Army’s Warfighting Philosophy and ‘Warfighter’ Culture
Culture is the deeper level of basic assumptions and beliefs that are shared by members of an organisation; that operate unconsciously and define in a basic ‘taken for granted’ fashion an organisation’s view of its self and its environment.
- Edgar Schein
Abstract
The way the Australian Army uses the term ‘warfighter’ as part of its contemporary culture undermines its joint warfighting philosophy by generating disharmony between the elements of fighting power and the external environment. This ultimately constrains land power. This article explains how Army’s drift in cultural understanding represented by the adoption of the new term ‘warfighter’ influences the moral and intellectual components of fighting power, which affects the organisation’s ability to think strategically and as a system to ensure an asymmetrical environment. It concludes by explaining how realigning Army and the wider Australian Defence Force’s understanding of the term could strengthen its joint warfighting philosophy to ensure the total force develops a balanced capability for the future environment, ultimately enhancing land power in the context of ‘Accelerated Warfare’.
Introduction
The context in which military forces operate is increasingly complex and dynamic. Boundaries are blurring as the distinction between war and peace, front and rear, and friendly and enemy become unclear.1 The nonlinearity of our operating environment and the movement from closed to open systems are generating more uncertainty, as cause and effects are progressively unpredictable and disproportionate in nature.2 The fundamentals of the manoeuvrist approach to warfare remain unchanged; however, the increasingly complex, interrelated and dynamic environment is stretching the boundaries of military action.3
The Chief of Army (CA) acknowledges this increased complexity and rapid change in our operating environment and the growing need to examine how we, as an army, respond. In August 2018, CA released a futures statement entitled Accelerated Warfare, designed to stimulate creative thinking about the Australian Army in a rapidly changing context and ensure our warfighting philosophy is appropriate to inform development of future capabilities. The overarching aim of the futures statement is to strengthen Army’s joint warfighting philosophy to enhance our land power and meet the challenges of the future, while remaining led by strategy and concepts.4
This article will argue that the way we use the term ‘warfighter’ in our military culture today is undermining our joint warfighting philosophy by generating disharmony between our warfighting components (physical, moral and intellectual) and the external environment. This binds the application of our warfighting capabilities, which ultimately constrains land power. The article will first outline Army’s current warfighting philosophy, analysing the components of fighting power and the importance of ‘systems thinking’ to achieve a strategic, concept-led approach in Accelerated Warfare. It will then briefly examine the semantic change in the term ‘warfighter’ over the past two decades to how we use the term in our culture today, highlighting the emergence of a misalignment with our joint warfighting philosophy. It will then look at the impact it is having on the organisation’s ability to think strategically and as a system to ensure the force can make the most of strategic effects in an ‘open systems’ environment. It will conclude by outlining how realigning Army’s cultural use of the term ‘warfighter’ could strengthen Army’s joint warfighting philosophy to ensure the total force is capitalising on its capability and developing a balanced capability for the future, ultimately enhancing land power in the context of Accelerated Warfare.
Army’s Joint Warfighting Philosophy
The Australian Army is the foundation of the nation’s military land power. As part of the joint force, it promotes and protects Australia’s interests. It deters threats to Australia’s sovereignty and, if necessary, defeats them.5 These requirements inform Army’s concept of land power and provide the basis of its warfighting philosophy in its capstone document Land Warfare Doctrine 1: The Fundamentals of Land Power. Army’s philosophy reinforces key concepts for the organisation to achieve strategic effects. It recognises that ‘warfighting’ demands optimal force integration or ‘joint interdependence’ to combine the capabilities of all arms and services to optimise effectiveness while minimising vulnerabilities of the total force.6 Instilling key concepts of land power as a philosophy within Army’s culture provides the context for the organisation to generate the land effects required to support the Australian Defence Force’s (ADF’s) purpose: securing Australia and its national interests.
For Army to have the capacity to generate credible and sustainable land effects as a medium-weight force,7 it must lever its structural flexibility not only through organisational changes and structures (Army’s ‘teams’)8 but also through its fighting power—its capacity. Fighting power is the way in which Army generates its capacity for its teams through the integration of the physical, moral and intellectual components at individual, team and organisational levels. It requires a balance of current force requirements with future force development to produce strategically relevant and combat-ready forces.9 Land Warfare Doctrine 1 states:
The intellectual components provide the knowledge of war, warfare and cognitive capability—the ‘what to think’. The moral component reinforces culture, values and legitimacy—the will to fight. The physical components provide Amy’s capabilities and functional effects—the means to fight. When all three components interact, Army’s capacity to operate in the future environment will be strengthened.10
The Army describes its physical component (its warfighting capabilities) through four elements: Combat; Combat Support; Combat Service Support; and Command Support. Army doctrine states that these physical elements are all necessary and interdependent and a combination of combat and logistic elements must be present in any land power contribution through a combined arms approach, which is fundamental to generating warfighting capability.11 The intellectual and moral components—what we think and how we think—profoundly influence the way we see, use and lever the physical component of fighting power. Maximum impact is achieved when the components of fighting power are harmonised to accomplish objectives.12 If the complex system and relationship between these elements are not in harmony with the current operating environment, Army’s fighting power is reduced and the organisation’s capacity to operate in the future environment is weakened.
The Importance of Systems Thinking in Accelerated Warfare
The Australian Army’s philosophy has its foundations in manoeuvre theory. Development of Australia’s manoeuvre warfare concepts mirrored developments in the United States (US) Army and Marine Corps during the 1980s and 1990s. Contemporary US Marine Corps philosophy based on manoeuvre theory was first introduced in its 1989 Fleet Forces Manual (FFM) 1: Warfighting. In 1997, the publication was revised to Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1: Warfighting, which aimed to elevate the document from ‘guidance for action to a way of thinking’.13
In reading MCDP 1: Warfighting it is difficult to ignore the role that systems play in the modern warfighting paradigm and the parallels with characteristics of the context of Accelerated Warfare. In describing the enduring features of war, it emphasises the property of nonlinearity in contributing to uncertainty, describing the nature of war as a system in which causes and effects are disproportionate.14 As it focuses on the nature of the enemy, it emphasises the complex, interrelated system that makes each belligerent—each element acting as part of a larger whole in cooperation with other elements for the accomplishment of the common goal.15 As a result, in describing the nature of war, it posits that war is not governed by the actions or decisions of a single individual in any one place but emerges from the collective behaviour of all the individual parts in the system interacting locally in response to local conditions on behalf of the whole. What truly connects the system together is not technology but the human and social capital, linking the parts, either physically or with the aid of technology, to make the system whole. The complex system, consisting of physical, moral and intellectual components and their relationships, combine to determine a force’s unique character and power within the nonlinear operating environment.16
Success in this paradigm depends not so much on the efficient performance of procedures and techniques but on understanding the specific characteristics of all actors and the environment’s system(s). Systems thinking is concerned with understanding the dynamics of the whole and has its basis in holistic thinking.17 Systems thinking is a switch from seeing the organisation as a fractured grouping of disassociated parts (and people) competing for resources to seeing it as a holistic, social system that integrates each part in a relationship to the whole.18,19
Strategic thinking, as the activity of developing strategy, requires systems thinking and is vital for the Australian Army to remain competitive in an increasingly turbulent and global environment. Young identifies significant characteristics of strategic thinkers in order to better develop a strategic thinking capability within an organisation. Characteristics included visionary thinking and creative thinking along with systems thinking.20 He defines strategic thinking as ‘a means-ends way of thinking that is future-oriented and seeks to create value or an advantage for the system’.21 Strategic thinking is central to an organisation’s ability to develop strategy, and effective strategy is fundamental to achieving a competitive advantage in the context of Accelerated Warfare.22
Systems thinking, and therefore strategic thinking, does not occur in a single mind but is affected by the social context in which an individual operates.23 It is a result not only of the characteristics of an individual but also of the dynamics and processes that take place within the organisation, which influences all individuals and generates a shared understanding. In other words, it is a result of the organisation’s culture. Building on this background, the next section will look at how the semantic change in the term ‘warfighter’ over the past few decades is creating a social context in Army’s culture which differs from the intent in its joint warfighting philosophy. This emergence of a misalignment of philosophy and culture appears to affect both the individual’s and the organisation’s ability to think strategically, as it influences the organisation’s social context and distorts the individual’s view of the organisation’s system(s), constraining Army’s capacity to think as a system and fight as a whole.
Semantic Change in the Term ‘Warfighter’
In the 1990s and early 2000s the term ‘warfighter’ became popular in official US publications and articles to describe all active duty and reserve personnel. Although the exact origins appear unclear, the reason commonly given for its popularity is that it replaces the need for government organisations, reporters and journalists to spell out all types of duty, such as soldier, sailor, airman and airwoman, and provides a simple, gender-neutral term.24,25 Coincidence with the publication of the US Marine Corps’ Warfighting and the Australian Army’s 1998 publication The Fundamentals of Warfare also cannot be ignored. These publications contributed to the translation of the term ‘warfighting’ into the label ‘warfighter’ and provided a simple, modern mental association between the role of the individual and the goals of the organisation.
In the 2000s, use of the term ‘warfighter’ started to evolve in Army’s culture and take on a new, unofficial meaning. Changes in US language early in the decade appear to have influenced language changes in Australia toward the end of the decade.26 Towards the end of the decade, Australian use of the term ‘warfighter’ made the primary goal of ADF logistic elements to operate not in the act of warfighting but in support of the ‘warfighter’. Commonly, ADF discourse began to emphasise personnel in combat roles as ‘warfighters’, distinguishing them from logistic, enabling and support roles. For example, in 2009, a senior non-commissioned officer from the Royal Australian Armoured Corps stated that:
all corps subject courses are not providing the level of instruction and practical exposure to the Military Appreciation Process (MAP) process to suit both warfighter and logistics corps. The warfighters are not being developed due to the all corps environment and the logistics corps do not have the necessary tactical experience and capability knowledge to achieve the required standards within the course length.27
Another example in 2011 came from an officer posted to the Combined Team Uruzgan-1 (CTU-1), Afghanistan, as the mentoring Brigade Major to the Afghan National Army, who stated:
the Mission Rehearsal Exercise did not test logistic skills possibly due to their focus on the warfighter and lack of appropriately qualified staff to develop relevant logistic test scenarios.28
Army’s Warfighter Culture
A decade later, cultural use of the term ‘warfighter’ in Australia continued to drift towards a delineation between depicting combat elements as ‘warfighters’ and other elements—in particular, Combat Service Support (logistics)—as supporting ‘warfighters’ in aspects of Army training, planning and operations. While the distinction appears to remain out of Army’s official publications and doctrinal guidance, it is evident in the organisation’s social norms, informal conversations though online blogs and articles, and observations recorded in Army Knowledge Online.29 One only has to attend an Army Logistics Officer or Combat Officer course to hear how ‘warfighter’ is commonly used to distinguish combat from logistic roles within the training environment. Cultural use in Army planning and operations can be observed in a number of blogs and articles. For example, in a recent blog on autonomous resupply, the author states that ‘the modern Army has a tooth-to-tail ratio of approximately two logisticians supporting every warfighter’.30
Another example is a news article in which an Army Captain discusses mentoring Afghan logisticians:
they [the Afghan National Army] are very good at a warfighter level … [however] they won’t be able to sustain if they can’t get their logistics working properly and effectively.31
In an organisational example, ADF’s Joint Logistics Command has adopted a vision which may be interpreted as incorporating this cultural use of ‘warfighter’ to guide their day-to-day work:
Joint Logistics Command is trusted, adaptive and performance leading in the provision of military logistics fundamental to the success of our Nation’s warfighters.32
All of these examples can be interpreted as reinforcing a distinction between ‘warfighters’ and logisticians and implies that the logistician’s primary role is not in the act of warfighting but in support of the ‘warfighter’, which differs from the intent of Army’s warfighting philosophy.
Misalignment in Philosophy and Culture
It should be made clear that there is no problem with having a distinction between the two physical elements of Combat and Combat Service Support (logistics). The problem is with the method in which the distinction is made, as it distorts the association with Army’s warfighting philosophy and generates a misalignment in philosophy and culture. Army understands Combat, Combat Support, Combat Service Support and Command Support elements as interdependent, requiring an unbiased, integrated, teams-based approach to remain competitive in the current environment. This creates the basis and physical means for Army’s approach to warfighting.
However, the notional separation of ‘warfighter’ and logistician creates an implicit assumption that logisticians are not ‘warfighters’. This assumption creates an imbalance in the components of fighting power through Army’s culture by simultaneously strengthening the link for combat elements and weakening the link for logistic elements with Army’s warfighting philosophy. If you are not a warfighter then how are you part of Army’s warfighting philosophy? ‘In support of’ does not imply ‘part of’. ‘In support of’ implies a relationship in Army’s planning and operations, in which all military personnel are trained to be familiar with the application of mission command. It indicates support to a main effort. The problem with defining the role of logisticians in this way is that modern logistics does not ‘just support’ a warfighting system in our philosophy—it is part of the system; it defines the capacity of the system;33 and it links the systems together.34 According to our warfighting philosophy, a logistician’s role is in the act of warfighting in a non-linear, open systems environment, as it makes up part of the physical component of fighting power35 and can generate its own strategic effects in an asymmetrical warfighting environment.
The Effects of a Misalignment in Philosophy and Culture
Unfortunately, the emergence of a misalignment in our way of thinking is reducing the organisation’s capacity to harness the physical component of our fighting power by generating disharmony between the moral and intellectual components of fighting power and the external environment. The way we use the term ‘warfighter’ in our culture (moral component) is presenting an unintended barrier to engaging systems thinking (intellectual component) as a key element of strategic thinking when planning for, and using, our warfighting capabilities (physical component) in the external environment.
We saw earlier that the intellectual and moral components—what we think and how we think—profoundly influence the way we see, use and lever the physical component of fighting power.36 These two components can be examined through the study of mental models. A mental model is an individual’s internal understanding and representation of external reality, based on a small set of fundamental assumptions founded on internal beliefs.37 An individual’s mental model is flexible and heavily influenced by experience through an organisation’s culture. The notion of a shared mental model in an organisation is well known in literature regarding teamwork.38,39 Creating the right shared mental models for the current environment is highly relevant for developing high-performance teams.40 An organisation’s culture can facilitate development of a shared mental model to improve communication and cooperation for high-performance teams.
Army’s cultural use of the term ‘warfighter’, as distinct from logistic, enabling and support roles, affects an individual’s ability to translate the external environment into internal vision41 by generating a mental model that implies a symmetry about the conduct of warfare in a world that is now asymmetrical. It creates a simplistic, linear mental model for understanding the organisation’s projection to, and conduct on, the battlefield in a world that is now nonlinear. The distinctive construct between the ‘warfighter’ and logistician is becoming embedded in our culture and therefore our moral component of fighting power. This is a mental model that is closer to historical standards of linear fronts than a modern, complex, dynamic system and ultimately penetrates the intellectual component of our fighting power. It is a step backwards from Army’s stated philosophy of an integrated, combined arms approach to manoeuvre warfare. Such a notional separation undermines the creation of balance and unity across combat and logistics capabilities42 that link the system together—vertically and horizontally—and make up our physical component of fighting power.
Fostering the right social context and the ability to deal with competing demands are two critical sources of sustained competitive advantage in a complex and uncertain environment. A distinctive, linear social context inhibits the full integration of Army’s workforce as teams, which could offer a critical source for sustained competitive advantage.43 The ability to deal with competing demands is another critical source of sustained competitive advantage and vital for a medium-weight army aiming to rebalance its capabilities to create the right mix of combat and logistic effects.44 Having a cultural understanding of a logistician’s role as a supporting effort to the main effort at the philosophical level not only reinforces a linear mindset but also facilitates a simple, implicit, prioritised value structure, which is shared through language and carried in culture. An implicit value structure can operate unconsciously and influences the way individuals think and how they make local capability decisions45 on behalf of the whole without recognising the increasing need to take a systems thinking approach. Unfortunately, a linear mindset and implicit value structure of the organisation’s physical elements undermines Army’s organisational capability to find the right balance across its warfighting capabilities—its physical components—by diverting the organisation’s moral and intellectual components away from a position of harmony across the three elements of fighting power in the context of Accelerated Warfare.
Conclusion
By understanding the elements of Army’s culture and how they interact, we can understand how the culture influences our warfighting philosophy and our ability to think strategically and how it may enable a sustained competitive advantage for Australian land forces.46 If we are to have a warfighting philosophy that guides the whole organisation then we need a ‘warfighter’ culture that encompasses all elements of the organisations and matches the intent of our warfighting philosophy. A small change in the mental habits of Army’s people—that we are all ‘warfighters’— would facilitate a shared understanding that breaks down organisational barriers and enables a holistic, systems thinking approach to developing a balanced future force. Awareness of the implicit assumptions and value structures that we as individuals hold is the first step towards a change in shared understanding for higher performance teams in the future operating environment. Changing our interpretation of the term ‘warfighter’ to an understanding that we are all ‘warfighters’ in the modern, nonlinear, open systems environment would facilitate a balance between combat and logistics capabilities, which matches the external environment. Such a change would facilitate strategic thinking through systems thinking and ensure that the total force develops a balanced capability for the future, ultimately enhancing our land power.
Endnotes
1 United States (US) Marine Corps, 1997, Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1: Warfighting (Washington: United States Marine Corps), 11.
2 Ibid., 8.
3 United Kingdom (UK) Ministry of Defence, 2017, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP): Land Operations (London: UK Ministry of Defence).
4 Chief of Army, 2018, Accelerated Warfare: Futures Statement for an Army in Motion (Canberra: Australian Army), at: https://www.army.gov.au/our-work/army-motion/g-warfare
5 Australian Army, 2017, Land Warfare Doctrine 1: The Fundamentals of Land Power (Canberra: Australian Army), 19.
6 Ibid., 7.
7 Ibid, 50. Force weight is a product of the combat mass of the force and the environment it operates in. Combat mass is then the product of combat power and structural flexibility. Structural flexibility is achieved through the organisation’s structure and its fighting power.
8 Australian Army, 2019, Army’s Contribution to Defence Strategy (Canberra: Australian Army).
9 Australian Army, 2017, 37.
10 Ibid., 37
11 Ibid., 39.
12 Department of Defence, 2014, Campaigns and Operations, Australian Defence Doctrine Publications (ADDP) 3.0 (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia), 62.
13 Marine Corps University Research Library, ‘Warfighting Discussion Panel’, GEN Alfred M Gray, LTGEN Paul Van Riper, MAJ John F Schmitt (Marine Corps Base Quantico, VA: MCB Quantico Combat Camera, 2015), 3.
14 US Marine Corps, 1997, 17.
15 Ibid., 21.
16 Ibid., 54.
17 L Young, 2016a, ‘Developing Strategic Thinking’, Australian Army Journal XIII, no. 2: 5–22.
18 R Kaufman, 1992, Strategic Planning Plus: An Organizational Guide (New York: SAGE Publications).
19 JM Waldman, 2007, ‘Thinking Systems Need Systems Thinking’, Systems Research and Behavioral Science 24, no. 3: 271–284.
20 L Young, 2016a.
21 L Young, 2016b, ‘Towards a More Comprehensive Understanding of Strategic Thinking’, Australian Defence Force Journal 199: 55–64.
22 L Young, 2016a.
23 I Bonn, 2005, ‘Improving Strategic Thinking: A Multilevel Approach’, Leadership & Organization Development Journal 26, no. 5.
24 M Liberman, 2012, ‘Warfighter: Words Words Words’, Language Log, 25 November 2012, at: https://languagelog.ldc.upenn.edu/nll/?p=4339
25 J Reynolds, 2003, ‘Food; Ration-al Thinking’, New York Times Magazine, 16 March 2003, at: https://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/16/magazine/food-ration-al-thinking.html
26 Early examples are evident in the US, i.e. US Department of Defense, 2002, Future Logistics Enterprise: A Way Ahead (internal document of the Joint Logistics Board), quoted in Thomas R Gulledge et al., ‘Using ARIS to Design the Future Logistics Enterprise (FLE)’, in August-Wilhelm Scheer et al. (eds), 2003, Business Process Change Management: ARIS in Practice (Berlin: Springer-Verlag): ‘The primary intent of the FLE is to accelerate the DoD’s implementation of the integrated logistics chains and commercial information systems to meet warfighter sustainment needs and the operational requirements of the National Defense Strategy. The FLE is focused on those mid-term policy, process, and systems changes the DoD must make in order to continue to effectively support our warfighting customers.’
27 Army Knowledge Online, 2007, ‘Lack of War Fighting Exposure in All-Corps Environment’, Observation ID OBS000011230.
28 Army Knowledge Online, 2011, ‘Need for Logistic Representation in CTC’s Development Cell’, Observation ID OBS000022570.
29 Army Knowledge Online provides Army’s reference library on behalf of the Chief of Army, providing access to Army’s publications, observations and lessons.
30 J Choi, 2017, ‘Autonomous Resupply: Drones for the Supply Chain Reinforce the Kill Chain’, Land Power Forum, 30 September 2017, at: https://researchcentre.army.gov.au/ library/land-power-forum/autonomous-resupply-drones-supply-chain-reinforce-kill-chain
31 ‘Aussies Help Afghans with Logistics’, SBS News, 30 September 2013, at: https://www. sbs.com.au/news/aussies-help-afghans-with-logistics
32 Department of Defence, Joint Capabilities Group, 2019, Joint Logistics Command, at: https://www.defence.gov.au/jcg/JLC/
33 M Kress, 2016, Operational Logistics: The Art and Science of Sustaining Military Operations (Israel: Springer International Publishing).
34 JE Wissler, ‘Logistics: The Lifeblood of Military Power’, Military Strength Topical Essays (The Heritage Foundation), 4 October 2018, at: https://www.heritage.org/military-strength-topical-essays/2019-essays/l…
35 Department of Defence, 2014.
36 US Marine Corps, 1997.
37 RMJ Byrne and PN Johnson-Laird, 2009, ‘“If” and the problems of conditional reasoning’, Trends in Cognitive Sciences 13: 282–287.
38 E Mathieu et al., 2000, ‘The Influence of Shared Mental Models on Team Process and Performance’, The Journal of Applied Psychology 85, no. 2: 273–283.128
39 CM Jonker, MB Riemsdijk and B Vermeulen, ‘Shared Mental Models; A Conceptual Analysis’, in M De Vos, N Fornara, JV Pitt and G Vouros, 2010, Coordination, Organizations, Institutions, and Norms in Agent Systems VI, COIN 2010 International Workshops (Berlin: Springer), 132.
40 Ibid., 2010.
41 D Ulrich and D Lake, 1991, ‘Organizational Capability: Creating Competitive Advantage’, Academy of Management Executive 5, no. 1: 77–92.
42 Ibid., 1991.
43 R Andrews, MJ Beynon and AM McDermott, 2016, ‘Organizational Capability in the Public Sector: A Configurational Approach’, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 26, no. 2: 239–258.
44 DJ Beaumont, 2017, Transforming Australian Army Logistics to Support the Joint Land Force, Australian Army Occasional Paper (Canberra: Australian Army Research Centre).
45 MH Bazerman and DA Moore, 2012, Judgement in Managerial Decision Making (California: Wiley).
46 Australian Army, 2017.
