Sir Basil Liddell Hart’s Influence on Australian Military Doctrine
Abstract
The theories of Sir Basil Liddell Hart are a ready staple of Australian doctrine. Indeed they arguably represented the most significant influence on Australian military doctrine between the 1970s and the 1990s, the period in which the Australian Army developed its first independent and operational-level doctrine. This article will examine Liddell Hart’s influence on the Army’s doctrine development and the continuing relevance of his signature theories which espoused two specific military ideas. The first of these was limited war, an amalgam of defence in depth and limited liability, which proposed the employment of measured levels of military force to achieve strategic ends. The second comprised the indirect approach which significantly influenced early versions of the Fundamentals of Land Force Operations, the Army’s first operational-level doctrine publication. The indirect approach was also one of the key influences on the development of manoeuvre theory, a dominant element in Army thinking throughout the 1990s. As the Army progresses through its current period of change, it would benefit significantly from revisiting Liddell Hart’s theories as, for better or for worse, they exerted a profound influence during a period of fundamental change.
Introduction
The theories of Basil Liddell Hart were highly influential in the development of Australian military doctrine between the 1970s and 1990s. His theories of limited war and the indirect approach were consistent with the prevailing strategic context and thus were directly applicable to Australian Army doctrine during this period.
However influence is a difficult concept to trace. Furthermore, Liddell Hart’s ideas have seldom been explicitly acknowledged as a source of Australian military doctrine and thus there is no primary evidence of their use in the development of this doctrine. Yet any study of Army doctrine and the writing of Liddell Hart reveals the close similarity of themes that dominate both.
This argument will be supported by a comparison of Australian doctrine with Liddell Hart’s own key written works, particularly The Revolution in War and Strategy, and by the observations of academic and military thinkers.1 The Australian Army began producing its own unique doctrine in the 1970s in the aftermath of the Vietnam War and this doctrine was immediately influenced by the strategic context of the Australian military experience. The Australian doctrinal design from the 1970s adopted elements of limited warfare which closely resembled Liddell Hart’s theories of limited liability and defence in depth. The indirect approach was Liddell Hart’s signature theory and it exerted a substantial influence over Army doctrine, shaping doctrine development during its nascent stages. The indirect approach returned to prominence in the 1990s playing a seminal role in the development of manoeuvre theory.
Strategic context
Australian Army doctrine after the Vietnam War developed within the prevailing strategic context, which was focused on continental defence and dominated by tactical proficiency, the logical focus for a military without obvious threat. As Michael Evans writes, ‘In the 1970s and 1980s there was a … loss of confidence among defence planners in the value and relevance of offshore operations.’2 This was a departure from the previous position which had been based on alliances. Evans describes independent Australian strategic postures as the ‘tyranny of dissonance’ and remarks of the standard Australian approach: ‘The Australian way of war is best described as being based on using strategy and statecraft through the agency of overseas warfare.’3 The doctrinal hierarchy that shaped the focus on continental defence emanated from the Department of Defence.
It was expressed in a series of guidance documents, commencing in 1975 with Strategic Basis, and evolving into the Defence white papers of 1976 and 1987.4 John Blaxland observes that, ‘From then on, throughout the Cold War years the Strategic Basis papers would stress the need for being capable of responding effectively to low-level pressures or military attacks and of timely expansion to responses to a more substantial threat.’5 The Army developed its own capabilities and contingencies, and it learnt to operate without the support to which it had grown accustomed in Vietnam and in previous conflicts.6 Evans describes this as a process which gathered momentum but was stifled by the ‘lack of a consistent top-down approach to doctrine development’.7 One aspect of this strategic independence was a focus on development at the tactical level.8 This legacy — in the context of the Vietnam War — is summarised by Blaxland: ‘the Army was also affected by an over-emphasis on tactical-level excellence and not the operational art or the strategic-level dynamics’.9 Another consequence of self-reliance and tactical emphasis was that Australian military culture was susceptible to influence from specific military theories as the previous focus on alliance had partially stifled the development of a unique military doctrine. The ideas of Liddell Hart entered this opportune environment from the 1970s.
Liddell Hart’s background, theories and influences
The best sources of information on Liddell Hart’s development are Alex Danchev’s biography and the diverse range of articles that examine his theories.10 Liddell Hart served on the Western Front in a New Army infantry battalion in 1915 and was wounded in early 1916. He was subsequently deemed unfit for further active service and was employed as adjutant of a training battalion for the remainder of the First World War.11 He remained in the Army until 1926, supervising the production of training pamphlets as a captain in the Army Educational Corps. This position provided him a certain degree of exposure to military developments and to some important military figures. A seminal moment was his presentation of his ‘The Man in the Dark’ lecture to the Royal United Services Institute on 3 November 1920 which presaged his theory of the indirect approach.12
His lecture and subsequent expounding of his theories attracted acceptance and prestige within the military in spite of his junior rank.13 ‘The Man in the Dark’ theory consolidated his observations on infantry tactics, specifically the importance of avoiding points of effective resistance. But it was just the beginning. Liddell Hart enjoyed an extremely varied career. He dabbled in journalism, contributing features as a tennis correspondent up to 1925 prior to taking a position with The Daily Telegraph.14 In the aftermath of the Second World War he was also a noted correspondent on women’s fashion.15 He retained considerable influence as a military theorist after the Second World War and was described by one Israeli general as the ‘captain who teaches generals’.16 His writing was prolific and enduring, a reflection of his participation in many of the key events of the twentieth century, from his enlistment in Kitchener’s New Army in 1914 to his critical commentary on American strategy in Vietnam as late as 1970.
The development of limited war
Limited war is a collection of theories that proposes the limited use of force to achieve strategic ends. Liddell Hart’s frustration with the strategic reliance on total war saw him become an advocate of limited war. His approach was based on the concept that military force could be used in a limited fashion to achieve national aims. He disliked war, but was far from a pacifist and was eager to develop theories of military utility. Historian Brian Bond writes that ‘Liddell Hart was never a “defeatist” in that he never for a moment considered Britain’s independence to be negotiable.’17 Despite its role as a major theory of warfare, there is no defining document on his theory of limited war. His short book, The Revolution in Warfare, is perhaps the most succinct description of his rejection of total war. It was written in 1944 and released in 1946 with a short epilogue that described the importance of nuclear weapons and should be read not as a theoretic discussion of warfare, but as a narrative of European military history and the problems of a national, total strategic approach to warfare.18
Limited war comprised two related approaches: defence in depth and limited liability. Defence in depth emerged primarily in the context of the increasingly inevitable spectre of the Second World War in the late 1930s and was defined in his book The Defence of Britain.19 Liddell Hart was a fervent advocate of the advantages of defence as a morally superior and more efficient strategic use of force. Bond observes that ‘A major theme in Liddell Hart’s publications in the mid and late 1930s is that the defence is markedly superior to the attack.’20 He proposed a strong defensive belt as an economical means of deterring aggression. Mechanisation was also incorporated to enhance defensive capability. He wrote, ‘This implies in the military sphere an active and mobile defence, in which the effect of direct resistance is extended by reposts both strategic and tactical.’21 But this was also marked by a strategic and operational imperative: ‘Victims of aggression were unlikely to be beaten provided they refrained from “foolish indulgence in attacks”.’22
Limited liability developed as a related concept. Liddell Hart’s previous theories had led him to contemplate the use of force in a limited fashion. Azar Gat has conducted an exhaustive study of Liddell Hart’s theories and writes that he incorporated the approach to war prevalent in the eighteenth century.23 Liddell Hart advocated ‘relatively cautious tactics, and more limited use of battle in deciding the issue of war’.24 He opposed mass conscription and British military involvement on the mainland of Europe. His theories of limited war also influenced the context of military engagement and he advocated the selection of special missions suited to the British force structure.25 This was complemented by his belief in the importance of treaties to international security.26 Limited war has had a profound and ongoing influence on the way governments use force and the way in which military historians and commentators write on warfare. As recently as 2005, retired British general Sir Rupert Smith’s The Utility of Force highlighted the contemporary importance of limited warfare.27 However Liddell Hart intended limited warfare to be employed not in isolation, but in combination with the concept of defence in depth.
Defence in depth in Australia
The 1987 Defence of Australia doctrine represents one example of the use of the concept of defence in depth in the Australian context. Defence of Australia used the concept of defence in depth to task the Australian military with the primary role of defending Australia through surveillance and control of the sea-air gap. The Army’s role comprised surveillance of the defensive belt and maintenance of deployable land forces that could contain or destroy any incursion. As stipulated in the white paper, The Defence of Australia, ‘Australia’s defence strategy is based on the concept of defence in depth. This strategy and our force structure planning give priority to meeting credible levels of threat in Australia’s area of direct military interest.’28 This emphasis on a strong defensive belt was consistent with Liddell Hart’s theories. A defensive posture was advocated as a superior strategic posture for Australia and a means to guarantee the sovereignty of its interests. Ultimately this was a responsive approach to counter any possible incursion. The placement of screening forces in the north of Australia also accorded with Liddell Hart’s description of defence in depth.29 Subsequent brigade-size reaction forces, such as the Operational Deployment Force, and conventional follow-on forces were intended to repel any incursion.30 This concept of fixing and destroying incursions again reflected the strategic considerations Liddell Hart had espoused in his concept of defence in depth, an approach ultimately designed to protect the nation from invasion. The use of defence in depth following the Vietnam War mirrored the policy context of the late 1930s, specifically its aversion to decisive confrontation and commitment. Defence in depth was employed because it appeared to guarantee national defence in an era of reduced defence force capacity.
Australian use of limited liability
The Australian Defence Force (ADF) has applied Liddell Hart’s concept of limited liability primarily in the context of limited military operations. This was largely a consequence of the doctrinal prevalence of low-level military threats and the potential benefits of limited overseas deployments. Australian strategic doctrine from the 1970s reflected the fact that the majority of Australia’s threats and military requirements demanded a limited and scoped response rather than a conventional military deployment. This approach sought to ensure that the ADF would conduct measured and proportionate responses to threats, the ultimate aim to limit the consequences of aggression and conflict. An abiding theme of the 1976 (Australian Defence) and 1987 (The Defence of Australia) white papers was the threat of unconventional and limited operations against Australia.31 Chapter 3 of The Defence of Australia described possible threats as most likely low-level or escalated low-level conflict. It consequently advised that ‘The ADF should therefore be able to conduct such operations as maritime surveillance, interdiction and protection tasks.’32 This was reassuring given the Australian government’s previous successes with limited conflict during the Indonesian Confrontation. A number of historians have described the measured and proportionate response by Australia as effectively confining this conflict and preventing further escalation.33
The importance and complexity of limited threats remained a theme of defence policy in the white papers that followed: ‘These threats could range from harassment of our maritime zone and offshore rigs or mining of ports at the lower level, through to substantial raids of short term duration on important northern targets or our offshore islands.’34 Limited liability also shaped planning for limited offshore responses. The strictly limited nature of these responses was consistent with the prevailing reluctance to participate in significant overseas operations. Australia’s limited operations in the period ranged from peacekeeping to the use of force outside a UN mandate in the second Gulf War. Evans asserts that Australian diplomacy during that period was closely connected with its defence policy. He notes, however, that Australia has been able to use its limited military resources to achieve significant strategic aims: ‘Australia may well have spent much of its history as a “dependent ally”, but its dependency has always been clever, cynical and calculated.’35 He lists the Gulf War, Somalia, East Timor, Afghanistan and Iraq as key recent examples.36 Australia’s defence policy from the 1970s incorporated limited offshore operations in spite of the importance of continental defence and its overall aversion to overseas operations. These strategic outcomes were consistent with Liddell Hart’s concept of limited military involvement.
The indirect approach
Liddell Hart’s indirect approach exerted a crucial influence on Australian doctrine during the period of strategic change from 1972 until the 1990s. This is largely explained by the fact that it was consistent with the strategic context of the period and the prevailing Australian military culture. The indirect approach is a military theory that seeks to target the cohesion and will of a threat rather than its mass. This is a concept that has influenced Australian military doctrine through two distinct avenues. The first of these comprised its direct influence on the development of the Army’s first substantive doctrine following the Vietnam War. This doctrine was a reflection of independence compared with previous iterations that had emphasised alliances.37 This doctrine also gradually introduced the operational level of warfare. The second avenue of influence was manoeuvre theory. The key manoeuvre theorists were heavily influenced by Liddell Hart and this was directly reflected in the Australian adoption of this broad theory.
Overview of Liddell Hart’s indirect approach
The strategy of the indirect approach is Liddell Hart’s most influential and memorable theory and was a logical extension of his published theories on technology, infiltration and the means to avoid decisive wars of annihilation. The indirect approach was also a reaction to the casualties on the Western Front that had affected him so deeply. As Reid observes: ‘Liddell Hart could not escape the pressing reality that all of his theories were rationalizations of his emotional revulsion against the human cost of the great campaigns of the Western Front.’38
While Liddell Hart’s Strategy is recognised as the most comprehensive summary of the indirect approach, it is less a manual than a description of favourable historical applications. As Danchev comments: ‘This thinking grew out of his early work on infantry training and tactics, informed by a grand tour of strategy in history — Baedeker’s battles — and coloured by his more recent observation of live generals running wild in their natural habitat.’39 This approach was frequently oppositional and sought to highlight successful examples that were consistent with Liddell Hart’s theories. Strategy was primarily presented as a series of historical lessons and focussed on neglected military commanders, including Scipio Africanus,40 Belisarius41 and Sherman,42 according them status as successful indirect commanders. As Danchev writes: ‘Clinging to old idols was for Liddell Hart one of the common errors.’43
Nature of the indirect approach
Under the indirect approach, military commanders target alternative enemy vulnerabilities such as cohesion, command and logistics. The indirect approach synthesised Liddell Hart’s ideas that conflict could potentially be resolved without recourse to full military confrontation. He designed the indirect approach to counter existing military orthodoxy which targeted the mass of the enemy and firmly believed that any means that delivered realistic and practical national aims was an application of the indirect approach. Bond comments that, ‘In theoretical terms he attempted to devise a counter to what he regarded as Clausewitz’s evil legacy.’44 A further component of this approach was the military advantage provided by technological innovation and Liddell Hart was closely associated with the development of independent mechanised forces. He believed in the operational and strategic advantages of a faster tempo of warfare.45 However the strategy of the indirect approach has consistently been criticised as reliant on selective historiography and dismissed as vague and potentially controversial.46 Danchev disagrees, writing that it is important not to search for too much structure in Liddell Hart’s theory: ‘The indirect approach is more an attitude of mind than an arrow on the map.’47 This explains why it was not described in linear fashion, instead designed simply as a counter to existing military orthodoxy. Ultimately this was Liddell Hart’s aim. He sought to challenge orthodox thinking and provide an approach that would allow commanders to avoid casualties.
The indirect approach and the development of operational-level doctrine The indirect approach played a direct role in the development of the Australian Army’s operational-level doctrine. This was primarily because it was consistent with the prevailing themes of strategic independence and an aversion to conflict with a peer force. As the Defence of Australia doctrine developed from the mid- 1970s to the late 1980s through Strategic Basis and the white papers, the indirect approach influenced doctrine between the strategic and tactical level, shaping what eventually became the Army’s first operational-level doctrine. Evans notes of the period that ‘It was against the background of a DOA [Defence of Australia] strategic framework that the ADF began to move away from the strategy-tactics paradigm that had dominated its military history.’48 Fundamentals of Land Force Operations was the Army’s first capstone doctrine and described the overarching Army approach to warfare: ‘Collectively the 1977 Fundamentals of Land Force Operations laid down the foundations for a land force doctrine stressing a new indirect strategy.’49 In fact, several paragraphs were devoted to the indirect approach at the strategic and tactical level and the language of the publication stressed independence.50
The adoption of the indirect approach had two advantages. First, at the strategic level it was a military approach that sought to limit the role of armed conflict, consistent with Liddell Hart’s anti-war but non-pacifist stance. This served to reconcile military operations with the strategic direction of a period marked by a reduced appetite for conflict. Fundamentals of Land Force Operations reflected this theme in statements such as: ‘indirect strategy occurs when the result is achieved primarily by non-military means and the use of military force plays a secondary role.’51 As a consequence, the Army became a participant in a strategy that placed a diminished reliance on military actions. Second, the indirect approach was regarded as consistent with Australian military culture and experience. This was a period that encouraged innovative behaviour to offset perceived disadvantages in size and firepower against potential enemies with larger and better equipped forces. Evans comments that, ‘Given the Army’s low-force-to-space ratios, the 1977 pamphlet advanced the proposition that the development of an indirect strategy — derived from the writings of Basil Liddell Hart and Andre Beaufre — was particularly suited to the Australian situation.’52 Indeed Fundamentals of Land Force Operations included a section titled ‘The Characteristics of Australian Doctrine’ which asserted that ‘The Australian Army must be prepared to operate against superior forces … This does not mean avoiding combat, but rather the avoidance of strategies and tactics which rely for their effect on the direct application of massive forces.’53 The implication was that an innovative means of meeting threats would be more effective than mere overmatch of mass and firepower. Evans adds that ‘The Army had to be prepared to operate successfully on Australian soil against superior forces by avoiding attrition strategy and tactics.’54
Further development of operational-level doctrine
For all its innovation, however, the indirect approach may well have delayed the Australian Army’s development at the operational level of warfare because it focused on prevailing in battle without consideration of the campaign’s conclusion. Prior to the 1990s, the Australian Army had limited capability at the operational level and the indirect approach did not present an immediate remedy. The 1977 edition of the Fundamentals of Land Force Operations did not specifically address the operational level of conflict; indeed this was not introduced until the 1985 edition.55 Evans was one of a number of historians who noted that Liddell Hart had substituted the operational level of command for what earlier military theorists had termed ‘grand tactics’.56 Grand tactics largely comprised the connection of a series of tactical actions to achieve an end.57 The indirect approach generally focuses on the execution of tactical actions, although it is less descriptive in terms of campaigning and connecting these actions. This was consistent with the tactical bias prevalent during the period. The Army demonstrated a limited capacity to conduct its own independent operations during the 1980s and was confined to connecting tactical actions, a fact demonstrated during the major exercises of the period.58 There was also very limited joint interoperability.59 Blaxland denies that the Army was ‘an adaptive learning organisation, responsive to the emerging strategic and operational trends’.60 Indeed the limitations of the Australian Army’s operational capabilities were clearly revealed in this period by the difficulties faced in Operation Morris Dance which saw forces assembled close to Fiji in 1987. As Blaxland notes, this short deployment ‘provided a sobering demonstration of the limitations of Australian military power in the late 1980s.’61 The Australian Army’s involvement at the operational level required robust command at the joint level, while the indirect approach was concerned primarily with the use of combat force to decide conflict. The proper development of the operational level was to occur much later.
The indirect approach and the development of manoeuvre theory
The indirect approach played a pivotal role in the adoption of manoeuvre theory by the Australian Army. Manoeuvre theory did not follow a clear path of development because of the decentralised nature of its ideas. Instead it was a process of steadily increasing influence of which Danchev notes: ‘Liddell Hart’s significance in this sphere is greater than we know. He is part of the mental furniture of manoeuvre, part of the climate of ideas.’62 Manoeuvre theory was also influenced by Liddell Hart’s particular brand of advocacy, specifically the use of published work to change the military institution from the outside. From the 1980s, however, manoeuvre theory exerted a rapid and significant effect on NATO militaries.63
In the Australian Army it gained traction from the early 1990s, particularly as a result of the speed and decisiveness with which the 1991 Gulf War was concluded. As Blaxland writes, ‘In the years after the Gulf War, discussions took place within the Army concerning “manoeuvre theory” and the place of “protected mobility”.’64
The indirect approach and the authors of manoeuvre theory
The early development of manoeuvre theory resembled the initial development of the indirect approach in the 1920s and 1930s. The key theorists published books and voiced their opinions in professional journals with the aim of changing the military institution’s way of thinking. In this they resembled Liddell Hart in his advocacy during the interwar years. Sir John Kiszely wrote of manoeuvre theory’s magnetism: ‘Indeed, there are still some who attribute supernatural powers to it as a military panacea, comparable to Liddell Hart’s advocacy of his indirect approach.’65 Some of the key early theorists of manoeuvre theory made direct reference to Liddell Hart and different elements of the indirect approach, including Colonel John Boyd, William Lind and Lieutenant Colonel Robert Leonhard, all of whom have contributed to the development of Australian military theory. Frans Osinga studied the roots of Boyd’s military theories and identified Liddell Hart as a significant influence: ‘What Liddell Hart terms the indirect approach, Boyd refers to as Maneuver Conflict, one of three kinds of human conflict.’66 Lind consolidated this process by providing early manoeuvre theorists with advocacy in Washington, writing the first book dedicated to manoeuvre theory in 1985.67 Manoeuvre Theory Handbook was in part a critique of the US Army doctrine publication FM100-5 and in part a manual for the conduct of manoeuvre theory.68 The actual reference to Liddell Hart amounts to a short description of his ‘The Man in the Dark’ theory, simply noting that this was a brief publication.69 Leonhard’s book The Art of Manoeuvre contains a chapter titled ‘The Evolution of Maneuver Theory’ which provides a valuable summary of the contemporary influences and contributions to the approach. He noted in a section on Liddell Hart that ‘the indirect approach involves subtlety, deception and the avoidance of enemy strength’.70 Each of these books sought to distinguish manoeuvre theory from the prevailing operational art. The contrary position is one of the distinguishing features of the indirect approach and reflects the fact that manoeuvre theory itself is a very difficult concept to define. As Osinga commented, ‘Boyd also resembles Liddell Hart in his didactic method.’71 Their approach mirrored Liddell Hart’s form of outsider advocacy which aimed to change military thinking.72 The indirect approach continues to represent one of the most enduring influences on manoeuvre theory.
The nature of Liddell Hart’s influence on Australian manoeuvre theory
The influence of the indirect approach on Australian manoeuvre theory is evident in the themes of Australian doctrine and the bias for specific historical lessons. The Australian Army readily adopted manoeuvre theory from the late 1980s in a key document entitled Directive Control.73 The introduction to Directive Control announced that: ‘The main thrust of conventional tactical doctrine has shifted from battles of attrition … to an emphasis on manoeuvre.’74 Evans writes that Directive Control had a profound influence on the Army’s command arrangements with key texts on manoeuvre theory emphasising the distinction between attrition and manoeuvre. Liddell Hart’s theories, particularly the indirect approach, had a marked influence on doctrine and on military thought in the wider professional military forum in Australia. First, the selective use of military history to support Australian military doctrine, a technique beloved of Liddell Hart himself, was increasingly apparent. Australian military doctrine traditionally dismisses campaigns it identifies as attritional.75 Military campaigns such as the Somme and even some of the operations conducted in Vietnam are described as attritional and their failure is attributed at least in part to their reliance on firepower and mass. This is consistent with Liddell Hart’s writing as he was himself critical of these types of campaigns.76 Manoeuvre campaigns are accordingly distinguished by their decisiveness and creativity with examples that focus on Lae and the wider Pacific campaign.77 A key distinction of these battles is the attempt to avoid frontal assaults on enemy strongpoints.
There are also references to Liddell Hart’s work in both journals and doctrine publications, including an article published in the ADF Journal in 1996 which explores the indirect approach and the connection between Liddell Hart and Sun Tzu.78 Australian Army doctrine often uses quotes from the work of Liddell Hart.79 Such references acknowledge the influence of his theories on Australian military thought, particularly during the development of manoeuvre theory. Likewise, the Army’s relationship with mechanised warfare is an example of the specific influence of the indirect approach on its doctrine. Manoeuvre theory is inextricably linked with mechanised warfare and many of its key proponents such as Leonhard were themselves mechanised officers. However, neither manoeuvre theory nor the indirect approach represents a blueprint for mechanised warfare. Instead, mechanisation is used to enhance tempo and decision superiority. This is consistent with Liddell Hart’s views on mechanisation which were focused more on speed of decision-making than firepower and protection. The Army’s doctrinal focus on decision-making may have been a result of the reluctance of ADF planners to invest in totally mechanised forces. This point was reflected in the 1997 document Restructuring the Australian Army which sought to justify the grouping of armour, fire support and aviation into task-organised units by noting: ‘The current Army approach to the battlefield reflects an anticipated scarcity of some combat and combat support units.’80 The British Army experience mirrored that of Australia and the authors of British Military Doctrine introduced manoeuvre theory at the behest of Field Marshal Sir Nigel Bagnall in 1989. British Military Doctrine clearly linked the indirect approach to the manoeuvrist approach.81
Conclusion
The theories of Basil Liddell Hart consistently influenced the development of key areas of ADF and Army doctrine from the 1970s to 1990s. While this influence is not documented as such, the footprint of those theories is readily apparent in the presence of consistent themes in Australian doctrine that reflect his approach. The strategic circumstances of this period demanded unique ideas and Liddell Hart’s theories were appropriate to these circumstances and were characterised by innovation. The requirement to mitigate ambiguous threats with limited resources dictated a limited response and Liddell Hart’s defence in depth and limited liability provided an ideal solution. Defence in depth represented a means to defend Australia against possible threats while acknowledging the prevalent aversion to militarism. Limited liability sought to employ military force for strategic ends without escalation. Together these approaches formed the twin arms of limited war and exerted a substantial influence on the Defence of Australia doctrine.
Similarly, the indirect approach, which represented a key influence on the Army’s first operational-level doctrine, has consistently allowed Australian planners to develop operational and strategic doctrine that is not reliant on mass and firepower. It specifically influenced the Army’s first capstone doctrine, Fundamentals of Land Force Operations, continuing that influence with the development of manoeuvre theory. Indeed, the Australian use of manoeuvre theory was defined by Liddell Hart’s specific perspective on conflict. Liddell Hart’s influence on the development of such a broad range of military doctrine marks his theories as fundamental to doctrine development during the period from the 1970s to the 1990s. These theories were influential because they suited the circumstances of the period and reflected the timelessness of Liddell Hart’s particular brand of military thought.
That he should exert such a profound influence on military conceptual and doctrinal thought decades after his death in 1970 is a tribute to the innovative and enduring nature of his theories. The Australian Army of today would do well to revisit Liddell Hart’s theories and ponder their relevance in this time of change.
Endnotes
1 Sir Basil Liddell Hart, The Revolution in Warfare, Faber & Faber, London, 1946; Sir Basil Liddell Hart, Strategy, The Art of the Indirect Approach, Faber & Faber, London, 1967.
2 Michael Evans, The Tyranny of Dissonance: Australia’s strategic culture and way of war 1901-2005, Study Paper No. 306, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Canberra, 2005, p. 62.
3 Ibid., p. 55.
4 Department of Defence, The Strategic Basis of Australia’s Defence, October 1975, Chapter 5.
5 John Blaxland, The Australian Army from Whitlam to Howard, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 2014, p. 37.
6 Ibid., pp. 20–22.
7 Michael Evans, Forward from the Past, Study Paper No. 301, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Canberra, 2005, pp. 68–71.
8 Ibid., pp. 71–74.
9 Blaxland, The Australian Army from Whitlam to Howard, p. 22.
10 Alex Danchev, The Alchemist of War, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1998.
11 Ibid., Chapter 2.
12 B.H. Liddell Hart, ‘“The Man in the Dark” Theory of Infantry Tactics and the “Expanding Torrent” System of Attack’, The Journal of the Royal United Services Institution, Vol. LXVI, No. 461, February 1921.
13 Danchev, The Alchemist of War, pp. 102–03.
14 Ibid., pp. 78–79.
15 Alex Danchev, ‘“Cross-Dressing”: Liddell Hart, Fashion, and War’, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol. 24, No. 2, pp. 257–58.
16 Danchev, The Alchemist of War, pp. 227–28.
17 B. Bond, Liddell Hart: A Study of his Military Thought, Cassell, London, 1977, p. 129.
18 Ibid., pp. 166–67.
19 Sir Basil Liddell Hart, The Defence of Britain, Faber, London, 1939.
20 Bond, Liddell Hart: A Study of his Military Thought, p. 97.
21 Liddell Hart, The Defence of Britain, p. 43.
22 Bond, Liddell Hart: A Study of his Military Thought, p. 97.
23 Azar Gat, A History of Military Thought, Oxford University Press, UK, 2001, pp. 677–80.
24 Ibid., p. 678.
25 Robert H. Larson, ‘B.H. Liddell Hart: Apostle of Limited War’, Military Affairs, Vol. 44, No. 2, April 1980, p. 72.
26 Brian Holden Reid, ‘Young Turks or Not So Young? The Frustrated Quest of Major General
J. F. C. Fuller and Captain B. H. Liddell Hart’, The Journal of Military History, Vol. 73, Issue 1, January 2009, p. 163.
27 James Gow, ‘The New Clausewitz? War, force, art and utility – Rupert Smith on 21st century strategy, operations and tactics in a comprehensive war’, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 9, No. 6, December 2006, pp. 1161–62. See also Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force, Allen Lane, UK, 2005.
28 Department of Defence, The Defence of Australia, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1987, p. 31.
29 Ibid., pp. 56–57.
30 Ibid., p. 54; Department of Defence, The Army in the 1980s, Canberra, 1982, pp. 6–8.
31 Department of Defence, Australian Defence, Australian Government Publishing Service, 1976.
32 The Defence of Australia, p. 25.
33 For example, Garry Woodward, ‘Best Practice in Australia’s Foreign Policy: “Konfrontasi” (1963- 1966)’, Australian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 33, No. 1, pp. 93–97.
34 The Defence of Australia, p. 30.
35 Evans, The Tyranny of Dissonance, p. 57.
36 Ibid., p. 49.
37 Australian Army, Division in Battle, Counter Revolutionary Warfare 1965, Pamphlet No. 11, Army Headquarters, Canberra, 1966.
38 Reid, ‘Young Turks or Not So Young?, p. 164.
39 Alex Danchev, ‘Liddell Hart and the Indirect Approach’, The Journal of Military History, Vol. 63, Issue 2, p. 315.
40 Liddell Hart, Strategy, pp. 24–33; Liddell Hart, A Greater than Napoleon: Scipio Africanus, W. Blackwood & Sons, Edinburgh, 1927.
41 Liddell Hart, Strategy, pp. 39–53.
42 Ibid., pp. 131–37; Liddell Hart, Sherman: Soldier, Realist, American, Dodd & Mead, New York, 1929.
43 Danchev, The Alchemist of War, p. 158.
44 Bond, Liddell Hart: A Study of His Military Thought, p. 38.
45 Michael Howard, ‘Three People – Liddell Hart’ in Michael Howard, The Causes of Wars, Unwin Paperbacks, London, 1983, pp. 240–41.
46 Australian Army Doctrine Centre, ‘Manoeuvre Theory’, Australian Defence Force Journal, No. 111, March/April 1995, pp, 30–31; William F. Owen, ‘The Maneuvre Warfare Fraud’, RUSI Journal, August 2008, Vol. 153, No. 4.
47 Danchev, ‘Liddell Hart and the Indirect Approach’, p. 313.
48 Michael Evans, ‘The Closing of the Australian Military Mind’, Security Challenges, Vol. 4, No. 2, winter 2008, p. 115.
49 Evans, Forward from the Past, p. 20.
50 Australian Army, The Fundamentals of Land Force Operations, pp. 2-2–2-3, paras 206–208; 213–216.
51 Ibid., p. 2-2, para 206.
52 Evans, Forward from the Past, p. 18.
53 The Fundamentals of Land Force Operations, p. 4-1, para 405.
54 Evans, Forward from the Past, pp. 18–19.
55 Ibid., pp. 27–28.
56 Evans, ‘The Closing of the Military Mind’, p. 107.
57 Wallace P. Franz, ‘Grand Tactics’, Military Review, Vol. LXI, No. 12, p. 34.
58 Blaxland, The Australian Army from Whitlam to Howard, p. 58.
59 Ibid., p. 62.
60 Ibid., p. 71.
61 Ibid., p. 67.
62 Alex Danchev, ‘Liddell Hart and Manoeuvre’, RUSI Journal, Vol. 143, No. 6, p. 33.
63 Major General John Kiszely, ‘The Meaning of Manoeuvre’, RUSI Journal, Vol. 143, No. 6, December 1998, pp. 37–38.
64 Blaxland, The Australian Army from Whitlam to Howard, p. 93.
65 Kiszely, ‘The Meaning of Manoeuvre’, p. 38.
66 Frans Osinga, Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd, Eburon Academic Publishers, Delft, The Netherlands, 2005, p. 56.
67 William Lind, Manoeuvre Theory Handbook, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1985.
68 US Department of the Army, FM100-5 Operations, Washington DC, 1993.
69 Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook, p. 9.
70 Robert Leonhard, The Art of Maneuver: Maneuver-Warfare Theory and Airland Battle, Presidio Press, Novato, California, 1991, p. 46.
71 Osinga, Science, Strategy and War, p. 53.
72 Reid, ‘Young Turks or Not So Young?’, pp. 169–71.
73 Australian Army, Directive Control, Headquarters Training Command, Sydney, 1988.
74 Ibid., para 3.
75 Department of Defence, The Australian Approach to Warfare, National Capital Printing, June 2002, pp. 23, 5; Australian Defence Force Warfare Centre, ADDP 00.1 Command and Control, Defence Publishing Service, Canberra, 2009, para. 2.13.
76 Sir Basil Liddell Hart, A History of the World War, Faber & Faber, London, 1930, Chapter 6.
77 Directorate of Plans – Army, The Australian Army: An Aide Memoire, Canberra, 2014, p. 3.
78 Michael Krause, ‘Classical Strategists and the Indirect Approach’, Australian Defence Force Journal, No. 119, pp. 17–20.
79 There are no fewer than three in LWD-3-0 Operations.
80 Australian Army, Restructuring the Australian Army, Directorate of Publishing and Visual Communication, Canberra, 1997, p. 54.
81 Colonel Alexander Alderson, ‘Influence, the Indirect Approach and Manoeuvre’, RUSI Journal, Vol. 157, No. 1, p. 37.
