Book Review - Rebalancing U.S. Forces: Basing and Forward Presence in the Asia–Pacific

Rebalancing U.S. Forces: Basing and Forward Presence in the Asia–Pacific

Written by: Carnes Lord and Andrew S. Erickson (eds), 

Naval Institute Press, 2014 

ISBN 9781612514642, 226pp,

Reviewed by: Andrew Carr

There’s an old joke military officials like to tell: amateurs do strategy; professionals do logistics. For most of us self-proclaimed ‘amateurs’, how the United States positions itself in the Asia–Pacific is one of the key strategic questions of our time. As Carnes Lord and Andrew S. Erickson’s new book Rebalancing U.S Forces: Basing and Forward Presence in the Asia–Pacific admirably demonstrates, this is also fundamentally a question of logistics.

This is a very timely and important book given the many questions that are being asked of the US role in the Asia–Pacific. Among allies, questions focus on how the ‘pivot’ or ‘rebalance’ is being implemented, and how force presence translates into promises of protection. For those concerned about US presence, the questions are whether the United States is targeting them and whether its intentions are offensive or not. Finally, for the United States itself, there are questions about the long-term capacity of America to afford and sustain an expanded presence in this remote region.

Whatever your viewpoint on these questions, this book is a rich source of details and data to help guide assessment. Foremost, the eight case studies demonstrate the substantial presence the United States already has in the region. One-fifth of all US forces are in the Asia–Pacific, involving at least 330,000 civilian and military personnel, 5 aircraft carrier groups, 180 ships, 1,500 aircraft and substantial US Marine Corps and Coast Guard capacity. All this aptly demonstrates why many questioned how the United States could pivot to a region it had never actually left.

Yet, for those who doubt US commitment to the Asia–Pacific, the Obama Administration’s intention to situate 60 per cent of the naval fleet there and increase Marine presence in Australia does little to prove the US presence will endure. As several chapters clearly detail, the nature of US presence in these countries is as much about historical legacy as contemporary strategic policy. This is especially true for the base locations. As former US Defence Secretary Rumsfeld has noted of US bases in South Korea ‘our troops were virtually frozen in place from where they were when the Korean War ended in 1953’.¹

This obvious point should help defray Chinese concerns that the United States is attempting to encircle it. As Toshi Yoshihara elegantly demonstrates in the chapter on Japan, Beijing has paid significant attention to the location and presence of US bases. It also seems to have come up with a worst-case ‘solution’ of attacking via ballistic missiles. While Yoshihara identifies a number of questionable assumptions behind this approach, it does encourage serious reading of the final chapter on sea-basing as an alternate approach. Yoshihara’s analysis also strengthens the merits of more remote and sustainable bases for the United States such as Guam, Australia and Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean.

Moving out to more remote bases, either outside China’s anti-access, area denial zone or a serious effort at remote offshore balancing as advocated by Barry Posen² and others, would require changes to the way the United States approaches regional security and its allies. The logistics at the heart of the US presence in the Asia–Pacific, and almost uniformly endorsed by the authors in this book, is that distance still matters and the shorter distance from base to crisis point the better. Continuing America’s preferred strategy of quick and decisive force will be much harder to sustain if its fleet has to move to locations five to seven days sailing time away. This is where the nut of strategy meets the screw of logistics. Close in means greater threat, but a quicker response; further away is more safety, yet less immediate capacity.

Complications also exist in the political circumstances of the bases themselves. While Guam and Diego Garcia are under US control, there are still tensions around US bases in Japan, South Korea, Singapore and Australia. As all the chapters, but especially Alexander Cooley’s insightful chapter on Central Asia demonstrates, those who host the United States are not mere passive recipients. Leaders in host countries argue between themselves and with Washington over locations, they seek political pay offs, and they ‘cheap ride’ in the provision of their own security forces. Some, like South Korea, have even tried to claim a veto over what the United States can and can’t do with American forces based in its territory. Important questions such as the support the United States receives from its allies can only be answered with a clear understanding of just how much the United States does for its allies today.

Inevitably, an edited book like this will have stronger and weaker chapters. For those reading about their own countries, the bar for authors to say anything new or important will be that much higher. Any Australians who is likely to pick up this book is likely to be aware of most of the details Jack McCaffrie and Chris Rahman outline. The Australia chapter also feels one of the driest, in terms of listing names and places, as much as the authors try to dress it up.

Still, the most significant step in the US–Australia relationship in the last few years has been a question of basing, and understanding how the Darwin deployment fits into the wider picture of US presence. The message the United States tries to send with its force posture is vital. Too many arguments around the US approach to the Asia–Pacific still treat military force as something that is entirely a question of will or desire. If nothing else, this book demonstrates how short sighted this view is.

As the authors rightly argue, ‘it is puzzling that serious students of American national security policy have paid so little attention to the subject of overseas basing over the years’.³ This is not just a question for those interested in the sharp end of conflict. As the debates over the pivot and the South China Sea have shown, presence matters. Too little presence and your commitment comes into doubt, too much and your intentions can look menacing. All the while trying to manage the tension between the message you send to opponents and allies via your presence, with the inevitable trade-off between security, capacity and speed of response. This book deserves to be on the shelf of all those who want to move beyond amateur games of risk about the Asia Pacific and contribute to the full scope of professional analysis. 

Endnotes

1. Carnes Lord and Andrew S. Erickson, Rebalancing U.S. Forces: Basing and Forward Presence in the Asia–Pacific, Maryland: Naval institute Press, p. 73.
    
2. Barry Posen, Restraint: A New Grand Strategy for the US, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014.
    
3. Carnes Lord and Andrew S. Erickson, Rebalancing U.S Forces: Basing and Forward Presence in the Asia–Pacific, Maryland: Naval institute Press, p. 2.