Book Review - Margins of Victory
Margins of Victory
Written by: Douglas Macgregor
Macgregor, D (2016) Margin of Victory, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press
ISBN: 9781682476901,
Reviewed by: Major Mick Cook, Army Headquarters
A battle can determine the outcome of a war. The outcome of a battle can be determined by decisions made decades earlier. The reform program that Sir Richard Haldane began to impose on the British Army in 1905 enabled it to hold the line at the Battle of Mons in 1914. General Kazushige Ugaki was able to implement a partial reform program of the Japanese Army during the 1920s that enabled it attain victory at the Battle of Shanghai in 1937. The destruction of the Russian forces at Lokhvitsa in 1941 delivered some hard lessons that, once learnt, empowered it to destroy the German Army Group Centre in 1944. The Egyptians overextended in the Sinai and the Israelis were able to exploit a gap and destroy the crucial air defence umbrella that had protected Sadat’s forces. The USA missed an opportunity at the Battle of 73 Easting in the First Gulf War and Saddam Hussein maintained his iron grip on Iraq for another 12 years. The results of a battle, and the manner in which that result is exploited, can have a profound effect upon a conflict.
In Margin of Victory Douglas Macgregor examines five battles that influenced the conflict they were a part of and how they shaped modern warfare.
The five battles discussed in the book are the Battle of Mons, the Battle of Shanghai, the destruction of the German Army Group Centre in 1944, the counter-attack across the Suez in the Yom Kippur war, and the Battle of 73 Easting. Macgregor recounts the battles from the perspective of each of the respective adversaries, analysing the make-up of the force, the tactics employed by the force and the political imperatives driving the force. Macgregor provides a detailed account of each battle; the arguments he presents are drawn from a logical analysis of the evidence provided.
Throughout his analysis, Macgregor aims to determine what gave the victors of each battle the winning edge. He seeks to determine the margin of victory in each of these to, presumably, find a correlation that is able to be distilled into a more general lesson.
Margin of Victory concludes with some general lessons applicable for the USA. military in the 21st century. Two of these lessons that resonate with an audience from the Australian Defence Force are the need for protected mobility and firepower for the close fight and the importance of an efficient strategic sustainment system that enables the execution of joint operations.
The book is well-written and is an easy read for those with a general or specific interest in military history. At only 194 pages long it can be read in a single sitting and the structure, each chapter focusing on one of the particular case studies, focuses the reader’s attention on the details needed to build an understanding of each battle. I recommend this book to military officers and non-commissioned officers looking to understand the development of the close fight in the 20th century and the likely challenges for the Australian Defence Force on operations in the 21st century.
