From Institution to Occupation: Australian Army Culture in Transition
Abstract
For some time, the Australian Army has been moving from Huntington’s institutional culture model, characterised by a sense of service above self, to Janowitz’s more occupational model which is defined in terms of market principles. This shift from one cultural model to another is a result of both internal and external pressures and is reflected in what is broadly referred to as Army’s ‘culture’. This article uses the twin issues of recruitment and retention to measure this shift and provide some context for the resulting changes to that culture. While a degree of occupationalism is accepted within the ranks of the Army, there is evidence to suggest that there are limits set by stakeholders in line with institutional behaviour and attitudes. This cultural shift and its implications form the central focus of this article.
Culture does not change because we desire to change it. Culture changes when the organization is transformed — the culture reflects the realities of people working together every day.
- Frances Hesselbein1
Introduction
With demands for reviews and responses to reviews coming thick and fast in the Department of Defence it may be useful to re-frame the debate over the ‘culture’ of Defence and take a broader view of some of the issues at hand. A definition for the term ‘culture’ is a good starting point. For the purposes of this paper, culture will be very broadly defined as the sum of a shared set of values and norms which form a bond between people at the most basic level including language, religion, beliefs and traditions. Second — and importantly — culture must be capable of being transmuted from one generation to the next.2 The Army should not, however, be viewed as monolithic in its culture. It is a subset of the overall Defence culture and in turn has sub-cultures of its own.
The process of socialisation takes time to nurture and inculcate. It appears from a quick glance at the table fronting the 2012 report Pathway to Change that its authors may be somewhat ambitious in their time-frames for cultural change.3 However, without a compelling imperative such as military defeat in detail or massive loss of public confidence, generational change is far more likely and, in Army terms, this equates to a 20-year period. As Frances Hesselbein comments, cultural change cannot be mandated; it reflects changes in the organisation and its people. Change management is hard work and cannot be achieved easily or quickly.
This discussion of Army culture focuses on recruitment and the other side of that same coin — retention. Both elements have had a significant impact on Army workplace practices and policies and speak to the Army’s strength — its human capital. Each area has a number of strands and each is significant in and of itself, although space prohibits any more than a light treatment of each in this discussion. This article argues that the Australian Army is undergoing a fundamental cultural shift, as are the other services. While the Army experience is particularly emphasised, the nature of change within the Army will be placed in the context of changes within the wider Australian Defence Force (ADF) and Australian society and, where necessary, changes to international society.
Purpose and scope
This article identifies some of the cultural trends and challenges within Australian society that are influencing or have influenced the Australian Army. These influences can be tracked on three levels, either in isolation or combination: first, as part of the broader Australian society’s cultural tectonic moves; second, at the organisational level by the Army and/or Defence itself; and finally, as part of individual and collective change in attitudes and behaviour by military members.
The early theorists
Political scientist Samuel Huntington in 1957 and sociologist Morris Janowitz in 1960 proposed two differing schools of thought on military culture. In The Soldier and the State, Huntington noted the tendency of US military officers to become part of the growing US Department of Defense bureaucracy, known as the military-industrial complex.4 The dominant military figure for Huntington was that of the ‘heroic’ professional identity or the warfighter who advocated eschewing bureaucratic support roles in favour of concentrating on the core function of warfighting. No doubt for Huntington the term ‘warfighting’ was redundant — for what other purpose is the Army used except for fighting wars?
The Huntington model, also known as the ‘institutional’ military model, is legitimated in terms of values and norms; that is, its members are driven by a purpose transcending individual self-interest and family in favour of a presumed higher goal. Its members see the services as a calling or vocation as well as an obligation of citizenship. Members of the military ‘institution’ are commonly viewed by the public, and perceive themselves, as different and apart from society as a whole. Alongside the notion of selflessness and subordination to the greater good is an expectation or social contract with the organisation to meet all their basic needs and provide all their required services. The characteristics of the organisation reflect this self-perception of traditional patriot and protector of society. There is little room in Huntington’s military for the inclusion of minorities for the sake of diversity.
Janowitz, in The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait, also noted this tendency for officers to become part of the burgeoning bureaucracy.5 He described this as ‘civilianisation’ and advocated a more integrated military. This integrated military would also reflect or at the very least refract the wider societal composition. Under the Janowitz model the military needs to adopt the skills and orientations common to all large organisations in order to become more efficient. This so-called ‘convergence’ theory has significant implications for career patterns and development and, ultimately, the characteristics and self-perception of the military. Janowitz advocated that the military should be part of society and reflect its values. The Janowitz model describes the ‘occupational’ military, defined in terms of market principles and characterised by the members’ priority of self-interest over the interests of the employing organisation. The self-perception of the employees (as they would label themselves) is based on appropriate expectations and demands. The occupational military is cash driven and compares itself with external organisations for benchmarking purposes. As a consequence, the distinctions between the military and other large organisations are increasingly blurred.
Academic Dr Cathy Downes, who has analysed the personnel operations of the Australian Army, comments that Western armed forces (including Australia’s) have ‘to greater and lesser degrees, undergone a process of civilianisation in which there has been a convergence of technical and managerial skills and organisational formats between the military and civilian sectors.’ Her overarching hypothesis is that the military is ‘moving away from an institutional format to one more and more resembling an occupational one.’6
Although Huntington and Janowitz were commenting on the US military experience specifically, Professor Charles Moskos noted that the theory, concepts and hypotheses are more universal and that ‘much research has been conducted in Western military systems outside the United States.’7 According to Hugh Smith, although the research has primarily focused on the US, ‘the Australian experience fits the model rather well.’8 In fact, this appears to be something of an understatement. Correspondent Ian McPhedran noted that the number of star ranks (brigadiers and above) in the Australian Army has doubled in the last five years and numbered 77 in 2010. This represents a ratio of one general per 1560 soldiers, double that of the US Army.9 This is not to suggest that an increase in star rank officers equals an increase in occupationalism. In fact, the tendency in the corporate world is towards ‘flattening’ the organisational hierarchy. It does, however, show that Huntington’s original thesis has some validity in the Australian construct.
Recruitment
Recruitment is vital to any large organisation and its long-term viability. This is especially true in a ‘closed’ system such as the Army. The question of who serves and who does not is also fundamental. It is accepted as a truism in a Western democracy that the Army reflects the society from which it is drawn. Indeed, British military historian General Sir John Hackett argues that the Army must (emphasis added) reflect its host society.10 In doing so, it should share the same core values and be committed to the goals and aspirations of the culture it protects and the society it is ultimately established to defend.
Each new recruit brings with him (or increasingly and more significantly her) a piece of society and its values and, in its own small way, this will affect the institution. In addition, those same recruits have certain expectations and demands that they expect to be fulfilled. Externally, the policies of the government of the day and the trends and expectations of society will apply pressure for the armed forces to conform to the nation’s behavioural norms and cultural standards. This was very evident in the public response to the ADFA Skype scandal and other similar incidents of inappropriate behaviour.
The transition from an institutional military format to an occupational one manifests itself in the culture of the organisation. The culture and processes of the military include the ‘circle of life’ recruitment of its members, methods of retaining them and, ultimately, of retiring them. It should be noted that not all Western armed forces will advance evenly along a continuum from institutional to occupational military culture. For legal, cultural, and historical reasons, some military forces will embrace some measure of change however reluctant or actively opposed they are to this. However this process appears to be an inevitable shift as the Army follows its host society — willingly or otherwise. Whether there are limits imposed on this process and how long they remain, may depend on the nature of society and the degree of change.
In the early 1970s, following the end of the Vietnam War, Australia abandoned conscription and opted for an all-volunteer force. As a result, the Army has relied on the use of market-oriented strategies to compete with civilian employers for quality recruits. Former Deputy Secretary of Defence Alan Wrigley regarded this as ‘a turning point: with the abandonment of conscription went the notion of the citizens’ obligation of service to the state.’11 The Army recruiting marketing strategy moved from a focus on ‘not just a job but a career’ to the blandly all-encompassing ‘Defence Jobs’.12 While the change in language may be subtle it is nonetheless meaningful.
Recruiting is no longer the preserve of ‘old and bold’ sergeants seeking to fill their quota. Recruiting today is a unique collaboration between the public sector Department of Defence and the private sector human resources contractor Manpower Services (Australia) to provide an integrated recruitment organisation for the military. It is interesting that employees of a civilian human resources corporation, who may know little about service in the Army, are case officers and first points of contact for candidates in the enlistment process.
As noted in the latest Defence Annual Report, the ADF’s recruitment and retention program has now been in place since 2007, with $3.1 billion allocated over a ten-year period to a range of initiatives. The program includes retention bonuses focussed on reducing separation rates in critical categories and ranks in the short term, while longer-term structural change, remuneration reform and other benefits have been introduced to encourage members to stay longer. At the same time a number of improvements have been made to recruitment practices. These include initiatives such as specific-to-corps entry and 12-month enlistments as a ‘try before you buy’ option.
Ethnic diversity
In 1993 a major report initiated by the ADF concluded that the military was under- represented in soldiers from non-English speaking ethnic groups. Given Australia’s large immigrant population, the report appeared not only suggestive of underlying discrimination but also indicated wasted opportunity in recruiting potentially highly skilled personnel. For example, there are thousands of native Arabic and Farsi speakers in Australia yet there is still a need to train soldiers as Arabic linguists and hire interpreters in the Middle East Area of Operations. While the report concluded that there were no formal barriers to ethnic participation, it highlighted the need for the ADF to be proactive in recruiting a more ethnically diverse force. The report recommended the targeting of minority groups for recruitment although it opposed the setting of mandatory quotas. Hugh Smith believes that first generation immigrants are unlikely to enlist due to structural reasons such as age, cultural and language issues.13 The ethnicity of the Army, as measured by place of birth and self-identification, continues to be monitored through the ADF Census at five-year intervals. The latest ADF Census in 2011 notes that over 90% of both the full-time and part-time force was born in Australia (86%), the United Kingdom (5%) or New Zealand (2%).14 There is less than one percentage point difference across all services. This is slightly under the 2011 Australian Census figures for the general population of Australia which indicate an Australian-born percentage of 78% while those born in the United Kingdom total 6% with some 2% born in New Zealand.15
Nevertheless, the Army continues to encourage multicultural recruitment and retention and much money and effort is devoted to trying to achieve this elusive recruiting goal. Research into impediments to the enlistment of individuals with culturally diverse backgrounds has led to the establishment of a specific recruiting program including a school visit program by service personnel from multicultural backgrounds to promote the Army and community engagement with ethnic councils.
Indigenous issues
Indigenous recruitment and retention is also an Army priority albeit one in which the Army has a better report card. According to the 2011 Defence Census, less than 2% of the Army self-identified as indigenous Australian, a figure consistent with the overall Australian population. The Directorate of Indigenous Affairs was launched in 2008 to provide a single point of contact for Defence Indigenous issues. The Directorate oversees the implementation of initiatives and strategies arising from the Defence Reconciliation Action Plan such as pre-recruitment courses, seminars and scholarships.16 The ADF Indigenous Employment Strategy also generates initiatives to attract and recruit more young indigenous people from remote, regional and urban communities throughout Australia. Cultural integration training is mandatory and provided regularly. The Regional Force Surveillance Units present an excellent model of integration with large numbers of indigenous soldiers in their ranks and a flexible training and qualification regime to cater for their unique circumstances.
Female members
The recruitment and employment of women in the Army was formerly limited in scope, with women employed to perform what were often regarded as auxiliary functions. Historically, most Western armies refused to allow women to participate in close combat. Increasingly, however, these restrictions have been challenged and new policies adopted. Internal pressures for change from within the Army and the external pressures of civilian lobby groups and changing social norms have also combined to drive policy to the point where the range of employment opportunities for women in the Army has slowly increased over the last 30 years. In 1979, 5.7% of the Army overall and 4.8% of officers at the managerial level were women. During the early 1980s the separate women’s corps was disestablished, women were awarded equal pay with their equivalent male counterparts, and specific female issues such as maternity leave were addressed. By 1993, 83% of Army positions were open to the employment of women.
The 2011 ADF Census records the percentage of women in the Army as doubling to around 10%. The Census also recorded an increase in the number of senior female officers with at least three 1-stars and one 2-star officer at that time.17 In 2012, the Pathway to Change Report contained no fewer than three sub-reports specifically relating to the employment and/or treatment of women. This report cleared the remaining barriers to the employment of women in the Army with the proviso that all standards including physical standards must be met.18 The efforts of feminist advocates, both individuals and groups, parliamentary lobby groups and the expectations of females in the Army, had successfully combined to bring about change.
Retention
The introduction of the all-volunteer force demanded other flow-on changes in military remuneration and various conditions of service. This trend was clearly a move away from the institutional features of pay and conditions set solely by the employer, in this case the Commonwealth Government, to the more occupational model in line with the civilian workforce. This included the abolition of the daily rate of pay or wage to an annual military base salary and the inclusion of a service allowance. The introduction of an annual military salary allowed a direct comparison with that of civilian counterparts, something which had been difficult to achieve previously. The service allowance, which was to be paid in lieu of other allowances such as married members’ allowance, upheld the principle of equal pay for equal work, but it was also paid in lieu of overtime and compensation for ‘exigencies’ of the service. While the pay system was not flexible enough to cater for individual overtime, the concept was at least acknowledged.
Other civilian-based workplace policies and procedures have also been introduced into the military’s remuneration process. The crucial matter of determining service pay and allowances, formerly determined by the Minister for Defence as advised by the Committee of Reference, as the representative of the employer (the Commonwealth Government), was replaced in 1985 with the independent Defence Force Remuneration Tribunal (DFRT). The establishment of the DFRT allowed the military equal access to the principles by which the wider Australian community is rewarded for work and is a further step on the occupational scale. As a consequence we have seen the Chief of the Defence Force testifying to the DFRT during the ADF wage case in opposition to his employer, the Commonwealth. This is, indeed, a far cry from the previous institutional paternalistic approach to remuneration. Today, representatives from the Australia Defence Association or Defence Force Welfare Association are officially welcomed as observers at DFRT hearings.19
It is clear, however, that members of the Army still hold strong institutional values concerning pay. In 1994, performance-based monetary bonuses for senior military officers were introduced with the intention of expanding this subsequently to all ranks. The idea proved unpopular, even among the recipients, as it cut across the ethos of teamwork and the ‘all of one company’ principle on which the Army prides itself.
Twenty-five years on, and star rank officers appear to be more comfortable with the higher rates of pay with individual contracts and salary packaging which includes a car and mobile phone as fringe benefits.20 On the other hand, like any high-level executives in the corporate world, star rank officers’ employment tenure is subject to termination at short notice.
Military collectivism
The development of military industrial relations in Australia has also seen the rise of collectivism. Former Army officer Graham Pratt noted that collectivism can embrace all types of employee groupings formed to protect the interests of their members.21 Military industrial relations range from the use of quasi trade unions with the right to undertake industrial action to associations formed for consultative and lobby purposes such as the RSL. The formation of the Armed Forces Federation of Australia (ArFFA) in 1984 was related to the then ADF wage freeze, perceived erosion in conditions, and dissatisfaction with existing procedures. While acceptance of ‘soft’ collectivism such as lobbying was widely supported, ‘hard’ industrial action, such as the withdrawal of labour, was not. This would seem to indicate a limited acceptance of an occupational outlook, while at the same time holding the line on institutional values.
ArFFA, although small in membership (reportedly around 3000) was widely supported in spirit by the ADF, significantly by the officer corps, and tacitly by the military hierarchy. It had observer status at DFRT hearings and a regular column in official service newspapers. It boasted some of the advantages of a trade union in that it could publicly criticise government policy and directly lobby members of parliament in contravention of the non-partisan, apolitical and institutional tradition of the military. ArFFA specifically refused, however, to use the withdrawal of labour as a means of industrial negotiation. Despite the appointment in 2002 of a prominent figure as patron (Dr Tom Frame, former naval officer, author and Anglican Bishop to the ADF), ArFFA ceased operations in 2006.
In part, the demise of ArFFA was also due to the establishment of the DFRT which had an immediate and positive impact on remuneration.22 With the establishment of the DFRT an intellectual and legal rigour was introduced to the process which had been previously absent. The decisions made were well documented and transparent in their logic. They also enabled military personnel to access standard Australian wage fixing principles and yet also have their own separate tribunal. It should be noted that despite, or perhaps because of the existence of ArFFA, individual attitudes and organisational restructure have seen the Army move a long way down the occupational path in pay matters while stepping back from the collective action nexus.
Individual rights
Shifts in individual attitudes and behaviour are also part of the broad cultural change overtaking the Army. These changes to individual characteristics are, however, partially due to cultural trends in the broader civilian society. Sociologist John Faris argues that, as the military organisation shifts in orientation, it ‘both indirectly and directly affects both the attitudes and values of military personnel as individuals’.23 The changing culture of the organisation and individuals within the Army can become self-fulfilling as both groups reinforce each other. As the organisation becomes more occupational in nature, members become more occupational in outlook. In turn, the membersmake more occupational demands on the Army and so the process continues.
A dichotomy exists between the role of a soldier as a citizen who is subject to the laws of the land and an individual who is entitled to his civil rights. On enlistment, the soldier is subject to military law and discipline above and beyond the civil code. The Defence Force Discipline Act was implemented in 1985 to overhaul the then incumbent system and, in part, bring the individual rights of service members into line with community standards.
The civil rights of individual service personnel were also the driving force in the establishment of the Defence Force Ombudsman in 1983. Service personnel lacked a legally binding contract and their employment was at the pleasure of the Crown — they enjoyed few substantive rights. The Defence Force Ombudsman extended to soldiers a measure of legal protection such as from unfair dismissal, which civilians take for granted. The Defence Force Ombudsman is, in fact, the many-hatted Commonwealth Ombudsman which handled 104 cases for the Army in 2011–2012 with a 100% closure rate.24 This compares favourably with the Ombudsman’s other 160 clients from various Commonwealth departments with a caseload in excess of 40,000 in 2011–12. Despite these relatively small numbers the Defence Force Ombudsman, as an independent body to redress grievances outside the chain of command, further undermines the traditional institutional approach.
Project LASER
The Directorate of Strategic Personnel Planning and Research regularly conducts research into retention and every member who separates from the military is debriefed as part of Project LASER (Longitudinal ADF Study Evaluating Retention).25 Specifically, the quality of retention initiatives is evaluated through survey and interview. Clearly, a healthy organisation needs a constant throughput of new blood and fresh ideas and the Army in particular requires the physical toughness of youth. What Project LASER has established is that a member rarely separates on the basis of a single issue. Reasons for leaving are generally complex and are part of a wide range of factors both personal and professional.
Evidence of a shift
Dramatic movement and change in the areas of recruiting, retention, remuneration and individual rights support the hypothesis that the Australian Army is shifting from institutional paternalistic attitudes and adopting more occupational market- oriented work practices. Nick Jans summarises this cultural trend in the ADF as ‘the legitimisation of military service [which] remains strongly normative, but with simultaneous trends towards a more industrial attitude by service personnel.’26 There are, however, limits on how far the occupational shift will go. These limits are set by a combination of public opinion, the attitudes of service personnel, the Army hierarchy and the government itself. The Army also has an ethos and image formed by strong elements of tradition and patriotism. Symbols such as ceremonies, parades, uniforms, medals, and the ANZAC legend are closely linked to the national identity which is not easily put aside. Certainly, the recruit who casually enlists in the Army believing he joined a heavily armed branch of the public service will be quickly disillusioned.
Evidence also suggests that this is not a zero sum game in that more of one means less of the other. Smith and McAllistar’s Survey of the Military Profession collected data on the attitudes of officer cadets from all three services over ten years. As officer cadets represent future elite opinion in the armed forces, their attitudes are of particular interest. Preliminary findings indicated that cadets reflected the attitudes of the wider society on individual rights and freedoms, and concerns over pay and conditions — as would be expected of an occupational orientation. At the same time, traditional institutional values such as service to the nation and patriotism were still strong. It appears that the individual serviceman is able to successfully integrate both strong institutional and occupational attitudes. Faris adds that, in fact, the introduction of occupational measures strengthens the individual’s commitment to the institution and makes the serviceman (and woman) a more dedicated and effective member of the organisation.27
Service families
One example of occupational measures that strengthen institutional commitment lies in the issue of the service family. The Army is generous with its interpretation of what constitutes a service family, allowing single parent, de-facto and same sex, and even de-facto same sex couples full access to benefits enjoyed by more conventional couples. The Defence Census 2011 records that over half of Army personnel are married or otherwise partnered, many with children, totalling in excess of 50,000 dependants.28 The old Army adage of ‘recruit the soldier and retain the family’ has long roots. The Cross Report of 1998 identified family-related reasons as the main cause of separation from service of married members.29 The challenge for the soldier becomes one of managing a conflict of commitment to two often competing priorities. Both are described by Mady Segal as ‘greedy’ institutions insomuch as they both demand the member’s full attention.30 The Army has recognised the link between satisfaction of service family needs and military effectiveness and acknowledged the importance of families to service commitment, retention and capability.
The hub of all this is the new Army creed of ‘work-life balance’. The Army Work- Life Balance Strategy creates supportive, healthy work environments for members and assists them to maintain a balance between their paid work commitment and their personal, community and cultural responsibilities, interests and obligations. Army support programs are, in turn, aimed at improving the resilience of members’ families, particularly during deployment. Such measures have included the establishment of a junior Defence Minister with portfolio responsibility specifically for Defence Personnel in 1987. The ADF Families Information Liaison Service with its network of Family Liaison Officers, the National Consultative Group of Service Spouses, School Liaison Officers and Defence Transition Mentors were all initiatives driven by the demands and needs of the service family. The year 1994 was designated ADF Year of the Family and today the ADF prides itself on being the largest corporate-based childcare provider in Australia.
Housing the service family
A key complaint of service families was once the parlous state of service housing combined with the stress of posting turbulence. Before 1987, for example, the married quarter housing stock was single-service owned, often on service property if not in service cantonments usually adjacent to a military base. Its streets were typically named after old battles and past heroes. Service transport, driven by a soldier, was used to take Army children to Army schools and preschools with names such as ‘The Little Digger’. Wives, in particular officers’ wives, were expected to work as unpaid volunteers in community groups with the senior wife in charge and shown all the deference and entitlements of her husband’s rank and appointment. Support for family tragedies, respite care, or just information about the Army was often next door as spouses built social support networks to assist one another.
The establishment of Defence Housing Australia (DHA) as a government statutory body changed much of this quasi-village atmosphere. The stated DHA mission is ‘to deliver efficiently, housing and related services that meet Defence operational and personnel needs’.31 DHA has achieved this by facilitating all Army removals and centralising control of housing stock with standards relative to family composition rather than rank. Newly built housing stock is deliberately spread out so that, in new suburbs, neighbours are often civilians. New and modern housing has been built and sold on lease-back to investors. Rather than simply covering service needs DHA, as a government business unit, is also cognisant of market- driven needs. DHA today is one of Australia’s largest real estate managers and controls 18,000 dwellings worth over $8 billion.
The institutional Army model with its small, tight-knit community has given way to the occupational Army model of civilian integration and market values. In turn, satisfaction rates with service housing, with its centralised control and standards and the provision of professional support networks, have risen as measured by the inaugural Defence Family Study released in 200932 as well as the annual Defence attitude surveys.33
Undoubtedly, these occupational-type measures have combined to address personnel concerns and, as a result, strengthened their institutional commitment. The Army’s initiatives to address family needs will certainly result in occupational change but will also ensure the preservation of the institutional nature of the military organisation.
Conclusion
This short analysis of changes in the Australian Army’s culture provides evidence of a continuing broad-based shift from Huntington’s institutional values-based military model to Janowitz’s occupational market-oriented military model. The examination of the two important aspects of recruiting and retention and their attendant issues provides practical data that is quite revealing. In most cases occupational change has been absorbed, although limits on the extent of that change have been established by both the institutional counterweight forces and the individuals who are the Army’s members. At the same time, an analysis of each area also shows some surprising, almost counter-intuitive results. The increase in occupational measures has paradoxically, in some cases, increased the members’ commitment. This is only possible where the individual serviceman or servicewoman is able to successfully integrate both strong institutional and occupational attitudes. The introduction of occupational measures can, in fact, strengthen the individual’s commitment to the institution and increase levels of dedication and the effectiveness of performance. Dare it be said, these measures may even produce a more committed ‘employee’.
Endnotes
1 Frances Hesselbein is the President and CEO of the Hesselbein Leadership Institute.
2 Adapted from the Macquarie Australian Dictionary (3rd edn revised 2004), The Macquarie Library, NSW, 2004.
3 Department of Defence, Pathway to Change: Evolving Defence Culture, Canberra, 2012, p. 12.
4 S. Huntington, The Soldier and The State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, Harvard University Press, US, 1957.
5 M. Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait, Free Press, NY, 1960.
6 Desmond Ball and Cathy Downes (eds.), Security and Defence: Pacific and Global Perspectives, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1990.
7 Charles Moskos, ‘Institutional and Occupational Trends in the Armed Forces’ in Charles Moskos and Frank Wood, The Military: More Than Just a Job? Pergammon-Brassey’s, Washington, 1988, pp. 16–17.
8 Hugh Smith, Social Change and the Australian Defence Force, Working Paper No. 19, Australian Defence Studies Centre, Canberra, 1993, p. 12.
9 Ian McPhedran, ‘Number of Generals in Australian Army Doubles’, Courier-Mail, 3 March 2010.
10 John Hackett, The Profession of Arms, Book Club, London, 1983, p. 197.
11 Alan Wrigley, The Defence Force and the Community, Australian Government Printing Service, Canberra, 1990, p. 209.
12 Defence Recruiting at: http://www.defencejobs.gov.au/ (downloaded 15 March 13).
13 Smith, Social Change and the Australian Defence Force, p. 12.
14 2011 Defence Census at: http://www.defence.gov.au/dpe/defencecensus/Public-Report2011.pdf
(downloaded 15 Mar 13).
15 Australian Bureau of Statistics at: http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/Summary2005 (downloaded 15 Mar 13).
16 Defence Reconciliation Action Plan at: http://www.defence.gov.au/fr/publications/DRAP2010-
14.pdf (downloaded 11 Mar 13).
17 Major General Elizabeth Cosson was the first 1-star and then 2-star female officer. She separated from the Army in 2010.
18 Culture review at: http://www.defence.gov.au/culturereviews/docs/.pdf (downloaded 15 Mar 13).
19 DFRT Annual Report at: http://www.dfrt.gov.au/annual-reports/DFRT-Annual- Report-2010-2011.pdf (downloaded 14 Mar 13).
20 2011 ADF Pay Scales at: http://content.defencejobs.gov.au/pdf/triservice/DFT_Document_ PayRates.pdf (downloaded 13 Mar 13).
21 Graham Pratt, ‘Institution, Occupation and Collectivism amongst Australian Army Officers’,
Journal of Political Sociology, Vol. 14, No. 2.
22 DFRT at: http://www.dfrt.gov.au/ (downloaded 17 Mar 13).
23 John Faris, ‘The Social Psychology of Military Service and the Influence of Bureaucratic Rationalism’ in Moskos and Wood, The Military: More Than Just A Job?, p. 59.
24 Defence Force Ombudsman at: http://www.ombudsman.gov.au/ (downloaded 19 Mar 13).
25 Project LASER at: http://www.internationalmta.org/Documents/2007/2007070P.pdf (downloaded 15 Mar 13).
26 Nick Jans, ‘Australia’ in Moskos and Wood, The Military: More Than Just a Job? p. 213.
27 Faris, ‘The Social Psychology of Military Service’ in Moskos and Wood, The Military: More Than Just A Job?, p. 59.
28 Environmental Scan 2025 at: http://www.defence.gov.au/dpe/dpe_site/publications/
DPES2025/chapter4b.pdf (downloaded 12 Mar 13).
29 Commonwealth of Australia, Personnel Wastage in the Australian Defence Force: Report and Recommendations, Australian Government Printing Service, Canberra, 1988. Known as the Cross Report after its chairman.
30 M. Segal, ‘The Military and Family as Greedy Institutions’ in Moskos and Wood, The Military: More Than Just A Job?
31 Defence Housing Australia at: http://www.dha.gov.au/about-us/about.html (downloaded 14 Mar 13).
32 See http://www.defence.gov.au/dpe/dpe_site/publications/ADF_Families_Survey…
General_Report.pdf (downloaded 15 March 13).
33 Environmental Scan 2025 at: http://www.defence.gov.au/dpe/dpe_site/publications/
DPES2025/chapter4b.pdf (downloaded 15 Mar 13).
