The principle of mission command, though not described as such, was practised by naval forces for centuries, and continues to be into the 21st century.[1] Exercise of command varies greatly depending on the context, and is highly dependent on the mix of organisational culture and enabling technology present. Since the development of radar, and reinforced by the advent of combat data systems and guided weapons, the volume of information available to a naval commander, and the speed with which command decisions have to be made, has necessitated the development of the additional concept of command by veto. This concept is similar in some ways to mission command, but with some substantial differences born of the challenges of warfare at sea.[2] This article will trace the development of command at sea through the lens of mission command and command by veto. We have contributed this article to the Army Journal to inform members of the integrated force (outside of Navy) as to how command functions in ships at sea. We believe that this is an important consideration given the forthcoming implementation into service of landing craft, and to bolster inter-service understanding in integrated contexts.
While references to command by veto are scattered throughout the warfighting policy, manuals and tactical documents of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), the term is rarely explicitly defined. The concept has become such an inherent part of the modern maritime command culture that it is assumed knowledge: the now retired Australian Maritime Doctrine did not mention the concept.[3] For the purposes of this article, command by veto is taken to be the delegation of command authority, within defined limits, exercised in the presence of the officer who made the delegation, for the purpose of expediting decision-making. Allied and multinational maritime procedures and instructions tend to use the term ‘command by negation’. This has substantively the same meaning as ‘command by veto’ and is the terminology used in the recently published ADF Maritime Power doctrine[4] and the United States Joint Publication 3-32 Joint Maritime Operations.[5]
In the military context, it is unremarkable to state that the exercise of any command (and control) cannot be divorced from communications, or indeed from intelligence. Without a good understanding of the environment and context, command decisions are governed more by chance than by professional skill. Without the ability to communicate a direction to subordinates, command is ineffective. Prior to the advent of modern long-range communications, there were few opportunities for a ship’s commander to receive new orders or send dispatches—in port or when ships joined or left a fleet. A frigate or sloop, if available, could be used to physically transport orders and information, but often with great time delay due to the distance to be covered, and not with certainty.[6] It was therefore a practical consequence that commanders were given (and gave) direction on what was to be achieved, assigned resources and provided constraints, and were then afforded very broad freedom of action as to how to achieve the aim. Simply put, the communications available did not enable anything else.
Take for instance Captain Arthur Phillip in command of the First Fleet in 1788. Phillip was instructed to take the fleet to Botany Bay and establish a British colony. He sailed with the fleet, and delivered on the mission intent, with little to no communication with higher headquarters for several years. On arrival at his destination, he changed the location of the colony because he judged that Sydney Cove presented a better option.[7] This experience was not unique among seagoing explorers and naval commanders of the time. The officer in command of a warship was frequently the person with the most recent and complete information about their government’s position on any given matter, and possessed the means to give effect to that position through negotiation or force if necessary. In addition to creating the conditions by which mission command was the norm at sea, the vesting of responsibility in the commander created the conditions by which naval forces were regarded as routine or normal diplomatic mechanisms.[8] The limitations of technology created the culture of (what was in practice) mission command with the associated expectation that commanders were sufficiently capable of carrying out a wide range of diplomatic, constabulary and warfighting tasks. This situation is similar to Auftragstaktik developing to multiply capacity for leadership by devolving responsibility for the delivery of mission/command intent downward on the battlefield.[9]
Today, reliable long-range communications are near ubiquitous on and above the water; the same cannot be said below the surface. Due to a combination of factors (including the constraints imposed on communication by the physics of the marine environment, and the need to remain undetected), submarine commanders in particular must exercise mission command as a matter of course. Indeed, this has been the case from almost the first uses of submarines for military purposes. In this regard, the example of Lieutenant Henry Stoker (commanding officer of submarine HMAS AE2) in the First World War is relevant. His orders were to penetrate the Dardanelles, sinking any minelayers he saw. From there he was to ‘run amok’ in the Sea of Marmara to interdict Turkish shipping to and from Gallipoli, thereby significantly inhibiting the adversary’s freedom to manoeuvre while supporting forces ashore.[10] With minimal intelligence, and no modern surveillance capabilities or communications systems, Stoker had to conduct his own reconnaissance, maintain his own understanding of the environment (particularly once he began operating in the Sea of Marmara) and then decide for himself the best way to ‘run amok’. While assessing the opportunities as they presented themselves, he simultaneously needed to carefully calculate the risks to his boat and crew. Stoker was successful in this endeavour, meeting the command intent.[11] Mission command was, and remains, a routine practice for submarine service.
The introduction of better communications above water did not initially change the practice of mission command substantially in the maritime domain. In part, communications systems had not improved sufficiently to enable commanders ashore to have a better appreciation of the operational situation than the commander at sea. In addition to the limited bandwidths available, other factors limited what was possible. For example, during the First World War, commanders at sea were initially suspicious of the accuracy of signals intelligence provided by higher headquarters ashore. Equally, cumulative errors in navigation by the ships meant that there was no common operating picture.[12] Even when these issues were resolved, communication was limited by the naval practice of radio silence as a means of remaining covert and denying information to an enemy.
The necessity for mission command remained a feature of the Second World War naval operations. For example, Captain John Collins,[13] in command of HMAS Sydney at the Battle of Cape Spada,[14] did not inform his higher headquarters of his position and intentions, or even the British destroyers which initially made contact with the opposing Italian naval force; there was no expectation that he would do so. If Collins was in a position to intervene in the developing encounter battle, and his orders for the operation anticipated the possibility, then it was expected that he would do so.[15] Similarly, it was not expected that the commander ashore would direct how to conduct the action; a consequence of the principles relating to radio silence was that the commander ashore did not have the fullest or best picture. Once again, mission command was practised if not named.
During the Second World War through to the 1950s, a new concept of command, known as ‘command by veto’, came about through the interaction between commanders and technology.[16] In the early 20th century, there were several changes to the way naval warfare was conducted that drove this change.[17] Initially, this included the emerging wireless radio technology that enabled communication at greater ranges; the introduction of turbine machinery allowing ships to operate at greater speed; and the development of longer engagement ranges by gyro-stabilised torpedoes. These advances greatly increased the size of the battle space, made it more difficult for a commander to see everything for themselves and, as a consequence, made it even more difficult to have enough information to make good decisions quickly enough. The most significant catalysts for change, however, were the advent of radar and guided weapons.[18]
Radar was first introduced into the naval forces of most of the major combatants during the Second World War. Prior to its introduction, a commander was best placed to understand their tactical circumstances from the bridge of the ship, as it was the focal point for communication and observation on board. Here a commander could work and eat, and they could sleep in a sea cabin mere metres away. As tactical situations generally did not develop quickly, the commander was sufficiently on hand to make informed command decisions at all times. Radar brought a new source of information (as did sonar) to bear which could not be displayed or integrated with other sources quickly enough on a warship’s bridge for it to be put to good use by a commander. In response, the United States Navy established the ‘Combat Information Centre’ or ‘Operations Room’. Its role was to bring together the different sources of information to produce a plot or operating picture to enable command decisions. Serviced by increasingly efficient communications methods, this entity could then pass the relevant information to other units under command.[19] The Command Information Centre came into common usage in ships in the US Navy during the Eastern Solomons campaign; the concept spread to Allied navies in the latter years of the Second World War and more widely thereafter.
Aircraft and then guided weapons increased the pace at which military engagements were fought. In this emerging warfighting environment, it became simply impossible for a naval commander to remain sufficiently available and adequately informed for 24 hours a day for extended periods. In response, commanders began delegating authority to warfare officers to make decisions, usually about the employment of weapons. Today, this situation has evolved such that appropriately trained and authorised officers will make the command decisions in the presence (physically or on a communication circuit) of their commander, who will intervene only if they need to modify or veto a decision—command by veto.[20] Command by veto relies on a shared tactical understanding between the commanding officer and the delegate, usually the principal warfare officer.
The principle of command by veto generally involves a trained and trusted officer executing a defined set of pre-planned responses on behalf of their commander.[21] It is a concept that is focused on defensive or procedural activities. In the case of defensive actions, this is because the response is usually required very quickly in order to avoid immediate threat to life or military capability. By contrast, offensive actions do not usually place the same time pressure on decision-making. While authority to act is delegated, accountability always remains with the commander. The benefit of this approach is that it enables rapid decision-making while still keeping a commander informed, engaged and empowered. More broadly, in a task group where command decision-making could occur across several warfare activities, involving multiple platforms (so commanders may not always be co-located), command by veto minimises the amount of communication required. This is particularly useful for procedural activities or for pre-planned responses and announced intentions.
The principle of command by veto underpins the so-called ‘composite warfare commander concept’. This is a naval command structure that organises forces into warfare areas (air, surface, subsurface etc.) under the overall command of the composite warfare commander. The relationship between the two ideas is well expressed by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff maritime operations publication:
Command by negation acknowledges that, because of the often distributed and dispersed nature of maritime warfare, it is necessary to pre-plan the actions of a force to an assessed threat and delegate some warfare functions to subordinate commanders. Once such functions are delegated, the subordinate commander is to take the required action without delay, always keeping the OTC (Officer in Tactical Command) informed of the situation.[22]
For Australia, ADF Maritime Power doctrine offers:
[M]aritime command and control is executed in Navy platforms through an embedded command structure, including the commanding officer and heads of departments, responsible for the execution of higher command intent through a command by veto construct.[23]
Command by veto necessarily involves a very explicit use of the term ‘intent’. Specifically, a subordinate, in the presence of their commander, is able to assume approval of that intent unless it is countermanded or otherwise modified.
Command by veto expedites decision-making by encouraging (and indeed requiring) that subordinates exercise initiative on behalf of the commander.[24] In effect, the delegations granted to warfare officers (and increasingly to other key positions within the operations room) are similar to localised rules of engagement or ‘orders for opening fire’. When a vessel is under fire, the ability to speed up reaction times to stimuli, or respond to a threat, may be the determining factor in whether a ship survives a naval engagement or becomes a ‘mission kill’. Similarly, in air warfare, extra seconds taken in decision-making can mean ‘miles’ of closure rate of an inbound missile or aircraft. Equally, in anti-submarine warfare, seconds may mean the difference between a vessel turning quickly and avoiding a torpedo attack, or succumbing to it.
Command by veto and mission command continue to evolve in maritime warfare, again responding to what technology demands (evolving threats) and the opportunities it presents. For example, in a modern warship, the command by veto concept extends to the application of both ‘human on the loop’[25] and ‘human in the loop’[26] systems. For example, in the Aegis Combat System fitted to Hobart-class guided missile destroyers (DDGs), an individual pre-programs the system’s automation settings to fire (or recommend firing) a missile based on the threat meeting certain parameters. The system will respond as programmed, unless a human observing (on the loop) intervenes. The second concept requires a human to physically act to progress an engagement at certain decision points (in the loop) to allow the missile to leave the ship. In each case, there are decisions made in programming the system and responding to its recommendations which require command input.
A commander will specify the level of autonomy granted to delegates over the conduct of certain high-risk or sensitive activities. These may include actions such as launching or recovering helicopters or streaming towed arrays, or decisions that will involve a vessel operating in or near contested waters. Delegates may be granted full autonomy or partial autonomy, or their decision-making authority may be subject to caveats.[27] For example, a warfare officer may not need to inform their commander over the radio that the ship has been challenged by another warship or an aircraft before responding with an authorised response, but the commander may nevertheless need to be informed immediately thereafter. Levels of autonomy may change depending on whether the commander is in the operations room or elsewhere. The level of autonomy for each action may differ depending on the level of threat, the proximity of the enemy, and the state of readiness. Regardless of the delegation granted, it is worth observing that the delegate is always authorised (and expected) to exercise the overriding right to use force in self-defence, recognised by international law. In such situations, the commander will be informed after the action is taken.
Prior to the modern day, delegations tended to vary depending on the state of readiness of the ship. Such readiness states would be described variously as ‘cruising watches’, ‘defence watches’ and ‘action stations’, with higher levels of autonomy granted towards the latter states. Modern delegations, especially those in highly automated DDGs, are more nuanced and situation based. Autonomy increases relative to weapons posture (the readiness of the weapons systems) with some correlation but not causation based on the specified ‘threat warning condition’.[28]
Much as concepts of naval command at sea have changed in response to changes in technology, the relationship between a commander at sea and higher headquarters is continuing to evolve. From about the 1980s onwards, higher headquarters (afloat or ashore) have increasingly been able to achieve a better, more complete picture.[29] This is due to the multiple intelligence sources and situational awareness tools available to a higher headquarters (Joint Operations Command in the Australian context), which far exceed the volume and quality of information available to or digestible by a ship or task group, particularly given enduring concerns over information security at sea. Information provided to a ship’s commander is inevitably filtered and interpreted in an effort to provide them with adequate situational awareness without overwhelming them; it is a tricky balance. This is especially the case when vessels are involved in shaping activities: actions taken to influence the behaviour of allies, partners and potentially adversaries. Such actions may include transiting through or near contested waters, interacting with adversary vessels shadowing the fleet, or interacting when challenged by ships or aircraft. Commanders of vessels involved in such activities will provide a lot of data back up the chain of command so that the higher headquarters can combine this information, with that gathered from other sources, to determine how best to respond.
The data-heavy method of operational control over modern military operations—enabled by technology and the product of cautious peacetime strategic manoeuvring—may be regarded as the antithesis of mission command. However, mission command is not dead, especially when communications are denied or tactical units are running silent—and this does not only apply to submariners.[30] Just as the preceding paragraphs have explored the evolution of the command by veto concept into a much more nuanced and conditional practice, so it is likely that mission command will continue to evolve with tactical commanders and higher headquarters being able to adopt different modes of operation depending on the circumstances.
There are also limits to what a higher headquarters can do, even if communications are efficient. For example, a headquarters ashore will usually have an excellent picture of the air and missile threat facing a force at sea. However, they are not all the way ‘in the loop’ so far as the tactical-level engagements are concerned; nor are they inside the combat system. For example, in ballistic missile defence (a strategic-level activity), the higher headquarters will provide cueing, and the firing units will execute the engagement because the latency in communications systems is too great for accurate engagement by a higher headquarters. In this instance, while mission command can move between the commander of the naval vessel and the higher headquarters, the application of command by veto during the engagement remains at the discretion of the commander at sea. The converse of this situation would occur in strike warfare involving a Tomahawk mission.[31] In this instance, the ship is just a delivery platform for the cruise missile, responsible only for the safe overwater flight of the weapon. The mission itself is developed and approved by the higher headquarters. The ship provides the weapon to the mission but is not responsible for where it goes once it is over land. The authority to engage is instead assumed by the unit commander and there is no veto other than that affecting the safety of the firing unit or its immediate surroundings. In the terminology of warfare delegations, the employment of strike weapons from the ship is one delegation that is never passed to a warfare officer and remains solely with the commander.
Conclusion
This article has proposed that the concept of mission command has existed in the context of naval operations for centuries and, to a degree, persists to this day. However, better communications and access to richer and often classified information sources have enabled higher headquarters to play a more active role in decision-making and directing the actions of commanders at sea. The exercise of mission command is therefore increasingly nuanced and conditions based. Mission command is complemented by the concept of command by veto, particularly in maritime task group organisations using the composite warfare commander concept. These approaches to command have been shaped by technology, particularly as it relates to communication capabilities and the demands for increasingly rapid decision-making in modern warfare. While new technology has served to assist decision-making and command in some ways, it has also created new challenges that have needed to be solved. Solutions have been found in the introduction of new concepts of command, such as command by veto. While command concepts in the maritime domain share many similarities with Auftragstaktik and mission command in the land domain, they have developed separately. The interaction between what technology both enables and dictates, and the exercise of command at sea is, by necessity, sufficiently different from command in other domains that it is worthy of understanding on its own terms. If it is to respond effectively across the spectrum of complex operating environments demanded by government, the ADF must plan both for the existing methods of executing command at sea and for their future development.
The authors are very grateful for the review and input from Commodore Peter Leavy and Commanders Bernard Dobson and Bart Harrington.
Endnotes
[1] For the purpose of this paper, mission command means delivery on command intent by balancing direction and constraint, aligned to resourcing, through a degree of subordinate discretion and initiative.
[2] James Goldrick, ‘Command: A Historical Perspective’, Journal of Character and Leadership Development 3, no. 1 (2020): 1–14.
[3] Royal Australian Navy, RAN Doctrine 1: Australian Maritime Doctrine, second edition (Sea Power Centre, 2010).
[4] Australian Defence Force, ADF-I-3 ADF Maritime Power, first edition (ADF Doctrine Directorate, n.d.).
[5] US Department of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-32: Joint Maritime Operations (US Department of Defense, 2018).
[6] Michael A Palmer, ‘“The Soul’s Right Hand”: Command and Control in the Age of Fighting Sail, 1652–1827’, The Journal of Military History 61, no. 4 (1997).
[7] Michael Pembroke, Arthur Phillip: Sailor, Mercenary, Governor, Spy (Richmond, Victoria: Hardie Grant Books, 2013).
[8] Palmer, ‘“The Soul’s Right Hand”’.
[9] David Stahel, ‘Auftragstaktik: The Prussian-German Origins and Applications of Mission Command’, Australian Army Journal 21, no. 3 (2025).
[10] Fred Brenchly, Stoker’s Submarine (Harper Collins, 2002); Mike Carlton, Dive! Australian Submarines at War (Penguin Random House, 2024).
[11] Brenchly, Stoker’s Submarine; Carlton, Dive!.
[12] Jon Tetsuro Sumida, ‘A Matter of Timing: The Royal Navy and the Tactics of Decisive Battle, 1912–1916’, The Journal of Military History 67, no. 1 (2003): 85–136.
[13] Sir John Augustine Collins (1899–1989) is one of the Royal Australian Navy’s most highly regarded officers. A successful wartime commander, he is also the first graduate of the Royal Australian Naval College to be Chief of Naval Staff. A concise overview of his decorated career can be found in ‘Sir John Augustine Collins (1899–1989)’, Australian Dictionary of Biography (website), at: https://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/collins-sir-john-augustine-12335.
[14] Andrew Browne Cunningham, A Sailor’s Odyssey (Hutchinson & Co, 1952). Note: The Battle of Cape Spada (19 July 1940) was a key naval battle in the Mediterranean during the Second World War. HMAS Sydney (Captain John Collins) was instrumental in the incapacitation and subsequent sinking of the Italian light cruiser Bartolomeo Colleoni. The following article from the Australian War Memorial offers a high-level outline of the contribution of Australians in this battle, with reference to primary source material: Rebecca Brenton, ‘Mad Aussies of the Med’, Australian War Memorial (website), 14 July 2020, at: https://www.awm.gov.au/articles/blog/battle-of-cape-spada.
[15] John Collins, As Luck Would Have It (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1965); G Hermon Gill, Royal Australian Navy 1939–1942 (Australian War Memorial, 1957).
[16] Goldrick, ‘Command’.
[17] Sumida, ‘A Matter of Timing’; Goldrick, ‘Command’.
[18] Trent Hone, Learning War: The Evolution of Fighting Doctrine in the U.S. Navy, 1898–1945, Studies in Naval History and Sea Power (Annapolis MD: Naval Institute Press, 2018).
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid.; Goldrick, ‘Command’.
[21] ANP4312 Royal Australian Navy Action Information Organisation User Instruction.
[22] US Department of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-32.
[23] ADF-I-3 ADF Maritime Power.
[24] US Department of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-32.
[25] Defined in Navy RAS-AI Strategy 2040 as ‘a category of … control where the system performs all functions autonomously but a human may intervene to stop or modify the outcome before the task is complete’. Royal Australian Navy, Robotics, Autonomous Systems and Artificial Intelligence (RAS-AI) Strategy 2040 (Canberra: Sea Power Centre, 2020).
[26] Defined in Navy RAS-AI Strategy 2040 as ‘a category of … control where the system performs some functions independently but requires a human to perform functions that complete the systems task cycle’. Ibid.
[27] ANP4312 Royal Australian Navy Action Information Organisation User Instruction.
[28] Ibid.
[29] Goldrick, ‘Command’.
[30] US Department of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-32.
[31] The Tomahawk (BGM-109) is a long-range subsonic cruise missile developed by the United States and used primarily in the US Navy, Royal Navy and now RAN for ship- and submarine-based land attack operations.