This article reflects a vibrant and ongoing professional debate within the Army’s combat arms, particularly the infantry corps, about appropriate tactics for the close battle in complex terrain. In particular, this essay’s content updates and expands material in a previous article entitled, ‘Rethinking The Basis of Infantry Close Combat’, published in the June 2003 issue of the Australian Army Journal, which suggested that we should attempt to refine our tactical thinking about dismounted close combat.1 That article proposed an approach to combined arms warfare based on point suppression by semi-autonomous, small teams, rather than linear manoeuvre by large formations. Since the June 2003 essay appeared, there has been significant discussion within the infantry and other combat arms on combined arms tactics. The purpose of the present article is to outline the recent evolution of the Australian Army’s tactical debate and to identify its possible implications for the future development of the land force.
Close Combat and Point Suppression Tactics
Before describing the latest tactical thinking in the Army, it is worth summarising the author’s original article, which argued that our doctrinal tactics are slow, costly, and often unsuccessful when applied to close combat in complex terrain. Our current doctrine suggests the application of fire in order to support movement. Hence, we have developed the notion of ‘fire support’ for manoeuvre in order to enable victory in battle. In short, we fire in order to support manoeuvre, then we manoeuvre in order to win. In practice, however, infantry using such tactics in complex terrain (such as villages, towns, and mountainous or heavily forested areas) tend to lack firepower within the assigned ‘fire support group’. This inadequacy of organic firepower often compels an attacking infantry force into a series of time-consuming, limited assaults that may be costly in terms of casualties, collateral damage and fighting power. Traditional tactics continue to apply linear concepts, such as axes of advance, limits of exploitation and lines of departure.
In complex terrain, however, points rather than lines seem to be more important factors in the calculus of combat. For example, troops engaged in close combat seldom advance in neat linear movements, or in set formations along pre-planned lines of exploitation. Instead, as operational experience and training simulation demonstrate, troops move from point to point, establishing a series of positions from which they can observe, suppress and attack the enemy by delivering fire. Soldiers in close combat engagements tend to move using covered approaches that are often non-linear in character while fighting in a cycle of ‘observe–suppress–move–clear–observe’. In the close fight, soldiers tend to operate in small, semi-autonomous teams that ‘flock’ or ‘swarm’, rather than move forward in large linear-based groups. Because of the reality of close combat, it probably makes more sense to consider terrain in terms of representing a network of points and nodes, rather than as a sequence of lines. Under a point or nodal model of attack, manoeuvre supports fire. In other words, troops manoeuvre in order to generate effective fire, and then apply this fire in order to neutralise the enemy and achieve victory.
In traditional doctrinal tactics, it is normal to regard the reserve force as a body of troops held under the commander’s immediate control and committed when required to consolidate military success. However, the development of high-fidelity simulation through the use of the individual weapons effects simulation system (IWESS), combined with recent operational experience, now provides us with a body of empirical evidence that may help to change the way in which we view the role of the reserve. Evidence from both IWESS and recent operations tends to confirm what most combat-experienced leaders have been warning about for many years, namely that the act of committing more troops seldom guarantees tactical success in complex terrain. On the contrary, the use of greater numbers of infantry in an assault often simply means that the attacking force will suffer higher casualties.
While reserve forces remain critically important, their use in conditions of complex terrain requires generating reserves of fire rather than of mass. Committing a reserve to the battle may mean manoeuvring by delivering greater direct or indirect fires, or moving troops into attack-by-fire positions that surprise an enemy.
Using such methods, forces engaged in close combat aim first to ‘win the firefight’, and only then do they concentrate attention on manoeuvre. Volume of fire is applied to try to suppress the enemy, weaken his morale and inflict casualties. It is only when the enemy has been ‘softened’ in this way, and ‘fire superiority’ achieved, that the attacking commander begins to move forward aggressively in order to clear enemy positions and consolidate, through manoeuvre, a victory already won by the use of firepower. The troops employed in the manoeuvre stage may be quite small—perhaps only a quarter of the overall force—while the forces engaged in winning the firefight may be much larger in numbers. Moreover, the assault group may consist of pioneers or assault engineers, rather than riflemen.
There is nothing new or original about the above tactical approach, which has been commonplace in various land forces—notably the German Army—for many years. Such tactics demonstrate that ‘classical’ fire and manoeuvre methods tend to be rarely employed in complex terrain where movement is slow, ammunition consumption is heavy, and non-linear ‘infiltration tactics’ are essential. Yet, historically, such a non-linear fire-manoeuvre approach has not been emphasised in Australian tactical doctrine.
The Infantry Company in the Urban Attack
After reading the author’s initial article in the June 2003 AAJ, some Australian commanders asked for a more detailed example of the ‘point suppression’ methodology. Consider an infantry company, supported by mortars, direct fire support weapons and reconnaissance assets, attacking an enemy platoon in a village. Such a scenario is useful to consider, both as a hypothetical worst tactical case and as a baseline for determining the requirements for effective combined-arms teams. The stages of such an attack might unfold in the following ways.
The first stage would involve investment. In this sequence, reconnaissance elements, patrols, snipers and mobile blocking forces would seek to ‘invest’ (or cordon off at distance) the enemy position inside the village. The aim would be to conduct observation over the perimeter of the area, secure its approaches, and dominate points of entry and exit from the village. The cordon is not constituted as a continuous line surrounding the objective, but should be viewed as a series of points that dominate specific features. This approach permits the attacker to deny the enemy any reinforcements and to cut off the possibility of withdrawal. Such methods also allow the attacking force to identify non-combatants and to be in a position to receive early warning of any attempted enemy countermoves. Investment may include electronic warfare, the use of aviation or airborne fire support, satellites, fixed-wing aircraft and the employment of Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles (UAVs).
The next stage in the attack is the break-in. In this sequence, attack from mortars, machine-guns, heavy direct-fire support weapons and snipers is delivered against a key break-in sector. The aim of the attacker is to neutralise a selected tactical point, allowing assaulting forces to break into the village. In this stage, deceiving the enemy with respect to the whereabouts of the actual break-in point is a key objective. Smoke and dust, electronic attack, bad weather or darkness, and deliberate deception measures can be exploited in order to allow the attacking force to gain entry into the village and to occupy a series of points from which the assault can commence in earnest.
Following the break-in, the attacking force conducts infiltration in order to suppress enemy positions. The attackers ideally move on a broad front using small, semi-autonomous teams that exploit covered approaches, probing forward until the enemy is detected. Simultaneously, the investing elements provide radio commentary on enemy movement and on the evolving tactical situation. As the assault teams come into contact with enemy forces, they seek consolidation in covered positions such as houses or other buildings from which they can observe the adversary and use fires to suppress his activity. The assault force progressively feels its way forward until the enemy’s main positions have been located in what is, in effect, a ‘reconnaissance in force’. Such an action is extremely difficult in complex terrain, and airborne observers, intelligence sources, thermal sensors or electronic warfare elements can be valuable in this process.
The use of infiltration has the effect of creating a non-linear deployment at the forward edge of the battle, with the attacking force forming a series of points from which the enemy can be observed and suppressed. On a standard map, such a deployment may resemble a ‘high-tide mark’, but on the ground it is not a continuous front; rather, it is a series of mutually supporting strong points. These strong points have the potential to communicate with each other, to suppress enemy positions, and to provide cooperative self-defence. By this stage in the battle, the attacking force is likely to have assumed suppression positions, with perhaps 50 per cent of its strength engaged in combat. In our company attack scenario, this situation might mean that there are two platoons and the headquarters engaged in contact, with another platoon uncommitted and assault groups standing by for orders to commit to battle.
The next, critical, stage is winning the firefight. This stage will be the most time consuming, and is likely to absorb large amounts of ammunition. The infantry company seeks to attack by fire all key enemy positions, applying direct-fire weapons and mortars, using observation from investing forces and employing its own lead elements in order to react to any enemy countermoves. However, enemy positions cannot be destroyed unless they can be targeted. As a result, sensor and reconnaissance technologies and deception measures become critical in ‘unmasking’ hidden positions so that they can be destroyed. Assault teams may now conduct limited and local manoeuvre in order to generate more effective fire against enemy positions. While ammunition resupply is important in supporting the close fight, the infantry company—by consciously adopting a point suppression approach—ensures that its leading platoons carry large ammunition loads. In a linear assault, such extra ammunition loads would hamper an attack and would be likely to require classical ‘fire and movement’ techniques. However, in the point attack scenario being outlined, the assault platoons infiltrate to first contact with the enemy and then apply fire from relatively static positions. Each suppressive element conserves an ammunition ‘assault reserve’, which it retains for use later in the action.
As the suppression battle continues, the enemy will become progressively incapable of dealing with the flow of the attack, or of manoeuvreing and applying counter-fire. If concealed enemy positions do open fire, their locations can be quickly identified and then suppressed by the attacking force’s fire superiority. When the attacking commander judges that the enemy has been comprehensively suppressed and is about to ‘crack’, he then commits the assault team. The latter may comprise between twelve and sixteen assault troops equipped with grenades, breaching charges, flame weapons, CS gas and white phosphorous grenades. Assault troops may also include pioneers, engineers and infantry, but should always seek to operate as a combined arms team. The assault group must be committed under the heaviest possible weight of supporting fires, with the company ‘shooting in’ the assault team.
Company elements unable to support the assault directly should concentrate on neutralising enemy in-depth positions in order to prevent any of the latter from engaging the attackers. Offensive support also provides smoke and suppressive fire in order to isolate each successive position as it is engaged by the assault troops. Offensive support elements can occupy enemy positions once the latter are secured, thus relieving the assault troops of mounting defensive tasks. The company should constitute at least two ‘mirror teams’ of assault troops capable of rotation in action.
Throughout the assault, the commander monitors progress and decides when to order exploitation. An exploitation force may be drawn from another platoon, or from suppressive elements of the company. The commander may seek to commit his exploitation force in depth so that it is able to reinforce the cascading collapse of the enemy’s positions under the impact of the assault force. At this point, tactical coordination becomes critical because the intention should be to use the exploitation and assault forces as mutually reinforcing elements in order to ensure the enemy’s collapse. There is, however, always a risk that the exploitation force may become overextended, resulting in a danger of fratricide among the attacking troops. Investment forces (including air observers) that employ combat identification techniques and radio communications become essential in these conditions. The commander should order a reorganisation when he judges that his attacking force is becoming spent and ammunition is running low, or when he is confident that the enemy has been destroyed. In a larger battle, the commander may also call a reorganisation in order to allow another combat team to conduct a forward passage of lines to continue the fight.
In summary, the tactical approach outlined above uses infiltration and offensive support in order to move small groups along multiple non-linear routes to a series of points from which the enemy can be attacked. The attacking force then uses point suppression and attack by fire in order to win the fight before committing a small assault group followed by a larger exploitation force. Following a reorganisation, the entire force then consolidates its new positions. This tactical description is, of course, oversimplified, largely because it describes a hypothetical assault involving primarily infantry rather than combined arms teams. Such an assault represents a worst-case scenario and serves as a baseline for developing combined arms manoeuvre.
Insights from the 2003 Australian Infantry Corps Conference
The idea of using point suppression tactics was analysed in detail at the 2003 Australian Infantry Corps Conference and generated considerable debate. The conference brought together present and past members of the Australian infantry, including Special Forces personnel and retired officers. Nearly every participant at the conference possessed operational experience and many had recent combat experience.
One important observation came from veterans who had experienced close combat in Vietnam during the 1960s. In his June 2003 article, the author speculated that the Australian Army might have adopted a linear approach to tactics partly because of a tradition of jungle warfare, which favours linear formations and allows a force to ‘shake out’ into extended line while concealed by tree cover. Yet the infantry elders at the corps conference disagreed with this assessment. Several Vietnam veterans recalled jungle firefights in South-East Asia in which the whole force immediately ‘went to ground’ in a tight group. One veteran recalled this process as forming a ‘blob’—a useful way of describing a non-linear formation. A number of veterans outlined situations in which the application of fire suppression occurred without significant manoeuvre until the enemy’s resistance appeared to crack. Only at the point of the enemy’s wavering, and often only after calling for armoured and engineering support, would Australian assault troops seek to undertake manoeuvre. Other veterans outlined the process of fighting in built-up areas with small teams that advanced on narrow frontages, employing every available fire suppression asset as they probed forward. A close reading of the Army’s 1988 Training Information Bulletin no. 69, Infantry Battalion Lessons from Vietnam, hints at some of these ideas—which are similar to those described in the point suppression model—but for reasons that remain unclear, Australian tactics since Vietnam have not emphasised such an approach.2
Several other useful insights came from officers and non-commissioned officers with operational experience in East Timor and Afghanistan. These veterans helped to clarifiy thinking at the conference about the meaning of ‘complex terrain’. They argued that complex terrain should be regarded as ‘any terrain where you cannot see as far as you can shoot’. Such a definition would include theoretically ‘open’ terrain such as mountains; low, sparse scrub; coastal areas; or sand dune country. This type of topography might appear open from the air, but with restricted lines of sight and fields of vision, it is effectively ‘complex terrain’ to the ground soldier. Moreover, such terrain would be complex for a force without air assets, yet be open for a force with UAVs or helicopters. In other words, terrain itself is not inherently ‘complex’. Rather, complexity should be seen as a relative term that depends on what reconnaissance assets a force can apply in the field. The distinguishing feature of complex terrain is, therefore, what might be called a detection threshold—that is, the point at which a ground force, depending on its reconnaissance assets, is likely to detect the presence of an enemy force.
Another idea that became prevalent at the infantry corps conference was the notion of a disaggregated battlespace. The latter is the type of battlespace that is common in complex terrain. In such terrain, even large engagements between major forces tend to dissolve into a series of ‘mini-battles’ between small groups in restricted areas of open space, such as streets, tunnels, courtyards and rooms in houses. If a thousand troops attack a hundred in complex terrain, what ensues is not one large, single battle, but several dozen individual duels and small-group engagements fought over a dispersed area. One only has to recall the description of the 1993 American–Somali Mogadishu battle in Mark Bowden’s study, Black Hawk Down—and the images conveyed in Ridley Scott’s later film of that book—to realise that a restricted environment demands small-team skill and individual capability rather than large-unit sophistication. The urban maze of Mogadishu is, in effect, exactly the kind of environment that we can expect to confront in close combat in complex terrain. In such conditions, semi-autonomous teams fighting mini-battles in a disaggregated battlespace would effectively become miniature battlegroups.
A point made strongly by readers of the author’s original article in the June 2003 AAJ was the critical importance of adopting a combined arms organisation in close combat. Such an approach is critical, and no sensible commander would commit forces to battle without first organising available troops into a balanced combined-arms team. It is important, however, to emphasise that what a combined arms team represents is a tailored, mission-specific, agile task-grouping that can rapidly reorganise to deal with a changing situation and exploit fleeting tactical opportunities. A modern army fighting in complex terrain will usually incorporate tanks, dismounted infantry, mechanised infantry, engineers, artillery, reconnaissance and aviation. However, these traditional military assets may be task-organised at a much lower level than contemplated in current Australian doctrine. The combined arms team is also likely to include more novel elements such as electronic warfare, human intelligence assets, civil–military operations teams, deployable logistics and networked communications. These are ‘non-traditional’ assets in the sense that they have usually been held at the higher-force level, rather than be allocated to fulfilling the task of small-team manoeuvre. Yet modern armies are increasingly realising that, for military effectiveness, these very assets must be present at the small-group level as well as at the higher-force level.
Close combat in complex terrain requires small, networked, mutually supporting semi-autonomous teams. As a result, the principles of battle grouping and task organisation to create combined arms teams need to be applied at a much lower tactical level in the future. Frequently, we have battle grouped at battalion–regiment and company-squadron levels. Yet in a disaggregated battlespace, such high-level battle grouping is of little assistance in maximising combat power. Irrespective of how comprehensive a battalion commander’s situational awareness may be, or how effective his supporting assets are, if these advantages cannot be brought to bear at the critical time and place, they cannot be considered to be combat multipliers. In the complex conflict environment outlined in this article, the critical time may be little more than a fleeting opportunity while the critical place may be a ‘mini-battle’ that occurs at the fire team or section level. These new combat conditions mean that we must begin to consider battle-grouping troops at a much lower tactical level, possibly at intra-platoon or even intra-section level.
Combined Arms Lessons from Recent Operations in the Middle East
The clear need for small-team, combined-arms battlegroups for operations in a complex disaggregated battlespace has been one of the main lessons to emerge from recent operations in the Middle East. These operations include the 2002 Israeli experience in Jenin in the ongoing conflict with the Palestinians, and the British Army’s experience in Basra during the 2003 Iraq War. The lessons revealed in Israeli and British military operations provide further evidence for the point suppression approach to tactics for the close battle.
The Israeli Experience: The Battle of Jenin
In April 2002, the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) attacked the Jenin refugee camp as part of an incursion into the Palestinian Territories. Initially, the Israeli operational approach was tentative, with the IDF issuing warnings to non-combatant inhabitants to evacuate the camp. The IDF’s use of warnings effectively telegraphed their intentions to Palestinian fighters and eliminated any surprise during the tactical break-in phase. Despite this drawback, Jenin was effectively invested by the IDF and the Israeli break-in was ultimately successful, although costly in terms of casualties. The Israelis deployed snipers, Special Forces, infantry, and attack helicopters, using ad hoc groupings of force elements at about platoon size. There was no artillery or fixed-wing offensive support but tanks were committed late in the operation when Israeli infantry began to suffer significant casualties from lack of armoured protection. Once deployed, Israeli tanks were used as a mobile base of fire, equipped with machine-guns and sensors rather than their main armament.
The IDF’s tactical approach changed on 9 April 2002, when thirteen Israeli soldiers were killed in an ambush. The number of casualties convinced the Israeli commanders to apply much greater force. That same evening, the IDF began using D9 armoured bulldozers that were impervious to small-arms fire and explosives. The bulldozers pioneered assault routes for other armoured vehicles and destroyed buildings from which hostile fire had been directed at the Israeli ground troops.3 Eventually, the IDF used a combination of armoured bull-dozers, tanks, and attack helicopters to reduce the remaining strongpoints in the centre of Jenin.4
The Jenin battle showed the adaptability of the IDF in being able to change its tactics in the middle of the operation. After initially employing unsupported infantry that manoeuvred through an urban maze and suffered casualties, the Israeli military assembled combined arms teams, which, although larger than the teams that have been considered in this article, worked relatively autonomously. These combined arms teams centred on the D9 bulldozer, which was used in the role of an assault detachment, with infantry and tanks providing suppression and support. While the battle of Jenin was inconclusive in terms of the overall Israeli campaign, the action represented a tactical success for the IDF.
The British Experience in Iraq: The Battle of Basra
In April 2003, British forces attacked the southern Iraqi city of Basra as part of the US-led Coalition advance into Iraq. The original operational plan did not envisage the occupation of Basra, and as a result, the city was never fully invested by invading Coalition forces. The British Army initially broke into the urban area by securing the town of As Zubayr and the airport on the city outskirts. As British forces penetrated the city, they relied on suppression from organic direct-fire weapons, aviation support and precision air weapons rather than blanket indirect fires. British troops operated in small groups, with armoured vehicles grouped down to platoon and sometimes section level. Special Forces worked closely with intelligence personnel to generate situational awareness, although most units still needed to ‘fight for information’. British artillery pieces never entered Basra, although mortars were employed. Once enemy Iraqi centres of resistance were identified and suppressed, British forces attacked from three directions, neutralising the Ba’ath party headquarters and then beginning a transition towards security operations.5
Participants in the battle for Basra have highlighted the small-team approach adopted by the British Army. A battalion headquarters became a ‘clearing house’ for fires, support and information, while the fight itself was largely a company and platoon commander’s battle. A typical British Army section organisation included two dismounted fire teams, each consisting of four men; a Warrior Infantry Fighting Vehicle, possibly a tank; and some indirect-fire observers and engineers. Within the infantry fire teams, the weapons mix favoured an ‘attack by fire’ tactical approach. In at least one battalion, dismounted fire teams included no riflemen. Rather, the fire teams consisted of a gunner with a 7.62 mm MAG 58 General Purpose Machinegun, two Minimi gunners with 5.56 mm Light Support Weapons, and one grenadier with a 40 mm grenade launcher. During the fighting, the British made extensive use of snipers armed with 7.62 mm and .50-calibre weapons.
The British tactical approach at Basra proved extremely expensive in ammunition, and the Warrior fighting vehicle was used as a mobile ammunition resupply point. However, the invulnerability of both the Warrior and the Challenger tank to portable anti-armour weapons proved to be a critical factor in British military success.6 The battle at Basra was one of the most successful actions of the entire Coalition campaign in Iraq. The operation resulted in the successful capture of Basra against significant opposition, but with minimal loss of life and limited damage to the infrastructure of the city. The success of British tactics reportedly influenced the American military’s approach to the subsequent battle for Baghdad.7
The above examples from recent Israeli and British military operations demonstrate that several armies have adopted a combined arms organisation for close combat in complex terrain. The Israeli and British methods resemble the techniques proposed earlier in this article—that is, non-linear infiltration by small, semi-autonomous combined-arms teams, moving from point to point, applying firepower to win the suppression battle. The success of this tactical approach in contemporary military operations suggests that it is worth considering within the Australian Army and the ADF.
Future Combined-Arms Tactics: Implications for the Australian Army
The central implication that stems from the analysis advanced in this article is that the Australian Army force elements must operate as combined arms teams. While such a conclusion may be self-evident, there are organisational and doctrinal features that require close attention. The Army should expect combined arms teams to be smaller in future, leading to increased reliance on the initiative, professional judgment and technical skill of our junior commanders. The Army should also expect smaller combined-arms teams to include a mixture of traditional and non-traditional elements—not simply combat-arms elements, but also specialist detachments that may be joint service or inter-agency in composition. A key requirement in our doctrine will be the need to train and rehearse as we intend to fight: in small, semi-autonomous combined-arms teams.
Another implication that arises from this article is that the infantry achieve the best results when operating within a balanced combined-arms team. While most Australian infantry specialists would agree theoretically with this statement, in practice there has been a tendency in Australia to view the infantry battalion itself as a miniature combined-arms team. The infantry battalion is often considered as an organisation that incorporates offensive support, reconnaissance, engineering, signals and intelligence elements as well as dismounted combat specialists. As a result, there is an assumption that an Australian infantry battalion can fight on its own, or if grouped alongside other arms, the battalion will be the lead partner, providing a framework for the other arms. Yet, as we have seen, the close battle in complex terrain is a decentralised phenomenon: a subaltern’s war that is built around small, mobile teams that need all-arms representation at platoon or even section level.
The infantry’s unique contribution in this tactical situation is its capability for dismounted close combat and its flexibility in dealing with complex situations on the ground. In reality, modern infantry are dismounted combat specialists that operate within a combined arms team. As a consequence, we should consider structuring the Australian infantry battalion to reflect this new reality. The infantry battalion needs to become an organisation geared to providing task-organised groups for dismounted close combat as part of a combined-arms team.
A related implication is that the tactics being employed by other armies—such as the American, Israeli and British armies—are beyond the Australian land force’s current combat capability. Despite the capability improvements generated by the 2000 Defence Capability Plan, the Army currently lacks many of the critical elements for an effective combined-arms team. Projects Land 17/18, Land 125 and Land 40 will deliver enhanced artillery and give the infantry individualised communications, sensors, optimised combat equipment and enhanced organic firepower. In addition, other projects will provide protected mobility for deployed infantry. Such assets represent a step in the right direction.
The Australian Army nevertheless continues to face the problems of combat weight and protection. Our current tank, the Leopard I, cannot survive against any opponent armed with cheap and portable antitank weapons. Without appropriate armoured protection, the Army cannot hope to function effectively in complex terrain where lethal weapons proliferate. In this respect, our current Australian light armoured vehicles (ASLAVs) and personnel carriers are highly vulnerable in combat operations in complex terrain. These vehicles rely on speed, good sensors and, in the case of the ASLAV, weapons systems that detect and destroy the enemy at stand-off range. Unlike tanks, however, such light armoured vehicles cannot loiter in a street, storm a bunker, or survive short-range hits from anti-armour weapons. Ultimately, it is only the modern, well-armoured tank that can act as a mobile point-suppression device, and be brought to bear at the right time and place to operate simultaneously in both fire suppression and assault roles.
Besides new tanks, the Army requires a genuine assault engineer capability. Assault engineers, including armoured engineers and dismounted assault specialists, provide a potent spearhead for assault breaching, combat demolitions, and mounted mobility in urban operations. Assault engineers of this type are reminiscent of the Viet Cong ‘sappers’ of the 1960s, or the German glider-borne engineers who captured the fortress of Eben Emael in 1940. Armoured bulldozers may also be critical in future urban operations, but again, this is a capability that we currently lack within the Australian Army.
There are also organisational questions that must be resolved. In order to be effective in complex warfighting, we need to task-organise at the intra-section and intra-platoon levels. Such an organisational shift may demand the creation of more modular structures that can be ‘sliced and diced’ in different ways in order to enable rapid and flexible regrouping of forces for any given mission. A related issue is that the section organisation of ten men may no longer be capable of forming the basic building block for close combat. Given the development of enhanced weapons systems and sensor technology, and the need to operate in small, flexible groups, the four-man fire team may become the true building block for the close fight in the first quarter of the 21st century.
As the Israelis found in Jenin, the need for unit cohesion is the Achilles heel of the small fire team. When troops have not trained together, or are unused to rapid reorganisation, battle grouping at too low a tactical level may simply damage unit cohesion and general morale. For these reasons, there needs to be a focus on ensuring habitual training relationships, while tactical education—the ability to apply judgment creatively, in situations where no doctrinal approach is apparent—will become essential.
Devolved situational awareness—that is, the ability for junior commanders to access the situational awareness that they need to conduct the fight—is also increasingly important. Such awareness involves equipping soldiers with personal communications, providing capable sensors at section and individual level, and devising effective combat identification in order to prevent fratricide. A culture based on allowing junior commanders to act on ‘decision superiority’ must be fostered. While using information from a common situational awareness picture, higher commanders must trust subordinates to run their own battles without micro-management.
Another important factor that must receive consideration by the Army is devolved firepower. Section and fire team battles and individual duels are the main focus of close combat in complex terrain. Hence, good firepower at support company or brigade level is of little assistance since it cannot be brought to bear at the critical point. This reality does not mean that we do not need such higher-level firepower for combat in open terrain and in the manoeuvre tactics that set the conditions for close battle. However, in the close battle itself, we must devolve effective firepower through such techniques as regrouping, the use of observer teams, reachback methods, or through the employment of more capable individual weapons at the small-team level.
A final observation concerns the way in which we teach tactics to commanders. Combat training centres, such as the Combined Arms Battle Wing, are of critical importance because such institutions use high-fidelity simulation in combat exercises in complex environments. In the future, Tactical Exercises Without Troops need to emphasise the realities of complex terrain, the requirement for firepower, and the advantages of small-group initiative. These exercises are for all members of the Army, and must be conducted with less emphasis on assessment and more concentration on developing good judgment in ambiguous situations where doctrinal tactics do not easily apply.
Conclusion
The Australian Army’s tactical debate is ongoing and is far from resolved. From the 1940s until the 1960s, jungle warfare was the prime challenge that the Australian Army painstakingly mastered in order to become one of the foremost jungle-fighting armies in the world. In the 1970s and 1980s, the Army became primarily a light infantry force designed for continental defence involving dispersed operations against a low-level enemy in northern Australia. In the first decade of the 21st century, we need to focus intellectual and professional military effort on mastering combined arms operations in urbanised and complex terrain. As this article has sought to demonstrate, a variety of ideas and operational experiences are circulating throughout the land force for refinement into current tactical and force development thought. The whole of the Army owns the debate over tactics; this debate should be seen as an ongoing journey rather than as a final destination. It is a journey that lies at the heart of our professional existence as warfighters, and it is not too late to contribute to the process of developing new tactical thought.
Endnotes
1 Lieutenant Colonel David Kilcullen, ‘Rethinking The Basis of Infantry Close Combat’, Australian Army Journal, vol. 1, no. 1, June 2003, pp. 29–40.
2 Australian Army, Infantry Battalion Lessons from Vietnam 1965–71, Training Information Bulletin no. 69, Headquarters, Training Command, Sydney, 1988. This bulletin was drawn up in the early 1970s by the Directorate of Infantry but was only formally published sixteen years later.
3 Yagil Henkin, ‘Urban Warfare and the Lessons of Jenin’, Azure, Summer 5763/2003.
4 See Time magazine reportage of the battle at <http://blackwaterusa.com/btw/articles/opjenin.html>.
5 United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, Operations in Iraq: First Reflections, DCCS Media, Ministry of Defence, London, July 2003, pp. 11 et seq.
6 This information is based on interviews with British Infantry commanders, unclassified portions of a report by an Australian Infantry Captain attached to a British mechanised unit during the Basra battle, and detailed input from the Centre for Army Lessons, Puckapunyal, Vic.
7 See J. Fitchett, ‘British Influence U.S. with Tactics in Iraq’, International Herald Tribune, 9 April 2003.
