertise, and general degradation of warfighting assets through lack of use.¹⁸

In search of an activity to fill the void of operational commitments, the ADF will increasingly employ large exercises to hone the force; but it will struggle to fill the gap. International conflict and Australia’s military contribution to it are not persistent. Ebbs and flows in force capability and experience are natural; however, large exercises are costly¹⁹ and rarely expose participants to the same degree of complexity or force diversity as military operations.²⁰ Such exercises require complex and voluminous scripting, more significant technical support, and investment from government agencies that should not be readily expected, owing to their commitments elsewhere. Large exercises will need to form part of the solution to maintain an experienced force, but are unlikely to replicate operational experiences.

As the ADF responds to the national focus on the Asia-Pacific, deployments to support regional neighbours will remain common. The deployment of ADF personnel and assets in support of the Armed Forces of the Philippines following the seizure of parts of Marawi in 2017 demonstrates the ADF’s need for force preparedness across broad CT roles. The desire for Australian military assistance among our regional partners will remain tied to the ADF’s CT credentials. These credentials are not passed from one country to another through written evidence or certificates, but rather are evident through publicised operations and international training activities and are discussed by peers at military and diplomatic forums. As such, a deliberate transition from coalition operations to regional engagement could be used to promote ADF CT credentials, in combination with existing training and liaison. This would also provide an opportunity for sustained military and diplomatic engagement in the region.

CT is not a role that lies solely within the responsibility of SOCOMD, and CT expertise is not captured in the combat formations. ADF expertise in critical, but often overlooked, components of large CT activities is worthy of consideration for export. Planning and executing large-scale CT operations, or developing a robust national CT enterprise, requires a variety of expertise. The ADF has proficiencies in strategic and operational logistics, inter-agency coordination, and equipment procurement processes. These are examples of areas that often lack development and focus in the CT enterprise, to which the ADF can offer its noteworthy expertise. Viewing the ADF’s opportunities for CT engagement through a wider lens enables a wider variety of regional engagement and credential-proving opportunities. Flexibility and responsiveness will be essential.

Just as terror organisations move rapidly across state boundaries, future ADF operations to counter terrorist activities must be prepared for geographically dispersed and legally complex battlespaces.²¹ While still acting locally, today’s terror organisations utilise global networks for inspiration and guidance, together with regional connections for financing and logistics. Several organisations have been established solely to address the trans-regional problem of foreign terrorist fighters, most notably Operation GALLANT PHOENIX (OGP). OGP tracks foreign fighters through conflict zones and liaises with relevant governments to facilitate law enforcement solutions.²² That trans-regional approach is relevant to other areas, including terrorist financing and messaging, which are the foundation of the approach taken by the Global Coalition Against Daesh.²³ Just as the Department of Defence tracks these groups globally, so it must be prepared to act. Information operations and cyber effects can cross national borders quickly, and the legal apparatus must be prepared for those eventualities.

The Cognitive Dimension

The ADF and the global community will continue to face significant challenges in trying to assess the future of terrorism. Indicators of an individual’s mobilisation to violence can be challenging to observe, and the process is rapid.²⁴ On a greater scale, national analysts continue to struggle with the identification and accurate prediction of conflict; the emergence of ISIS and the 2017 Marawi crisis are potent examples. Decades of attempts to predict future acts of terror and the terrorist landscape demonstrate the complexity of the target and the need to accept uncertainty.

The CT and ADF intelligence communities continue to refine their analytic capability, improve processes and eliminate ‘stovepiping’. Nevertheless, future analysis of terrorism features less clarity than that of emerging technology and state conventional force development, and the latter forms the backbone of ADF force development considerations. Without methods that articulate the size, scope and capability of a threat actor, decisions about force composition and development cannot be tailored accordingly. The relationship between strategic intelligence and force design and development is strong. Therefore, if CT intelligence practitioners cannot provide a compelling narrative in contrast to conventional military analysis, the Department of Defence will logically defer to conventional force development over the nuanced force requirements of future CT capability.

The ADF, like its coalition peers and inter-agency colleagues, has passed through what was a ‘golden age’ of CT focus, and subsequently the capability has both decreased and become more nuanced. In line with the changing strategic focus, personnel and funding for CT have also diminished over time. One notable change is the decrease in CT specialised staffing across the organisation. In most ways, this is a positive development. An extended period of ‘testing and adjusting’ staff levels, training and expertise requirements has led to a steady state of CT staff effort across relevant organisations. It displays the organisational capacity to shift effort to more significant priorities, but it is also prophetic of declining experience. Senior Defence leaders will need to be aware of this declining specialty and the need to enable staff to mitigate the loss of expertise through alternative strategies. This means sometimes paying for that expertise.

There is no disguising the lack of CT analysts now compared to a decade ago when commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan necessitated a more substantial effort. In the long term, this means fewer ADF personnel are exposed to CT, less CT expertise is generated, and staff work will suffer a corresponding decrease over time. There are ways of managing this lack of depth in CT expertise within the ADF. Civilian staff, who rotate less and can stay in organisations longer, may provide the additional depth where required. However, the most significant offset will have to come from outside the Australian Government. The ADF could take advantage of academic and industry expertise, particularly at the operational and strategic levels, notably in the delivery of informed policy. Defence’s future CT expertise network will require active engagement by the ADF, a budget, and an understanding of where the gaps are.

Culture

As right-wing extremism (RWX) assumes a prominent place in global media, the ADF should consider the impact of and response to instances of extremist actions or ideology among its members. Australia is far from immune from such influences. As Kristy Campion states, ‘Right-Wing Extremism … in Australia is historically persistent and contemporarily well-established.’²⁵ If we adhere to the logic that volunteer militaries are representative of the culture from which they are born, then subsequent logic would indicate an RWX presence in the ADF, if not now then soon.

The ADF should not leave this problem to existing legal procedure, as the cultural complexity of social interactions requires greater nuance. An example of this is the complicated approach the ADF took to serving members’ membership of and association with outlaw motorcycle gangs.²⁶ The ADF will have to navigate problems such as how to address membership of groups that are not listed as extremist organisations but may espouse similar ideology; if and how to observe group membership; how to treat extreme right-wing influence in military units; and ethical methods of surveillance of members suspected of RWX association. There are lessons to be learnt from others. The United States manages extremist ideologies among its military members, and RWX has been recently highlighted. However, knowledge of RWX specifically is not the only answer. Many Muslim majority nations have fought a similar battle against violent extremist ideologies over the past decades, and are now the experts on this topic. It is appropriate that the ADF ask for advice now, and take preventive action, rather than seek support after a problem emerges.

Ethics

As Defence modernises the means of support to partners, so too must it review and refine the ethics of ‘train, advise and assist’ operations and what the US military refers to as ‘by, with and through’²⁷ and ‘remote advisor’ operations. The ‘remote’ style of operation is prolific in CT operations and is likely to expand. As Deane-Peter Baker states, ‘this type of operation provides a reduced risk to own forces, reduced cost, and a lower threshold for involvement in conflict.’²⁸ At the same time, however, it presents a range of ethical challenges that Defence will need to consider if it is to maintain the moral and therefore strategic high ground.

Modern technology will increasingly enable military personnel to conduct their work from afar, which brings ethical challenges. The ‘train, advise and assist’ style of operations the ADF has become familiar with in Afghanistan and Iraq will lever technology to distance ADF personnel from harm’s way. Where once an experienced soldier may have attended a host nation patrol to provide advice to its commander, that interaction can, and already has, occurred through a digital medium like a smartphone, tablet computer or radio.²⁹ Many existing examples of this approach are SOF led, but an application across the conventional force is within sight. The challenges facing ‘remote advisors’ are similar to those for pilots, particularly drone pilots, whose distance from the effect of their decision is significant.³⁰ These implications combine to lower the threshold for engagement in conflict and violence.

Likewise, the use of ‘by, with and through’ operations can be ethically complex. We need to ask, for example, ‘Is it ethical for ADF personnel to provide remote training of a partner force in psychological operations during the pre-conflict phase?’ And, if so, ‘How do we avoid the possible misuse of such a capability by a foreign force?’ Following human rights concerns about partner forces,³¹ the United States adopted a system of ethical scrutiny of partner forces commonly referred to as ‘Leahy vetting’.³² That scrutiny helps the US to avoid training forces that have been guilty of human rights abuses, thereby avoiding some ethical concerns. This has led some to comment that the law is under-applied.³³ However, it also prevents their ethical training and development, effectively limiting the US military from proactively engaging a force to prevent further unethical conduct—leading some to comment that the law is over-applied.³⁴ Leahy vetting only addresses human rights abuse, and should not be conflated to cover all aspects of ethical behaviour in a potential partner force. The ethical considerations here should prompt continued demand for the development and study of emerging ethical issues.

Foreign Competition and Counterterrorism Diplomacy

CT will increasingly become a vector for access and influence in Australia’s near region. As terrorism matures, so too do the skill sets of states to counter those threats. The result is a body of expertise and capability, often poised for global action and available to support external states through missions such as ‘train, advise and assist’. Countering terrorist organisations offers governments an easy mechanism for inter-state dialogue and diplomacy where the shared condemnation of terrorism provides common ground.³⁵ That increase in expertise and in availability of assets, and a lower bar for diplomatic engagement, increases the number of CT engagements, and hence competition in the region.³⁶

China and Russia have demonstrated agility in CT diplomacy and a corresponding desire for diplomatic access and influence. With competition comes the likelihood of an increasingly contested and congested CT landscape. Just over a month after ISIS-aligned militants seized parts of Marawi in May 2017, gifted Chinese military material, predominantly small arms, arrived in the Philippines. At a handover ceremony of equipment and funds attended by President Duterte, China deftly demonstrated the impact of rapidly delivering CT services to a client state in need when Chinese Ambassador Zhao Jianhua stated:

It is a demonstration of our growing bilateral relationship. It’s also a demonstration of a new era of friendly and cooperative relationship between our two militaries.³⁷

China’s rhetoric speaks to the long-term goals of access and influence, although single acts do not necessarily cause enduring changes. China– Philippines military relations remain very limited, predominantly along CT and humanitarian aid and disaster relief lines;³⁸ however, the long-term effects may take shape at levels below the strategic political sphere.

Even if Chinese equipment were to receive poor reviews from users, its impact could be felt elsewhere in the political, diplomatic and military systems. Parts are needed for repair of existing weapons, replacement systems may be desired, ammunition is a persistent demand, and specialised training may be sought or offered; all of these requirements establish long-term relationships between the provider and the receiving country. It may be true that, over the long term, soldiers could advise senior decision-makers not to purchase or accept specific weapon systems; however, the relational effects of gifted systems may already be established and felt. Once these weapons are in the system, soldiers establish familiarity with them, while senior leaders, diplomats, politicians and logisticians develop relationships with foreign interlocutors, potentially resulting in foreign access and influence. Countering that influence is difficult without persistent commitment.

Inaction or reductions in the ADF commitment to partner forces provides gaps that competitors can exploit for access and influence. Recent testimony from the Commander of United States Africa Command, General Townsend, is indicative of the emerging issues caused by competition in CT. His assertion that ‘[in] Africa, counter [violent extremist organisations] is global power competition’³⁹ demonstrates the interwoven nature of global competition and CT. Allowing voids in CT assistance to exist enables foreign powers to seize those opportunities to develop access and influence— potentially limiting our ability to affect strategic goals in the future.⁴⁰ The danger of trading continued assistance to partner forces is summarised by Townsend:

… enduring relationships built while we develop partner capabilities provide us with the long-term strategic alliances we need to address future challenges.⁴¹

The increasing focus on CT diplomacy as a mechanism for access will quickly surpass the capacity to absorb of regional partners. A haphazard approach to training and operations is unlikely to generate meaningful progress in CT capability. The US experience in the Philippines over a decade of Operation Enduring Freedom Philippines demonstrates this.⁴² The implications for the ADF are twofold. First, force posture and operational readiness needs to reflect the capability to provide CT assistance to regional partners on short notice across a wide variety of capabilities. Second, the ADF will face increasing competition for CT engagement with our partners. In the long term, even those the ADF considers to be ‘partners of choice’ may find other political or economic reasons to favour external partners.

Conclusion

A potential shift in the focal point of domestic CT from SOCOMD to the conventional force is likely to characterise the coming decades. This will be set against changing ADF operational commitments, the drawdown of distant operations providing the space and time for a pivot of effort towards supporting partners in the near region. Challenges in the cognitive domain will probably remain consistent, although awareness of the shortfalls in understanding should be prioritised to ensure effective decision-making at all levels. The ethical challenges of emerging technology and military methodologies are not novel, but should remain a point of consistent interest for a military community that wishes to remain morally forthright. Finally, foreign competition is already influencing the CT domain. To remain a partner of choice, the ADF will need to retain and develop its CT credentials and maintain persistent relationships with partners.

The challenges facing the ADF’s CT capability in the future are not simple to solve. They go beyond the topics we favour in academic discussion, such as urbanisation, ideology, technology and workforce diversity, into areas seldom discussed by non-practitioners. The themes addressed in this article do not come with simple solutions. Indeed, some probably cannot be solved—they are simply the conditions within which the ADF will operate. Developing this conversation will enable the ADF to understand its limitations and tailor solutions accordingly.

Endnotes

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1 Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal, 2009, Inquiry into Recognition of Australian Defence Force Service for Special Air Service Counter Terrorist and Special Recovery Duties, 8, at: https://defence-honours-tribunal.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/SAS-…

2 Defence Amendment (Call Out of the Australian Defence Force) Act 2018 (Cth), at: https:// www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2018A00158

3 In fact, the majority of commentary on this issue is concerned with military ownership. See Timothy W Thurston II, 2007, ‘The Military’s Role in Domestic Terrorism’ (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School); Amnesty International, 2015, Deadly Force: Police Use of Lethal Force in the United States (New York: Amnesty International).

4 Adam Findlay, 2018, ‘Special Forces, Counterterrorism and Partnership’, Australian Army Journal XIV, no. 3: 70–73.

5 Thurston, 2007.

6 National Counter-Terrorism Committee, 2005, National Counter-Terrorism Plan, 2nd ed (Canberra: National Counter-Terrorism Committee), 3:7–4:2, paras 55, 59, 62, 63, 64, 77, 78.

7 State Coroner of New South Wales, 2017, Inquest into the Deaths Arising from the Lindt Café Siege (Sydney: The Coroners Court of New South Wales), at: http://www.lindtinquest. justice.nsw.gov.au/Documents/findings-and-recommendations.pdf

8 Australia New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee (ANZCTC), 2017, National Counter- Terrorism Plan, 4th ed (Canberra: ANZCTC), 20, at: https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/ Media-and-publications/Publications/Documents/ANZCTC-National-Counter-Terrorism- Plan.PDF

9 Ibid., 22.

10 Department of Defence, 2016, Defence White Paper 2016 (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia), 71.

11 Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal, 2009, 11.

12 Ibid.

13 Duncan Lewis, 2003, ‘Inside and Outside the Battlespace: Understanding the Rise of Special Operations in Australia’ Australian Army Journal 1, no. 2: 56, 57.

14 Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal, 2009, 9, 10.

15 This is widely discussed. See Head Modernisation and Strategic Planning—Army, 2009, Army’s Future Land Operating Concept (Canberra: Australian Army); Kimberly Amerson and Spencer B Meredith III, 2016, ‘The Future Operating Environment 2050: Chaos, Complexity and Competition’, Small Wars Journal, 31 July 2016, at: https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/ art/the-future-operating-environment-2050-chaos-complexity-and-competition; Rick Burr, 2019, Army in Motion: Accelerated Warfare Statement (Canberra: Australian Army), at: https://army.govcms.gov.au/sites/default/files/publications/accelerated… updated_0.pdf

16 Defence Amendment (Call Out of the Australian Defence Force) Act 2018 (Cth).

17 Scott Brady, Paula Hanasz and Patrick Bigland, 2019, ‘Aiding the Civil Authority: The Potential for a Broader Army Role in Domestic Counter-terrorism’ Australian Army Occasional Paper Developmental Series 2 (Canberra: Australian Army Research Centre).

18 Department of Defence, 2009, Defence White Paper 2009 (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia).

19 This is true for a variety of reasons. Scripting a detailed and large exercise based on an enemy human network to an individual level requires substantial effort and time from personnel with appropriate expertise. Likewise, the range of exercise participants needs to be wider to account for the variety of military and whole-of-government forces utilised in the contemporary operating environment. Targeting of a single individual, in a manner that replicates the modern battlefield, could necessitate personnel from other government agencies, a variety of joint assets, simulation of decision-making apparatuses at the national level, and the actual or simulated execution across multiple domains.

20 Nicholas Barber, 2014, ‘Adapt and Overcome: Promoting Tactical Adaptation in the Post- Afghanistan Army’, Australian Army Journal XI, no. 2: 29, 30.

21 Findlay, 2018, 74.

22 Jim Garomone, ‘Australia, US Discussions Ranged the Globe, Dunford Says’, in DOD News, Defense Media Activity, US Joint Chiefs of Staff, 7 June 2017, at: https://www.jcs. mil/Media/News/News-Display/Article/1205895/australia-us-discussions-ranged-the-globe-dunford-says

23 US Department of State, 2019, Joint Statement by the Political Directors of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, 25 June 2019, at: https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-by-the-political-directors-of-the…

24 Paul R Pillar, 2017, ‘Terrorism and Current Challenges for Intelligence’, The Georgetown Security Studies Review, Special Issue: What the New Administration Needs to Know About Terrorism and Counterterrorism, 24 February 2017: 108–111.

25 Kristy Campion, 2019, ‘A “Lunatic Fringe”? The Persistence of Right Wing Extremism in Australia’, “Perspectives On Terrorism”, Volume 13(2): 2–20, at: https://www. universiteitleiden.nl/perspectives-on-terrorism/archives/2019#volume-xiii-issue-2

26 Nick Butterly, 2015, ‘Defence Warns Ranks of Gang Links’, The West Australian, 26 January 2015, https://thewest.com.au/news/australia/defence-warns-ranks-of-gang-links…

27 For a detailed explanation and history of the term and its use, see Diana I Dalphonse, Chris Townsend and Matthew W Weaver, 2018, ‘Shifting Landscape: The Evolution of By, With, and Through’, The Bridge, 1 August 2018, at: https://www.realcleardefense.com/ articles/2018/08/01/shifting_landscape_the_evolution_of_by_with_and_through_113676. html

28 Deane-Peter Baker, 2019, ‘Proxies and Surrogates—The Ethics of “Through, By and With”’ (lecture, University of New South Wales, Canberra, April 2019).

29 Christopher Thielenhaus, Pat Traeger and Eric Roles,2016, ‘Reaching Forward in the War Against the Islamic State’, Prism 6, no. 3, at: https://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/ prism/prism_6-3/Prism%20Vol%206%20No%203a.pdf?ver=2016-12-09-115330-500

30 Andrew Brown, 2018, ‘Why Bother Teaching Drone Pilots About Ethics? It’s Robots

That Will Kill Us’, The Guardian, 27 September 2018, at: https://www.theguardian.com/ commentisfree/2018/sep/27/drone-pilots-ethics-robots-kill-church-of-england-raf

31 Initially, this legislative amendment was targeted toward US drug enforcement activities and was later widened to include State and Defense Department activity with partners.

32 Leahy vetting is a procedure permitted under the ‘Leahy Laws’. For a detailed description, see Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 2019, ‘Leahy Law Fact Sheet’, US Department of State, 22 January 2019, at: https://www.state.gov/key-topics-bureau-of-democracy-human-rights-and-l…

33 Winifred Tate, 2011, ‘Human Rights Law and Military Aid Delivery: A Case Study of the Leahy Law’, PoLAR: Political and Legal Anthropology Review 34, no. 2: 337–354, at: http:// onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1555-2934.2011.01169.x/abstract

34 Eric Schmitt, 2013, ‘Military Says Law Barring US Aid to Rights Violators Hurts Training Mission’, The New York Times, 20 June 2013.

35 For a Chinese example, see Richard Weitz, ‘Chinese Relations in Eurasia: The Case of Kazakhstan’ in Nicole Peterson (ed.), 2019, Chinese Strategic Intentions: A Deep Dive into China’s Worldwide Activities (Boston, Massachusetts: NSI), 102.

36 Scott W Harold et al., 2019, The Thickening Web of Asian Security Cooperation: Deepening Defense Ties Among US Allies and Partners in the Indo-Pacific (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation), at: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR3125.html.

37 Pia Ranada, ‘Philippines: China Gives P370M in Guns, Ammunition to PH’, Rappler, 28 June 2017, at: https://www.rappler.com/nation/174190-china-military-aid-guns-ammunitio…

38 Raissa Robles, ‘Why Don’t Manila and Beijing Have Closer Military Ties, Despite Duterte’s “Pivot to China”?’ This Week in Asia, 5 October 2019, at: https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3031629/why-dont-manila…

39 Stephen Townsend, 2020, Statement of General Stephen J Townsend, United States Army Commander United States Africa Command before the Senate Armed Services Committee (Washington DC: United States Africa Command), 10, at: https://www.armed-services. senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Townsend_01-30-20.pdf

40 Weitz, 2019, 129.

41 Townsend, 2020.

42 Linda Robinson, 2016, US Special Operations Forces in the Philippines, 2001–2014. (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation) at: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/ RR1236.html