Book Review - ‘Sorry, lads, but the order is to go’ – The August Offensive, Gallipoli: 1915

‘Sorry, lads, but the order is to go’ – The August Offensive, Gallipoli: 1915

Written by: David W Cameron, 

UNSW Press, Sydney, 2009,

ISBN: 9781742230771, 370pp.

Reviewed by: Rhys Crawley

After the months of stalemate that followed the failed Gallipoli landings, the Allied high command began to look for new options. They decided to mount a breakout manoeuvre from the Anzac sector to seize the northern heights and eventually cross the peninsula. At the same time there was a new landing at Suvla Bay which aimed to both support the Anzac left flank and provide a logistical base for the subsequent phases of the offensive. This was the August Offensive, and it was the largest and last major effort to defeat the Ottomans at Gallipoli.

It is this offensive that forms the subject of David Cameron’s second book on the Gallipoli campaign. Like his previous foray into the first 24 hours of battle, Cameron successfully focuses his narrative on the individuals who took part in the actions of August 1915. He provides an evocative and emotional read throughout and is able to successfully convey the confusion of battle, while at the same time telling an interesting and historically correct story.

Despite this, Cameron provides little more than was previously known about the August Offensive. He relies heavily on secondary sources, especially the works of Charles Bean, to construct his narrative. Where primary materials are used, Cameron has largely drawn from previously published accounts. Some unseen records do appear, but these are in the minority. One must, however, be conscious of the audience for whom Cameron was writing. The book was never intended to be an academic text, nor an educational tool for the professional soldier. Rather, it was written for the general reader, and therefore strove to introduce those with little or no prior knowledge of the August Offensive to this important period of Australia’s military history.

There can be no doubt that the author has an extraordinary grasp of the various batdes that constituted the August Offensive. He presents a succinct, yet detailed and accurate understanding of the plans and objectives, followed by an impeccable blow-by-blow account of what, how and when units fought. By examining the Ottoman story Cameron also presents his audience the bloody reality of war on both sides of no-man’s land. Cameron’s real strength, however, is his ability to accurately describe the landscape, constantly reminding the reader of its key features and the difficulties these posed for the planners and troops.

That said, there are aspects of Cameron’s approach and content that let him down. His focus on the soldiers’ war is at the expense of the operational and strategic levels of the war. Similarly, his reliance on narrative is at the expense of an analysis of the reasons for failure. One of the major shortcomings of this book is that like many authors before him, Cameron briefly succumbs to the age-old myth that the Anzacs ‘almost managed to pull it off’ (p. xiii). This is not only incorrect; it is ignorant of the inherent impossibility of the task. The principal drawback, though, is the scant attention paid to the equally chilling and pointless saga of the British at Suvla Bay. By focusing almost entirely on the fighting at Anzac, Cameron tells only a portion of the story. As such, the book sits as just another volume of Anzac-centric rhetoric in the historiography of this failed campaign.

The book is also let down in its presentation. While sufficient for someone with an avid knowledge of the Gallipoli campaign, and given its intended general reader audience, its maps are merely adaptations of the thumbnail sketches used by Bean in 1924, and offer nothing for those who want to understand the particularities and peculiarities of the terrain. The endnotes are also brief, confusing and inconsistent. On a positive note though, the author should be congratulated for his selection of interesting, and not often seen photographs.

Despite being an amalgamation of previously seen material, this was a long overdue book about the August Offensive. It does not provide many educational lessons for the professional soldier, but it does remind one of the importance of adequate command and practical planning. If you are after a captivating story, then Cameron’s narrative is for you. But be warned, it is not the full story.