Without it We're STUFT

Prior to the First World War there was very limited preparation for the task of transporting Australian troops overseas. The Defence Act of 1903 gave the military the power to requisition vessels when required, but no further processes had been put in place.^[3] The absence of any detailed planning framework had obvious drawbacks. On 3 August 1914, the Commonwealth Government offered the British an expeditionary force of 20,000 men. It was not until two days later that Commander Walter Thring, Naval Assistant to the First Naval Member of the Naval Board, called the military authorities to ask if they needed the RAN to ‘prepare a scheme for taking up transports’.^[4] To meet the challenge, a committee was formed, made up of naval and military personnel, supplemented by expertise in the form of the Commonwealth Naval Ship Constructor and representation from the shipping industry. Through the war much of the work was carried out by Commander AC Dunn, who served as Transport Officer in Sydney.  

The requirement to rapidly dispatch the first contingent of the Australian Imperial Force (AIF) for service overseas involved a pressing need for shipping. Over the course of the latter part of August and early September 1914, the committee examined as many ships calling at Australian ports as possible, and identified 28 vessels which were immediately taken up. At this stage they could count on the ‘cordial co-operation’ of the shipowners and their representatives in Australia.^[5] Many of these vessels were on the migrant routes, but they still needed significant modification to make them suitable for transporting troops: 

In nearly every vessel the whole of the passenger accommodation had to be gutted, and often the electric wiring and water-supply systems had to be dislocated and renewed; further, the galley and lavatory accommodation needed much enlargement.^[6]  

The vessels taken up to transport horses required even greater modification. Given the limited facilities in Australia at the time, and the complete absence of prior preparation, the conversion of vessels was undertaken with extraordinary speed. By 27 September 1914, all of the conversions were complete, and 21,529 men and 7,822 horses were embarked on a fleet totalling 237,885 tons. The conversion process was further enhanced as the war progressed, and by the middle of 1915 it was possible to fully equip an 11,000 ton steamer to carry 1,500 troops inside 60 hours.^[7] Due to the duration of a round trip to Europe and back, it was necessary to continue the process of taking up and converting further vessels in order to transport the newly raised contingents of the AIF to the various fronts. Overall, the Transport Branch of the Navy Department took up 74 transport vessels between 1914 and early 1917, and these shipped 337,000 men and 27,000 horses from Australia to the European and Middle Eastern theatres.^[8] 

A useful supplement to the British and Australian vessels requisitioned by the Commonwealth Government came in the form of 28 German and Austrian vessels that were interned in Australian ports on the outbreak of war. Although these should have come under the technical control of the Admiralty in London, they were handed over to the Commonwealth Government for use as part of the Australian war effort. The majority of these vessels were ill suited to troop transport duties and were instead used to supplement commercial shipping in the region. However, six of these vessels, including the SS Pfalz (the ship on the receiving end of the first shots fired by the British Empire in the war) were used for trooping. This additional pool of shipping was comparatively small but was nevertheless very significant given the scarcity of Australian flagged and controlled tonnage, a point that would become more notable as the war progressed.^[9]  

By the end of 1915, it had become clear that the conflict would be won by the side that could mobilise and deploy the greater resources. Accordingly, shipping was recognised as one of the most, if not the most, critical aspects of the Allied war effort. As a result, the British Government took a series of steps to increase their control over shipping and to focus it on strategically critical routes. Australia, like most of the rest of the world, relied very heavily on British shipping, and therefore these measures had profound effects on the Australian economy.^[10] Most of that impact fell on trade, and therefore lies outside the scope of this article. Nevertheless, these pressures did affect the ability of the Australian Government to use shipping for military purposes. From the outset of the war, ships that were transporting Australian forces to Europe were frequently then taken over by the Admiralty in London for what they saw as more pressing imperial needs. As a report from the Navy Board Transport Branch noted:  

When reinforcements are urgently required or a new expedition is launched at short notice, all considerations beyond the military necessities of the moment must be disregarded, and any and all ships within reach have to be requisitioned. At such times the Commonwealth transport service suffers, unexpected delays result, and prearranged plans are seriously disorganised.^[11] 

This was particularly galling as these ships had been requisitioned by the Australian Government and converted at some expense to adapt them for trooping duties. Such actions by the Admiralty in London also forced the Navy Board to take up new vessels in Australian waters, which tended to further deplete the merchant fleet in the region. To try to ease these challenges Herbert Larkin, formerly of the Australasian United Steam Navigation Company, was attached to the High Commissioner’s Office in London as the Commonwealth Shipping Representative. Larkin fought the good fight, but his success was limited. Ultimately, it was difficult to argue against claims by the War Office or Admiralty in London of the essential military necessity of utilising specific vessels. Equally significant was the fact that the vast majority of the vessels taken up by the Australian Government were in fact British as opposed to Australian. This meant that the Commonwealth had very little leverage in its disputes with London, something that would be a recurring theme.^[12]  

The Transport Branch was further challenged by the increasing centrality of shipping to the war effort, and the resultant efforts by belligerent governments to control it. While shipowners were generally very obliging at the beginning of the war, this did not last. As the supply of shipping tightened and freight rates rocketed, shipowners increasingly complained about their vessels being taken up for war service, often at now uncompetitive rates.^[13] Furthermore, efforts by the Australian Government to use military transports to ship general freight (where they had capacity) were seen as undercutting their legitimate business. British shipowners therefore complained to the Admiralty, the Board of Trade and eventually the British Prime Minister, arguing that Australian requisition of British ships was illegal. A compromise was eventually reached whereby the shipowners would be able to load paying freight in certain circumstances on requisitioned vessels; however, before this could be properly implemented it was overtaken by events.^[14]  

Following the German declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare in February 1917, the British Government decided to requisition all vessels operating between Britain and Australia. Initially this decision excluded those ships already taken up by the Australian Government, but from June the decision was extended to include such vessels, with the process of transfer being completed by the beginning of 1918. This development had a profound effect on the management of Australian military transportation. The key role of the Transport Branch shifted from directing the take-up and conversion of vessels in Australia to being a lobbyist in London ‘to secure from the Ministry of Shipping accommodation both for reinforcements proceeding from the Commonwealth and for invalids and wounded men who must be returned to the Commonwealth’.^[15] This process ran relatively smoothly, and in some respects removed some of the inconsistencies produced by the Australian requisitioning of British shipping. It nevertheless highlighted the degree to which Australia was absolutely reliant upon British shipping, and the challenges of securing necessary tonnage for one’s priorities, even from one’s closest allies. 

Endnotes

The importance of shipping to the British Empire was well understood prior to the First World War, but governments took relatively few active measures to support it. The experience of conflict taught governments that they could not simply rely upon private enterprise to provide the facilities necessary to ensure national security. This challenge, however, was generally viewed through an imperial, as opposed to a purely Australian, lens. Throughout the interwar period, organisations such as the Imperial Shipping Committee (where Australia was represented by the High Commissioner) met to discuss both the economic and security challenges associated with shipping, and potential government action. As the British Government told the 1937 Imperial Conference, ‘the importance of maintaining in peace time a Mercantile Marine which will be adequate to war-time needs requires no argument’.^[16] 

On the outbreak of World War II, the Australian Government raised the 2nd AIF for potential service overseas. In November 1939, following some debate, it was decided to send the first contingents to the Middle East. In many respects the requirements for military transport in the early years of the Second World War mirrored those in the First World War, being primarily focused on the oceanic transportation of troops. The arrangements for such transportation clearly drew directly from First World War experience, with little evidence of the extemporised solutions of 1914. Instead the entire process was far more centralised, with both British and Australian organisations working within the framework set out in the Regulations for His Majesty’s Sea Transport Service.^[17] The plans for the transport of Australian troops were made by the Director of Sea Transport in London, who officially requisitioned the ships and allocated them to the task. A number of the ships were in ports in Australia or the wider region, and so the Transport Committee operating under the Navy Board in Melbourne undertook the task of actually taking some of the vessels up and managing their conversion. Initially:

[the] fitting out was done in such a manner as to cause the least possible damage to, and dismantling of, the ships’ fittings. There was virtually no ‘gutting’ as there was in 1914–18. 

This situation would change with the exigencies of war, but it ensured that the first Australian troops sent overseas went in style.^[18] 

While the provision of shipping for military transport ran relatively smoothly in the opening years of the war, problems rapidly developed elsewhere as London began to pull tonnage away from Australian trade in response to an overall shipping shortage. The Australian Government pressed the British to get more ships, highlighting how ‘on [the] outbreak of war, Australia was entirely dependent upon British and foreign shipping for oversea trade, principally [the] former’.^[19] The withdrawal of this tonnage had a significant effect on the Australian economy because its key export commodities were left piling up on the dockside for a lack of ships. However, as Prime Minister Robert Menzies discovered when he visited London in April 1941, the trouble was that there was little scope for a change of policy given the limited tonnage available and the critical nature of other demands, including military logistics and food supply to the UK.^[20]

From the beginning of 1942, shipping worries focused on Australian exports were replaced by rather more pressing concerns. Specifically, the rapid Japanese advance into the Pacific and South-East Asia threatened all of Australia’s critical lifelines, while the entry of the United States into the war served to further restrict the availability of shipping. This development primarily impacted trade (which in such times is better framed as maritime supply) rather than military transport; however, these issues obviously intersect. Overall tonnage shortages, most notably the shortage of tankers, had major implications for the supplies available for military operations. Limitations on shipping also helped to shape the scale and timeframe of the redeployment of Australian forces from the Middle East.

The shift of focus of the conflict into Australia’s near region had other, even more profound, implications for the use of shipping as military transport. A key factor in this was the development of Australia as a base of operations, not merely for Australian forces but also for those of its American allies. From early 1942, it became apparent that northern Australia would be a key launch pad for American forces, but as the US Army Logistics Official History noted, there was very little there in terms of facilities and support: 

Darwin was an isolated outpost in Australia’s back country, its facilities primitive … Practically all the supplies, equipment, and construction material, together with the troops required to set up and defend the base, would have to be brought in by water.^[21] 

The same story was true throughout northern Australia, with the joint US and Australian military build-up in the region being very heavily reliant on coastal shipping to provide all of the key logistical support. The importance of coastal shipping was further reinforced by the limitations of port facilities in the South West Pacific theatre. Throughout much of the initial period it was only the major Australian cities, especially Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane, that had sufficient infrastructure to support large quantities of ocean-going shipping. Smaller vessels were therefore essential to move supplies further north. The situation did improve as facilities were developed in Townsville, and later in New Guinea itself at places like Oro Bay, but this took time.^[22]

The shortage of smaller vessels capable of supporting operations in northern Australia and New Guinea rapidly developed as a critical bottleneck holding back the Allied shift to the offensive. As General Douglas MacArthur told the leading Australian official in charge of shipping in April 1942, ‘[W]e wish to impress upon you that no supply or tactical operation can be executed or even planned unless the vessels of the descriptions made are available to us’.^[23] MacArthur repeatedly pressed his superiors in Washington for more ships, but he was bluntly told ‘to make all possible use of Australian shipping’.^[24] In a period when the shortage of shipping was the critical factor inhibiting Allied operations across the globe, planners were invariably engaged in a task of ‘robbing Peter to pay Paul’.^[25] Given this environment it is hardly surprising that Australia, as the junior alliance partner and largely locked out of the discussions over the global allocation of tonnage, struggled to make its voice heard. 

Through 1942–43 there was an ongoing battle for control for coastal tonnage in Australian waters among a variety of organisations. Issues first developed in respect of the control of 21 Dutch vessels that had fled to Australia following the fall of the Dutch East Indies. The Ministry of War Transport in London, the War Shipping Authority in Washington and the Shipping Control Board in Australia all sought to claim this prize, with the debate quickly descending into a stoush by telegram. General MacArthur, who insisted that these vessels were essential to his operations, was furious at the back and forth, but did eventually secure control of the ships.^[26] In response to American demands, the Australian Government had handed over a further 23 coastal vessels for service with the US military. This was on top of 61 vessels that had been requisitioned by the RAN, both to support Australian military operations and for a diverse range of more directly naval purposes.^[27] These demands had severely impacted the tonnage available for shipping requirements that were not purely military in nature. Australia’s geography, and the paucity of land transport, ensured that coastal shipping was an essential part of the economy, both to support civilian life and to pursue the war effort. In the middle of 1942 MacArthur pressed again, asking for an additional 42 small Australian vessels. The Australian Shipping Control Board pushed back, using its channels to Washington and London to highlight the plight of the wider Australian economy. 

In view of the general inadequacy of our shipping tonnage it is not possible for us to provide all the ships stated to be necessary for military purposes. In fact, unless we receive substantial additions to our coastal fleet from overseas sources the present desperate situation will deteriorate to such an extent as to most seriously jeopardise our whole war effort.^[28]

These rebuttals did not stop the transfer of the vessels to the Americans, following a direct appeal from MacArthur to the Prime Minister, John Curtin. The board did, however, secure some concessions in terms of how the Australians could use ocean-going tonnage—particularly British—when in Australian waters.^[29] The impact of the military shipping requirements on the wider economy was severe. By the end of January 1943, only 114 vessels, with a gross tonnage of 194,706, were left for civilian coastal cargoes, compared with a pre-war level of 231 ships totalling 434,327 tons. This deficit caused real problems, especially for the iron and steel industry and the railways, both of which were reliant on shipping for supplies of bulk goods like coal.^[30] 

The situation did slowly improve through 1943 as a range of new shipping construction projects and developments in facilities eased the pressure slightly. The growing number of American merchant vessels eased the demand for coastal tonnage, while improvements in port facilities enabled ocean-going tonnage to bring supplies much closer to the front in New Guinea. Eventually the tidal wave of American production of amphibious craft would obviate the need for requisitioned vessels, but in the shorter term new construction of both landing craft and other smaller vessels in Australia helped bridge the gap. These vessels were supplied to both Australian forces and the Americans through a reverse lend-lease arrangement.^[31] Improved organisation also helped. Prior to the extension of the war to the Pacific the Australian Government saw little need to exert direct control over shipping, as overseas shipping was controlled by London, and the coastal trade had been little impacted by the conflict. The bureaucratic machinery developed in the interwar period was thus never set in train.^[32] This step was taken following the entry of Japan into the war, but the arrival of the conflict on Australia’s doorstep and the resultant interest of its allies in local shipping ensured that there remained a multiplicity of organisations with competing interests and claims. In July 1942, Curtin told a conference in Canberra:

The Government wishes to have one person or authority to see that all shipping available to Australia and the allied nations operating in Australian waters is being put to the best and fullest use. 

It took some time for this desire to be achieved, with an Australian Department of Supply and Shipping being established in October with a Director of Shipping, Sir Thomas Gordon. By April 1943, a British-American-Australian Shipping Committee had been established with representation from the British Ministry of War Transport, the American War Shipping Administration, the Australian Shipping Control Board, the United States and Australian armies, the RAN and the Royal Australian Air Force. The existence of this committee served to reduce, although not eliminate, the tensions over shipping in Australia and greatly enhanced coordination. It was no magic bullet, but when combined with the additional available tonnage it slowly relieved the pressure on both military logistics and the civilian economy.^[33] 

The Australian Army was just as reliant on vessels taken up from civilian use for its water-borne logistics as were its American allies. As the forces of the 2nd AIF returned from the Middle East it became evident that they would need a wide range of small vessels to operate effectively in northern Australia and New Guinea. The problem from the Army’s perspective was that, in the words of a senior officer involved, ‘the Navy’, who were responsible for the acquisition and crewing of all vessels, ‘were quite incompetent in their efforts’. It was eventually agreed between the two services that ‘the Army should provide and operate small craft up to 300 tons deadweight’.^[34] The next problem came in the form of procuring such craft. When the Army began a survey of the small craft available in Australia, it quickly came to realise that the Navy had requisitioned many of the most suitable vessels on the outbreak of war, and the US Army had acquired many of the rest earlier in 1942. The result was that the Army ended up requisitioning a diverse range of vessels—from ferries to yachts, to schooners and fishing trawlers. These vessels performed an equally diverse range of roles, from the transport of supplies to the direct support of amphibious operations, and even as floating workshops. All were operated by the Australian Water Transport Groups of the Royal Australian Engineers. By the end of April 1943, the Army was operating 348 small craft, almost all of which had been taken up from civilian use. This extraordinary mobilisation was vital in helping Australian forces to stabilise the situation in New Guinea and begin to shift to the offensive. For example, the maritime logistics during the Battle of Milne Bay were provided by an ad hoc unit with 36 small craft including 19 luggers requisitioned from Thursday Island.^[35] The diverse nature of the force posed its own challenges, most notably in terms of maintenance. No two vessels were the same, and keeping them serviceable and providing spares proved a perennial challenge, but one the engineers generally managed to overcome.^[36] 

From the autumn of 1943, supplies of new purpose-built small craft began to come on stream. These were ordered from a wide range of Australian firms, from traditional shipyards through to the Ford and Holden car factories. Initially these vessels augmented the requisitioned civilian craft, but throughout 1944, as the trickle turned into a flood, the Army began to return some of its eclectic early fleet to civilian use. We do not have any data on the specific contribution of requisitioned vessels, but the contribution of all Army small watercraft to the war effort in the South West Pacific was remarkable. Over the period between January 1942 and June 1945 they carried over one million tons of cargo and nearly 1.5 million men in 141,319 voyages covering three million kilometres.^[37] Despite this remarkable record, the best-known ships taken up from trade that supported the campaigns in the South West Pacific were operated not by the Army but by the RAN. The liners Manoora, Kanimbla and Westralia were initially taken up by the RAN (and Royal Navy) as armed merchant cruisers. By 1942 this role had largely become redundant, and the decision was taken to convert them into amphibious assault ships. All three were heavily modified and recommissioned as Landing Ships Infantry.^[38] In this guise they played a critical role in supporting Australian Army amphibious operations in New Guinea, Borneo and the Philippines through to 1945.

Endnotes

The postwar years saw a continuation and expansion of the trends that had, by this stage, been evident for some time. Shipping was seen as a critical aspect of national security, something that encompassed both the requirement for supply from overseas and the need for transport as a facilitator of military operations. This in turn meant that there was an almost universal acceptance that shipping was a resource which governments needed to foster in peacetime and be prepared to control in wartime. As was set out in documents to accompany discussion of a NATO-led Defence Shipping Authority:

The coming of total war has required (i) the close integration of all demands for shipping, (i.e. civil and military) to ensure economic use, and (ii) the establishment of a central agency, which is itself not a bidder for shipping to co-ordinate impartially demands, priorities and allocation.^[39]

Throughout the 1950s, Australian Government transport policy was consistently shaped with defence requirements in mind. In October 1953 the Department of Shipping and Transport requested information on potential defence requirements so as to help shape their policy. The Defence Committee responded that, due to the generally benign strategic situation, transport must ‘be considered from the point of view of equipping this country as a main support area rather than for the local defence of the Australian continent’. The committee went on, however, to observe that in regard to sea transport: 

there is an additional factor in that many of the vessels available in peace are physically requisitioned for a large range of warlike purposes. It is therefore important for the defence aspect that sea transport should be maintained in a healthy condition.^[40] 

A consistent theme emerged throughout defence engagement with government departments involved in transport policy: 

[T]here will be a requirement for sea and air transport to be available on the outbreak of war for the movement and maintenance of our forces overseas. It is important therefore that sea and air transport suitable for this purpose should be fostered and maintained in peace.^[41] 

This requirement went beyond the ships themselves, and the Defence Committee emphasised that ‘it is essential, for defence requirements, for Australia to possess a merchant shipbuilding industry on an adequate and efficient basis’. The purpose of such industry was not just to support naval requirements but also to build and maintain the ships necessary ‘for the carriage of troops and essential goods in time of war’.^[42] 

The post-war period was characterised by an acknowledgement from both the Department of Defence and the wider government that Australia was, and would likely remain, reliant on foreign owned and flagged shipping, at this stage still overwhelmingly British. However, there was an expectation that Australia would need to be able to meet its military transport requirements from its own coastal fleet. In April 1956 the Department of Defence set out its likely shipping requirements in the event of a crisis in order to inform the Department of Shipping and Transport ‘in its planning for the Australian Coastal Fleet’. These defence plans set out the forward deployment of a large force, including the dispatch of over 128,000 men to Malaya, as well as Air Force and Navy personnel and equipment to Darwin, Manus Island and Nauru. The shipping requirements for stores alone for Malaya in the first six months amounted to nearly 1.5 million tons. Beyond this, defence planners estimated that they would need over 3.6 million tons of interstate shipping capacity in Australia in the first six months of a major war. Much of this domestic requirement may have replicated or replaced peacetime shipping of goods (for example, iron ore), but it gives an indication of the scale of defence requirements for civilian shipping.^[43]  

These preparations for a future conflict were never tested in full. Australia did, however, take up two civilian vessels, MV Jeparit and MV Boonaroo to support operations in Vietnam. Although far less famous than HMAS Sydney in its role as the ‘Vung Tau ferry’, these two merchant ships taken up from the Australian National Line (ANL) played an important role in supplying the Australian forces in Vietnam. Jeparit completed 43 trips to Vietnam carrying a range of equipment, including the Centurion tanks that were deployed to the country. The smaller Boonaroo made the trip twice. Both vessels were initially chartered, but for short periods of time were taken over and commissioned into the RAN to overcome issues with securing crews due to opposition to the war from the Seamen’s Union. Despite these issues, the wider logistics support for the war proved very effective and was a notable development. As historian Jeff Grey remarked:

it demonstrated, for the first time, that Australia was capable of transporting, maintaining and reinforcing a sizeable ground and expeditionary force at a distance and for a considerable period of time, with and from its own resources. Australia had not done this before, and has not needed to do it since.^[44] 

Over the later Cold War period, the shift from a ‘Forward Defence’ to a ‘Defence of Australia’ doctrine—when combined with the absence of any significant threat—ensured that the focus on civilian transport as a facilitator of military operations faded. While experience from the two world wars had led to a widely held understanding that government needed to take active measures to ensure that civilian transport would be available for defence purposes in times of crisis, this sentiment faded. The free market reforms of the 1970s and 1980s saw widespread deregulation and privatisation in order to rationalise industry and promote growth. The shipping industry was no exception to this development, with deregulation and the winding-down and eventual sale of ANL, the government-owned shipping line.^[45] There were clearly some concerns about this shift. In 1984, an inter-departmental working group was established to explore the coordination of maritime resources in crises or conflict.^[46] The origin of this committee is unclear, but it possibly stemmed in part from the attention given to this topic following the Falklands War. It does not appear, however, that anything specific came from this renewed attention.^[47] The free-market reforms instigated some 50 years ago have undoubtedly made much of the modern Australian economy more efficient. Nevertheless, a strong argument can be made that this efficiency has come at the expense of resilience in multiple ways, one of these being secure access to transport in time of need. For the past 30 years at least, there has been an expectation that shipping will ‘simply be there’ when needed. The experience of the past suggests that the continuing confidence in such assumptions is unwarranted. 

Endnotes

Prior to the 2022 federal election, the Labor leader Anthony Albanese committed to establish a strategic fleet of Australian ships to help ensure national security and economic sovereignty.^[48] At the end of 2023, the report of the Strategic Fleet Taskforce was released, recommending that the Australian Government take substantive action to both establish a core fleet of 12 Australian owned and flagged vessels, and incentivise a wider regeneration of the industry. We are still waiting to see if the government will acknowledge the true extent of the problems created by Australia’s near total reliance on foreign owned and flagged shipping and act on the taskforce’s full recommendations.^[49] While the significance of the taskforce’s report has generally been viewed through the lens of economic security, taskforce members were clearly deeply aware of the potential importance of Australian-controlled commercial shipping for defence purposes. They identified ‘three prime strategic purposes of the fleet’, one of which was ‘to support the Defence Forces’. The taskforce also proposed, with specific reference to vehicle and freight ferries, that ‘the Government consider whether Defence can ensure those ships can be supported even if not fully commercially self-sustaining’.^[50] 

The importance of civilian shipping to Australia’s national security has also been recognised within recent defence documents, with the establishment of a ‘civil maritime strategic fleet’ being specifically referenced in the government’s response to the Defence Strategic Review (DSR).^[51] This capability has, however, largely been discussed in the context of the need to enhance economic and supply chain resilience, with comparatively little said about the role of civilian vessels in supporting military operations. Despite this, an examination of recent strategic statements, including the DSR and the National Defence Strategy, reveal two broad areas where vessels taken up from trade are likely to be essential in supporting operations by the Australian Army in the event of a major conflict in the Indo-Pacific. 

The first area stems directly from the DSR directive that the Australian Army is to reimagine its role and be ‘optimised for littoral operations in our northern land and maritime spaces’.^[52] In order to support littoral manoeuvre, there is to be a major expansion in Army watercraft through the acquisition of both medium and heavy landing craft. This growth in the ADF’s amphibious capability is welcome, but in the event of major conflict it will be insufficient to support forces deployed at scale. In littoral operations, maritime logistics remain almost as important as they were during the Second World War. For reference, in 1999, 93 per cent of all of the equipment deployed from Australia to East Timor as part of Operation Stabilise went by sea.^[53] The challenge of maritime logistics is not unique to the Australian Army. The US Marine Corps, whose Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations concept is remarkably similar to the Australian concept of littoral manoeuvre, is struggling with the same problem. In the event of crisis, both forces will have to rely heavily on a range of capabilities to meet the challenge, and requisitioned civilian craft is going to be one of them. Similar to the experience from 1942 onwards, Australian Army operations are likely to require large numbers of small craft taken up from a range of civilian uses. In particular, these vessels are likely to be essential in resupply and sustainment tasks, leaving the specialist grey hull craft (whether operated by the Army or Navy) to focus on offensive operations and the frontline manoeuvre elements of littoral manoeuvre. Many of these civilian craft are likely to be significantly smaller than those that have been the focus of recent discussions instigated by the Strategic Fleet Taskforce Review and there is potential to draw on vessels employed in a wide range of Australian maritime industries. Work boats, resupply vessels and other craft supporting industries as diverse as hydrocarbons, aquaculture and offshore renewable energy could be exploited for this purpose.  

Beyond Army’s focus on littoral manoeuvre, a key theme within recent defence policy pronouncements has been the significance of northern Australia as a base of operations, not just for Australian forces but also for American ones. As the National Defence Strategy states, the ADF needs to shift its posture to ‘deliver a logistically networked and resilient set of bases, predominantly across the north of Australia, to enhance force projection and improve Defence’s ability to recover from an attack’.^[54] Logistics have long been one of the key challenges of conducting operations in northern Australia. While transport and infrastructure connections have improved considerably since the Second World War, they remain thin and would be stretched to breaking point in the event that northern Australia were to become a major base for operations. Most significantly, maritime logistics offer unmatched flexibility and resilience. The sea cannot be targeted by enemy forces in the way that rail bridges or pipelines can, and large quantities of material can be moved by ship to remote locations that are unconnected to major land-based transportation networks. For this reason alone, maritime transport will remain a critical component of any effort to deploy, maintain and sustain large-scale forces in northern Australia. The shipping requirements to support this type of function are likely to involve larger vessels than those more directly focused on supporting littoral manoeuvre, but will still be well short of the capacity required to maintain Australia’s economic and supply lifelines across the oceans. Exploiting the vessels employed on the (still) very significant Australian coastal shipping trade appears to be the most obvious way to fill this role, although any attempt to requisition vessels for military purposes will inevitably impact the wider economy. By far the greatest challenges, however, will come from the collapse of Australian owned and flagged coastal shipping, which means that the vast majority of cargoes shipped around the Australian coasts in peacetime are carried in vessels that will not be available to the Australian Government in wartime.^[55] 

Contemporary requirements for civilian shipping to support military operations align closely with previous Australian experience, most notably during the Second World War. Thus, the examination of previous efforts to take up civilian craft is instructive, offering insights into the nature of the challenges, and potential solutions. The first point to take away from this historical context is that civilian shipping has always been a vital asset in significant conflicts and has rarely been sufficient to meet the demands of the defence forces. With all the modern focus on military assets, and requirements for new high-tech platforms, it is easy to forget the vital role played by mundane civilian technologies and equipment in facilitating military operations at all levels. The second point relates to the control of civilian shipping. One of the issues frequently raised in current debates around shipping and economic security has been the paucity of Australian owned and flagged tonnage. This situation is less novel than is often made out. Throughout the first half of the 20th century Australia relied very heavily on foreign owned and flagged shipping. This dependency caused major issues in wartime, especially in the First World War and early parts of the Second World War, when Britain pulled its shipping off the lengthy Australian trade routes. The major difference between then and now, however, is that in previous conflicts the countries controlling global shipping were Australia’s allies. This did not mean that the leaders in Canberra and Melbourne did not frequently feel hard done by; they did. However, the nature of the alliance relationship ensured that Australia at least had a voice in the management of global shipping. Comparable influence is likely to be far more challenging to achieve in any modern conflict, as Australia’s allies, including the United States, will themselves be scrambling to gain control over shipping for their own purposes. Nevertheless, past experience reinforces the critical importance of getting a seat at the table where control over global shipping is discussed; without this, Australia is likely to struggle to access sufficient shipping either for its essential supply or for military purposes. 

The third point that arises from a survey of previous experience is the necessity of conversion. In the past, it was very rare for civilian ships to be fully equipped to undertake wartime work. Through both world wars, shipyards in Sydney and Melbourne undertook major conversions of civilian vessels ranging from huge liners to small ferries. Given the trend towards greater specialisation in shipping, military access to civilian shipyards is now likely to be more, not less, important. The capacity of the Australian shipbuilding industry to carry out short-notice military work at scale is highly questionable, especially given the competing demands of naval construction, maintenance and repair work. This challenge serves to reinforce the importance of careful planning, including the identification of likely vessels to be requisitioned and assessment of necessary modifications well before the outbreak of war. Such planning was a commonplace practice in the first half of the 20th century but it appears to have been abandoned through the long years of peace. 

The fourth key point stems largely from Australia’s Second World War experience. Here, arguably the greatest challenge was managing the competing demands on limited resources. The demands made by American forces based in Australia served to compound existing tensions between the use of civilian shipping to support military operations and its use in the completion of other important work related to the war economy. In the 21st century, as in the 1940s, basing large numbers of American troops in Australia will place significant additional demands on Australian civilian logistics, including shipping. In the event of a national security crisis, it will be critical to manage these challenges in a way that does not undermine the wider war economy. In the Second World War it took over 18 months to form an effective Allied coordination body for shipping in Australian waters. It seems essential that such delays are not repeated in the future. 

Finally, and perhaps most important of all, is the lesson that was slowly learned over the course of two world wars: if you want civilian shipping to be there to support the defence forces in war time, it is essential in peacetime to both support the industry and put in place systems which can be used in the event of conflict to control and manage it. Hard experience taught previous generations of policymakers that you could not simply rely on ships, structures and people being there when you needed them. There are signs of a renewed awareness of this reality, but there remains little indication of substantive action. If Defence intends to take up civilian shipping and to exploit civilian maritime logistics infrastructure in wartime, then it needs to drive a wider conversation across government about how such capability can be fostered in peacetime. These conversations are difficult, but one only has to look at the planning of the early Cold War period to see that those who had already experienced major conflict instinctively understood that ensuring national security was a far larger task than could be achieved by Defence alone. 

Endnotes