An essay on the Success of Air-Land Integration during the Burma Campaign in World War II–An illustration of the importance of leadership, adaptation, innovation, and integration

In peace, the function of tactical air support of land operations is apt to fade, but in war its urgency will increase.¹

- Field Marshal Viscount Slim

Abstract

Any history of the campaign in Burma highlights the vital importance of air power to the eventual victory over the Japanese by the 14th Army. The purpose of the paper is to explore how the Allies achieved air-land integration (ALI) during the Burma campaign during the Second World War. The key research question was to establish why ALI was so successful during the Burma campaign.

The first factor was the leadership of the Army and the Air Force senior officers within their respective organizations built strong relationships, which overcame inter-service rivalry. Co-located headquarters, combined messes and the linking of RAF groups with Army formations built strong relationships across the chain of command and enabled co-operation and collaborative planning. The second factor was the four core roles of air power were vitally important to an ostensibly land campaign. Air superiority provided the necessary pre-condition to enable the other three roles. There was significant innovation and adaptation in the air mobility role, which provided the solution to the Japanese tactics of encirclement. The strike and reconnaissance role worked in synergy. Overall, forming strong relationships is the principle lesson from the successful application of air power in Burma.

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Introduction

The quote from Field Marshal Viscount Slim highlights how important air support is to the army during conflict. In 1944, the then General Slim commanded 14th Army in Burma. This campaign, conducted from December 1941 until 28 August 1945, is relevant to the Australian Defence Force (ADF) due to the lessons resulting from the success of inter-Service cooperation, principally between the Army and the Air Force.

The system or process for organising and executing tactical air support of land operations is now termed Air-Land Integration (ALI). There is no ADF definition or specific doctrine for ALI. British doctrine highlights that ALI requires three key elements: the development of strong relationships to engender co-operation and mutual trust, an understanding of each component’s capabilities and limitations, and the knowledge of component doctrine and validation through joint training.² The purpose of the paper is to explore how the Allies achieved ALI during the Burma campaign in the Second World War. The study of ALI, innovative methods of war fighting and adaptable command and control concepts are of contemporary relevance, and they were the focus of the Sir Richard Williams Foundation in March 2016.³

This paper will first describe the campaign in Arakan and the defence of Imphal and Kohima in 1944 to set in context the success of ALI in these conflicts. Next, the paper will discuss the importance of leadership in the development of the effective relationships necessary for ALI. The strong relationships based on mutual trust between the leaders in the campaign ensured close co-operation between the Services. Finally, the paper will provide examples of the adaptation and innovation that took place within each of the four core air power roles of air power (control of the air, strike, air mobility, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR)).⁴ Air superiority provided the vital pre-condition to enable significant innovation for air mobility. Air superiority also enabled effective strike missions without enemy interference. There was significant innovation in how air power supported land forces to clear Japanese fortifications. ISR assisted in locating the Japanese—its greatest utility was in detecting the movement of additional Japanese aircraft into the Burma theatre.

Background–The Burma Campaign 1943–1944

Without doubt, air power was crucial to Anglo-American successes in Burma.⁵

Any history of the campaign in Burma highlights the vital importance of air power in defeating the Japanese. The quote above provides one example. Hence, the Burma campaign in late 1943 is worth studying as it illustrates the importance of adaptation, innovation and integration to the successful use of air power. In late 1943 and early 1944, the view of the Allies and the Japanese was that campaigning in the monsoon was impossible, due to difficult ground and air movement. Therefore, the campaign season was from October 1943 to May 1944. The Allied plan for the Second Arakan Campaign was to seize the small, but significant, ports at Maungdaw and Buthidaung in the Arakan (see Map 1). The road connecting them was the only all-weather route for motor transport across the Mayu Peninsula. The capture of these ports and the road would improve the logistical support of 15 Corps, thus enabling a subsequent operation to seize the important airfield at Akyab—vital to the recapture of Rangoon.

The Japanese plan was first to attack in the Arakan around Ngakyedauk and draw the British 14th Army reserves to that area. Once the British were engaged in the Arakan, the Japanese would then advance across the Chindwin River, climb into the hills in Assam and seize the Allied administrative area that supported 4 Corps on the Imphal plain with its depots and airfields.6 In February 1944, the Japanese struck, infiltrating two brigades through 15 Corps’ front, encircling the 7th Indian Division, overrunning its headquarters and blocking the main supply road to the 5th Indian Division (see Map 2). Fortunately, the main British administrative area, organised as an all-round defensive box, was able to resist their repeated attacks. After three weeks of violent attacks the surviving Japanese retreated.

The Japanese also attacked 4 Corps on the Imphal plain in March 1944 (see Map 3). The intent of the campaign was to seize and secure the Allied logistics support there and delay the campaign to recapture Burma by another year. The Allies knew of the Japanese plans and intended to fortify the various logistics nodes and destroy the Japanese attackers on ground of its own choosing using vastly superior armour, artillery and airpower. The Japanese attack was initially successful and almost trapped and destroyed the 17th Indian Division; however, by 22 June 1944, 33 Corps, attacking from the north, had broken the siege and re-opened the road to Dimapur. The Japanese 15th Army retreated in disorder.⁷

Air power was vital to 14th Army and its effective use throughout the campaign was attributable to the high level of integration between the Services. The next section will explore the importance of the strong relationship between the two principal commanders in the campaign and the relationship’s impact on ALI.

Strong Relationships–The importance of Leadership and Command to ALI

The problem of inter-[S]ervice cooperation is essentially a political one.⁸

The political problems that Russell Parkin refers to above are largely due to a lack of understanding between the Services of each component’s capabilities and limitations. To overcome the political issues of inter-Service cooperation requires intelligent leadership to form the strong relationships vital to mutual trust and coordination. Fortunately, the tactical commanders during the fighting in Burma in 1944 had the right qualities for ALI. The Commander of the 14th Army was General Slim. Slim recognised from his earliest experiences during WWII just how crucial air power would be to the campaign. In Slim’s words, ‘…in Burma it [air power] was from the very start a dominating factor’.⁹

General Slim’s opposite number was Air Marshal Sir John Baldwin, the Air Officer Commanding Third Tactical Air Force. Third Tactical Air Force comprised the Strategic Air Force, Troop Carrier Command, and the Photographic Reconnaissance Force.¹⁰ General Slim saw the air force and the army as a combined force. When Slim spoke of the Third Tactical Air Force he stated, ‘we grew into a very close brotherhood, depending on one another, trusting one another, and taking as much pride in each other’s triumphs as we did our own’.¹¹ This quote stresses the strength of the relationship between the two Services. Baldwin recognised that Slim understood the capabilities and limitations of air power, highlighting that ‘particularly did he [Slim] appreciate what the air required and was ready to understand their difficulties and limitations’.¹²

The next section will describe the importance of air mobility operations in supplying isolated army formations during the Arakan campaign. An example of the strong relationships between Services occurred early in these operations. In February 1944 in Arakan, the 7th Indian Division was isolated by a surprise attack by the Japanese and required air resupply to maintain its position. The first flight of transport aircraft had to turn back due to enemy air interference. The Commander of Troop Carrying Command (Brigadier General Old, United States Army Air Force ((USAAF)) led the next wave to ensure it got in.¹³

The leadership by commanders influences the behaviour of their staff and the overall tone of their headquarters. During the retreat from Burma in 1942, Slim had learnt a sharp lesson on the necessity for the headquarters of the land forces and the supporting air forces to be together.¹⁴ This was an innovation from the Middle East, which stressed intimate relations between the two Services at all key points (at the highest command level, at important field headquarters level and at the battlefront).¹⁵ Baldwin’s Third Tactical Air Force Headquarters was alongside Slim’s. Brigadier General Old also established his headquarters there. The three headquarters worked as a joint headquarters, pooling their intelligence and planning staff. All three commanders and their principal staff also lived in the same mess.¹⁶ The air force staff collaboratively developed all plans for 14th Army with their army counterparts. Army and air force staff conducted the initial appreciation and then Slim consulted Baldwin.¹⁷

In addition, the assignment of RAF Groups from Third Tactical Air Force in direct support of the corps within 14th Army increased partnerships or habitual relationships. 221 Group’s headquarters was collocated with 4 Corps’ headquarters at Imphal and was responsible for the central front. The shared joint, headquarters and dedicated support meant that the relationship between 4 Corps and 221 Group was excellent.¹⁸ David Dick, a pilot with 221 Group, stated that ‘on and around the Imphal plain during the siege in 1944 a close association grew up between the two [S]ervices.’¹⁹

In contrast, 224 Group commanded by Air Commodore Gray, had its headquarters at Chittagong, but it was some 100 miles from 15 Corps’ headquarters on the Arakan front.²⁰ During the second Arakan campaign, there was friction between the two headquarters. 15 Corps was entirely committed to the Arakan offensive, whilst 224 Group was engaged in a variety of other operations including air defence. As Sebastian Ritchie highlights, ‘in these circumstances, there was inevitably strong competition for resources between the two headquarters, and it proved difficult to strike a mutually acceptable balance’.²¹

Following the victory over the Japanese 15th Army, a combination of the difficulties caused by competition for scarce resources and the Japanese defensive posture led to Admiral Mountbatten (Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia Command) appointing an inter-Service committee to examine and report on methods for closer tactical support in the coming offensives of 1945. The committee recommended in August 1944 the reorganization of 221 and 224 Groups into mobile groups, each with a main headquarters designed to combine with the headquarters of the appropriate army formation. Reorganization occurred on 4 December 1944, with Headquarters 221 Group remaining responsible for close support on the Central front, but now accommodated with Headquarters 14th Army, and Headquarters 224 Group collocating with 15 Corps to provide close support for the Arakan front. Both groups were relieved of responsibility for the air defence of their base areas and allowed to concentrate on support to land forces through close contact between the respective land and air commanders and the exercise of command through joint land/air headquarters.²² As Wilfrid Russell observes, ‘…the 14th Army in Burma was an army with an air force, not an army and an air force; the air force and the 14th Army were in spirit as fused together as a pair of oarsmen’.²³

This section highlights that strong relationships fostered by intelligent leadership were vital to the success of the campaign in the Arakan and on the Imphal plain in 1944. These relationships overcame the political issues of inter-Service rivalry and achieved effective ALI. Both Slim and Baldwin ensured their staff worked collaboratively to develop a joint plan. Collocated headquarters, combined messes and habitual relationships between air and army formations ensured strong relationships. The friction between 224 Group and 15 Corps prior to their collocation highlights the risk of neglecting the importance of face-to-face relationships.

The next section will discuss the outcome of the collaborative planning, highlighting the importance of innovation and adaptation in the campaign to the four core roles of air power.

The enduring importance of the four core roles of airpower and the success of adaptation and innovation in the Burma Campaign

War has an enduring nature and a changing character that reflects political, social-cultural, economic, technological, military-strategic, geographical, and historical contexts.²⁴ The four core roles of airpower are enduring and they were vital to the joint campaign in Burma in 1944. However, the environment, the Japanese enemy and the significant changes in technology, required significant adaptation and innovation within the RAF.

ALI requires an understanding of each component’s capabilities and limitations. As early as 1940, the army knew of its weaknesses in operating in a jungle environment. Military Training Pamphlet No.9 (India) Extensive Warfare: Notes on Forest Warfare published in 1940, highlighted that ‘Armoured Fighting Vehicles and artillery would have a limited role since they were largely road-bound’. The solution lay with the air force, which needed to be used fully, especially for providing heavy close support (strike) and transport of supplies and information (mobility)’.²⁵

Generally, military campaigns such as the one in Burma are won on the land.²⁶ To win on the land, armies require the support of air power in providing strike, air mobility and ISR; however, for airpower to provide these roles in a sustainable fashion requires a degree of control of the air. As RAAF doctrine clearly highlights, failure to achieve adequate control of the air will constrain or preclude the conduct of land activities. Determining the degree of control of the air required and then achieving it must be the prelude to all other operations.²⁷

The definition of control of the air is ‘the ability to conduct operations in the air, land and maritime domains without effective interference from adversary air power and air defence capabilities’.²⁸ Jim Storr in his book The Human Face of War highlights the vital importance of control of the air by quoting a study of 158 land campaigns from 1914 onwards. The study found that three battlefield factors dominated the probability of success at the campaign level. One was the possession of air superiority, as it enabled freedom of manoeuvre for your own forces and permitted some interference with the movements of the enemy.²⁹ The fighting withdrawal during the first Burma Campaign reinforces this point as the Army faced a handicap (assessed as serious, but not fatal by General Slim) as it fought without adequate air support.³⁰

It was no different later in the campaign in 1944 where Allied air superiority would eventually become almost the crucial factor in the struggle for Burma.³¹ As a prelude to the Allied offensive in the Arakan, the first requirement was the establishment of the degree of air control necessary for the operation. The campaign to re-establish air control was incremental and had commenced in March 1942 when Air Marshal Sir Richard Peirse arrived in Delhi from Java to assume command of the air forces in India and Ceylon (now Sri Lanka). At once, he began to reorganize his command, establish a main supply unit for aircraft, establish base repair facilities and tackle the colossal problem of constructing new airfields for the expanding air force. In March 1942, there were only sixteen airfields in India and Ceylon with all-weather runways; to deploy the envisaged 66 squadrons, 215 airfields were required.³² Later came the establishment of a radar chain (augmented by ground observers), and fighter control facilities. The final foundation was a properly unified and integrated command and control structure–Air Command South-East Asia–covering all British and American air forces in India and Burma.³³

These changes came just in time as gaining air control had become especially important during the winter of 1943–1944. The Japanese Army and Navy demonstrated that they still held the initiative in the air, conducting air raids on Calcutta and 15 Corps from a wide selection of forward airfields. The geography in northern Burma also provided the potential for the Japanese to achieve surprise in the air. The Allied air forces had to provide air defence to a wide variety of potential targets and their warning system had a handicap, since there were many places where the intervening mountains made radar warning impossible.³⁴

Peirse, in December 1943 and January 1944, directed that fighter operations were to be undertaken in the greatest possible strength to engage and destroy enemy aircraft in the air and on the ground at enemy airfields and installations.³⁵ It took the RAF until February 1944 to establish air superiority over Arakan, partially due to an increase in the numbers of fighters in the area establishing a 2:1 numerical superiority. They also re- equipped with improved aircraft including the Spitfire, which was superior to the Zero and the Tojo, and the Allied aircrew had a more professional approach to the employment of air power.³⁶ From that point, Japanese air operations over Allied territory began to incur unsustainable attrition rates.³⁷

The establishment of air superiority enabled the use of the other core roles of air power without undue interference.³⁸ As Sebastian Ritchie stresses, ‘… none of the air operations in support of 14th Army would have been possible without one fundamental precondition—air superiority’.³⁹ The next role that was vital to the campaign in the Burma, because of the geography of the theatre, was air mobility.

The definition of air mobility is, ‘the ability to move personnel, materiel or forces using airborne platforms’.⁴⁰ As early as April 1941 (prior to the declaration of war by the Japanese), the Army in India Training Memoranda No. 6 War Series suggested that mobile infantry columns in a jungle environment required highly trained porters or air supply.⁴¹ A review of the Commonwealth Army’s defeat in Malaya reinforced the need for air supply. Field Marshal Wavell’s notes on the Malaya campaign offered insight into how to meet and defeat the Japanese tactics. He argued that troops needed to learn not to be road-bound, to develop their cross-country skills and he discussed the concept of resupply by air.⁴²

During the Burma campaign in late 1943 and early 1944, important innovations in air mobility occurred due to the requirement to adapt logistics arrangements for 14th Army to the environmental conditions in Burma. 81st West African Division was the first conventional formation to be committed to full air maintenance during offensive operations in the Arakan.⁴³ This was an important innovation and an understanding of the difference in the terms, air supply, and air maintenance is needed to comprehend the magnitude of the logistics operation undertaken by Troop Carrier Command. The definition of air supply was the airborne delivery forward of stores, by either landing or dropping. Air maintenance embraced all aspects of tactical logistics transport: the forward delivery of supplies, equipment and reinforcements, as well as the rearward evacuation of casualties, prisoners of war and damaged equipment.⁴⁴ This capability had only recently been realised but the low priority of the Burma Theatre for silk parachutes almost made air supply impossible.

There was a shortage of parachutes in January 1944 and they would not be available for the forthcoming campaigns in 1944 in the quantity required. Due to General Slim’s familiarity with industry in eastern India, he recommended that it might be possible to make serviceable supply- dropping parachutes from either paper or jute. Within ten days 14th Army were experimenting with ‘parajutes’. Within a month, there was a parajute in use that was 85 percent as effective as a normal parachute.⁴⁵

The next adaptation was providing air maintenance in defence. The ‘Battle of the Admin Box,’ during the Arakan Campaign of 1944, provides an excellent example of the importance of air mobility. The ‘Admin Box’ at Sinzweya, near Ngakyedauk, contained the administrative base for the 7th Indian Division. Air mobility enabled the British to stand and fight once encircled by the enemy with their ground lines of communication cut. Previously, without air maintenance, a division would have needed to break out and fight a costly retreat to its next administrative hub. Now each time the Japanese attacked the defensive position, the British could use their advantage in firepower delivered by air power and artillery. Air mobility provided 10,000 short tons of supplies during February 1944.⁴⁶ It was during the second resupply mission to the Admin Box that Brigadier General Old led the flight. It was a true battle with the Japanese still contesting the degree of air control that existed over the area; however, the Japanese Army Air Force ‘proved unable to stop airborne supplies from reaching the surrounded Indian ground troops’.⁴⁷

More innovation was to come when the Japanese attacked 4 Corps’ administrative areas in Imphal. When the road from Imphal to Dimapur was cut by the Japanese, 4 Corps, consisting of two and later four divisions, required air maintenance. Their combined requirement was 400 tons of stores per day. Over the course of the battle, air mobility also flew 59,000 personnel into or out of the battle area and evacuated 15,000 casualties.⁴⁸ 4 Corps could fight on ground of its own choosing and Baldwin began the airlift, code named Operation STAMINA, on 08 April.⁴⁹

It was during the Imphal battle that the Allies achieved another first. 14th Army’s reserve was 5th Indian Division positioned on the Arakan Front. The reserve was now required to support 4 Corps to shore up the defences around Imphal. The redeployment of an entire division by air required 750 sorties.⁵⁰ Air mobility achieved staggering results during this period. The complete support of a division by air mobility in attack and another in defence proved the concept of air maintenance. These systems were adapted to support an entire corps in defence. Finally, air mobility enabled the re- deployment of an entire division during a crucial period of fighting. As Graham Dunlop argues, ‘air maintenance was the most significant development in tactical logistics during the campaign in South-East Asia by providing the most effective countermeasure to enemy encirclement on the ground’.⁵¹ Air mobility allowed the Allies to stand and fight. However, the destruction of the Japanese 15th Army around Imphal was due to a combination of strike, artillery and armour. Strike operations will now be examined.

Doctrinally, strike consists of seven missions comprising strategic attack, Close Air Support (CAS), air interdiction, anti-surface warfare, anti-submarine warfare, electronic warfare and information operations.⁵² During the period in question, the RAF undertook strategic attack, CAS, air interdiction and anti- surface warfare missions in support of the Army in Burma. Strategic attacks took place against key logistic nodes in Siam (now Thailand); Japanese coastal and riverine transport was subject to anti-surface warfare across Burma, which greatly reduced the supplies of ammunition and food available to the Japanese frontline forces. However, this section will concentrate on CAS and air interdiction, which were so vital to the outcome of the campaign.

The meeting engagements between the Japanese and the British at Imphal, whilst expected, did not initially go well. 17th Indian Division was encircled and 23rd Division (the Corps’ reserve) was required to re-open the road to it. The tactical/reconnaissance Hurricanes were particularly valuable during the confused fighting that followed. They assisted in searching for enemy movements and positions (ISR); attacking opportunity targets (air interdiction); spotting for artillery (forward air control); and passing information on the location of Allied troops (assist with CAS).⁵³ As Slim stated this support was vital: ‘…had not our fighters maintained continuous cover and given quick support at call, the withdrawal…would have been a much grimmer and more protracted affair’.⁵⁴

As the battle progressed and the British went onto the offensive, strike was a vital part of the solution to trench warfare, which developed around the key logistic nodes. The Japanese were superb at constructing fortified defensive positions that were impervious to frontal attack. The problem was how to achieve continuous fire support whilst the infantry advanced to clear the trench/bunker. First, the tanks fired surface-burst high explosives to clear the jungle around the bunkers. Next, the tanks used delayed-action high explosives to break up the facades of the bunkers. Finally, as the infantry closed in, the use of solid armour-piercing shot provided covering firing without the fragmentation that could injure the infantry.⁵⁵ Instead of tanks, artillery could strip the vegetation from the bunkers and low-flying aircraft could make successive strafing and bombing runs. On the final run, the conditioned enemy would take cover, but the low-flying aircraft would hold their fire, safely allowing the infantry to advance.⁵⁶ The reduction of the Razabil fortress during the Arakan campaign in 1944 required heavy bombing from the strategic air force and dive-bombing by RAF Vultee A-31 Vengeances, directed by smoke shells from artillery.⁵⁷

There were often large distances that separated tactical squadrons from the troops they were supporting, which rendered face-to-face briefings on the locations of ground targets and friendly positions impossible. The search for an effective means of controlling direct (close) air support led to a new system based on methods developed in Europe.⁵⁸ This involved the appointment of pilots (often reluctantly) to command Air Support Signals Units and a Visual Control Posts with VHF radio communications. These units were attached to ground forces to speak directly with the aircrew to prosecute attacks.⁵⁹ In addition, there were senior officer air advisers established at corps and divisional headquarters to assist in the control of the assigned air support. When the Japanese emerged from the jungle, air power gave an overwhelming advantage to the British and quickly exacted punishing strikes on the enemy. The final core role of air power was required to find the Japanese—ISR.

ISR enables ‘decision superiority by providing key pieces of data, information and intelligence to assist commanders in achieving battlespace awareness and decision superiority’.⁶⁰ Following the invasion of Burma in 1942 and the long retreat, General Slim considered the factors that had been responsible for the defeat of Burma Corps. Intelligence on the enemy was extremely bad, which resulted in the British inability to form cohesive plans to parry the Japanese’s blows or seize the initiative by counter attacking.⁶¹

The previous section on the strike role highlighted the role of Hurricanes as both a tactical and a reconnaissance platform. The integration of air power in the army’s plans was crucial to the ISR role. The jungle environment meant that there was a dearth, or entire absence, of visible worthwhile targets.⁶² However, the defence of fortified administrative centres on the Imphal Plain drew the enemy out of the jungle onto ground advantageous to the defender. Without cover, suitable tactical aircraft could then attack the enemy on call from the Visual Control Posts near the fortified bases or search for and destroy the enemy along his lines of communication.

ISR was significant just prior to the Imphal Battle. Pilots reported that the enemy were developing roads from the Chindwin to central Burma, camouflaged rafts existed on the river due east of Imphal, and there were great herds of cattle.⁶³ This intelligence fitted with the noticeably increasing enemy activity and gave a general idea of the enemy’s intentions and strength. Photographic reconnaissance was also important.

Photographic reconnaissance in Burma was of greater importance than in other theatres to strategic attack and air interdiction owing to the meagre intelligence available from other sources such as ground patrols, signals intelligence and prisoners.⁶⁴ The spectacular successes of the bombers was due to the remarkable flow of information from photographic sources.⁶⁵ The maintenance of air superiority relied on photographic reconnaissance as it provided timely evidence of the concentration of enemy aircraft when they redeployed into Burma.⁶⁶ The Intelligence staff also used photographic reconnaissance for aerial survey to produce maps. New arrivals to Burma used these maps to train and learn the hard-won lessons of the campaign. In May 1943, the Military Intelligence Directorate at GHQ India published a detailed new guide; Japanese in Battle Part 1: Enemy Methods–for regimental officers. It used aerial photographs to illustrate the various types of country in which military operations might take place. 14th Army also produced a series of detailed reports on recent operations (including maps and aerial photographs).⁶⁷

This section highlights the enduring importance of the four core roles of air power to ostensibly land campaigns. Air superiority was the necessary pre- condition to enable the other three roles. There was significant innovation and adaptation in the air mobility role, which provided the solution to the Japanese tactics of encirclement. The strike and ISR role worked in synergy. Tactical aircraft could spot and destroy Japanese troops. The strike role gave 14th Army an advantage over the Japanese and air mobility enabled 14th Army to fight on ground of its own choosing.

Conclusion

The victory was at every stage a joint Army/RAF one.⁶⁸

Following World War II, Field Marshal Viscount Slim reflected on how 14th Army achieved victory in the Burma campaign. His view on the successful execution of the campaign was attributable to, ‘the utmost co-operation between soldiers and airmen’.⁶⁹ The leadership of Slim and Baldwin within their respective organizations built strong relationships, which overcame inter-Service rivalry and enabled effective ALI. Collocated headquarters, combined messes and the linking of RAF groups with Army formations built strong relationships across the chain of command and enabled co-operation and collaborative planning.

All core roles of air power were vital to the success of the joint campaign and of enduring importance to the prosecution of warfare. Innovative thinking and adaptation were vital to each of the four core roles due to the enemy and the environment. The establishment of air superiority required the build-up of proper support facilities, the introduction of radar warning and the introduction of superior aircraft. The contest for control of the air was continuous with the Japanese Air Force, but it was a necessary pre- condition to enable air mobility. In turn, air mobility provided the answer to the Japanese encircling tactics on land. Formations of 14th Army, including a corps of four divisions, could now stand and use the tactical advantage of the strike role to destroy the Japanese as they emerged from the dense jungle. The ISR role was of less use to 14th Army directly because of the jungle, but it was vital to maintaining air superiority.

The Sir Richard Williams Foundation seminar suggests that the application of technology in conjunction with innovative methods of war fighting and adaptable Command and Control concepts has the potential to revolutionise the way the ADF conducts ALI.⁷⁰ This essay argues that the success of the Burma campaign was due to the strong relationships between Baldwin as the air commander and Slim as the land commander. Strong relationships enabled effective ALI. Once effectively integrated, the land and air forces adapted collaboratively to the environment and the enemy. Forming these strong relationships is the principal lesson from the successful application of air power in Burma. 

Map 1 – North Arakan.⁷¹ 

Map 2 – Battle of Ngakyedauk.⁷²

Map 3 – 4 Corps dispositions on 29 February 1944 and Japanese Plan of attack.⁷³

Endnotes

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1. Russell Parkin, ‘The Urgency of War: The Development of Close Air Support Doctrine in the Second World War’, in From Past to Future: The Australian Experience of Land/Air Operations, University of New South Wales, (1995) 47.
2. British Army Field Manual, ‘Air Land Integration’, Vol 1 Part 13, (December 2009), 2-1, accessed January 20, 2016, http:// drnet.defence.gov.au/vcdf/JCC/JointForceIntegrationBranch/ BattlespaceIntegration/AirSurfaceIntegration-JointFires/Pages/Good- Gouge.aspx.
3. ‘New Thinking on Air-Land’, Sir Richard Williams Foundation Seminar on 17 March 2016, accessed January 20, 2016, http://www. williamsfoundation.org.au/resources/Documents/Air%20Land%20 Seminar%20information%20v6%2029%20JanWEB2.pdf
4. Royal Australian Air Force, Australian Air Publication 1000-D, The Air Power Manual, (September 2013), 44.
5. Frank McLynn, The Burma Campaign: Disaster into Triumph, 1942-45, (Yale University Press, 2011). Kindle edition.
6. Ian Grant, ‘Burma: The Land Campaign’, in The RAF and the Far East War 1941-1945, Bracknell Paper No 6 - A Symposium on the Far East War, Royal Air Force College Bracknell, 24 March 1995.
7. British Broadcasting Corporation, ‘Animated Map: The Burma Campaign’, accessed January 25, 2016, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/ interactive/animations/wwtwo_map_burma/index_embed.shtml
8. Parkin, The Urgency of War, 65.
9. William Slim, Defeat into Victory – Battling Japan in Burma and India 1942-1945, Cooper Square Press, (2000), 5.
10. Slim, Defeat into Victory, 209-211.
11. Slim, Defeat into Victory, 212.
12. Geoffrey Evans, Slim as Military Commander, (Batsford, 1969), 124.
13. Slim, Defeat into Victory, 236; and Wilfrid Russell, Forgotten Skies: The Story of the Air Forces in India and Burma, (London: Hutchinson, 1946), 85.
14. Slim, Defeat into Victory, 9.
15. Nicola Baker, More than Little Heroes: Australian Army Air Liaison Officers in the Second World War, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, (Canberra, 1994), 33.
16. Slim, Defeat into Victory, 212.
17. Slim, Defeat into Victory, 209-210.
18. David Dick, ‘Offensive Air Operations in Burma in Support of the Army’, in The RAF and the Far East War 1941-1945, in Bracknell Paper No 6 - A Symposium on the Far East War, Royal Air Force College Bracknell, 24 March 1995.
19. Dick, Offensive Air Operations in Burma in Support of the Army.
20. Slim, Defeat into Victory, 209-212.
21. Sebastian Ritchie, ‘Rising from the Ashes - Allied Air Power and Air Support for 14th Army in Burma, 1943-1945,’ in The Foundations of Victory: The Pacific War 1943–1944, ed. Peter Dennis et al. (Chief of Army’s Military History Conference, 2003), 144; and Stanley Kirby, The War against Japan: The Reconquest of Burma, Vol. 4, (HM Stationery Office, 1957), 31.
22. Kirby, The War against Japan: The Reconquest of Burma, 35.
23. Russell, Forgotten Skies: The Story of the Air Forces in India and Burma, (London: Hutchinson, 1946), 122.
24. Colin S Gray, Fighting Talk: Forty Maxims on War, Peace, and Strategy, (Greenwood Publishing Group, 2007). Kindle Edition.
25. Tim Moreman, The Jungle, Japanese and the British Commonwealth Armies at War, 1941-45: Fighting Methods, Doctrine and Training for Jungle Warfare. (Routledge, 2013), 19.
26. Albert Palazzo, Forging Australian Land Power: A Primer, (Army Research Papers, 2015), 11.
27. RAAF, The Air Power Manual, 52.
28. RAAF, The Air Power Manual, 50.
29. Jim Storr, Human Face of War, (Continuum International Publishing, 2009), 49.
30. Stanley Kirby, The War against Japan: India’s Most Dangerous Hour, Vol. 2, (HM Stationery Office, 1957), 213; and Slim, Defeat into Victory, 116 and 543.
31. Norman Franks, Hurricanes over the Arakan (Wellingborough, 1989), 210.
32. Kirby, India’s Most Dangerous Hour, 111-113; and Russell, Forgotten Skies: The Story of the Air Forces in India and Burma, 37.
33. Ritchie, Rising from the Ashes, 138.
34. Kirby, India’s Most Dangerous Hour, 43.
35. Stanley Kirby, The War against Japan: The Decisive Battles, Vol. 3, (HM Stationery Office, 1957), 386.
36. Frank McLynn, The Burma Campaign: Disaster into Triumph, 1942-45, (Yale University Press, 2011). Kindle edition; and Air Ministry, Wings of the Phoenix: The Official Story of the Air War in Burma, (His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1949), 106.
37. Louis Allen, Burma: The Longest War, 1941-1945, (Sterling Publishing Company, 2000), 178-9; and Ritchie, Rising from the Ashes, 138.
38. Kirby, The Decisive Battles, 385.
39. Ritchie, Rising from the Ashes, 137.
40. RAAF, The Air Power Manual, (September 2013), 65.
41. Moreman, The Jungle, Japanese and the British Commonwealth Armies at War, 20.
42. Marston, Phoenix for the Ashes, 81.
43. Ritchie, Rising from the Ashes, 139.
44. Graham Dunlop, British Army Logistics in the Burma Campaign, 1942- 1945, (University of Edinburgh, 2007). Kindle Edition.
45. Slim, Defeat into Victory, 225.
46. Ritchie, Rising from the Ashes, 139.
47. Ritchie, Rising from the Ashes, 138.
48. Ritchie, Rising from the Ashes, 140.
49. McLynn, The Burma Campaign, 324.
50. Ritchie, Rising from the Ashes, 140; and Russell, Forgotten Skies: The Story of the Air Forces in India and Burma, 111.
51. Dunlop, British Army Logistics in the Burma Campaign, 1942-1945.
52. RAAF, The Air Power Manual, 59.
53. Dick, Offensive Air Operations in Burma in Support of the Army.
54. Slim, Defeat into Victory, 303.
55. McLynn, The Burma Campaign, 254; and Slim, Defeat into Victory, 230.
56. Air Ministry, Wings of the Phoenix: The Official Story of the Air War in Burma, (His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1949), 55; and Slim, Defeat into Victory, 544.
57. Slim, Defeat into Victory, 229.
58. Moreman, The Jungle, Japanese and the British Commonwealth Armies at War, 168-9.
59. Dick, Offensive Air Operations in Burma in Support of the Army; and Moreman, The Jungle, Japanese and the British Commonwealth Armies at War, 191.
60. RAAF, The Air Power Manual, 71.
61. Slim, Defeat into Victory, 29.
62. Dick, Offensive Air Operations in Burma in Support of the Army.
63. Slim, Defeat into Victory, 289.
64. Kirby, The Reconquest of Burma, 408; and Allen, Burma: The Longest War, 395-396.
65. Air Ministry, Wings of the Phoenix, 109.
66. Dick, Offensive Air Operations in Burma in Support of the Army; and Air Ministry, Wings of the Phoenix, 108.
67. Moreman, The Jungle, Japanese and the British Commonwealth Armies at War, 103 and 145.
68. Grant, Burma: The Land Campaign.
69. Parkin, The Urgency of War, 47.
70. ‘New Thinking on Air-Land’, Sir Richard Williams Foundation Seminar on 17 March 2016.
71. Slim, Defeat into Victory.
72. Slim, Defeat into Victory.
73. Evans, Slim as Military Commander.