Book Review - Fighting to the Finish: the Australian Army and the Vietnam War, 1968–1975
Written by: Ashley Ekins and Ian McNeill,
Allen & Unwin, 2012,
ISBN 9781865088242, 1184pp,
Reviewed by: Thomas Richardson, UNSW Canberra
Ashley Ekins and Ian McNeill’s Fighting to the Finish is the much-anticipated final volume of the Official History of Australia’s Involvement in Southeast Asian Conflicts, and the final volume to deal with Australia’s participation in the Vietnam War. The value of Fighting to the Finish for military professionals and historians lies in both the volume’s comprehensive treatment of Australian Army operations in Vietnam from mid-1968 to the final withdrawal in December 1972, and the willingness on the part of primary author, Ashley Ekins, to provide honest assessments of the controversies generated during the conflict. The result is a book that is not only an indispensable reference, but one which also provides an excellent insight into the operational problems faced by the Australian Army in Vietnam.
Australia’s participation in the Vietnam War is often described as a ‘platoon leaders’ war’, and this is reflected in a historiography dominated by veterans’ memoirs, battalion histories and accounts of individual battles (particularly Long Tan). The effect of this literary tradition is twofold: a preponderance of individual, or tactical, perspectives of combat and a skewed understanding of the reality of this war in which large stretches of operations and actions are obscured by a handful of ‘famous’ engagements. Long Tan may have been one of the great triumphs of Australian arms, but it was atypical of combat in Vietnam and is of less relevance to the modern Army than operations undertaken between 1968 and 1972.
In a narrative structured around the ebb and flow of these Australian operations in the field, Ekins largely keeps the tactical viewpoint but adds a much needed operational and strategic perspective. The events of 1968—the Tet Offensive, the appointment of General Creighton Abrams as commander of MACV, and the election of Richard Nixon—marked a fundamental shift in the course of the war, with the stage set for eventual American withdrawal. Nixon’s ‘Vietnamisation’ policy and Abrams’ ‘One War’ concept, in theory, represented significant changes in policy. Despite this apparent shift, Australian commanders continued to be torn between operations aimed at the destruction of communist ‘main force’ units (such as the ubiquitous D445 Battalion) in remote jungle base areas, and pacification operations conducted in and around Phuoc Tuy’s villages—much as they had been in 1966 and 1967. Even as Abrams was promoting the ‘one war’ concept, Lieutenant General Julian Ewell (the commander of II Field Force Vietnam, the corps headquarters to which 1ATF reported) was pressuring his Australian subordinates to increase their ‘body count’ totals.
This operational dilemma was not just a product of external pressure, however, and in examining it Ekins demonstrates a willingness to challenge some of the more pervasive myths of Australian involvement in Vietnam. Far from being united behind a common and effective counterinsurgency doctrine, Australian commanders had vastly different ideas as to the role of 1ATF and the tactical model to be followed. Thus we find Lieutenant Colonel Colin Khan, the commander of 5RAR during its second tour, lamenting that his unit had been ‘trained for totally the wrong war’, that pacification was ‘a waste of time’, and that the proper role of 1ATF was to hunt communist main force units in their remote jungle bases. But just months after Khan and 5RAR departed Vietnam, 8RAR’s CO, Lieutenant Colonel Keith O’Neill, was reaching the opposite conclusion—that operations in deep jungle resulted in bunker contacts that created excessive Australian casualties for little permanent gain, and that operations around villages were far more effective. Ekins does not overly emphasise this difference, but rather lets the arguments of the respective battalion commanders speak for themselves. Likewise, a rebuttal to the common argument that the Australians won a ‘tactical victory’ in Phuoc Tuy province in the conclusion is firm but far from overbearing.
Fighting to the Finish also refuses to shy away from criticism of 1ATF where it is warranted. As is to be expected, considerable space is devoted to the Dat Do minefield—Brigadier Graham’s abortive effort to cordon off the Dat Do district from external infiltration from the east of Phuoc Tuy. This is well-tilled ground (notably in Greg Lockhart’s The Minefield), but where Lockhart assigns blame overwhelmingly to Graham, Ekins acknowledges that significant penetrations of the minefield were occurring while it was still under the partial protection of 1ATF in 1967. Ekins acknowledges that this does not absolve Graham of blame, but again shows the willingness of Fighting to the Finish to challenge common tropes of Australian military history—in this case, that of valiant diggers being led astray by incompetent senior officers. Uncomfortable issues such as discipline inside Nui Dat (specifically the relationship between excessive drinking and ‘fragging’), friendly fire and the legacy of Agent Orange are also addressed in depth.
At the same time there are some notes of caution. Fighting to the Finish is part of a series and needs to be read as such. There is no detailed description of Phuoc Tuy province, something that is present in the previous volumes, To Long Tan and On the Offensive. Tactical success is often measured on the basis of body count, ignoring both the potential political ramifications of communist activity and the losses of local South Vietnamese forces. This is in part understandable given that Ekin’s mandate is to write a history of Australian operations rather than a history of the war in Phuoc Tuy, but nonetheless this lack of context can be frustrating. It is also unfortunate that the volume’s long lead time has meant it has missed out on some relevant advances in scholarship, notably Ernie Chamberlain’s translations of some of the more recent (and balanced) Vietnamese works.
Overall, Fighting to the Finish is an important work that is a must for students of both the Vietnam War and Australian military history. The appendices, specifically Colonel D A Chinn’s summary of operations, are invaluable. But it is Ekin’s willingness to provide more than a simple narrative that forms the core strength of Fighting to the Finish. Perhaps the most important part of the volume is the final paragraph, in which Ekins notes the continued relevance of the Vietnam: ‘It continues to serve as a warning of the potential cost and outcomes of misconceived intervention ... For Australia, the Vietnam War stands as a reminder that open-ended military commitments carry unforeseeable risks, even when based on perceived national self-interest and for espoused altruistic or humanitarian reasons.’
