ADF Operational art is conceptually weak and has been characterised by an intellectually restrictive framework. Specifically, there is no widespread understanding of operational art relevant to Australia's contemporary geostrategic and geopolitical context. The consequence is that there is virtually no culture of campaigning in the ADF that is based on sound doctrine relevant to the demands on the use of military force in the contemporary operating environment. This is compounded by a …

The premise of this study paper is that operational art and strategy are dynamic and contingent practices. Talent, refined by dedicated study of war and warfare, are the critical prerequisites for capable operational artists and strategists. General principles, rules derived from them, and systems based on these rules have only limited value for strategy and operational art. In fact, they may even serve to undermine the practices of operational art and strategy because prescribed principles, rules and …

Success in counterinsurgency requires a careful balance between the ability to win the support of the people, and a finely honed close combat ability that can crush the enemy with precision whenever and wherever the opportunity arises. This paper examines these issues from a commander's perspective with a focus on counterinsurgency operations in Uruzgan in the second half of 2009. In doing so it focuses on areas in which MRTF-2 modified its operational techniques. These included dispersed operations, …

This paper considers Strike as a strategic and operational-level technique from two perspectives: historical and theoretical. The historical perspective shows a long record of the land and maritime forms of Strike. The advent of the aeroplane opened new options for strategic strike, but changes in technology and the nature of the state also provided new opportunities for surface forces. Strike by land and maritime forces grew at the same time as air forces were proving themselves. The theoretical …

This paper analyses the implications of the concepts derived from the US Army's Army-After-Next (AAN) Project for the Australian Army. The paper is designed as an overview; it is a snapshot of ideas arising from the revolution in military affairs (RMA) and a speculative insight into the future strategic environment, rather than a detailed assessment or exhaustive examination of the AAN Project as a whole. Such an approach is necessarily selective, with issues identified and examined insofar as they impact …

All three countries, the UK, Canada and the US, have adopted the US-initiated concept of the 'Total Force'-an integrated, 'seamless' military comprising both full and part-time components. However, as a consequence of cultural, budgetary, political and historical factors, each country has arrived at a different model. Despite having achieved considerable improvements in their force structure and operational capabilities, many of these initiatives appear provisional and short sighted, limited by a narrow …

The Australian Army must be prepared to conduct land force operations throughout the spectrum of conflict. These land force operations are simplified into two main categories: warfighting (combat operations) and military support (peace and support operations). The fluidity of the strategic environment puts a premium on the Army's ability to be a flexible and agile organisation if it is to retain its effectiveness. To be flexible and agile, the Australian Army needs to develop and maintain a high level of …

The Australian Army recognises that organisations that excel in the future will be those that discover how to tap people's commitment and capacity to learn at all levels. The aim of this paper is to discuss the concept of professional mastery and its application to the Army-After-Next and to leadership development for the Australian Army. The paper describes professional mastery by developing an integrated model of the concepts underlying the intellectual and moral components of warfighting capability. The …

In spite of the international condemnation and remedial efforts after the May 1998 Indo-Pakistan nuclear tests, the situation in South Asia has subsequently been an action-reaction of missile race, local war, full-fledged nuclear weapon program and coup d'etat. International arms control regimes such as the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) have been hampered. South Asia as a whole has become a more dangerous place and a range of …

Success on the battlefield depends to a large extent on the timely receipt of accurate information presented in a format that can be digested readily by the commander and staff to allow them to prepare appropriate plans. The receipt of sensor data, information processing and communication of orders all require the provision of suitable tactical communications systems providing high-speed data networks and voice communications. Without communications on the modern battlefield the commander is deaf, dumb and …