The Myths of Cultural Awareness: Culture Does Not Eat Strategy for Breakfast
Abstract
Since military operations in international settings often place a greater emphasis on cooperating with indigenous forces and working within local populations the understanding of cultural factors — what is commonly referred to as cultural awareness — is frequently stressed in military training. This article presents a slightly dissenting view from mainstream cultural awareness training and critically analyses the ‘primacy of culture perspective’, concluding that cultural factors will not significantly alter human nature and that military commanders often tend to over- complicate the issue of culture. This article will argue that most human behaviours are universal — not cultural — and that although understanding cultural factors may appear to be an operational necessity, they do not fundamentally change the principles of warfare, military strategy or the military profession. Culture is one factor to consider in military operations, but by no means the most crucial. This article also considers the perspective that cultural awareness has to start with an awareness of our own culture and how we will be perceived in international operations.
Introduction
During recent years both the Swedish Armed Forces and the Australian Defence Force have participated in similar operational deployments to Afghanistan, the Middle East and Africa. Since these deployments often involved cooperation with indigenous forces and working within local populations, the importance of understanding the local culture — what is commonly referred to as cultural awareness — has been emphasised in military training.1
Experience has clearly shown that aspects of different cultures — such as religion, language, local and regional customs, values and ways of living together — will affect military operations in current and future deployments.2 It has shown that soldiers should have a deep understanding of the local population’s culture and sub-cultures, as well as an ability to influence people and perceptions.3
This article will present a view that differs from mainstream cultural awareness training. It will dismiss common misconceptions about cultural awareness and will propose a practical framework for soldiers. This framework is based on solid scientific evidence and tested by my own operational experiences.
Defining and approaching culture
Culture is a difficult term to define, mainly due to the fact that it is a collective term describing many different things. From art and literature to customs, values and beliefs, culture is a term that defines and describes many aspects of our lives that we cannot easily group under the same heading. In different areas the word is given different meanings. Hence there is a need to operationalise what we mean by the word ‘culture’.
The word ‘culture’ originates from the Latin culturae ‘to cultivate’. Whereas natura is the untouched form, culture is a pattern that has been created by man. In social terms it is most often described as ways of living together. Culture is always shared and used to distinguish different groups that have more or less distinct characteristics.
Culture distinguishes social constructions within a group of individuals. These seldom, if ever, match national, geographical or ethnic boundaries and it is very difficult to ascertain exactly how small or large a culture is.4 Any identifiable culture can be further broken down into unique, more or less homogenous sub-cultures. This further complicates the definition of culture.
The problem of how to define and delineate a culture soon becomes obvious. How far should the cultural division go — does it reach down to the level of tribes, neighbourhoods, families or even individuals? How do we conceptualise the fact that an individual can be influenced by several cultures or sub-cultures to varying degrees? An individual can be part of the cultures of a church, a trade union, a military unit, a football team or a family — all influencing him or her to different degrees and in different ways. While these questions have no easy answer they lead to one important conclusion: when discussing culture in an operational context, it is difficult — even dangerous — to generalise so broadly as to speak of one Somali, Afghan or Iraqi culture. Our mindset, given our profession, should be that we interact with humans, and culture is only one factor to consider.
But since we’re dealing with human beings, do we really need cultural awareness training? Historically many wars and peacekeeping operations have been successfully waged without any such training. Shouldn’t the ‘good bloke factor’ or plain common sense be enough?5 Certainly, being a good person is an important element, but it should be supplemented with knowledge about the individuals we are meeting. As for the common sense factor, we should always ask ourselves: common to whom?6 Individuals from another culture may view the world from a different perspective, thus making ideas about what is sensible ‘common’ primarily to them. Having a mindset that encompasses these perspectives is likely to enhance operational effectiveness.
There is clearly a need for cultural training in the modern military. The question is how we can best prepare soldiers, sailors and airmen for future operations through this training.
Awareness is not enough
To begin with, let’s examine some of the basic factors concerning training in cultural awareness. A common error can be identified in the term itself: awareness. Have you ever received a military order that states: ‘Kilo Lima, advance to the town square, and be culturally aware’? Probably not. This is because cultural awareness is only a means to reach a military objective and never an objective in itself.
When giving lectures on operational culture I often ask individuals to select which category best describes them: 1) scholars of social anthropology or 2) soldiers, sailors and airmen. To date, no-one has selected the first option. Since I have primarily given presentations to military audiences, this is an expected result, but it is relevant exactly because of that. In a military context it is not the cultural phenomenon per se that interests us but rather how — if at all — it will affect our military operations.
The cultural awareness training given to soldiers can take many forms. It is possible, however, to group culture training programs into two broad categories. The first category comprises simple approaches often involving a ‘cultural awareness smart card’ that is laminated and fits in your pocket. With clear do’s and don’ts, these cards tell you in simple terms how to face another culture. Do not spit, do not break wind, do not show the soles of your feet and do not greet with your left hand. If you commit one of these cultural mortal sins you will be forever doomed. But if we look at these critically the flaws become self-evident. Do you often spit at people when you talk to them? Do you not normally shake hands with your right hand? The behaviours described on these smart cards often reflect not cultural, but rather more general human codes of conduct and if our soldiers can’t follow them to begin with then we have bigger problems than those addressed by cultural awareness training. Nor can we, for that matter, reduce human interaction to something that can be described in an Ikea-style manual.
The other category comprises a more advanced approach which involves studying everything about an area or a culture. This approach often involves listening to lectures from ‘experts’ on the area such as professors, ambassadors, diplomats or aid workers. The problem with this approach is the same as the question that the rifleman asks when he or she finishes reading a prescribed book or after leaving a lecture: so what? While often highly interesting, lectures and books on the subject are often too theoretical and too difficult to easily implement within the daily military routine, especially for the average soldier. If anything, this approach can create a dangerous sense that culture is impossible to fully understand and that soldiers do better by not trying at all. The simple ‘smart card’ approach contains too many broad generalisations while the advanced ‘going for the PhD’ approach is too theoretical and not applicable to military operations.
One other possible reaction to the expectation that cultures will be substantially different is to prohibit certain topics of discussion where differences may arise. During one conversation with a counterpart in the Middle East I explained the directive from our armed forces to never discuss politics, sex or religion. The man simply looked at me perplexed and finally answered: ‘Then what is there left to talk about?’ There are seldom any ‘hazardous topics’ that shouldn’t be discussed. On the contrary, people across the world share a willingness for conversation and the points mentioned above are among the most common topics for discussion, both within and across cultures. To reduce or restrict communication cannot be a viable solution.
What we must try to do is to give soldiers a simplified, defusing approach — free of intimidation or restriction — that views the individuals we encounter as human beings. And this must be an approach that recognises that the cultural behaviours of those individuals are seldom, if ever, an obstacle for communication or military cooperation.
In a different culture, everything changes
The argument is often made that ‘when working in a different culture, everything changes’. The implication is that, unless born and raised in the culture in question, one can never fully understand or function in that society. This paints the culture as an obstacle that can never be overcome. But looking critically at this primacy of culture perspective, do we really believe that some of the people we encounter are like aliens that do not share the same cognitive processes and basic human values as the rest of the world’s population?7 Probably not.
In fairness, some of the sources on cultural awareness mentioned earlier recognise that culture doesn’t change everything, despite adopting a primacy of culture perspective. For example, Christopher Lamb, in his discussion of persuasion tactics in US psychological operations notes that ‘persuasive communication transcends culture by the most basic appeals’, arguing that the most fundamental principles, for example the appeal to self-interest, are universal across cultures.8
But there is strong evidence that more than just the basic principles of psychology are common across cultures. In reality, most human behaviours are universal. Few are culturally distinctive, and I have yet to find support for the claim that culture can fundamentally alter human cognition. In fact, it was recently discovered that the classical psychological conformity study conducted by Solomon Asch in 19519 has been positively replicated 133 times across the globe.10 This, along with other studies, indicates that the fundamentals of human psychology are common to individuals everywhere. Matsumoto asserts that ‘general functions are more likely to yield cultural universals, while specific functions are more likely to prove culturally distinctive.’11 By this he means that our general human functions are the same,
and that it is the small, specific functions that are culturally distinctive. Humans are humans wherever you go in the world, and there is more that connects us than separates us.
They are the strange ones
So far we have limited our considerations to the culture of the individuals we encounter during overseas deployments. But another equally important variable in the cultural equation is your own culture, how it manifests itself and how it will be perceived by the local population.
If we are talking about cultural differences, then we are talking about a measurable distance between ourselves and another social group. When considering the distance between point A and point B, it is always the case that the distance from each point to the other is the same. To another culture, we are as different to them as they are to us. If we perceive cultural differences, so will they.
In this cultural equation we often view our own culture as normal — we are the normal ones and they are the strange ones. But there is no logical argument to support such a claim. In fact, when visiting another country, wouldn’t it make more sense to accept that we are the strange ones and that that country’s citizens are normal? Our culture does not set the standard for what is ‘normal culture’ even though we might unconsciously assume this.
This error in thinking is not uncommon and has a natural explanation. We view the world through our own eyes and interpret it according to our own expectations, values and beliefs. Information that is new to us and does not match our expectations or previous experiences is, by definition, strange to us.
To view culture in black and white terms is a characteristic of ethnocentrism.12 This view often results from a lack of education and experience and can cause an individual to see his own culture as ‘right’ and any other as ‘wrong’. Ethnocentrism influences our perception of the world in varying degrees. But it is clear that, in order to fully understand and appreciate another culture, we must first be aware of and embrace our own culture and be open to the fact that other persons may view us as culturally strange.
Organisational culture and operational culture
In addition to the cultural differences of individuals in another country, we must also consider the culture of our own organisations. We often react strongly to the differences of a foreign culture, but can be blind to the fact that these may be dwarfed by the differences between the services (army, navy, air force) within our own military.
This is natural in all major organisations. A study of international corporations notes that sometimes the differences within an organisation can be greater than the differences between similar organisations in different countries. ‘The temptation to attribute differences to different cultural mindsets is strong,’ states Professor Livia Markóczy, ‘… but may pale in comparison to the differences between the production people and the marketing people in that same firm.’13
Israeli Army psychologist Ben Shalit makes a similar point when he recounts his experiences visiting the front-line troops in the Sinai desert.14 His first stop was the commander of the paratrooper battalion. Eager to make a good impression, the sharply dressed Shalit saluted crisply when reporting correctly to the commander. His behaviour led to a scolding and almost got him thrown out of the command post. Saluting, wearing headgear in the field and calling title by rank was almost a mortal sin (no reason to give the snipers a clear target) and unheard of within the strongly functional discipline of the paratroopers. A few hours later, Shalit put his newly acquired knowledge into action when visiting the commander of the armour battalion, which in turn earned him another scolding and almost saw him thrown out of that command post as well. Attention to the smallest detail was considered fundamental for combat success among the tankies (formal discipline was considered crucial for the intricate teamwork of the tank crews) and any form of sloppiness or neglect was considered unacceptable. Behaviour was operationalised around the objectives and modus operandi of the different kinds of units, which in turn affected their organisational culture.
Shalit points to even more interesting differences in organisational culture when he admits (with good humour) that the only possible reason the two battalion commanders tolerated his behaviour was that he was wearing a navy uniform, which apparently automatically excused his ignorance of proper military manners. Despite notable differences in organisational culture, Shalit makes no suggestion of a consequent reduction in the combat effectiveness of each respective unit — rather the opposite — or the ability of the two commanders to work together towards a common objective.
These examples raise an important question: if we can successfully work together with individuals from other parts of our own organisation with significant differences in organisational culture without any advanced training, then shouldn’t we be able to work together with individuals from cultures in other countries as well?
Markóczy’s theories argue that we already have the ability to work with individuals from other cultures, but that ‘our view is obscured by our expectation of substantial cultural differences’.15 When we expect the individuals we are meeting to be radically different, with behaviours it will be impossible to fully comprehend, we tend to limit our communication, making our expectations a self-fulfilling prophecy. But if we instead embrace the fact that every individual is first of all a human, who holds the same basic values and beliefs as we do, we can start to look for commonalities that will facilitate communication and are likely to enhance the overall efficiency of the operation we are undertaking. If you search for differences you will build obstacles — but if you search for commonalities you will build bridges. Even if there are numerous differences between cultures, an approach based on trying to find commonalities will probably be far more fruitful.
During a deployment to Afghanistan I served as team leader, working closely with the local population. On one patrol we were accompanied by a colonel and his close protection team. During a short stop, while trying to negotiate the best way to reach the police station that was our destination, I noticed that one of the military bodyguards — a military policeman — had engaged an Afghan police officer in conversation at an intersection ahead. Surprised, since I knew that the individual could not speak the local language, I walked up to them. As I approached I could clearly hear the soldier, a sociable and outgoing man from Gothenburg, in heavily accented Swedish and with wild gesticulations, asking for directions to the police station. What was more surprising was that the Afghan police officer clearly understood him, and was answering with directions in the local Dari dialect. These directions led us directly to the police station.
When asked for the reason behind his actions, the military policeman simply answered, ‘I saw that he was a police officer as well, I figured he had to know the way.’ When asked more specifically why he didn’t bring an interpreter, the man only laughed and said, ‘Now you’re only seeing the problems.’
Although I firmly believe that the communication between the two police officers would have been better with an interpreter, it clearly indicates that communication does not have to be complicated. The two individuals were not afraid of cultural boundaries and searched instead for commonalities. Identifying each other as police officers established common ground between them, and the use of simple words such as ‘police’ and ‘motor’, together with body language was sufficient for them to communicate.
Culture does not eat strategy for breakfast
A phrase often heard and repeated as a mantra before and during overseas deployments is that ‘culture eats strategy for breakfast’.16 This phrase, and others like it, suggests that unless we understand the cultural context in which we operate, our military strategies will never succeed. In some cases, military theorists have gone so far as to coin the term culture-centric warfare with the implication that we should approach all military operations from a cultural perspective.17 It is not uncommon for culture to be portrayed as the primary factor affecting success in military operations.
But is understanding the cultural context really more important than understanding the military profession, operational art or military strategy? If this was the case then local employees — natives from the culture in question — would be best suited to conduct negotiations, liaison, psychological operations, mentoring, special operations or any other type of military task that involves contact with the local population. This is probably not the case. Looking back at the most successful campaigns and operations in military history, are those successes the result of superior cultural awareness or the best military strategy and resources to pursue that strategy? Not understanding the cultural context might be a barrier, but not nearly as dangerous as having insufficient skills in the military profession.
When considering cultural factors we should always bear in mind that we are soldiers — experts in the instrument of legitimised violence — who conduct military operations.18 We’re not midwives, priests, anthropologists, journalists or members of any other profession. We’re soldiers, and as soldiers we should adapt only to the cultural phenomena that affect our military operations and leave the remaining cultural elements for others to explore.
Cultural awareness or cultural adaptation?
During overseas deployments it is not uncommon to see soldiers from different nations embrace some of the cultural practices of the local population to varying degrees. Examples include growing long beards, wearing civilian scarves or hats from the area or participating in local ceremonies in order to express ‘deep cultural sensitivity’. The implication is that this will raise the level of communicative trust and therefore increase operational effectiveness. Committing to the ‘go native style’ (a practice originally undertaken by special operations forces) is sometimes accepted as justification to break military rules and regulations even if there is no other logical reason for this.
There is, in fact, little evidence in the literature on cultural psychology or in military doctrine that the ‘go native’ approach — mimicking or adapting to the culture in question — produces any increase in operational effectiveness. On the contrary, the individuals you encounter will expect you to be a good representative of your culture. To over-adapt can easily be counter-productive and cause more harm than good. Markóczy agrees, arguing that ‘the line between being insensitive and sensitive to cultural differences may be as thin as the line between being sensitive and oversensitive to them.’19
Let us consider another example but in reverse: a warlord from Afghanistan comes to your regiment in your home country to negotiate. On arrival he is clean-shaven, sporting a slicked-back hairstyle and is dressed in clothes common among the hip-hop culture of the urban youth in your city. Would you interpret this as incredibly culturally sensitive in a way that makes you trust the individual more, or would you find it laughable or even suspicious? Probably the latter!
One possible explanation for the ‘go native’ approach is that it lends a perception of cultural competence. From a purely individual perspective the approach can actually have some limited effect. Reducing the differences in physical appearance might give the perception that, as a corollary, any cultural differences will be reduced as well, thus facilitating interpersonal communication. If an individual feels confident that a longer beard makes him better at communicating, then it might give him the confidence that perceived cultural obstacles can be overcome more easily. However, this will only affect the individual’s belief in his own ability to communicate, and not how this behaviour will be interpreted by a counterpart, thus still making it highly likely to be counterproductive.
The arguments for the ‘go native’ approach also rest on the premise that culture is an obstacle that has to be overcome in order to communicate. Methods to overcome perceived cultural obstacles might have some effect, but will probably never be as effective as not regarding cultural differences as an obstacle in the first place.
The tendency to over-complicate culture
So why are the views expressed above not mentioned more often in training or in the literature? Many people, not just soldiers, are required to work within a different culture. This has created a flourishing market for consultants and cultural awareness training programs. To simplify the problem or downplay the need for training is not in the interests of individuals making a business from the delivery of such training. Another explanation is that academia places a premium on statistics and identifiable differences between experimental and control groups. Intercultural psychology places a premium on finding differences, not similarities, between cultures. And humans — including researchers — tend to find what they expect to find.20
Kelton Rhoads emphasises these effects in his work on intercultural communication. He asserts that it is not uncommon for researchers and lecturers to masquerade psychological universals as cultural specifics.21 He cites several examples of influence campaigns designed to be successful in a given cultural setting when in reality these campaigns would succeed — or fail — in any cultural setting for similar reasons. Although Rhoads’ work focuses on cross-cultural communication in general, military examples of this difference-bias are not difficult to find:
- A study discussing communication techniques for psychological operations to foreign target audiences in the Arab world stated that using ‘Western style’ dissemination methods such as television were less persuasive and that the culture in question was more likely to be influenced by relationship- centred, interpersonal communication. This is absolutely true, however it is also true in other parts of the world, and is a good example of a universal principle masked as a cultural specific.22
- During the conflict in Afghanistan, US forces have, to date, been accused several times of desecrating the bodies of enemy combatants. During one incident in 2005, the action of incinerating the bodies instead of burying them infuriated the local community and was categorised by many as a ‘huge cultural blunder’, indicating the need for increased cultural awareness training.23 The act was in itself despicable, but a valid question is: can you name any culture in which the desecration of bodies would be anything but insensitive? If a taboo is shared across cultures then it is not culturally but rather humanly insensitive.24
In addition to the difference-bias, culture is sometimes used as a scapegoat for behaviours which have no valid justification. Comments such as: ‘it’s in their culture’ or ‘they don’t want to help themselves’ are sometimes made in frustration. Such comments clearly externalise the reason for failure to communicate and also attribute this failure to a culture, not a person. To attribute failure to external causes without acknowledging one’s own shortcomings is actually a normal reaction, according to Attribution Theory, a psychological principle derived by Fritz Heider.25 Ironically, in the reverse situation, the same individuals would be more likely to internalise the causes of successful communication. They would ascribe success to their own personal competence (such as a high level of cultural awareness) rather than favourable situational factors. But the fact remains. In general we have a tendency to automatically attribute failures to external causes generally, and often culture specifically, rather than take the time to find more plausible explanations.
We don’t always need to find complex answers to cultural questions. Sometimes the simple explanations are best. The principle of simplicity is an excellent tool when encountering a foreign culture.26 For example, in some under-developed countries people sit on the floor and eat with their hands. We can seek a complex cultural explanation for this behaviour — and believe me, I have heard several of them — or we can accept a simpler explanation that requires fewer assumptions: they are very poor and have never been able to afford furniture or cutlery.
Conclusion
Culture should best be viewed as a moderator of psychological effects rather than something that fundamentally changes human nature. Cultural differences are natural and should exist, but are seldom — if ever — an obstacle, nor are there any ‘cultural mortal sins’. Most human behaviours are universal, not cultural. If we search for cultural differences we will build our own obstacles. But if we search for commonalities instead, we will build bridges and a stable ground for future military cooperation.
Cultural differences will enrich your experiences in another country, but they are seldom — if ever — a factor that fundamentally changes human psychology or the basic principles of warfare. The extent to which a cultural phenomenon requires an explanation depends on your task: if it is clear that culture will affect your operations, then by all means it should be included as a factor in operational planning. But if the culture does not affect the task at hand — and the chances are that it won’t — then the solution can be as simple as carrying on with the military operation and leaving culture as a phenomenon for the anthropologists to study.
Endnotes
1 Angus Houston, Joint Operations in the 21st Century, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2007.
2 Steven Brain, Operational Culture: Is the Australian Army Driving the Train of Left at the Station?, United States Marine Corps, School of Advanced Warfighting, Command and Staff College, Marine Corps University, Quantico Virginia, 2008.
3 Christopher Lamb, Review of Psychological Operations Lessons Learned from Recent Operational Experience, National Defense University Press, Washington DC, 2005; Australian Army, Adaptive Campaigning: The Land Force Response to Complex Warfighting, Directorate Combat Development, Future Land Warfare, Canberra, 2006.
4 Kelton Rhoads, ‘The Culture Variable in the Influence Equation’ in Philip Taylor and Nancy Snow (eds), Handbook of Public Diplomacy, Routledge, 2008.
5 Brain, Operational Culture.
6 The conceptual question ‘common sense – common to whom?’ is often asked by cultural lecturer Karin Sharma. See Karin Sharma, Alla dessa kulturer (in Swedish), Industrilitteratur, 2011.
7 Rhoads, ‘The Culture Variable in the Influence Equation’.
8 Lamb, Review of Psychological Operations Lessons Learned from Recent Operational Experience.
9 Solomon Asch, ‘Effects of group pressure on the modification and distortion of judgments’ in Harold Guetzkow (eds), Groups, Leadership and Men, Carnegie, Pittsburgh, PA, 1951.
10 Peter Smith and Michael Bond, Social Psychology Across Cultures, Prentice Hall, 1999.
11 David Matsumoto, Handbook of Culture and Psychology, Oxford University Press, USA, 2001.
12 William Sumner, Folkways, Ginn and Company, Boston, US, 1906.
13 Livia Markóczy, Us and Them, Annual editions, International Business, Wiley Press, 1999.
14 Ben Shalit, The Psychology of Conflict and Combat, Praeger Publishing, 1988.
15 Livia Markóczy, ‘Are cultural differences overrated?’ Financial Times, 26 July 1996.
16 ‘Culture Eats Strategy for Breakfast’ is a remark attributed to Peter Drucker who was an American consultant and educator in modern business management. The quote was popularised in 2006 by Mark Fields, President of Ford Motor Company.
17 James Karcanes, Cultural Competence and the Operational Commander: Moving Beyond Cultural Awareness into Culture-Centric Warfare, Naval War College, Newport, US, 2007.
18 Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1957.
19 Markóczy, ‘Are cultural differences overrated?’.
20 Thomas Gilovich, How We Know What Isn’t So: The Fallibility of Human Reason in Everyday Life, Free Press, New York, 1993.
21 Rhoads, ‘The Culture Variable in the Influence Equation’.
22 Rhonda Zahaarna, ‘The Unintended Consequences of Crisis Public Diplomacy: American Public Diplomacy in the Arab World’, Foreign Policy in Focus, June 2003; Ronald Rice and Charles Atkin, Public Communication Campaigns, Sage, Newbury, 1989.
23 James Sturcke, ‘US Soldiers “desecrated Taliban bodies”’, The Guardian, 20 October 2005.
24 Rhoads, ‘The Culture Variable in the Influence Equation’.
25 Fritz Heider, The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations, Wiley, New York, 1958.
26 Julius Weinberg, Ockham, Descartes, and Hume: Self-knowledge, substance, and causality, The University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1977.
