The Battle of Marawi: Lessons for Developing Urban Capabilities
Abstract
In May 2017, Islamist insurgents laid siege to the city of Marawi in the Mindanao region of southern Philippines. This siege led to a five-month campaign by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to retake Marawi and restore order to the region. The experiences of the AFP have broad relevance to the Australian Army across a number of corps and disciplines, including close combat, offensive support, mobility and survivability, urban sniping and counter-sniping, and logistics. The aim of this article is to describe the key tactical lessons the Australian Army can learn from the AFP’s urban clearance of Marawi. Consideration of these lessons may inform, and improve, the Australian Army’s current approaches to force generation of close combat, combined-arms capabilities.
Introduction
In May 2017, Islamist insurgents swarmed through Marawi in the southern Philippines, attempting to take the population of 200,000 hostage and announcing it as a new ‘Capitol’ for Islamic State (IS) in South-East Asia. This wildly ambitious, unprecedented move triggered a state of martial law, and from May to October 2017, fighting echelons of the AFP deployed to Marawi. The southern Philippines has proven to be a haven for Islamist terrorists for many years;1 however, anecdotal evidence suggests the region has also seen a recent increase in activity due to an influx of foreign terrorist fighters from the Middle East.
Prior to Marawi, the AFP had limited experience in urban combat, with their training historically focusing on ongoing jungle operations to suppress various Islamist groups and the New People’s Army (NPA)—a rebel communist group. As a result, with almost no notice, the soldiers, marines, sailors and airmen and women of the AFP were required to adapt to this new environment extraordinarily quickly.2 The lessons learned by the AFP from grinding combat in a large, broken, crowded city are important. The Australian Army has been investing in developing leading training to improve its skills for combat operations in the urban environment, but it must learn everything it can from the AFP’s vicious Marawi experience to ensure it is best prepared to operate, fight and win in similar urban conflicts.
A Philippine Army soldier provides security during urban combat training with Australian Army soldiers from the 3rd Brigade at Capinpin, Philippines as part of Operation AUGURY. Image courtesy Department of Defence
The aim of this article is to describe the key tactical lessons the Australian Army can learn from the urban clearance of Marawi. Consideration of these lessons may inform and improve the Australian Army’s current approaches to force generation of close combat, combined-arms capabilities.
Accordingly, this article will describe the Battle of Marawi. Subsequently, it will identify the key lessons learned by the AFP in fighting an intelligent, determined, disciplined and well-equipped terrorist threat in the extraordinarily difficult, intense and complicated urban environment. Finally, this article will identify how these lessons could inform or improve the Australian Army’s current approach to generating a close combat and combined-arms edge over potential adversaries. These lessons are drawn from a wide range of sources, including members of an Australian Mentoring and Training Team (MTT), the Philippines Joint Special Operations Group (JSOG), the Light Reaction Regiment (LRR) and the Marine Special Operations Group (MARSOG).
Marawi: A Vicious Urban Battle
On 23 May 2017, security forces from the Philippines conducted a raid in Marawi to capture an insurgent named Isnilon Hapilon—the former leader of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and self-proclaimed Emir of IS in East Asia. The forces that conducted the raid reported much tougher resistance than expected. The insurgents were rapidly reinforced and quickly revealed extensive defensive preparations throughout the city—concealed routes, hidden ammunition and arms caches and an almost doctrinal urban defensive plan. The raid was repulsed, and by the end of the day the so- called Islamic State in the Philippines (IS-P) had triggered their long-laid plans to dominate the city.
Martial law was declared by President Rodrigo Duterte, and a five-month urban campaign to regain the city commenced. The battle was pitched against a well-resourced, sophisticated enemy that had the ‘home ground advantage’. Extensive preparations had been conducted throughout the city, and an intense, protracted and close-quarters battle, the likes of which has not been seen in the region in decades, became the only way to destroy the enemy and recapture Marawi.3 On 23 October, following 153 days of war, this gruelling mission was achieved.
The costs of the Battle of Marawi were high. Opinions on infrastructure damage vary, but aerial imagery indicates that huge swathes of the city have been devastated by the fighting—the mass destruction flattening entire city blocks. The World Bank estimates it may take two decades to restore Marawi to its original condition. However, the true price of the battle is that paid by the people of Marawi and the lives of those fighting in it. 165 members of the AFP were killed in action, with over 1,000 injured. Some reports indicate over 1,000 insurgents were killed in the siege, which is reported to have also taken the lives of 47 civilians. The fighting drove over 400,000 people from their homes.
The Fundamentals of Close Combat
Fundamentally, the Battle of Marawi was a systematic clearance by individuals and small teams. This was necessary because of the presence of trapped civilians and hostages. While the AFP had access to overwhelming offensive support, armoured fighting vehicles, unmanned aerial surveillance and close air support platforms, these tools alone could not eliminate the terrorists, especially as firepower was restricted to limit civilian casualties and avoid destroying mosques and other key buildings. Despite the great destruction wrought by close air support and indirect fires, the city was not liberated until every building had been deliberately cleared by ‘the man [and teams] on the scene with a gun’.4 This battle demonstrated that intense close combat remains the only way to achieve decisive urban victory.
Adaptation of jungle combat skills to achieve expertise in combat shooting, battlefield fitness, ingenious improvisation and small team tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) were crucial factors in the AFP’s eventual success. Furthermore, the Battle of Marawi demonstrated that it takes a high standard of command, control and communications (C3), combat trauma management and interoperability with supporting arms, such as joint fires and engineers, to fight and win in the urban environment. All this took time to learn and develop. The observations made by the Operation AUGURY Land Mentoring and Training Team (MTT-L) support this. The most regular feedback received after the combat shooting, urban tactics, joint fire, counter improvised explosive device (CIED), urban breaching and combat trauma management training, was that these skills would have allowed the AFP to win more rapidly and with fewer casualties.5
An up-armoured combat engineer bulldozer clears a path through urban debris during the battle for Marawi. Image courtesy Armed Forces of the Philippines
While the AFP had access to enabling technologies and supporting arms such as indirect fire, close air support and armoured fighting vehicles, the battle was ultimately won by room-to-room, house-to-house fighting. In a fight where minimising civilian casualties and collateral damage is a critical factor, no amount of firepower can substitute for intimate, discriminate, and precise application of force.
Combat shooting, battlefield fitness, small team TTPs and battle craft are vital. Above all else, to prevail in an urban fight in accordance with its core values, the Australian Army must have the ability to deliver small combined-arms teams to the fight that are capable of shooting faster and more accurately than their enemy out to 200 metres by day and by night; can dominate and control complex spaces more rapidly and with fewer casualties; and can operate seamlessly with other small teams or supporting elements in joint and coalition environments. The Marawi experience suggests that such small teams, operating seamlessly alongside engineers, artillery and armour—as well as combat medics and military police—fighting as combined-arms sections, platoons, combat teams and battle groups, are the key to success.
Owning the Night
Both the AFP and the insurgents had very limited access to night fighting equipment (NFE); indeed, the only forces well equipped with NFE were those from Armed Forces of the Philippines Special Operations Command (AFPSOCOM) and MARSOG. This meant the majority of forces were static at night and would occupy urban defensive positions until dawn. Early warning devices would be improvised by placing tins and cans on lines of string or by shattering fluorescent globes on likely enemy approaches—the clanging of the tins or the crunch of the broken glass would compromise any would-be attacker.
However, Filipino special forces with access to NFE were extremely effective when operating at night. They were able to cross obstacles considered risky during daylight and could conduct assaults on enemy positions to take advantage of the overwhelming overmatch in night fighting ability. They could then path-find for conventional forces, which had little to no NFE, to secure new battle positions. The Australian Army should seek to leverage its significant advantages in night fighting equipment and ability. All elements of the combined-arms team must seek complete fluency in all skill sets between day and night and become comfortable with operating primarily in the dark. In a context similar to Marawi, the ability to dominate the enemy by day and night, and to strike them when they are most vulnerable, could prove decisive. This requires agile and stealthy forces that are comfortable in conditions of significant fatigue. Non-verbal communication by night should be second nature but takes time and practice to master; basic skills such as small team room entry drills or corner-and-partition drills become significantly more complex once combatants cannot rely on peripheral vision. Reverse-cycle operations can and should be the norm,6 and combined-arms units should seek to train in reverse-cycle conditions as often as practicable. This will require a shake-up of ‘traditional’ training and barracks training approaches, and commanders will need to adopt much more flexibility around start and finish times during the working day.
Reverse-cycle training can be resource neutral and employed in a standard barracks working week. Training can be in a purpose-built facility or even just in the facilities around barracks. The only requirements are clear, targeted training outcomes (not just training for the sake of being there) and committed, creative leaders.
Use of Armour
Marawi highlighted the vital importance of having armoured fighting vehicles (AFV) fighting alongside the infantry and engineers in the urban environment. The Marawi experience suggests that, in such a contested, formidable and lethal environment, armour saves lives. Wherever possible, infantry platoons advanced with armour in intimate support, bounding forward to clear the way and allowing the AFV to move forward to a support by fire (SBF) position. Engineers breached with armour in close support wherever possible, and the AFVs were also used to support casualty extraction. Despite the obvious advantage of the mobility, firepower and protection that AFVs afforded the AFP, their mobility limitations became clear: even in undamaged areas, narrow, labyrinthine streets, like those found in most Indo-Pacific cities will pose significant limitations for AFV employment. Particularly given the overwhelming destruction in Marawi, there was limited scope to employ AFV in many areas until bulldozers could clear corridors and fire positions for them. This was typically conducted using a ‘leapfrog’ technique, which is described below.
Armour supporting infantry is highly desirable in the urban environment, but its limitations must be considered and significant interoperability training must occur beforehand. The time it takes to refine TTPs and develop the trust and understanding required to fight in combined-arms teams means that infantry and armour should train together in this environment regularly. Furthermore, AFV will be unable to access key areas in the urban environment without access to bulldozers or other mobility support. Urban mobility training for armour and engineers should also be prioritised.
Command and Control
Due to difficulty in coordination and inexperience in orchestrating effects in the urban environment, command and control was highly centralised. Furthermore, because urban fighting was new to the AFP, rapid operational tempo and simultaneous action were nearly impossible to achieve. The most effective way to achieve tempo in this situation would be the orchestration of multiple effects simultaneously rather than in sequence. For example, walking suppressive fire up, or across, a building in support of the break-in is much more effective than cutting fire completely. Training commanders to favour simultaneous action over linear effects planning will support achievement of tempo at all levels. This can be achieved by enabling shared understanding (using a Common Operating Picture, such as that provided by a Battlespace Management System, down to small team level) combined with clearly understood and thoroughly rehearsed control measures. Furthermore, continued emphasis on developing junior leaders must be maintained. Having platoons and sections capable of conducting simultaneous activity without micromanagement increases the higher commander’s ability to layer multiple effects and achieve decision superiority. The Australian Army’s focus on small team leadership and developing tactical acumen is well directed and should continue to be a fundamental line of effort.
Use of CS Grenades
Some infantry battalions used tear gas grenades extensively in Marawi to clear urban areas occupied by civilian hostages. This was conducted to counter IS hostage-taking tactics. Rather than throwing a fragmentation grenade into a room before a clearance, they would use CS grenades to incapacitate the enemy combatant inside, conduct a room entry wearing gas masks, and kill the enemy without killing, or grievously wounding, the hostage.
If faced with a similar situation to Marawi, it is highly likely that teams from the conventional fighting echelons of the Australian Army would have to conduct combat clearance in the vicinity of, or to rescue, hostages. Close combatants should conduct training serials where urban combat clearance is practised while using gas masks. This will help prepare the infantry, and close combat enablers, for the type of urban fighting where the use of fragmentation grenades is inappropriate. It will also allow soldiers to identify, through ‘learning by doing’, the best employment of CS grenades to support urban clearance, as well as problems surrounding positive identification of targets using chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defence (CBRN-D) equipment. International law regarding the use of chemical agents in combat may be problematic here. The use of CS grenades may breach international treaties where the opponent is a state actor, although battles such as the Battle of Hue in Vietnam indicate that there is precedent in the use of such agents. The legitimate use of such agents remains contentious, and there may be additional ambiguity when non-state actors are involved.
Targeting Withdrawal Routes
In Marawi the enemy used covered withdrawal routes, or ‘ratlines’ (holes dug through walls or floors; or concealed passageways through basements) to enable movement to and from battle positions or to move to depth if a battle position was at risk of being overrun. When these were discovered, the AFP would either have combat engineers collapse the tunnels on top of the enemy or use tear gas to flush the lines out. If using smoke or tear gas, they would concurrently send a drone above the entrance, as they could often find the other end of the ratline by watching for the smoke escaping from the far end.
In this situation, close combatants could adopt a similar tactic. CS or smoke grenades would be used to flush out any enemy tunnels discovered; concurrently, by deploying an unmanned aerial system (UAS) to observe the area and having an interdiction force ready, an infantry-led call sign could rapidly mark the exit to a ratline with the escaping smoke, identify it with UAS, and interdict any fleeing enemy combatants. This would need to be carefully coordinated, but this tactic would mitigate the high risk of methodical and time-consuming subterranean, or ‘tunnel rat’, clearances. Such subterranean withdrawal routes could be readily rigged with improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or targeted by an ambush.
Ground-Up Innovation
In the Battle of Marawi, the marines of the Philippine Marine Corps (PMC) had little to no access to smoke grenades. This posed a significant problem for mobility, primarily due to the sniper threat down fire lanes (streets and alleys in particular). As a result, innovation was required to deny enemy observation and enable urban manoeuvre. To conduct crossings, the marines of MBLT10 would carry a long piece of fabric the height of a marine. They attached one end of the fabric to one side of the obstacle and had a runner sprint across the fire lane trailing the sheet behind him. He would then tie it off, taut, to the other side of the obstacle. This then enabled the entire platoon team or combat team to cross with relative impunity, especially as the resource-poor enemy would not risk wasting ammunition by ‘drake-shooting’7 at the sheet.
The above vignette illustrates the value of innovation in combat. Due to the operational realities in Marawi (a resource-poor enemy, limited friendly resupply and a significant number of enemy snipers), the ‘sheet method’ for conducting urban obstacle crossing was an expediency borne of necessity. The example highlighted above illustrates the value of allowing bottom-up innovation to drive TTPs; finding localised solutions, not necessarily aligned with doctrine, and giving frontline troops the latitude to be creative. The Australian Army has a rich tradition of such innovation in combat, harking back to the famous drip rifles of the Gallipoli campaign.8
Clinging to orthodox solutions would have made the AFP predictable and targetable. Building teams where members feel empowered to be involved in problem solving, where critical thinking is the norm and where making honest mistakes in training is accepted and encouraged, is the first step in this process. This is easier said than done and needs to be driven by leaders at all levels. However, if correctly implemented, it will result in a force characterised by agility and innovation rather than tradition and predictability.
Use of Unmanned Aerial Systems
During the Battle of Marawi, both the AFP and the enemy used drones extensively. Drones were employed down to platoon team/combat team level to observe both friendly troop movement and enemy infiltration and exfiltration routes, movement and locations.
Both forces employed inexpensive, off-the-shelf varieties, as each side would prioritise shooting down one another’s aerial surveillance assets. The AFP used a rudimentary marking system to identify friendly unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to ensure they did not accidentally shoot down those from neighbouring call signs.
This would suggest that, at the tactical level, commercial drone technology can be extremely effective at complementing the in-service, encrypted UAS fleet. The consequences of losing a Black Wasp or Hornet in combat would be significantly greater than losing an AUD$400 off-the-shelf drone that is essentially disposable—the loss of a store-bought drone would not risk losing any controlled or encrypted technology. Any operational security issues would be mitigated by the fact that the information developed from these off-the-shelf drones is purely tactical and, at best, relevant for a very short period of time. Furthermore, it would probably allow frontline units to replace damaged or capture UASs far more quickly than unit requisition. The other key lesson for the Australian Army is that close combat forces must be adept at using UASs and that there is benefit from increasing exposure to, and understanding of, these technologies.
Close Air Support
Extraordinary firepower was employed to enable the seizure of Marawi. One company from the 2nd Infantry Division employed over 10,000 mortar rounds in three months. Offensive support came primarily in the form of close air support (CAS), intimate support from mortars, and employing 105 millimetre field guns in a direct fire role. The AFP was very effective in employing CAS to enable house-to-house clearances. These strikes were highly effective on the first pass of the aircraft, when surprise could be maintained.9 However, the enemy became aware of the CAS schedule, and this undermined the effectiveness of the CAS. Once they identified a CAS platform in the air, there was a marked decrease in enemy movement in the open as they waited for the asset to retire and refuel. This limited the effectiveness of the aircraft in both a CAS and an Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconniassance (ISR) role and, due to the limited number of aircraft and crews available to the Philippines Air Force (PAF), this meant that, once the air window was closed, the insurgents could be confident in acting and/ or attacking without concerning themselves with air attack for some time. Planners should be alert to the enemy’s tendency to monitor CAS flights, especially if continuous air cover is not available. The number of sorties available, the on-station time and the time required to transit and rearm/ refuel before returning to the area of operations should be considered Essential Elements of Friendly Information that need to be protected from the enemy.
Control Measures
Marker panels were found to be the most effective CAS Forward Line of Own Troops (FLOT) marker. However, the enemy was extremely active in employing deception to confuse aircraft and degrade the effectiveness of CAS. The enemy employed dummy marker panels and smoke, and it probably had the benefit of being able to monitor the air-to-ground communication being conducted over un-encrypted Motorola radios. This made identifying friend or foe extremely difficult and greatly increased the time taken for CAS aircraft to provide support.
FLOT marking techniques for aircraft need to be understood by all soldiers, as qualified joint fire observers/joint terminal attack controllers may not be in a position to conduct the mark themselves. These marks need to be unmistakable as to their origin and easily verified by the aircraft. Clear, common doctrine for the employment of joint fires and a thorough understanding of necessary control measures are critical. Close combatants need to routinely train with their joint fire enablers, and rehearsals of such measures need to occur regularly at the tactical level.
Direct Fire
During the Battle of Marawi the Filipino gunners used their 105 millimetre guns in a direct fire role to penetrate the thick concrete walls prevalent in Marawi. This technique was employed on multiple occasions, with the infantry platoon commander involved directly liaising with the gun crew rather than ‘calling for fire’. While direct fire would be difficult for Royal Australian Artillery (RAA) 155 millimetre M777s due to their size and weight, direct fire remains part of RAA doctrine. An understanding of the application of light and medium guns used in this role may prove useful for future urban conflict. Furthermore, the battle demonstrated that the utility of shoulder- fired high-explosive (HE) weaponry, with munitions optimised for the urban environment, including breaching rounds, cannot be overstated. The AFP did not have these for the majority of the five months. Instead, they used their limited shoulder-fired weaponry with unsuited munitions (anti-tank (AT) and high-explosive anti-tank (HEAT) munitions are not suited to breaching a hole in reinforced concrete) or used heavy machine guns (HMGs) (12.7 millimetre) to ‘bore’ a point of entry (discussed below).
Explosive Breaching
During the Battle of Marawi there was an extraordinary requirement for explosive breaching to support infantry platoon movement. The enemy created complex obstacles in which IEDs were incorporated into rubble obstacles along AFP avenues of approach (AA) and covered with sniper fire to deny access without sustaining casualties. The AFP response was to generate new AAs through buildings which enabled cover from sniper fire and bypass of IEDs. Initially, mechanical breaching and breaching by fire were both attempted by manoeuvre elements with mixed results. Infantry platoons also used HMGs to bore a point of entry in some buildings when engineers were unavailable.
However, many of the buildings within the city were constructed of thick, heavily reinforced concrete. As such, breaches were often required to be conducted in two stages: the first stage was an explosive breach to strip away concrete, leaving thick reinforcement bars to be reduced in a second stage. Hydraulic cutters were then used to mechanically reduce the reinforcement before assaulting forces moved in.
In Marawi, structural integrity varied greatly from building to building. Where in one building a given charge type would produce a mouse hole, in another it could cause significant damage or completely level the structure. Charge selection was described as a ‘dark art’ due to the unpredictable nature of the structures, and structural assessment skills were identified as a shortfall. Safety distances were refined through trial and error and balanced against the tactical scenario. Combat engineers (CEs) were often only able to move to a room or building to the rear; in the classic ‘hugging the belt’ technique used by many insurgents, the enemy continually pushed forward to remain within friendly artillery safety distances. There will be the same requirement for significant amounts of explosive breaching in future urban conflict. There will never be enough engineers to support simultaneous manoeuvre. A priority should be placed on light urban breaching skills to enable the infantry to carry and employ their own demolitions.
Australian Army soldiers demonstrate building clearance techniques during urban combat training. Image courtesy Armed Forces of the Philippines
Rubble and Obstacle Clearance
The enemy placed obstacles, such as parked cars, to delay or deny likely friendly AAs. However, as the battle ensued, the damage caused by CAS and artillery fire created major obstacles to mounted movement and disrupted dismounted manoeuvre. CEs adopted a mounted clearance technique where an M113 would move to the FLOT and occupy an SBF position. An up-armoured bulldozer and guide would then move up and clear a bound of 10 to 50 metres depending on terrain. The bulldozer would then reverse out and allow the M113 to move forward into the newly cleared area and adopt SBF from that position, and to provided security for the next bound. This method was described as ‘leapfrogging’. Due to the sniper threat, using dismounted guides was impossible. Instead, guides would use a UAV in conjunction with radio communications in order to remain within cover. Interoperability training between infantry, engineers and armour is essential to ensure that the trust and TTPs required are established.
Collapsed Structure Rescue
Some AFP CEs had received critical training in collapsed structure rescue. This was found to be an invaluable skill set, and it was recommended that all CEs be trained in this as part of lead-up training for any future conflicts in the urban environment. While it is possible to use the skill to rescue friendly forces trapped within collapsed structures, this was not required during the Battle of Marawi. The skills were used primarily in a battlefield clearance team (BCT) role to retrieve intelligence and biometrics from enemy corpses within collapsed buildings. Similar training may be a valuable inclusion in engineer training in preparation for future urban warfare.
Snipers
One of the major threats to friendly forces was enemy snipers. The majority of these were not the highly trained and well-equipped snipers common to many armies but instead were closer to what might be better termed ‘marksmen’ or ‘sharpshooters’ engaging at short to medium ranges. Regardless, they exacted a heavy toll on friendly forces and often imposed significant delay on manoeuvre. Although optic sights were found on a limited number of rifles, most of the enemy sniper weapons utilised iron sights. The vast majority of the insurgent snipers were local to the city or region and therefore had an in-depth knowledge of the city layout. Most of their hides and firing positions, often using tall buildings to dominate all approaches, were well thought out and planned prior to the IS-inspired insurgents seizing Marawi. The insurgents would also utilise hostages as human shields to restrict any opportunities that the AFP had to return fire in their hide location.
Enemy snipers utilised loophole shooting (often called ‘murder holes’) to deadly effect. They would position hides overlooking choke points, bridges and obvious AAs with excellent fields of fire or onto killing zones where AFP would traverse or dwell. They would then knock a medium-sized hole in a wall. After that, if possible, they would knock a smaller hole in the adjacent room. From the adjacent room they would often set up their hide, allowing them to engage from depth with relatively good cover from fire and concealment.
This tactic was also utilised in stairwells. Knowing the AFP would have to make entry to clear the building, the enemy snipers would cut a hole through the stairwell and sit off some distance. Once the AFP made entry the enemy sniper would have a clear line of sight to the doorway and stairwell entry, allowing the sniper to score a centre of mass hit. The insurgent snipers also made use of dummy hides to draw out or bait the PMC scout snipers to engage. Quite often the PMC scout snipers would enter counter-sniping battles with the insurgent snipers across roads, city blocks and bridges, with the average engagement distance being 150 to 200 metres.
The enemy is extremely cunning and will adapt their tactics to best target Australian soldiers. Continuous analysis of enemy TTPs and dissemination of this information across the force is important in undermining the enemy’s lethality and survivability. Friendly forces, particularly those most likely to be targeted by enemy snipers, should receive up-to-date information about enemy sniper TTPs and the best way to increase their survivability.
The AFP snipers quickly adapted to enemy tactics and began using loopholes and dummy hides as well. Often one team would act as a ‘tethered goat’ to draw enemy sniper fire while a separate team waited in a concealed hide waiting to engage. The PMC normally work in pairs with mutual support from a regular infantry platoon; however, at Marawi they deployed as a sniper platoon to support major clearance tasks conducted by the dismounted ground forces. One challenge facing the AFP snipers was the enemy’s use of UASs. Enemy snipers regularly flew UASs around the battle space to likely counter-sniper locations in order to identify the AFP hides. They also faced the challenge of fleeting opportunity—exposure time of enemy targets was typically very short and at short to medium ranges of unknown distance. The AFP snipers had to learn techniques to enable rapid, accurate engagement of threats at uncertain distances. Finally, insurgents often spent much of the night taking drugs such as ‘shabu’ (methamphetamine). The PMC scout snipers took advantage of this, as well as the limited enemy NFE, to move into and occupy sniper hides under the cover of darkness.
Improving hide construction is the most effective way to undermine the enemy’s use of UASs to compromise hide sites. Deliberate training for fleeting engagements of enemy targets at uncertain ranges is critical in preparation for urban counter-sniping. Observation of enemy habits surrounding drug use should be included in planning. Heavy drug use has been a feature in many conflicts the Australian Army has been involved in, including Somalia (khat) and Afghanistan (opioids). Understanding the type, effect and routine of enemy drug use may identify key enemy vulnerabilities or periods of heightened risk.
One of the major challenges faced by the AFP was the severe psychological toll paid by their snipers. This was a widespread phenomenon experienced across multiple units of snipers and sharpshooters. Anecdotal evidence suggests that some individuals personally killed dozens of insurgents. However, in the latter stages of the campaign a number of AFP snipers were unfit to continue fighting due to the psychological toll paid, despite generally having a significant degree of prior combat experience. The implication is that the particular kind of killing involved here may have a different psychological impact.
The Australian Army must prepare snipers for the mental pressure of constant killing at short range. Having world-class infantry and snipers who are able to perform to the highest standards in training is important. However, all close combatants, but especially snipers and marksmen, must also be psychologically prepared for repeated, deliberate killing.
Combat Trauma
The AFP platoons had not conducted extensive training in combat trauma management, and their Role 2 and Role 3 equivalent medical facilities were not accustomed to the very high volume of casualties which can be expected during urban fighting, a significant number of which were non- battle casualties (casualties induced by means other than direct fighting). Medical planners should expect higher rates of casualties than usual when fighting in the urban environment. Furthermore, combat trauma management skills must be trained down to the individual level. Such skills save lives—and instil morale.
The battle also highlighted the sheer number of non-battle injuries in the urban environment and the importance of using protective equipment such as helmets, ballistic eye protection, gloves and body armour. The true value of this equipment was found in protecting combatants from secondary fragmentation, falling debris, hitting their heads while moving and cuts and scrapes which so rapidly become infected in this environment.
Combat Resupply
Ammunition consumption became an issue at the Battle of Marawi in terms of both quantities available at 4th line (bulk ammunition depots) and delivery of ammunition and stores to the forward deployed platoons and companies. The ‘fight light’10 concept dictates that fighting echelons need to be enabled by agile, responsive A and B echelons. All echelons need to work together, learn from each other and trust each other if they are to achieve and maintain an edge over such an adversary.
The Australian Army should focus on delivering realistic training for close logistic support in a contested urban battle space. Delivery of rations, water, fuel and ammunition is essential, but training for forward delivery of key urban stores often does not happen. Who will fill sandbags and with what? How will defensive stores be moved through streets blocked by rubble? It is important to ensure that the Australian Army fully exercises all components of combat service support (CSS). Training should be realistic for every component of the fight, especially in the urban environment, where logistics enablers will have to get much closer to the enemy than they will in rural fighting.
Equipment
Much of the equipment used by the AFP at Marawi was optimised for jungle operations. As a result, they lacked some of the equipment required to operate effectively in an urban environment. For the AFP, the most valuable equipment—other than the platforms used by the combined-arms team and joint fires—was related to individual fighting (body armour and load carriage equipment), personal protection (helmets, ballistic eye protection and fire retardant clothing) and lethality (NFE, weapon ancillaries such as thermal sights and enhanced optics). Furthermore, access to direct fire support weapons, particularly shoulder-fired HE weaponry with multiple munition options, such as breaching munitions and those ideal for firing into enclosed spaces, was also considered a priority.
The Australian Army has addressed some of the equipment issues required to fight and win in the urban environment with recent acquisitions. However, the Australian Army must pursue constant improvement of its equipment to ensure close combatants can rely on both a skills and an equipment advantage.
Conclusion
The lessons learned by the AFP in the Battle of Marawi when fighting a determined, ruthless enemy are invaluable to the Australian Army. This article highlights the key tactical observations of the combat experienced by the AFP fighting in Marawi and suggests the lessons that the Australian Army can draw from these experiences. Consideration of these lessons may inform and improve current approaches to force generation and modernisation of close-combat, combined-arms capabilities. The experiences of the AFP have broad relevance to the Australian Army across a number of corps and disciplines, including close combat, offensive support, mobility and survivability, urban sniping and counter-sniping, and logistics.
The Australian Army must become a force that is expert at urban fighting. Urbanisation trends, as well as the existential reality of conflict amongst people in the place where they live, compels us to be expert at this most difficult of environments. Continued emphasis must be placed on the importance of the individual and small team skill set. For the infantry, combat shooting, small team TTPs, battle craft and battlefield fitness are the four factors that ultimately mean the difference between victory and defeat in this environment. Above all else, the Australian Army must have the ability to deliver small teams to the fight that are capable of shooting faster and more accurately than their enemy; can dominate and control complex spaces more rapidly and with fewer casualties; and can operate seamlessly with other small teams or supporting elements. For armour, engineers and artillery, these factors will be different; however, the requirement for small teams and individuals who can master their respective trades and integrate seamlessly in small combined-arms teams is universal. Such small teams, operating seamlessly alongside engineers, artillery and armour—as well as combat medics and military police—fighting as combined-arms sections, platoons, combat teams and battlegroups, are nearly unbeatable.
By studying the Battle of Marawi closely, the Australian Army will benefit from the hard lessons learned from the AFP. The AFP’s small teams of close combatants were faced with a number of viciously complex problems and showed remarkable adaptability and innovation in solving these under fire. It is highly likely that, in a similar situation, close combatants will encounter the same problems—Islamic terrorists and violent extremists within the Indo-Pacific region will be studying the Battle of Marawi closely, as it is an example of just how brutally effective a relatively small group can be in causing chaos in a city. The Australian Army should identify the key lessons learned from Marawi and implement them within training and modernisation to maximise its ability to operate, fight and win in the urban environment.
Endnotes
- These include, most notably, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), Jemaah Islamiyah’s Mantiqi 3 (where a significant amount of the training and preparation for the October 2002 Bali bombings took place), the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), the Maute Group, and now the Islamic State of the Philippines (IS-P).
- Greg Fealy, 2017, ‘The Battle for Marawi and ISIS in South East Asia’, The Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 23 Aug, at: https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/battle- marawi-isis-southeast-asia/
- Footage of the sheer intensity of the fighting can be found at https://youtu.be/_4zXI0X8Brc
- Rear Admiral C Wylie, US Navy, World War II.
- Department of Defence, Australia, 2017, ‘JTF 629 Graduates First Class in the Philippines’, Defence News, 14 Nov, at: https://news.defence.gov.au/media/stories/jtf-629-graduates- first-class-philippines
- Reverse-cycle operations consist of conducting training or operations by night with a recovery and rest period during the day.
- Firing at likely (but not confirmed) enemy locations.
- Drip rifles were self-firing rifles used at Gallipoli to deceive the Turks during the evacuation of December 1915.
- Surprise was regularly achieved by jet aircraft; however, rotary wing aircraft were unable to achieve the same effect. Furthermore, many structures were found to be impervious to many munitions up to 2,000 pound bombs. As a result, the AFP began targeting the sides of buildings seeking to cause them to collapse.
- ‘Fight light’ is a concept which focuses on minimising the soldier’s load to maximise warfighting capacity. It ‘gets weight off the soldier’s back’. ‘Fight light’ seeks the optimal balance between soldier lethality, mobility, survivability, sustainability and situational awareness.
