The Evolution of Australian Army Training Adversaries: 1948–2018
Abstract
One of the essential requirements for Army training is the creation of a contemporary and relevant training adversary which allows tactics, techniques and procedures to be tested and weapons and equipment to be evaluated. This is an important part of Army’s value proposition to government that it can provide directed capability. In most cases, the training adversaries developed by the Australian Army in the past have represented opponents the Army was actually fighting or generic opponents it was unlikely to fight. This led the Australian Army to train for operations against an adversary it was unlikely to fight rather than preparing for probable future conflict.
In 2015, Army adopted the United States (US) Army Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE). DATE provides a sophisticated operating environment and adversary construct which is constantly updated to reflect current real-world operations. The adoption of DATE will transform Australian Army training by providing a contemporary, reality-based training adversary, allowing Army to train for contemporary operations and conduct mission rehearsal exercises against a contemporary adversary for the first time.
Introduction
One of the essential requirements for Army training is the creation of a contemporary and relevant training adversary which allows own force tactics, techniques and procedures to be tested and permits own force weapons and equipment to be evaluated. This is an important part of Army’s value proposition to government that it can provide directed capability.
Until recently, Army single-service training adversaries have been developed by the Australian Army and disseminated via a range of adversary doctrine pamphlets. This process has created a variety of training adversaries over the period 1948 to 2018, most of which have rapidly become outdated. In most cases, the training adversaries represented either opponents the Australian Army was actually fighting or opponents it had just fought. This has led the Australian Army to train for operations against an adversary it was unlikely to fight rather than preparing for probable future conflict against a reality-based, contemporary adversary. The use of the Musorian Armed Forces (MAF) as a training adversary for the period 1980 to 2016 is an example of this approach to training for operations. The necessary updating of training adversary doctrine has been a difficult and time-consuming process. A significant issue has been the identification of suitably qualified personnel to carry out the update process.
During the most recent update of existing Australian Army adversary doctrine (the Musorians), the US Army offered the DATE enterprise to the Australian Army. DATE provides a sophisticated operating environment and adversary construct which is constantly updated to reflect current real-world operations. The adoption of DATE will transform Australian Army training by providing a contemporary, reality-based training adversary, allowing the Australian Army to train for contemporary operations for the first time.
Historical Background: 1950–2015
The development of adversary doctrine from 1948 to 2015 will be examined through the lens of conflict and operations which have occurred during this period.1 The strategic and cultural drivers for the development of adversary doctrine in the 1950s, 1960s and even 1970s are difficult to identify; however, an enduring theme which can be traced through the various iterations of the MAF doctrine from 1980 to 2010 is interoperability. Interoperability is demonstrated by the use of US and United Kingdom (UK) adversary doctrine to develop generic Australian training adversary doctrine.2

One of the essential requirements for Army training is the creation of a contemporary and relevant training adversary which allows own force tactics, techniques and procedures to be tested and permits own force weapons and equipment to be evaluated. Image courtesy Department of Defence
Korea 1950–1953 and the Malayan Emergency 1955–1963
The first post-1948 attempt by the Australian Army to produce an adversary doctrine pamphlet was Notes on the Chinese Communist Army in 1951.3 It would seem reasonable to assume that this pamphlet was used for training during the period of the Korean War (1950–1953) and the early part of the Malayan Emergency (1955–1963). Notes on the Chinese Communist Army comprised 52 pages and allocated five pages to tactics of the Chinese Communist Army.4 While the communist insurrection in Malaya continued, Australian Military Forces Study Precis Book 8, The Soviet Army (1954),5 was released. This doctrine delivered a generic, Soviet-derived adversary. The precis comprised 24 pages, of which six pages were devoted to tactics.6 While Notes on the Chinese Communist Army represented an opponent the Australian Army was actually fighting in Malaya and Korea, The Soviet Army did not. The Soviet precis may have been released as a result of Australia’s entry into the Australian, New Zealand and US Treaty (ANZUS) in September 1951 or the signing of the South-East Asia Collective Defence Treaty by the US, Australia, New Zealand, France, Britain, Pakistan, Thailand and the Philippines in September 1954, establishing the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO).
The Pentropic Reorganisation: 1960–1965
The 1961 pamphlet The Phantom Army (Provisional)7 depicted the enemy as both a guerrilla and a conventional force. The aim of the pamphlet was to provide information on the ‘enemy’, giving details of military organisation, weapons and tactics. This pamphlet established a format which remained largely unchanged throughout the generic adversary pamphlets written up to 2016.8
The Phantom Army (Provisional) provides an early representation of a hybrid threat9 by discussing the use of local bandit groups with revolutionary, insurgent or guerrilla forces and conventional military forces;10 however, the bulk of the pamphlet was devoted to conventional forces.11 Like The Soviet Army, The Phantom Army (Provisional) did not represent an adversary which the Australian Army was likely to fight at the time. This publication was the first iteration of a generic training adversary, although the conventional force it described was clearly based upon the armed forces of the Soviet Union, with a South-East Asian hybrid threat. Additional guidance on the ‘enemy’ was provided by Notes on the Phantom Army (Provisional), also published in 1961.12

Work commenced on the updating of obsolete adversary doctrine in September 2014, as part of the SAF. Image courtesy Department of Defence
The Phantom Army (Provisional) was superseded by The Enemy 196413 in July 1964.The new training adversary pamphlet represented a minor revision of The Phantom Army (Provisional). At 185 pages, The Enemy 1964 was much longer than previous versions and continued to reference a hybrid threat by describing a Soviet-derived conventional force with a South-East Asian insurgent threat. These training adversary pamphlets led the Australian Army to train against a Soviet or Soviet-derived adversary and a South-East Asian communist insurgent force in the period from 1951 to 1966, providing a more relevant training adversary.
Confrontation: 1965–1966
In March 1965, the Australian Army deployed troops to Borneo to defend Malaysian interests and remained in place until August 1966. The Indonesian Army (1966),14 originally released at the security classification of ‘confidential’, delivered a much more detailed depiction of an actual opponent than the earlier Notes on the Chinese Communist Army (1951). During the period when the Australian Army was in Malaysia between 1964 and 1972, the Army used both The Enemy 1964 (Soviet-derived adversary with South-East Asian hybrid threat) and The Indonesian Army (1966).
Vietnam: 1962–1972
Although Australian troops had deployed to Vietnam in 1962, the training adversary remained The Enemy 1964, which would have been of little use in preparing Australian troops for the type of adversary they would face in South Vietnam. It was not until July 1970 that The Enemy 1964 was superseded by The Enemy 1970, released in two parts.15 The Enemy 1970 Part 1 covered communist insurgent and guerrilla units and closely resembled the enemy encountered in the Republic of South Vietnam, with many references to Viet Cong tactics, techniques and procedures. This pamphlet expanded on the revolutionary, insurgent and guerrilla (hybrid) forces which appeared in part 1 of The Enemy 1964.
The Enemy 1970 Part 2 dealt exclusively with communist conventional forces, once again expanding on information contained in part 2 of The Enemy 1964. The adversary orders of battle (ORBAT) contained in this pamphlet are overwhelmingly Soviet, as are the majority of weapons systems. Included in this expanded doctrine was limited coverage of Chinese Communist (CHICOM) equipment. The Enemy 1970 provided a relevant training adversary for the period 1970 to 1972. However, after the withdrawal of Australian troops from Vietnam, its training value decreased.
The Long Peace: 1973–198616
Training Information Bulletin Number 26: The Enemy17 (TIB 26) was released around 1972. This pamphlet once again included an insurgent threat; however, the balance of revolutionary, insurgent and guerrilla forces to regular forces shifted fundamentally. The bulk of TIB 26 was devoted to regular forces, with only one chapter out of nine devoted to irregular forces. Once again, the training adversary had become largely one-dimensional. TIB 26 contained an ORBAT for an initial adversary lodgement force comprising organic divisional units and supplementary forces allocated from corps level. This pamphlet also delivered, for the first time, an abbreviated country study and details of Soviet weapons systems. TIB 26 revisited the format established by The Phantom Army (Provisional) and The Enemy 1964 in the way the training adversary reverted to a Soviet-derived adversary with South-East Asian hybrid threat in the absence of any other strategic guidance.
The Musorian Armed Forces
The 1980 publication MLW 3-2-2 The Musorian Armed Forces (MLW 3.2.2) significantly reworked the previous generic training adversary pamphlets, from The Phantom Army (Provisional) (1961) to TIB 26 circa 1972. MLW 3-2-2 created the fictitious country of Musoria, and its military forces ( MAF). The Australian Army was destined to fight against this fictitious training adversary, which employed a mix of Soviet and CHICOM tactics, for most of the next 37 years.18 Comprising 470 pages, MLW 3-2-2 was the largest training adversary pamphlet produced at the time. It incorporated doctrinal templates, ORBATs, arm of service and rank insignia, and adversary weapons and equipment. Although the hybrid theme was continued in this pamphlet, conventional tactics comprised a quarter of the content. Part 4 of this pamphlet devoted 90 per cent of its content to conventional tactics. MLW 3-2-2 continued to be used to provide the training adversary for conventional operations at formation level for almost 17 years (1980–1996) until The Musorian Armed Forces Army Trial Doctrine 4.2 Aide-Memoire (1997) (Aide Memoire (1997)) and The Musorian Armed Forces Army Trial Doctrine 4.3 Land Operations, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (1997) (Land Operations, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (1997)) appeared.19
MLW 3-2-2 The Musorian Armed Forces Part 5 Aide-Memoire (1980)20 (Aide-Memoire) was developed from the pamphlet of the same name. The Aide-Memoire was meant to serve as a summary of main publication and was small enough to carry in one of the map pockets of the uniform of the day. Unfortunately, in the process of transposing data from MLW 3-2-2 to the Aide-Memoire, the equipment tables became corrupted. As a result, the Aide-Memoire proved to be an unreliable aid to training and was quickly removed from service.21 This was the only time that a true aide memoire (summary) was produced in support of a training adversary pamphlet.
Defence of Australia: 1987–1998
The Hawke Government tabled the Defence White Paper (The Defence of Australia 1987) in Parliament as a ‘Policy Information Paper’ on 19 March 1987. This document presented a 10- to 15-year outlook22 and its change in strategic direction led to the creation of a training adversary configured for the conduct of low-level operations against the Australian mainland. The new adversary developed for this purpose was the Kamarian Armed Forces (KAF);23 however, the MAF continued to be used as the training adversary for conventional operations at formation level.24
MLW 3.2.3 Kamarian Armed Forces (MLW 3.2.3) was released in 1993 25 and included 46 pages of annexes. This new pamphlet was the first generic adversary doctrine in which coverage of irregular forces outnumbered coverage of conventional forces by three to one. This pamphlet became obsolete at the end of 1997, when it was superseded by the Aide-Memoire (1997) and Land Operations, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (1997).
The Musorian Armed Forces Trial Doctrine,26 released in 1997, set the pattern for future generic adversary training pamphlets. This update of adversary doctrine was the first to portray a conventional adversary only—there was no longer any reference to a hybrid threat. This doctrine was introduced in two volumes, and future updates of Musorian doctrine continued to be released in this two-volume format up to 2010.27 The Aide-Memoire (1997) contained 10 new chapters of tactics, techniques and procedures, which would continue to be reproduced in updated versions of adversary doctrine based on the MAF until Land Warfare Procedures— General 7-5-5 Training Adversary (LWP-G 7-5-5) was written in 2016. Accordingly, during this period the training adversary continued to depict a Russian-derived, large-scale conventional force, despite a number of deployments in which such an adversary was never encountered.28
War and Peacekeeping: 1999–2014
The Australian Army was almost continually on operations from 1999 to 2014. Operational commitments included stabilisation missions in the Asia-Pacific and coalition operations in the Middle East. In spite of this, the MAF continued to serve as the training adversary in the Force Generation (FORGEN) domain, providing limited training value for troops deploying on operations. The Aide-Memoire (1997) was replaced by LWD 7-5-2 Musorian Armed Forces—Aide-Memoire (Developing Doctrine), which was released in 200129 and was intended to be used from 30 December 2001 to July 2002.
The Musorian Armed Forces Army Trial Doctrine 4.3 Edition 1 Version Land Operations, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures, Part 1 (1997) was replaced by LWD 7-5-3 Musorian Armed Forces—Land Operations, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (Developing Doctrine) in 2001.30 The new pamphlet delivered the same 10-chapter structure as its predecessor, running to 414 pages. Like the 1997 doctrine, the 2001 doctrine contained no hybrid content and continued the process of replacing MLW 3.2.2 (1980) and MLW 3.2.3 (1993). Under the 2001 doctrine, the MAF assumed the role of the Australian Army’s sole training enemy. The new 2001 doctrine provided the user with a far more detailed training enemy than had previously been available; however, the new training adversary continued to be based on the fictitious nation of Musoria, providing limited training value for troops deploying on operations.
Doctrine Confusion: 2002–2013
The period 2002 to 2013 saw the release of three new training adversary doctrine pamphlets. Confusingly, LWP-G 7-5-2 Musorian Armed Forces— Land Operations, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures, Developing Doctrine (2010)31 was a reissue of LWD 7-5-3 Musorian Armed Forces—Land Operations, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (Developing Doctrine) (2001). The only new piece of training adversary doctrine released in this period was LWD 7-5-3: Doctrine Note 1—2008 Non-military Forces and Organisations—Operational Models32 (Doctrine Note). The Doctrine Note was a significant departure from the previous 28 years of MAF doctrine, breaking new ground by dealing with asymmetric operations and by reintroducing a hybrid element to training adversary doctrine. The pamphlet comprised 126 pages, contained seven chapters (four of which were Reserved—that is, never issued) and was intended to be endorsed by 2009.
LWP-G 7-5-2 Musorian Armed Forces—Land Operations, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures, Developing Doctrine (2010)33 comprised 416 pages and was a reissue of LWD 7-5-3 Musorian Armed Forces—Land Operations, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (Developing Doctrine) (2001) (414 pages). Strangely, it superseded the 1997 doctrine and was intended to be used in conjunction with LWD 7-5-2 Musorian Armed Forces—Aide Memoire (Developing Doctrine) (2001), which was still current doctrine at the time. Consequently, with the exception of the Doctrine Note, training adversary doctrine in this period continued to provide limited training value for troops deploying on operations.
Recent Developments: 2014–2018
Foundation Warfighting
The Foundation Warfighting Training Management Framework Directive (FWF TMF Directive) represented an attempt to increase the relevance of training in the Operational Generation (OPGEN) domain. Released on 2 December 2014 by Commander Forces Command, the FWF TMF was intended to generate a contemporary standardised adversary framework (SAF) and remove from use the myriad ‘Red Books’ used to provide up- to-date adversary doctrine. It was also intended to ensure a standardised adversary appearance in terms of uniforms and weapon systems.
Work commenced on the updating of obsolete adversary doctrine in September 2014 as part of the SAF. The updating process was conducted with the support of the Weapons and Technical Intelligence Section of the Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO), which advised on ORBATs and weapons systems. The new adversary doctrine was initially allocated the title LWP-G 7-5-5 Musorian Armed Forces—Organisations, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures. However, this pamphlet was renamed LWP-G 7-5-5 Training Adversary when submitted for sponsor clearance in March 2018.34 LWP-G 7-5-5 Training Adversary introduced a four-tiered weapons system borrowed from DATE, heralding a new era in training adversary paradigms.
The Land Combat Training System
In December 2015, Headquarters Forces Command (HQ FORCOMD) released the Land Combat Training System (LCTS). The LCTS provides the means by which the pillars of the Army’s Land Training Support Systems could be synchronised with Army’s training environment. The four key components of the LCTS are the Land Adversary System (LAS), the Land Simulation System (LSS), the Land Training Area and Range System (LTARS), and Introduction Into Service (IIS). The LAS was to effectively replicate contemporary threats and was to be both scalable and adaptable. The LAS, as part of the LCTS, was intended to evolve Army’s SAF into an integrated adversary system which would provide a credible training adversary supported by doctrine; simulation models and metadata; and ‘live’ capabilities. This approach was to enable the development of a training adversary which could be scaled by force size and capability to meet Army’s Foundation Warfighting training needs for Army Training Levels 1–8.
In spite of the release of the LCTS, the updating of obsolete adversary doctrine continued. The updating process was completed in October 2016, when the new single-volume Musorian doctrine, LWP-G 7-5-5 Training Adversary, was sent to Land Doctrine Centre for final editing.35
Evaluation of DATE in 2014–2016
The utility of DATE as a replacement for the Musorians as Army’s single- service training adversary was investigated in 2015. At the time both the armed forces of both the UK and Canada had adopted DATE as their training adversary, while New Zealand was still considering its adoption. The Australian Army sought advice from both the UK and Canada regarding the implementation of DATE and decided against it due to the significant financial and personnel investment required for implementation and concerns that DATE would not be able to perform the functions of a joint training adversary for Exercise Hamel/Talisman Sabre.
Accordingly, in December 2014, the Chief of Army confirmed that the MAF would remain Army’s single-service training adversary; the Joint Exercise Operating Environment (JEOE) would be used to develop the joint training adversary for Exercise Hamel/Talisman Sabre, with the KAF filling the role of training adversary; and a ‘watching brief’ would be maintained in relation to the possible future use of DATE as Army’s single-service training adversary.36 As a consequence, DATE continued to be evaluated for possible use as Army’s single-service training adversary. The British and Canadian Armies had, by 2016, mandated DATE as the common operating environment for training at divisional level and below, and New Zealand was evaluating the model. Subsequently, the realisation that the adoption of DATE by Australia’s partners meant that Australia would enhance Army’s multinational interoperability by following suit.
The LCTS described the need to generate a training environment which replicated the complexity and challenges faced by land forces across the spectrum of conflict. Consequently, Army’s LAS needed to generate a training environment inherently linked to the operating environment and to provide coherency and consistency within the Training Management Framework and throughout the Army Training Continuum (ATC) as described in The Ryan Review (2016).37 While the Musorian construct had served as a ‘passable’ training adversary for some time, it inadequately represented contemporary threats and provided limited support to training across live, virtual and constructive domains. The DATE package offered significant benefits, including the richness of its operating environment, which is documented in a comprehensive unclassified library that is continuously updated by US Traning and Doctrine Command’s G2 enterprise of some 400 personnel.
Endorsement of DATE as Army’s Single-Service Training Adversary
In late 2016, the Director of Training Systems at HQ FORCOMD travelled to the US to see for himself what the DATE enterprise could offer the Australian Army. The visit convinced the Director of Training Systems that the extant training adversary paradigm (the MAF) should be abandoned and the DATE enterprise adopted. Accordingly, Head Modernisation and Strategic Policy—Army was convinced of the need to endorse the use of DATE to support Army Training Levels 1–5 in November 2016 while also endorsing the Headquarters Joint Operations Command sponsored JEOE as a suitable adversary construct for joint and collective training. Factors leading to this decision included that DATE provides a contemporary operating environment and adversary construct which is continuously updated; that DATE has been adopted by the other ABCA nations, thus enhancing interoperability; and that DATE is supported by the resources of US TRADOC, whilst Musorian doctrine has typically been updated via a ‘cut and paste’ process every five years or more, undertaken by one author supported by advice from the Weapons and Technical Intelligence Section of DIO.
DATE Working Group February 2017
Headquarters Forces Command convened a DATE Working Group in February 2017. The Working Group was sponsored by the Directorate of Training Systems (under command of DG TRADOC) and was attended by personnel from US TRADOC, the UK, Canada, Australian Training Centres and Training Establishments and the Australian Defence Simulation and Training Centre. The purpose of the Working Group was to develop a plan to implement DATE as Army’s single-service training adversary for Army Training Levels 1–5.
Friction points which emerged at the DATE Working Group included the need to abandon the use of doctrinal templates, the use of DATE Caucasus terrain for Australian Army training, and the need to maintain the JEOE for Exercise Hamel and Exercise Talisman Sabre. The need to abandon the use of doctrinal templates has led to a realisation that certain steps of both Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield and the Military Appreciation Process need to be changed in doctrine, as the use of doctrinal templates is currently included in both staff processes. These doctrinal changes are yet to be made.
DATE arguably has limitations in its current form and does not represent Australia’s regional context and littoral operating environment. However, the development of the DATE—Pacific (DATE–P) operating environment will address this issue and is expected to be delivered by 2020.38 In the meantime, ‘terrain draping’ will be used to generate digital terrain for use with Australian simulation systems. Terrain draping will involve superimposing Caucasus terrain layers obtained from the US on Australian training areas. It is intended that key terrain features will remain unchanged, but township names will be changed and a constructive wraparound will be created, which will be aligned with the Australian DATE Campaign Plan. Terrain data is essential for Exercise Hamel and Combat Training Centre activities and for training centres which use battlefield simulation to support their courses.
From 2018 Army began to replace the MAF with the DATE enterprise as its single-service adversary and operating environment for Army Training Levels 1–5. Army also recognised the need for a joint training adversary for Exercise Hamel and Exercise Talisman Sabre and, accordingly, will continue to utilise HQJOC’s JEOE for joint collective activities at Australian Training Levels 6–8.
Description of the Decisive Action Training Environment Enterprise
DATE is a US-sponsored operating environment and adversary construct featuring conventional, irregular and hybrid adversaries. The DATE environment is fictitious but is constructed from a composite of real-world terrain and operational conditions. DATE provides country studies for five fictitious countries: Ariana, Atropia, Donovia, Gorgas and Limeria
(see Figure 1).

Figure 1. All DATE Country Studies Address the PMESII-PT variables39
The building blocks of DATE include operational conditions, threat ORBATS, equipment tables and hybrid tactics. DATE is designed to support training needs across the individual and collective spectrum. DATE is continuously informed by the rapid infusion of lessons learned and features operations short of war and a hybrid threat opposing force.40
Threat doctrine for DATE is composite in nature, contains the full spectrum of threats and is primarily based upon states and non-state actors, including China, Russia, Iran, North Korea and ISIS. As a consequence, for the first time DATE provides a contemporary adversary which employs current, real- world operational tactics, techniques and procedures. The adversaries within DATE are flexible and adaptive and do not conform to tactical templates. The Australian Army will be required to adjust its approach to tactics training in order to realise the full benefits of a versatile adversary as delivered by DATE.41
DATE also provides a contemporary unclassified exercise development tool, simulation entity and data management system consisting of a Virtual Opposing Force (OPFOR) Academy which comprises a total of 28 hybrid threat tactical examples (from platoon to company level) designed to support live, virtual and constructive training. It also offers an Information Operations Network (ION) reflecting social media and digital domains. The content of this network is housed on closed intranets, unique to each exercise and accessed via the web. This allows the trainees to search social media content specifically built to match their scenario. The network supports intelligence, information operations, and civil–military cooperation training. The DATE OPFOR is experienced in the application of the attributes of information warfare.42 ION enables the training adversary to conduct information warfare activities to support training outcomes.
Hybrid Threat
DATE restores to Army training the hybrid threat, which disappeared from Australian-developed adversary doctrine in 1997 (see Figure 2). TC 7-100 Hybrid Threat is the lead pamphlet in the hybrid threat series. It describes the hybrid threat and lays out key hybrid threat concepts of regular, irregular and criminal elements. Other organisations within the operating environment are motivated by personal gain (for instance, shadow political groups, criminal elements and private corporations). Hybrid threat forces may share a unified purpose. These forces can align either temporarily or for longer periods to achieve mutually beneficial goals.

Figure 2. Content of Australian Army Training Adversary Doctrine
Modern adversaries understand that the environment that would produce the most challenges for western military forces is one in which conventional military operations are executed in association with irregular warfare. In addition, there is a synergy to the simultaneous use of regular and irregular methods that is difficult to counter. Synergy will be achieved by a threat state actor executing conventional operations that ensure the opposition is also simultaneously presented with an irregular warfare environment; or by a threat non-state actor conducting irregular warfare that integrates conventional means and tactics into its operations.
DATE Implementation: 2017–2020
The DATE Working Group decided that DATE would be transitioned into Army over 2017–2020 by the DATE team at Training Systems Branch, HQ FORCOMD in order to support individual and collective training. DATE was to be introduced into Army’s individual and collective training continuums commencing in January 2018. DATE was integrated into Exercise Hamel 1843 as the first collective activity to test and implement DATE. It is intended that the Combat Training Centre will be a regular user of and contributor to DATE across the live, virtual and constructive domains (enabled by Land Simulation Centre (LSC)) for up to six exercises annually by 2019.
Terrain and Simulation
US TRADOC at Fort Leavenworth (Kansas) is in the early stages of creating the new DATE–P (based on the Philippines) operating environment, which is planned for release in 2019 or 2020. The Australian Army provided a short-term embed to assist in the design of this environment, intended to ensure that it is contemporary and reflects the Australian Defence Force’s requirements for training in the region (Melanesian/Polynesian, Indo-Malay et cetera). A small team at the 1st Intelligence Battalion continues to support the development of DATE–P. While DATE–P is yet to be completed, DATE–Caucasus is a mature operating environment, used by ABCA over the past three years, with a large repository of data to leverage from. While a transition to DATE–P is a logical step, implementation is unlikely to commence before 2019–2020.
Australian Army DATE Campaign Plan
In order to standardise training across continuums and environments, a DATE Campaign Plan originally developed by the Canadian Army has been adapted for Australia. The Australian Army DATE Campaign Plan is based upon an invasion of Atropia by the armed forces of Ariana. The United Nations response to this invasion was to raise a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF), the land component of which includes a Canadian-lead Multi National Division, with an Australian Combat Brigade allotted. The identified adversary force for this Campaign Plan is the 25th Mechanised Division Tactical Group, part of the 2nd Operational Strategic Command of the 3rd Arianian Army.
Adoption of DATE by Other Services
Although the DATE enterprise represents a training adversary which is land- centric, the operating environment and adversary construct contained in the DATE enterprise does have appeal outside Army. The Royal Australian Air Force has decided to introduce DATE Caucasus into all Air Warfare School (AWS) courseware immediately. DATE Caucasus will be used in pilot courses at the AWS from 2019.
In summary, DATE is both evolutionary and revolutionary as a training enterprise. DATE is evolutionary in that it includes many of the attributes of the Australian Army’s traditional ‘home-grown’ adversary doctrine (country studies, orders of battle, hybrid threat, tactics, techniques and procedures, and weapons data). DATE is revolutionary for the following reasons. First, the size and scale of the DATE enterprise dwarfs the Australian training adversaries developed between 1948 and 2016, providing a flexible, agnostic adversary construct. Second, DATE is a US product and is continuously updated. It is constructed from a composite of real-world terrain (Caucasus region), operational conditions, threat actors, tactics and equipment. Third, DATE will align future training with other ABCA partners and will allow training material to be shared. Fourth, DATE portrays a free-thinking adversary, abandoning the doctrinal templates which have been a feature of Australian Army training adversaries since 1961. DATE places much greater emphasis on the hybrid threat. Finally, DATE has been created in the digital age, providing opportunities to support live, virtual and constructive training. DATE supports simulation via the use of digitised terrain.
Conclusion
Until recently, Army single-service training adversaries have been developed by the Australian Army and disseminated via a range of adversary doctrine pamphlets. This process has created a variety of training adversaries over the period 1948 to 2018, most of which have rapidly become outdated. In most cases, the training adversaries developed by the Australian Army represented either opponents the Australian Army was actually fighting or generic opponents it was unlikely to fight. This meant that the Australian Army trained for operations against training adversaries it was unlikely to fight rather than preparing for probable future conflict.
In 2015 the US Army offered the DATE enterprise to the Australian Army. DATE provides a sophisticated operating environment and training adversary construct which is continuously updated to reflect current real-world operations. The adoption of DATE will transform Australian Army training by providing a contemporary, reality-based training adversary, allowing the Australian Army to train for contemporary operations for the first time.
Endnotes
- Readers interested in Australian Army historical doctrine should access Army online historical doctrine at http://drnet.defence.gov.au/ARMY/Doctrine-Online/Information/Pages/ Historical Doctrine.aspx, as most of the training adversary doctrine referred to in this article can be found here.
- It is interesting to note that one of the major reasons behind the decision to adopt the DATE enterprise was the fact that the use of DATE enhanced interoperability across the ABCA partners.
- Australian Military Forces, 1951, Notes on the Chinese Communist Army, Melbourne: Army Headquarters. This is the first Australian-developed adversary doctrine which I can identify in the post-1948 period. For details regarding Australian adversary doctrine, see Michael O’Brien, 2004, Australian Army Tactical and Instructional Pamphlets: A Bibliography, Australian Army.
- The tactics described were reconnaissance, attack, night attack, defence, supporting fire, noise, deception and propaganda.
- Directorate of Military Training, 1954, AHQ, The Soviet Army, Australian Military Forces: Study Précis, Book 8, Seymour, Victoria: School of Tactics and Administration
- Three pages were devoted to the attack and three pages were devoted to the defence.
- Australian Army, 1961, The Phantom Army (Provisional), Canberra: Army Headquarters
- This date has been chosen because the last Musorian-derived adversary doctrine (LWP-G 7-5-5 Training Adversary) was completed in October 2016.
- The term ‘hybrid threat’ will be used throughout this article. A hybrid threat is defined as a diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, terrorist forces and/or criminal elements unified to achieve mutually benefiting outcomes.
- Australian Army, 1961, p 5
- M. C. J. Welburn, 1994, The Development of Australian Army Doctrine, 1945-1964, Australian National University, p 53
- Australian Army, 1961
- Australian Military Forces, 1964, Military Board, The Enemy, Canberra: Army Headquarters
- Australian Military Forces, 1966, The Indonesian Army 1966 (Canberra: Army Headquarters
- Australian Army, 1970, The Enemy, Parts 1 and 2,Canberra: Army Headquarters
- During this period the Australian Army sent a contingent of 151 personnel to Rhodesia/ Zimbabwe in 1979.
- Australian Army, 1972, Training Information Bulletin Number 26: The Enemy, Sydney: Headquarters Training Command
-
This doctrine referenced a number of ABCA pamphlets, including:
• US Department of the Army, 1977, Opposing Forces Europe (FM 30-102), Nov
• UK Department of Defence, 1972, Notes on the Soviet Ground Forces, Jan
• UK Department of Defence, 1975, Tactics of the Soviet Ground Forces, Aug
The author recalls that the enemy tactical training he received at the Officer Cadet Training Unit (OCTU) located in Ingleburn in 1983 was based on Notes on the Soviet Ground Forces. The Chief Instructor at this OCTU was Lieutenant Colonel T J Smith MBE—a former member of the Australian Army Training Team Vietnam and author of Training the Bodes: Australian Army Advisers Training Cambodian Infantry Battalions—A Postscript to the Vietnam War, Newport, NSW: Big Sky Publishing Pty Ltd, 2011
- Australian Army, 1997, The Musorian Armed Forces Army Trial Doctrine 4.2 Edition 1 Version 1 Aide-Memoire, Commonwealth of Australia; and Australian Army, 1997, The Musorian Armed Forces Army Trial Doctrine 4.3, Edition 1; Land Operations, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures, Part 1, Commonwealth of Australia
- Australian Army, 1980, Manual of Land Warfare, Part Three, Volume 2, Pamphlet No 2: The Musorian Armed Forces, Part 5: Aide-Memoire, Canberra: Army Headquarters
- These comments are based upon the experiences of the author, who attempted to use MLW 3-2-2 The Musorian Armed Forces Part 5 Aide-Memoire, 1980, during the mid- 1980s.
- Australian Government, 1987, The Defence of Australia 1987, Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia
- The Kamarian Armed Forces were colloquially referred to as the ‘Thugs in Thongs’.
- Australian Army, 1991, MLW 3.2.3 Kamarian Armed Forces, Canberra, Army Headquarters
- Australian Army, 1993, Manual of Land Warfare, Part Three: Training, Volume 2: Training for War, Pamphlet No 3: Kamarian Armed Forces, Canberra: Army Headquarters
- Australian Army, 1997, The Musorian Armed Forces Army Trial Doctrine 4.2, Edition 1, Version 1: Aide-Memoire, Headquarters Training Command; Australian Army, 1997, The Musorian Armed Forces Army Trial Doctrine 4.3, Edition 1, Land Operations, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures, Part 1, Headquarters Training Command
- Generic adversary training doctrine based on the Musorian Armed Forces continued to be released in a two-volume format until LWP-G 7-5-5 Training Adversary was written in 2016.
- During the period from 1988 to 1999 the Australian Army deployed forces to Iran and Iraq (1988–1999), Namibia (1989), Pakistan and Afghanistan (1989–1993), First Gulf War (1990–1991), Western Sahara (1991–1994), Cambodia (1991–1997), Somalia (1992–1994), Yugoslavia (1994–2004), Rwanda (1994–1995) and Bougainville (1994–2003).
- Australian Army, 2001, LWD 7-5-2 Musorian Armed Forces—Aide-Memoire (Developing Doctrine), Combined Arms Training and Development Centre
- Australian Army, 2001, LWD 7-5-3 Musorian Armed Forces—Land Operations, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (Developing Doctrine), Land Warfare Development Centre
- Australian Army, 2010, LWP-G 7-5-2, Musorian Armed Forces—Land Operations, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures, Developing Doctrine, Defence Intelligence Training Centre
- Australian Army, 2008, LWD 7-5-3 Doctrine Note 1—Non-military Forces and Organisations—Operational Models, Land Warfare Centre
- This doctrine may never have been released. It was not listed as current doctrine when LWP-G 7-5-5 Training Adversary was being written in 2016.
- LWP-G 7-5-5 Training Adversary received sponsor clearance on 3 May 2018. The pamphlet was reclassified from ‘For Official Use Only’ to ‘Unclassified’ in order to make it easier to access electronically.
- The author sought to return to the structure of MLW 3-2-2 The Musorian Armed Forces (1980) when writing LWP-G 7-5-5 Training Adversary. A conscious effort was made to reduce the size of the doctrine in order to return to a single-volume format.
- Chief of Army Minute, ADF Joint Exercise Operating Environment (JEOE), 19 December 2014
- Brigadier Mick Ryan, 2016, The Ryan Review: A Study of Army’s Education, Training and Doctrine Needs for the Future, Commonwealth of Australia
- DATE–P will be set in the Philippines and will be used by the Australian Army for collective training. Individual training will be conducted in the digital terrain of the Caucasus.
- PMESIIPT: Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, Information, Physical Environment, Time.
- The DATE hybrid force is capable of gaining and exploiting relative technological overmatch, leveraging weapons of mass destruction, employing cyberspace and counter-space capabilities and conducting operations among populations, in cities and in complex terrain.
- Unlike the ‘home-grown’ generic adversaries, DATE does not currently provide the detailed tactical data which may be required to enable the delivery of high-fidelity virtual simulation. The tactical data which may be required includes frontages and depths of objectives, length of tactical march columns, rates of advance and indicative timings for battle procedure (eg, time required to mount an attack, defend a position etc.).
- The attributes of information warfare employed by the DATE OPFOR include deception, electronic warfare, perception management, computer warfare, information attack and physical destruction.
- The Marcellan ORBAT for Exercise Hamel 18 was based upon the Arianian 25th Infantry Division (APC). The Joint Exercise Operating Environment (JEOE) provided the operating environment.