Cyber-resilient Supply Chains: Mission Assurance in the Future Operating Environment

Abstract

The mission-oriented performance of digital systems under attack requires an understanding of threat, vulnerabilities and impacts. Australian Army systems are likely to face credible adversaries in the future, capable of attacking digital supply chain systems and degrading the resilience of the overall force. The reality of this future requires capability development efforts now to create a force able to resist cyber-attack on the Defence supply chain and in support of deployed combat forces. The purpose of this paper is to outline the challenges faced by the Australian Army in the future, as they apply to the Defence supply chain, and the threat posed by malicious actors in cyberspace. This paper describes the relationship between digitised supply chains, cyber-resilience, mission assurance and the challenges Army faces in the Future Operating Environment (FOE). Army’s FOE vulnerabilities are classified based on the following: risk management, centralised architecture and data, education and research, system and software obsolescence, IT supply chain, and supply chain design. Further research is recommended to identify mitigations to the vulnerabilities described and a more detailed risk assessment process is suggested as a way forward.

---

Introduction

Supply chains are comprised of ‘flows of materials, goods and information (including money), which pass within and between organisations, linked by a range of tangible and intangible facilitators, including relationships, processes, activities, and integrated information systems’.¹ Army logistics is interlinked with supply chain management and focused on planning and executing the movement and maintenance of military capabilities.² Strategy and logistics are intimately linked.³ The planning, management and delivery of military logistics and supply chain functions across the full range of missions and spectra of conflict requires a secure and connected logistics information system. The vulnerabilities and risks facing supply chains will continue to increase as digitisation expands and the networked force becomes more advanced. The threatcasting report developed for the US Army’s Cyber Institute describes a ‘widening attack plain’ generated by the continuously evolving and increasing attack surface created by cyber-risks combined with more people, targets and threats.⁴ The FOE has a large influence on capability development efforts, to align future force capabilities with resource expenditure and prioritisation in the contemporary environment. The FOE is an attempt to describe the future which the military uses to support force design and capability development decisions.

The mission-oriented performance of digital systems under attack requires an understanding of threat, vulnerabilities and impacts. Australian Army systems are likely to face credible adversaries in the future, capable of attacking digital supply chain systems and degrading the resilience of the overall force. The reality of this future requires capability development efforts now to create a force able to resist cyber-attack on the Defence supply chain and in support of deployed combat forces. The purpose of this paper is to outline the challenges faced by the Australian Army in the future, as they apply to the Defence supply chain, and the threat posed by malicious actors in cyberspace. This paper describes the relationship between digitised supply chains, cyber-resilience, mission assurance and the challenges the Australian Army faces in the FOE. The Australian Army Future Operating Environment Vulnerabilities are classified based on the following: risk management, centralised architecture and data, education and research, system and software obsolescence, IT supply chain, and supply chain design.

Cyberspace and Cyber-Resilience

Cyberspace is the ‘interdependent network of IT infrastructures, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers, and the content that flows across and through these components’.⁵ The security of cyberspace is a critical component of business and the global economy.⁶ Cyber systems provide high levels of efficiency and enable the rapid exchange of data and information in ways that optimise business environments, the control of processes and resource allocation. High levels of efficiency through cyberspace can also introduce vulnerabilities from a variety of sources. This exposure to risk may be amplified by a reduction in the capacity to adapt to unforeseen circumstances.

Cyber-resilience is the ‘persistence under uncertainty of a system’s mission- oriented performance in the face of some set of disturbances that are likely to occur given some specified timeframe’.⁷ Cyber-resilience is also known as ‘assume breach’⁸ and ‘fight through’⁹ which seek to provide assurance through engineering and business solutions. ‘Assume breach’ and ‘fight through’ are both terms that deal with the mission-oriented performance of digital systems under attack. Performance under attack requires an understanding of threat, vulnerabilities and impacts which are dealt with as risk management problems. The risk management of digital systems requires an understanding of how each system supports the broader organisational mission.¹⁰ Mission assurance is defined as ‘operators achieve the mission, continue critical processes, and protect people and assets under internal/external attack (physical and cyber), unforeseen environmental or operational changes, or system malfunction’.¹¹

Cyber-resilience has already been identified as an issue across the Australian Federal Government, as well as an issue in industry. In the 2018 Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) Audit Report of Cyber Resilience, three government agencies were audited including Treasury, National Archives and Geoscience Australia. The audit results aligned with previous cyber security audits which identified:

… relatively low levels of effectiveness of Commonwealth entities in managing cyber risks, with only one of the three audited entities compliant with the Top Four mitigation strategies. None of the three entities had implemented the four non-mandatory strategies in the Essential Eight and were largely at early stages of consideration and implementation. These findings provide further evidence that the implementation of the current framework is not achieving compliance with cyber security requirements and needs to be strengthened.¹²

There is no shortage of guidance (including government assurance, regulations and strategic priorities) regarding cyber-resilience, cyber- security and cyber-threats. A key gap appears to be the level of resourcing and focus allocated to not only adhering or being compliant with the guidance, but clearly understanding the risks. The continuing digitisation of society and the military means that these risks and vulnerabilities will only continue to expand and broaden. The increased interest and resources that will progressively be applied by the Australian Government and Department of Defence to this problem will undoubtedly create a shift in vulnerabilities over time. However, the adversaries in this environment have demonstrated themselves to be agile, well-resourced and innovative in developing new approaches to undermine cyber-security efforts. As a result, this paper has adopted a forward-thinking view and applied the Australian Army FOE framework to consider the relevant vulnerabilities Army must address.

The Future Operating Environment

The nature of war is enduring, as a human and societal contest of wills, a ‘form of armed politics… and politics is about influencing and controlling people and perceptions’.¹³ However, the increasing desire to embed digital systems within military forces and their platforms, to obtain a competitive advantage on the battlefield, potentially increases the vulnerabilities of military forces to cyber-attack. Whilst the ends remain the same, the ways and means by which future combat will be resolved is likely to significantly change over time.¹⁴

The emerging maturity of artificial intelligence and machine learning technologies combined with the Internet of Things (IoT), drones and robotics provides a broad range of potential developments in the FOE. Global supply chains offer potential for significant change, as ‘the network-based nature of the industry provides a natural framework for implementing and scaling AI, amplifying the human components of highly organised global supply chains’.¹⁵ These technologies are double-edged swords, allowing attackers a host of options including hybrid and blended attacks, the use of AI to support targeting and speed up attacks, and the weaponisation of data.¹⁶

The Future Land Warfare Report 2014 describes five interlinked meta- trends termed Crowded, Connected, Lethal, Collective and Constrained.¹⁷ The following sections provide an overview of each of these meta-trends and relevance based on a global military supply chain.

A Crowded Environment

Migration and shifts in global urban demographics has led to increasing urbanisation, particularly in littoral environments. Global military supply chains will need to have the capacity to support operations in high density urban terrain with amphibious capabilities. The potential for military forces to operate in large cities and within civilian populations will force the engagement with different organisations and increased interoperability.¹⁸ The scale of logistics required in modern warfare is vast. For example, logistics support is required to supply the individual weapon systems, in addition to life support functions, as well as potentially supporting displaced civilian populations in conjunction with Non-Government Organisations (NGO) and the civil sector. Civilian partners enable supply chains. However, the increased interdependencies in the environment increase risk whilst the scale of the crowded environment reduces the capacity for redundant systems to respond to network failures.

A Connected Environment

The connected environment refers to the ‘propensity of global economic, social and communications systems to become increasingly interlinked. Connectivity will continue to be facilitated by global telecommunications network and ubiquitous telecommunications technology enabling near instantaneous communications’.¹⁹

Autonomous vehicles and machine intelligence of the future may fundamentally alter how supply chains operate and use their integrated data, systems and assets. The ability to implement heavily automated global supply chains is likely to further increase efficiency and lower cost.²⁰ 3D printers could further enable supply chain agility, allowing equipment and spare parts to be printed locally. These technologies will change the risks associated with supply chain management and the ability for cyber-attacks to disrupt supply chains.²¹

The introduction of Health & Usage Monitoring System (HUMS) has been embraced by militaries around the world for many years. These efforts will increase as real-time data becomes available through Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP). Building upon these capabilities, the prevalence of IoT technologies and embedding of devices in equipment, platforms and even people is likely to continue the networked-effect of Metcalfe’s law.²²

Industrial equipment and critical infrastructure will become increasingly dependent upon Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems.²³ These systems provide opportunities to optimise the effectiveness and efficiency of a variety of critical systems, increasing safety and reliability while decreasing the error and cost associated with human operators. However, SCADA systems are susceptible to attack, as their design generally does not consider security as a priority, and the systems are generally poorly maintained and patched from an information security perspective. The industrial control system market is inhibited by the focus on proprietary components and systems, making upgrades technically prohibitive and costly. A classic example of a cyber-attack on SCADA is the Stuxnet virus targeting Siemens systems.²⁴ Most SCADA systems are reliant on Demilitarised Zones (DMZs) on networks and air gaps between networks. Despite this, there are many SCADA systems on https://www.shodan.io/ that are susceptible to direct cyber-attack.

Automotive manufacturing is leading to the development of electronic control units to replace systems that were previously manually managed. The cyber-attack surface of digitally-enabled vehicles and self-driving cars is increasing significantly and with limited transparency on the long- term security risks associated with targeted cyber-attacks on vehicle systems.²⁵ Even older vehicles with Vehicle Engine Management Systems and HUMS are potentially susceptible to simpler cyber-attacks using logic bombs to disable the vehicle. A sustained or coordinated cyber-attack on future transportation systems could result in a global supply chain impact, particularly as self-driving vehicles increase in prevalence.

Drones and robots are other systems with large attack surfaces that could come under cyber-attack. The future warehouse is largely robotic, meaning that a well-timed attack could divert critical equipment from their intended location or alternatively a denial-of-service attack on supporting, connected infrastructure combined with an attack on the relevant ERP systems could result in a standstill, requiring human intervention. The lack of appropriately trained and qualified personnel to support a large-scale industrial shutdown of robotic systems, with the attendant reliance on paper-based transactions and mobile phones, would cripple a modern global supply chain until the digital systems were fixed or replaced.

A Lethal Environment

The violent and chaotic nature of warfare is the antithesis of efficiency and automation sought by modern global supply chains. However, many actions that seek to degrade global supply chains to support military operations are likely to occur outside of the lethal environment. Grey zones provide an asymmetric area of operations focused on the legal ambiguity surrounding sovereignty, the rule of non-intervention, requirement for attribution and the use of force as they are defined under International Humanitarian Law.²⁶ Grey zones are one such environment where cyber-attacks can target specific systems in ways that lethal actions cannot. The combination of kinetic and non-kinetic actions is likely to increase the lethality of military operations by degrading the overall functionality, efficiency and effectiveness of the over system of systems.

The ability to kill a system through non-kinetic means, such as a cyber- attack, combined with the increasing availability of precision weapon systems to state and non-state actors means that critical logistic systems can be targeted and neutralised in new and innovative ways. For example, fuel systems can be attacked throughout the supply chain from the refinery to the final delivery point through contamination, disruption of computer systems regulating pumps and storage systems, or by physical destruction. Although many of these supply chain systems are analogue in the contemporary environment, with the introduction of ERP systems and the push to automation, they will become increasingly connected and targetable. Even if such systems are not capable of direct interdiction through cyber-attack, their status as a component of a wider supply chain is likely to be observable as part of a common operating picture. If the adversary can gain access to the data which displays the supply chain and its status, lethal fires can be directed to degrade the effectiveness of the entire supply chain, rather than simply used to target parts of the supply chain that are readily accessible or vulnerable.

Cyber-attacks on global supply chains enable a military force to gain an advantage in a lethal environment, as part of an effects-based operational approach. The cyber-attack itself is not necessarily lethal. However, if a cyber-attack can degrade the effectiveness of a military force and potentially even reduce the functionality of precision weapons and targeting systems, or reduce the availability of fuel and medical supplies, the combat and operating environment will become more lethal for the force that lacks resilience and is dependent on compromised systems.

A Collective Environment

According to the Future Land Warfare Report 2014, the term ‘collective’ describes ‘a security or burden sharing arrangement in which parties cooperate to form a cogent total response to common threats and breaches of the prevailing order’.²⁷ The collective environment consists of the integration of supply chain systems. In this context, the collective environment enables ‘the synergy of intra- and inter-company business processes with the aim of optimising the overall business process of the enterprise’.²⁸ This collective environment should be agile, lean and resilient.

A Constrained Environment

‘Land force operations in the FOE will be affected by the ongoing major changes to Australia’s economic, demographic and social environment.’²⁹ The constrained environment as it relates to global supply chains is best encapsulated by fiscal constraints and workforce pressures. Fiscal constraints will drive the desire to develop efficient global supply chains with minimal waste. Although the need for redundancy and resilience will be understood by Defence Leaders, the realities of fiscal constraints may prevent redundant systems from being developed and maintained in such a way that they are truly capable of managing a sustained and sophisticated attack.

Business cases for large investments, such as ERPs, are likely to focus on efficiency and day-to-day transactional business to justify their high upfront costs. A focus on efficiency further reduces the capacity to make an effective argument for investment in redundancy and risk mitigation strategies. The focus on day-to-day transactional business may also lead to an increasing disparity between the supply chain military backbone and deployed operational forces.

Workforce pressures are likely to lead to increasing investment in automation, AI and robotics. These investments will fundamentally change the ways and means by which supply chains will operate and lead to an increased attack surface for malicious actors. Diminishing workforce capacity is likely to reduce the resilience of organisational responses if critical systems are successfully compromised. More specifically, an appropriately skilled workforce is increasingly difficult for the military to attract and retain, given the requirement for Australian citizens with appropriate security clearances coupled with the appropriate training and experience to manage complex technologies. The exponential growth in automation, AI and robotic technologies across various industries results in a small pool of resources from which to draw upon to deliver sovereign, digitally-enabled, military global supply chains.

Australian Army Future Operating Environment Vulnerabilities

The Australian Army future operating environment vulnerabilities have been grouped into the categories and are discussed in detail below.

Risk Management Vulnerabilities

Risk management can be improved by understanding the key issues and methods available to manage the links between risks, impacts and the relationship of supply chain resilience across global supply chains.³⁰ An understanding of the system of systems, connections across the value chain, direct/indirect links to business and mission outcomes will facilitate risk assessments and transparency. However, for these activities to be meaningful there is also a requirement for skilled and experienced risk practitioners who not only understand the global supply chain but also cyber vulnerabilities. In the event of a successful cyber-attack, an organisation needs to be able to clearly identify what its mission critical functions are and how operations can continue despite the cyber-attack. For each mission critical function, the organisation needs to define minimum acceptable service levels and how to sustain functions during a cyber-attack.

Centralised Architecture and Data Vulnerabilities

Security architectural decisions have long-term implications for the Australian military supply chain and how it works with global supply chains. For example, the decision to implement an ERP seeks to centralise the control of supply chain data, moving from a variety of different technology solutions to one single system that optimises integration with a single system provider. ERP has been highlighted as one of two of the most significant hazards that could potentially compromise a military supply chain, along with the introduction of sabotaged or counterfeit components into supply chain inventory.³¹

The alternative to an ERP implementation is a blockchain implementation, which has an entirely different philosophical paradigm. Whilst an ERP centralises, a blockchain decentralises. Hybrid approaches are possible but at their core the two alternatives – ERP or blockchain – have practical and philosophical limitations which should be considered during a supply chain’s architectural design.

Blockchain enables a peer-to-peer network to manage a transactional ledger through synchronised states, using cryptographic hash functions and digital signatures. Blockchains provide a degree of trust across a network, based on the principle of consensus and either proof-of-work or byzantine fault tolerance. The sort of implementation relevant to a military global supply chain is not a magic bullet to cyber-attack. Permissioned blockchain ‘requires careful planning and governance to establish the parties participating in the consensus process. Without proper governance, there may be a possibility of politically centralising some of the key functionality of the blockchain, limiting its capabilities, and providing a false sense of security’.³²

The difference between the centralised and decentralised approaches depends on the use case and view of the organisation. For an organisation such as the Department of Defence, with a focus on efficiency and management of Commonwealth funds, an ERP is a logical solution. However, for a deployed force against an adversary targeting data centres and seeking to break communication systems, a blockchain-like solution with best-of-breed and stove-piped systems may be more survivable and offer greater utility. Therefore, a hybrid approach could be viable to secure deployed forces and extended supply and value chains globally, creating trust between members of the supply chain network who otherwise may not have a mechanism for establishing the same degree of trust. However, blockchain implementations rely on a distributed model which does not heavily favour one party or provide one member of the chain too much control. The use of a blockchain solution in conjunction with an ERP across a military supply chain is an unresolved proposition.

Education and Research Vulnerabilities

The development of well-trained and experienced cyber-security professionals is one part of the challenge. Finding supply chain experts who also understand and can contribute to cyber-security and resilience is another critical part of addressing the problem. The conduct of exercises and collective training events is a critical part of building a trained and capable military workforce, ready to respond to a global supply chain system under cyber-attack. Simulations that provide a capacity to plan and potentially prevent successful cyber-attack, as well as educate cyber-defenders on mission critical functions and business imperatives, is another important part of preparing for the FOE.

Organisations should encourage targeted research and provide appropriate funding to subject matter experts and leverage leading practice approaches and techniques, and further develop detailed models for cyber-resilience.³³ Rigorous statistical causal modelling is recommended to support risk management and the understanding of risk management practices across global supply chains.

Limited data is currently available to support detailed analysis of military global supply chains and the impact, or even incidents, of cyber-attacks. Without adequate data, risk assessments must be based on expertise which is difficult to develop, or through supposition based on anecdote. The development of data could occur through data collection efforts across government and in conjunction with vendors and suppliers, or through simulation modelling (although the limitations of such models would need to be clearly captured).

System and Software Obsolescence Vulnerabilities

The US DoD has reported:

 … in typically long DoD acquisition processes, approximately 70 percent of electronics in a weapons system are obsolete or no longer in production prior to system fielding. The Department’s mechanisms for tracking inventory obsolescence and vulnerabilities in microelectronic parts are inadequate. Microelectronics components are likely to become obsolete repeatedly during the weapons system lifecycle. Efforts to track component obsolescence lack oversight at a Department-wide level.³⁴

Obsolete systems expose organisations and their networks to a range of potential attacks as well as making easier targets for an attacker due to the volume of open source information and potential zero days available.

Obsolete systems also reduce the capacity to integrate global supply chains by reducing the capacity to exchange data, reducing available functionality, increasing the reliance on custom solutions and increasing the necessity to prevent outgoing and incoming connections as a security measure.

The rapid development of new software systems and the introduction of increasingly complex and interconnected systems can create vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities are further complicated by the customisation often required and/or prescribed by large organisations. Up-to-date and ongoing software patch management is necessary. The management of software patching is complicated by the fragility of production environments where a multitude of applications and supporting packages must interact without causing conflicts or catastrophic failure. In addition, the emergence of IoT, drones, robotics and engine management systems create a reliance on vendors and contract managers to provide mechanisms to update software systems without providing attackers an additional attack vector.

IT Supply Chain Vulnerabilities

The supply chain includes the procurement and provision of computers, IT equipment and their components. Concerns about supply chain vulnerabilities within the IT sector have driven the Australian government to ban Huawei technologies from the National Broadband Network (NBN) and to consider similar bans for 5G networks. However, such a broad attempt to secure vulnerable supply chains only considers one part of one vector for attack, which is the reason that some other countries have avoided blanket bans on technology developers. Supply chain attacks do not need to originate with the manufacturer. Supply chain integrity can be compromised at many points. For example, the National Security Agency (NSA) has been reported to have intercepted US-made networking equipment for intelligence gathering.³⁵

The IT Supply Chain is not restricted to hardware. ‘Participation in the software supply chain is global, and knowledge of who has touched each specific product or service may not be visible to others in the chain… each of these indirect suppliers can insert defects for future exploitation.’³⁶ Software has its own lifecycle and supply chain which includes: the various code components developed by programmers, the development and code packages the programmers utilise, the development environment where the code is produced, the compilers, and the enterprise production environment where the code is finally deployed. Software can be compromised at any point in this value chain. ‘No amount of source-level verification or scrutiny will protect you from using untrusted code.’³⁷ The most effective method for securing software is to provide appropriate governance and security throughout its lifecycle and value chain. Supply chain contamination and/or sabotage has been highlighted as one of two of the most significant hazards that has the potential to compromise the military supply chain.³⁸

Supply Chain Design

The introduction of an integrated supply chain information system and embedded business processes requires a detailed understanding of the implications on supply chain design. Global supply chains are complex. Integrating into a global supply chain including external partners, vendors and suppliers can have fundamental implications on supply chain design and business practices. Supply chain practices need to be agile to accommodate new technologies and new suppliers. Typically supply chain policies and processes are strictly applied and irregularly reviewed and/or updated and do not align with leading industry practices. Across the end-to-end supply chain, there are constant changes in technology, partnerships and processes. Continuous review and improvement is required to keep up with the broader supply chain, ensuring that lessons learned across the organisation and external parties are included in process and policy updates.

The design of supply chain interfaces, including the mechanisms that allow information and physical items to be exchanged, can change the practices within an organisation and the risks inherent in the supply chain. Supply chains can be designed to be more resilient and capable of sustaining services whilst under cyber-attack if the design of that supply chain has incorporated the appropriate risk mitigations.

Summary

This paper has described the challenges faced by the Australian Army in the future, as they apply to the Defence supply chain, and the threat posed by malicious actors in cyberspace. The relationship between digitised supply chains, cyber-resilience, mission assurance and the challenges the Australian Army faces in the FOE have been discussed. The Australian Army Future Operating Environment Vulnerabilities have been classified based on the following: risk management, centralised architecture and data, education and research, system and software obsolescence, IT supply chain, and supply chain design. This paper has adopted a forward-thinking view and applied the Australian Army FOE framework to consider the relevant vulnerabilities Army must address.

Further research is recommended to identify mitigations to the vulnerabilities described and a more detailed risk assessment process is suggested as a way forward.

Endnotes

---

1. Donald Waters, Global Logistics: New Directions in Supply Chain Management, (Kogan Page Publishers, 2010).
2. Commonwealth Government of Australia, Land Warfare Doctrine 4-0 Logistics 2018, (Department of Defence, 2018), 9.
3. Nathan Brodsky, Logistics in the National Defense, (US Marine Corps), 315.
4. Brian David Johnson, A Widening Attack Plain – Threatcasting Report for the Army Cyber Institute, (Army Cyber Institute, 2017), 6.
5. Department of Defense, US Army Doctrine JP3-12, (Department of Defense, 2013).
6. Commonwealth Government of Australia, Australia’s Cyber Security Strategy 2016, (Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2016).
7. Scott Musman and Seli Agbolosu-Amison, A Measurable Definition of Resilience Using “Mission Risk” as a Metric, (MITRE Corporation, 2014), 9.
8. Microsoft Corporation, The cloud security mindset, (Microsoft IT Showcase, 2016)
9. US Department of Defense, US Air Force Blueprint for Cyberspace 2009, (US Department of Defense, 2009), 4.
10. Michael Nieles et al, An Introduction to Information Security, (NIST, 2017), 7.
11. MITRE, Systems Engineering Guide – MITRE CORPORATION
12. Commonwealth Government of Australia, Cyber Resilience, (ANAO, 2017)
13. Commonwealth of Australia, Adaptive Campaigning 09 – Army’s Future Land Operating Concept, (Department of Defence, 2009)
14. Commonwealth Government of Australia, Future Land Warfare Report 2014. (Department of Defence, 2014), 12.
15. Ben Gesing et al, Artificial Intelligence in Logistics, (DHL and IBM, 2018), 14.
16. Johnson, 6-7.
17. Commonwealth Government of Australia, Future Land Warfare Report 2014, (Department of Defence, 2014). 
18. Commonwealth Government of Australia, Future Land Warfare Report 2014, (Department of Defence, 2014).
19. Commonwealth Government of Australia, Future Land Warfare Report 2014, (Department of Defence, 2014), 11.
20. Commonwealth Government of Australia, Future Operating Environment 2035, (Department of Defence, 2016), 24.
21. J Augustyn, Emerging Science and Technology Trends: 2017-2047. (Future Scout, 2017), 8.
22. Bob Metcalfe, Metcalfe’s Law after 40 Years of Ethernet, (IEEE Computer Society, 2013).
23. D Barr et al, Technical Information Bulletin 04-1. Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) Systems, (National Communications System, 2004).
24. Symantec, W32.Stuxnet. (Symantec, 2010), https://www.symantec.com/security- center/writeup/2010-071400-3123-99
25. Guardknox, Automotive Cyber Security. (Guardknox, 2018), https://www.guardknox. com/automotive-cyber-security/
26. Michael N Schmitt, Grey Zones in the International Law of Cyberspace, (2017).
27. Commonwealth Government of Australia, Future Land Warfare Report 2014. (Department of Defence, 2014), 16.
28. Luis Rocha-Mier et al, Global Supply Chain Management based on Collective Intelligence, (World Conference on Pom, 2004).
29. Commonwealth Government of Australia, Future Land Warfare Report 2014. (Department of Defence, 2014), 18.
30. Serhiy Y. et al, Understanding the concept of supply chain resilience, (The International Journal of Logistics Management, 2009)
31. LTG Larry Wyche, Securing the Army’s Weapon Systems and Supply Chain against Cyber Attack, (Institute of Land Warfare, 2017)
32. Dave Bryson et al, Blockchain Technology for Government, (MITRE Corporation, 2018).
33. Omera Khan et al, Supply Chain Cyber-Resilience: Creating an Agenda for Future Research, (Technology Innovation Management Review, 2015).
34. Paul Hoeper and John Manferdelli, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Cyber Supply Chain, (Defense Science Board, 2017), 4.
35. Glenn Greenwald, How the NSA tampers with US-made internet routers, (The Guardian, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/books/2014/may/12/glenn- greenwald-nsa-tampers-us-internet-routers-snowden
36. Robert Ellison et al, Evaluating and Mitigating Software Supply Chain Security Risks, (Carnegie Mellon, 2010).
37. Ken Thompson, Trusting trust, (Communications of the ACM, 1984).
38. LTG Larry Wyche, Securing the Army’s Weapon Systems and Supply Chain against Cyber Attack, (Institute of Land Warfare, 2017).