Structuring for Train, Advise and Assist Missions?

The Australian Army’s Past, Present and Future

Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them. Actually, also, under the very odd conditions of Arabia, your practical work will not be as good as, perhaps, you think it is.^[1]

TE Lawrence, August 1917

Introduction^[2]

The public release of the Defence Strategic Review (DSR) in April 2023 and National Defence Strategy (NDS) in April 2024 directed the Australian Defence Organisation (ADO) to focus on the Indo-Pacific region as its primary operating environment. The DSR provided clear direction to the Australian Army that it must be ‘transformed and optimised for littoral manoeuvre operations by sea, land and air from Australia’.^[3] However, beyond worst-case scenarios, the DSR endorses activities that support the maintenance of strategic balance in the Indo-Pacific—encouraging greater Defence prioritisation of regional defence partnerships (including further investment in bilateral, minilateral and multilateral opportunities)^[4] and cooperative engagements, including (but not limited to) the Defence Cooperation Program (DCP) and activities that broadly fall under the umbrella of train, advise and assist (TAA) missions. The military value of TAA activities to trainer forces is manifold, with recent Western experience (in the Middle East and in support of Ukraine) generating an outsized impact through the employment of niche training support by small teams. In counterinsurgency experience, for example, Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds argue, ‘partner force capacity building’ has become ‘a favoured policy option to achieve military objectives’, not least because it offloads risk to partner forces.^[5] For trainee forces, the opportunity to improve military/combat effectiveness can lead to the achievement of military and/or political objectives, generate a self-sustaining capability, and facilitate enduring relationships with the mentor force. For the Australian Army, TAA activities help meet national policy objectives by strengthening host skill sets, building trust in the Army and the wider Australian Defence Force (ADF) as a responsible and reliable partner, and establishing respectful and trusting partnerships that reflect well on Australia and establish Army as a partner of choice for the trainee force.

The Australian Army has a long history of participating in and delivering TAA missions. From its earliest incarnation contributing to British-led efforts as part of ‘Dunsterforce’ in the last year of World War I,^[6] and with 204 Mission (‘Tulip Force’)^[7] in World War II, the Australian Army and its antecedents have delivered multiple TAA efforts to upskill host forces. They have done so with comparative success in Vietnam, during peacebuilding missions in Uganda, then more recently in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Philippines. Currently, Army contributes training teams to Operation Kudu to instruct Ukrainian troops in their war against Russian aggression. Unlike the recent establishment of special security force assistance brigades (SFABs) by both the United States and the United Kingdom, the Australian Army’s rich train and assist experience has never been generated from formed units specifically designed to deliver such practical support. Rather, the Army’s practice has drawn trainers and advisers from among the broader Army population—either picking elements of a sub-unit or drawing specialist skill sets from across the organisation—to deliver a mentoring or training capability. Army’s extant Land Warfare Doctrine, ‘Security Force Capacity Building’ (2018), omits any organisational-level discussion of structure, preferring instead to focus on the composition of the teams physically deploying—the larger issue is left unresolved. In exploring this subject, the key questions for the Australian Army are: should this approach change into the future; can it change, in light of consistently challenging recruitment and retention rates; or should Army maintain its traditional (and successful) approach? A brief survey of Army’s historical TAA experience will assist in providing both relevant observations and context to inform future approaches.

The Australian Army’s Historical Experience

The Australian Army has a rich catalogue of historical and recent TAA practice from which to draw appropriate observations around mission effectiveness. The force-level missions outlined below are sufficient to discern recurring themes, and have been selected as a broad sample representative of different geographic, political, strategic and temporal contexts. Given this breadth, the discussion precludes further consideration of the World War I and World War II examples previously noted, as well as instances of unit-level training provided by individual Army units such as 8/9 RAR in Papua New Guinea over 1990–1992, the numerous DCP activities that the Army has contributed to since 1963,^[8] and the knowledge transfer instruction provided by Australian battalion groups to Timorese border police in 2003 under UN imprimatur. 

Vietnam, 1962–1972

The Australian Army Training Team—Vietnam (AATTV) is arguably the best-known example of Army’s TAA missions. It established a template for how Army approached the delivery of mentoring and advising by later training teams, and cultivated an impressive reputation. The AATTV—known colloquially as ‘the Team’—operated within the training and advisory program under the auspices of the US Military Assistance Command Vietnam. Like their US counterparts, members of the Team were attached to South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) battalions and units, Montagnards,^[9] Territorial Forces (Regional and Popular Forces) and mobile strike units in a train and advise capacity, coordinated with the CIA and US Special Forces.^[10] Owing to its experience in jungle operations during the Malayan Emergency and its consequent training focus on counterinsurgency in jungle environments, the Australian Army already possessed the requisite operational expertise for a South Vietnam mission. 

In May 1962 the Australian Defence Minister, Athol Townley, announced that Army would contribute up to 30 military instructors to ‘assist in the training of the ground forces in Vietnam’.^[11] The inclusion of ‘Training’ in the team’s title was supposed to emphasise that they were ‘not to be involved in operational tasks’,^[12] though as the war progressed, this distinction was less discernible. From the earliest, the AATTV was clearly identified as Australian inside the US-based advisory structure. This demarcation was important to both the US and Australia to separate national participation and satisfy political optics, while also contributing to a ‘forward defence’ strategy.^[13] The first commander of the Team, Colonel Francis ‘Ted’ Serong, arrived in Saigon on 31 July 1962, with the remaining 30 Army personnel following days later.^[14] AATTV members were specially selected, with up to two-thirds of personnel in early rotations possessing Malayan experience. These small early deployments concentrated in Saigon before dispersing according to need, whether singly, in pairs, or occasionally in groups of as many as 10 personnel. They deployed across multiple provinces to train and advise South Vietnamese forces in village defence, jungle warfare techniques and basic engineering and signals skills. Rank selection for the AATTV was unique in the history of Australian Army training teams, with most members being either officers or warrant officers.^[15] The seniority and expertise of deployed personnel throughout the country averted the need for complex logistic support and allowed teams to draw upon the same supply chains that sustained the US’s own adviser network.^[16]

Throughout the decade-long commitment, the Australian TAA focus was usually directed at or below battalion level. Individual skills, small-unit tactics, night operations, and patrolling were emphasised.^[17] The recent Malayan counterinsurgency operations made Australian training lessons among the most valuable to the Vietnamese. The Team’s early mentoring effectiveness, however, was limited by strict national constraints. Specifically, for the first two years, the AATTV were directed not to become involved in operations,^[18] even as their US counterparts accompanied their trainees into combat. Initially, Team members were prohibited from even accompanying ARVN battalions as observers outside the wire, but this restriction was overturned six months into the deployment. Once permitted, such activities led to contact with Viet Cong forces, and at times these activities thrust AATTV members into an unauthorised battlefield leadership role for Vietnamese troops when their own leaders faltered.^[19] In June 1964 the AATTV was finally granted permission to accompany Vietnamese units into combat to observe how well training was employed under fire, understand the Viet Cong’s approach to war, and appreciate the problems faced by Vietnamese soldiers.^[20] This change was accompanied by an increase in adviser numbers to 80, and authority to assist Vietnamese paramilitary and special forces—which remained that way until 1970 (see Table 1).^[21] It was almost inevitable that operational advising would lead to Australian casualties; on 6 July 1964 (one month after relaxation of restrictions) WO2 Kevin Conway was killed alongside a US adviser in a Viet Cong attack on the Nam Dong special forces camp, the AATTV’s first battle fatality.^[22]

Table 1: AATTV strength by year, 1962–1972^[23]
 

^{* Authorised strength of 100 personnel from January 1965 (15 officers, 85 warrant officers).} 

^{^ 31 officers, 118 warrant officers and 78 corporals.[25] This was the peak of authorised AATTV manning.}

AATTV strength grew in 1965 in line with the US’s increasing adviser commitment, but still represented a tiny percentage of the overall US-led adviser effort. Similarly, while the deployment of the 1^st Battalion the Royal Australian Regiment (RAR) to Bien Hoa province in 1965 and the 1st Australian Task Force to Phuoc Tuy in mid-1966 represented the majority of Australia’s military effort, the AATTV remained a valuable and unique assignment. The AATTV’s geographical dispersion caused friction within Australian Task Force Command, which sought to concentrate Australian capability into one province, against AATTV wishes to preserve the independence of their mission and broader footprint. The Team’s place within the US advisory structure allowed it to establish enduring relationships inside the Vietnamese I Corps, special forces, territorial forces, training centres and provinces, while its geographical spread provided the Australian Government with an independent assessment of the conduct of the war across the length and breadth of the country.^[26] A compromise saw a small number (10 to 15 training team personnel) posted to Phuoc Tuy for advisory tasks (mid-1966 to mid-1970^[27]), while also permitting the AATTV to retain its previous countrywide focus.

By late 1970, a substantial increase in the AATTV’s strength (to over 200 personnel) was indicative of the renewed importance of TAA within the Australian Government’s Vietnam security contribution. Such strength facilitated the establishment of Mobile Advisory and Training Teams (MATTs) in Phuoc Tuy province.^[28] The MATTs presaged a trend away from operational advising for ARVN and special forces, to instead focus on training territorial forces.^[29] The AATTV supervised the first course at the new Jungle Warfare Training Centre (JWTC) in Nui Dat, modelled on the Australian facility at Canungra, with an intention to establish and impart specialist jungle warfare training knowledge prior to what was now an inevitable Australian withdrawal. Lack of sufficient numbers of interpreters—a frequent complaint across the entire TAA effort—constrained the effectiveness of instruction at the JWTC.

Figure 1: AATTV instructor Warrant Officer Class 1 Ned Larsson leads Vietnamese students through a wire perimeter to illustrate night operation techniques, Dong Tam, South Vietnam, November 1971. Photographer: Philip Errington. Australian War Memorial image: PJE/71/0554/VN.

The US’s decisions concerning its own in-country force strength and troop withdrawal informed Australia’s posture (including that of the AATTV). Indeed, in its broad outline, Australia’s entire TAA practice conformed with US structures and fluctuated according to their patterns; when US advisors withdrew from Vietnamese special forces activities, the AATTV did as well. For its final year of operations, the Team was concentrated in Phuoc Tuy province. From February 1972 the AATTV mentored at JWTC or was employed in MATTs training territorial forces, with a final task to assist a US program training Cambodian troops. This activity was delivered prior to the final departure of Australian troops on 18 December 1972.^[30]

Over 10 years of deployments to South Vietnam, the AATTV deployed 989 advisers, of whom 33 were killed and 122 wounded in action, with four Victoria Crosses awarded. The Team largely maintained its independence from other Australian forces in-country with an operational area beyond Phuoc Tuy’s borders, thanks to its role within the US advising framework. The Team set a template for Australian TAA practice that was adopted in part and whole by later missions: it comprised specially selected personnel; it delivered predominantly tactical-level training at or below battalion level; and it focused on counterinsurgency and jungle-specific programs. In I Corps areas where the Team focused much of its effort, the ARVN ‘had attained a level of confidence where advice, certainly at unit and sub-unit level, was no longer necessary’, though the complexity of combined operations increased as the war continued.^[31]The AATTV mostly achieved its goal to generate indigenous capability rather than directly suppress enemy activity. Yet, despite its impressive resume, for a multitude of reasons and due to developments beyond its control, the AATTV, like its US counterparts, was unable to develop the South Vietnamese Army sufficiently to endure North Vietnamese operations after Western withdrawal. Political decisions taken in Washington, Canberra and elsewhere ultimately dictated the outcome of national effort, irrespective of the expertise invested on the ground. The South Vietnam experience thereby demonstrated that efforts to mentor host forces can find success at a local level, yet be undermined by the impact of higher strategic failures. It would not be the last time that the Army’s TAA delivery would be so affected.

Iraq, 2004–2008^[32]

The absence of substantial adviser missions that followed the Australian Army’s Vietnam experience reflected the long period of peace between 1972 and the emergency that developed in East Timor in 1999. Aside from the deployment of 20 personnel over 1982–1984 with the Commonwealth Military Training Team—Uganda to train officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) of the Uganda National Liberation Army,^[33] the Australian Army’s first substantial post-Vietnam force-level adviser mission commenced in 2004 during the reconstruction phase in Iraq. The decision of the Coalition Provisional Authority—established under Operation Catalyst—to disband the Iraqi Army and rebuild it from scratch required the support of US coalition partners to succeed. Aside from the posting of two warrant officers to Kirkush to support training from late 2003, the Australian Army Training Team—Iraq (AATTI) was the first Australian-formed body to deploy to Iraq with a training mandate. Initially known as the ‘Iraqi Army Training Team’, it was renamed the AATTI in honour of the AATTV, and thus affirmed an important historical connection.

While ostensibly deployed to train and advise the post Saddam Hussein regime Iraqi Army, the first 44-strong rotation of the AATTI (AATTI (1)), which arrived in-country in May 2004, lacked clarity on the mission’s objective or indicators for success—aside from a directive to train Iraqi troops and, in doing so, build Australia’s alliance with the US.^[34] The demobilisation of 375,000 Iraqi military trained personnel, followed by their equally rapid reconstitution, provided an unstable backdrop against which to achieve the restructure and retraining of Iraqi forces into a credible force for domestic security. The fact that the first rotation deployed without organic force protection exacerbated the difficulties it faced. Having identified the need to establish trust in order to connect with trainees, the AATTI (1) prioritised its development of cultural awareness around local religious practices and ethnic sensitivities. Different work ethics between trainers and trainees (including for religious observance) required patience and perseverance to find a median that was mutually acceptable. As with the AATTV’s experience, the risk to locals and Australians from threat forces was ever present; an insurgent attack at Al Kasik in June 2004 killed at least 10 trainees and wounded dozens of others.

For training teams in Iraq, force protection considerations became a barrier between Australian trainers and Iraqi trainees that was not part of the AATTV experience. The first two Iraqi training teams lived on the same base as the Iraqis they trained. Ongoing securing concerns meant that later training teams were accommodated at separate camps.^[35] The separate living quarters of Australians and Iraqis added further complexity to what was already a challenging training experience. For example, daily variations to the travel route and timings that were implemented to avoid insurgent attacks limited the time available to build relationships and to deliver adviser training. As with the AATTV, the AATTI was aware of the tension between the benefits of conducting training within the base and the risk (and potential benefit) of accompanying their trainees on operations. While the security environment varied between AATTI rotations, at no stage were Australians authorised or encouraged to conduct combat operations with their Iraqi trainees, or to assume command of Iraqi formations, as the AATTV did.^[36]

Ultimately AATTI training was centred around a simple broadly defined mission: to train and mentor Iraqi Army elements to increase their capacity to operate independently and effectively, and thereby allow for a transition to Iraqi security responsibility. However, the rotations differed slightly in focus. As AATTI (1) and AATTI (2) deployed to Iraq in the early stages of the establishment of the new Iraqi Army, they took responsibility for providing ‘Kapooka-style’ basic training to two Iraqi brigades—one brigade each.^[37] In January 2005 the third AATTI rotation deployed to Taji in northern Baghdad to provide specialist logistic training in support of the nascent Iraqi Army’s logistics capability.

Figure 2: Members of Australian Army Training Team—Iraq Rotation 9 supervise Iraqi recruit live-fire training, 13 April 2008. (Source: Defence image gallery)

The change in focus from AATTI (2) (brigade and battalion training) to AATTI (3) (specialist logistics training) for a one-off rotation signalled that Australia was not considering a sustained training presence in Iraq.^[38] With the deployment of the Al Muthanna Task Group (AMTG) in 2005,^[39] subsequent AATTI rotations deployed as part of the broader battle group and had dual missions to assist the Al Muthanna based Iraqi Army brigade to achieve a standard suitable to take responsibility for Iraqi security, while simultaneously providing a secure environment in which the Japanese Iraq Reconstruction and Support Group could operate. In addition to mentoring an Iraqi Army brigade, AATTI (4) and (5) also assisted with the sourcing of equipment, the development of doctrine and facilities, and the delivery of training and mentoring—a focus on ‘training the trainers’ to inculcate self-sufficiency.^[40] From AATTI (6), teams transitioned from broader brigade and battalion training to providing basic infantry training at Tallil, counterinsurgency training for US and Iraqi forces at Taji, and infantry battalion training provided by two warrant officers at Kirkush. This focus of effort continued through AATTI (7) to (9). 

Table 2: AATTI rotations, May 2004 to June 2008

^{* LAV Tp (-) arrived for force protection several months into rotation.}

Beyond AATTI (9), successive rotations were formed and deployed on an ad hoc basis. During the latter rotations, specialist training was expanded to reintroduce logistics. While logistics offered some continuity in focus, the deployments nevertheless lacked consistency in their structure, and formal handovers were not always conducted between rotations as part of a sustained training continuum. Instead each training team operated, in effect, as a separate entity deployed to conduct a discrete mission.^[41] The separation between rotations, and their geographical dispersion across Iraq, necessarily impacted training continuity to some degree.

One recurring challenge for Army was to secure adequate linguistic skills to support the AATTI missions. The Iraq training teams generally reported that there were insufficient competent linguists for the task. While local interpreters were employed, not all possessed the appropriate technical language to impart the specific nuance of military lessons, and those who worked with coalition forces risked their own and their families’ safety. Some Australians underwent beginner language training prior to deployment, but this sporadic instruction rarely suited the demands of military interpretation. The lack of sufficient numbers of translators was a complaint made across all nine training team rotations. This situation reflects similar observations drawn from Army’s long history of TAA experience.

Despite the litany of challenges faced, over four years the AATTI delivered training, advice and assistance to the Iraqi Army across basic infantry, officer, command, headquarters functions, logistics, transport and counterinsurgency training, with a focus on ‘train-the-trainer’ activities to generate self-sufficiency. Facing insufficient numbers of interpreters, ongoing security risks and discontinuity between deployments, some 485 Australian advisors nevertheless provided training to over 33,000 Iraqi military personnel over four years. In pure numerical terms, small groups of trainers delivered an outsized training effect and demonstrated the impact that a modest TAA contribution can make to a larger deployment. In doing so, they achieved the broader coalition objective of supporting an indigenous force to become competent enough to take responsibility for its own security, while concurrently meeting the Australian national objective of maintaining its standing with US allies. As with Vietnam, however, the subsequent failure of the Iraqi Army to withstand offensives by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) from June 2014 raised questions about its military effectiveness and led to the loss of approximately of 40 per cent of Iraqi territory at ISIS’s peak, before US-led support wrested back control of the country. While the AATTI upheld the AATTV’s reputation for professionalism and tactical-level specialisation, ultimately its legacy was undermined by higher political and strategic decisions, Iraq’s own political and cultural environment, and Iraqi combat performance against ISIS.

Operations Slipper and Highroad, Afghanistan^[42]

Arguably the best known TAA mission in recent memory was that provided under the auspices of Army’s contribution to the US-led coalition war in Afghanistan. The mentoring components were separated into two distinct periods: 2008–2014 (Operation Slipper) and 2014–2020 (Operation Highroad).^[43] Combined, the sustained series of advise and assist tasks in Afghanistan generated the largest Australian TAA commitment since the Vietnam War in terms of number of rotations and number of personnel. 

The initial Australian military commitment to the international stability effort in Afghanistan was restricted to special forces operations and engineer-led reconstruction efforts.^[44] By 2008, however, the inability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to provide for the country’s long-term stability, combined with endemic low levels of training and professionalism, led to additional Australian commitments to the conflict. Specifically, in February 2008 the Australian Government announced the deployment of an Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT) to Uruzgan Province, with Mentoring and Reconstruction Task Force One (MRTF-1) deploying in October that year. From this initial commitment, Army’s mentoring and advising operations grew to include training in squad-level infantry tactics, weapons handling, corps-level headquarters operations and national logistics management. At the same time, mentoring was provided to Afghan partner units by the Special Operations Task Group (SOTG) in Kabul and Kandahar as part of the 205 Corps Coalition Advisory Team (205 CAT) to improve staff operations planning and administration; mentor Kabul’s Afghan National Army Officer Academy; and provide training for artillery and logistics.^[45]

From 2006 to late 2010, Australia’s contribution to Uruzgan was shared with the Netherlands under the auspices of Task Force Uruzgan. The Australian contribution varied significantly, but at its peak involved 1,500 personnel (not all for mentoring), and the Netherlands deployed a 1,600-person force.^[46] Between September 2006 and October 2008, four successive rotations of RTFs constructed schools, government buildings, medical facilities, commercial buildings and patrol bases, but their reach was always limited by the high-risk security situation and the varying levels of force protection available. The size and structure of ADF mentoring task forces in Uruzgan was modified over time in light of changes in mission, responsibility, geographic dispersion, and personnel caps. After October 2008, MRTF-1 was deployed to develop the ANSF’s skills to take over security roles performed by coalition forces.^[47] To fulfil this task, an OMLT was deployed to partner with an Afghan National Army (ANA) battalion (Kandak).^[48] The intent was for security responsibility to progressively transition to Afghan control as ANA capability developed, with the final objective being an ANA able to provide security and sustain its own training continuum, allowing Australian and coalition forces to withdraw.

Figure 3: Australian and Afghan National Army soldiers patrol together through Chora in Southern Afghanistan. Operational mentoring and liaison teams assisted the development of the 4th Afghan National Army Brigade.
(Source: Defence image gallery)

Mentors were specifically tasked to enhance tactical, administrative and logistics capabilities to mature ANSF capacity to a point where it could both sustain operations and maintain influence over the local population. To this end, and in line with International Security Assistance Force practice, Australian mentors were forward-deployed to cohabit with ANSF personnel in patrol bases. Australian mentors provided assistance on subjects crossing the whole gamut of military planning and operations including reconnaissance, weapons handling, combat first aid, logistics, intelligence and personnel administration. Owing to the high rates of illiteracy and unfamiliarity with structured learning environments among ANA personnel, instruction was typically provided in practical contexts using a ‘learn-by-doing’ methodology.^[49] The task force conducted numerous partnered operations with 2nd Kandak of the 4th ANA Brigade. OMLT personnel lived within ANA forward-operating bases and patrol bases, and frequently conducted joint patrols beyond established and secure perimeters with ANA elements, using lethal force in line with standard rules of engagement. Conditions in these forward bases were often austere, with few opportunities to return to larger bases for rest and refit, and mentors often had little access to fresh rations, climate-controlled accommodation, and welfare services. 

Due to their small-packet distribution across the area of operations, OMLT personnel accompanied ANA soldiers on patrol at significant risk to themselves. As in Vietnam and Iraq, insurgent activity placed Australian mentors in harm’s way,^[50] often despite the efforts of dedicated force protection elements (combat teams). These combat teams were tasked to protect the mentors and reconstruction work sites, to establish security and to provide sufficiently permissive environments for the conduct of advisory work. Force protection for mentors and advisors in Uruzgan remained a contentious issue throughout the duration of Operation Slipper. Personnel caps, injury, sickness and fatigue could force mentors to rely on the partner force for their own physical safety. Over 2011–2012 a series of so-called ‘green-on-blue’ attacks caused the deaths of six ADF members, leading to the implementation of an adviser overwatch (guardian angel) system comprising specialist armed personnel to provide local force protection to counteract ‘insider’ attacks on Australian and allied troops.^[51] Guardian angels had to strike a fine balance between being present and being visible, because their very presence reflected coalition distrust of Afghan troops. Pre-deployment cultural training and brief language instruction was conducted to foster understanding of Afghanistan and its people and to avoid, where possible, alienating partner forces or local nationals through inappropriate action.^[52] Sensitivities nevertheless remained among some ANA troops.

Throughout 2009 and 2010 the ADF’s focus in Uruzgan shifted decisively in favour of mentoring operations that would develop the capacity of indigenous Afghan forces to assume coalition security functions.^[53] This path followed a similar trajectory to efforts in both Vietnam and Iraq, where greater training priority was emphasised prior to the handover of security responsibility and withdrawal. MRTF-2 (which would ultimately comprise two OMLTs and two combat teams) was deployed in June 2009. The withdrawal of Dutch forces in 2010 complicated the Australian mentoring posture—Australians mentored more and more elements of 4 ANA Brigade and adopted additional responsibilities in the province. Through its mentoring task forces (MTF became the new nomenclature from the third rotation^[54]) Army maintained a permanent presence across ANA patrol bases in Uruzgan while also developing and employing a mobile mentoring capacity that allowed mentors to be reinserted into formations that had reached an independent operations capability milestone.^[55]

Over time, Australian mentors progressed from leading and planning joint patrols to merely ‘shadowing’ ANSF operations from a distance, positioning themselves to ensure that the Afghans did not ‘fail’ or miss opportunities to hinder insurgent activities.^[56] Accompanying this development was an understanding that mentors had to accept an ‘Afghan standard’ of competence, acknowledging that the ANSF could not be made into a Western-style force. The success of TAA missions in Afghanistan was mixed; although the international presence in Afghanistan was only ever temporary, there was a disinclination among some ANSF personnel to enhance their skills and abilities and to take responsibility for national security while coalition elements remained. Though motivated and professional Afghan personnel served, negotiation or persuasion was sometimes required to ensure elements patrolled their sectors, held courses, attended training and conducted anti-insurgent operations. 

The ADF mentored ANA formations in Uruzgan until November 2012 when, in line with international and Australian Government security transition policies, responsibility for security was transferred to the ANA’s 4th Brigade. With all four of the brigade’s infantry Kandaks declared capable of conducting independent operations without international assistance, Australian mentors withdrew from ANA patrol bases and ceased conducting joint patrols and operations. MTF-5 was withdrawn to Australia and replaced by a smaller Advisory Task Force (ATF-1). As operations were now largely conducted within secure areas without the need for embedded force protection elements, deployment of the ATFs was accompanied by a 250-person reduction in the size of Australia’s military commitment.

Table 3: Mentoring task force rotations, Afghanistan, October 2008 to December 2013

^{* Inside the wire
^ Outside the wire}

The area of operations of the two ATF rotations was limited to Headquarters 4 Brigade and its two Combat Support Kandaks, which were located wholly within Multi National Base—Tarin Kowt, or ‘inside the wire’. Alongside the ATF, Australia also maintained a quick reaction force element comprising motorised infantry (in Bushmasters) with supporting Australian Light Armoured Vehiclesto assist Afghan forces if required.^[57]

While the bulk of the ADF’s TAA mission in Afghanistan was carried out by MTF and then ATF rotations, mentoring was also conducted by special operations forces from 2009 onwards. From July 2009, SOTG members became engaged in the formal mentoring of Afghan partner forces. The catalyst for this role was a newly introduced International Security Assistance Force policy which provided that all subsequent SOTG patrols had to comprise one-third ANSF personnel.^[58] The quasi-official Provincial Police Reserve Company (later rebadged as the Provincial Response Company, or PRC) was selected to be the SOTG’s ANSF partner force. In July 2012 the SOTG also began mentoring and partnering a unit of the Afghan National Directorate of Security—the ‘Wakunish’. SOTG ‘stay behind teams’ conducted a full suite of training courses in secure areas within Tarin Kowt as well as conducting mentoring when the task force deployed on operations.^[59] Training was predominantly centred on infantry skills and special forces operations but other capabilities were also covered such as combat engineering, explosive ordnance disposal, operations planning, and intelligence. Over a period of four and a half years, 11 SOTG rotations contributed to the formal training and mentoring of ANSF partner forces. By December 2013 the PRC and Wakunish were deemed capable of conducting independent, evidence-based operations that targeted insurgent leadership and safe havens.^[60] While judged competent at the time, the Afghan forces had been mentored in the conduct of Western-style special operations that were supported by a preponderance of enablers such as airlift; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR); and close air support. The rapid deterioration in Afghanistan security post transition demonstrated to the world that withdrawal of these coalition assets significantly compromised Afghanistan’s ability to effectively target the insurgency by itself. 

In December 2013, ATF-2 and remaining SOTG elements were withdrawn from Tarin Kowt, marking the complete extraction of Australian personnel from Afghanistan. The overarching observation from the Afghanistan experience was that TAA efforts must lead to self-sufficiency after transition—for both the trainers and the host forces.^[61] As with practice in both Vietnam and Iraq, Australian mentoring in Afghanistan was always undertaken within a coalition context, with capability milestones, force size, manning, equipment levels and training requirements usually set by (or in accordance with) US-led TAA organisations and according to US security transition timelines. The Australian Army’s ability to influence the professional standard and capacity of the wider ANSF was further limited by the small number of its personnel (a maximum commitment of 1,550) and the wide geographic disposition of its units. The exercise of strategic influence and mentoring was not possible, even as small teams of advisors deployed to Kandahar or Kabul for specific duties (e.g. ‘train-the-trainer’ instruction at the Afghan National Army Officer Academy). In total, Australian mentoring operations involved over 10,000 deployed ADF members over a 12-year period across 40 distinct task force/team rotations. This represented a commitment approximately 10 times the total number of Australian advisors who deployed to Vietnam. Operations Slipper and Highroad were, and remain, the largest TAA campaign ever undertaken by the Australian Army.

Recent Operation: Kudu

Following Russia’s violent and illegal invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, NATO and Western governments supported the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) through donations of military equipment and munitions, through funding packages, and through the establishment of economic sanctions against the Russian Government and Russian companies and key figures. The Australian Government contributed equipment (including Bushmaster Protected Mobility Vehicles) and ammunition (105 mm artillery rounds). It also committed military training and funding under Operation Kudu—the name for ADF assistance to Ukraine.^[62] Commencing in January 2023, a company group (minus) from the Australian Army’s 5th Battalion, the Royal Australian Regiment (5 RAR), provided training and assistance to the AFU under the UK-led Operation Interflex, led by the British Army’s 11th Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB). This program forms part of a larger multinational training support effort involving Ireland, New Zealand, Canada, Lithuania, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden and Finland. 

Operation Interflex delivers basic combat training to 10,000 new and existing AFU personnel in partnership with allies through the Battle Casualty Replacement program. Its purpose is to support the Ukrainian military ‘to accelerate their deployment, rebuild their forces, and scale-up their resistance’.^[63] The ADF’s training contribution to this effort is clearly defined by operational constraints and restrictions directed by the Australian Government, including a prohibition on ADF personnel entering Ukrainian territory, and bounded training contributions. As with prior ADF TAA experience, Operation Kudu is delivered under the umbrella of a broader coalition-led training mission in which a larger partner provides facilities, infrastructure, security and logistics.

Prior to deployment, the first contingent of 70 Australian Army personnel refreshed their own skills on Ukrainian weapons and reviewed their instruction processes to prepare them to deliver a complex infantry-focused training package in a contracted time frame.^[64] The contingent structure was composed of four section-sized training teams (and one demonstration squad to exhibit the lesson during a walk-through^[65]) from Support Company, 5 RAR, with contributions from 1st Combat Signal Regiment (1 CSR) and 1st Combat Services Support Battalion (1 CSSB). Mission control is provided by Operation Kudu’s overarching headquarters—a UK Training Delivery Unit under Operation Interflex Headquarters. Each of the 2023 Australian Training Team^[66] rotations instructed 200-strong AFU intakes on basic infantry courses over two packages of 35 days each conducted at Salisbury Plain Training Area and Camp Knook in Wiltshire, England.^[67]

Figure 4: Soldiers from 5 RAR deliver trench warfare lessons to Ukrainian trainees during the first rotation of Operation Kudu in the United Kingdom, 10 February 2023. The interpreter is in blue on the right, demonstrating how critical that capability is to delivering military instruction. (Source: Defence image gallery)

From the second rotation, the ADF infantry team was augmented by combat engineers who, in the words of the second rotation commander, enhanced ‘the mobility, counter-mobility and survivability … outcomes to better meet the need of Ukrainian soldiers for the conflict they were stepping into’.^[68] Two lead instructors and two demonstration soldiers walked the AFU trainees through every training serial to illustrate the correct method. Within this training structure, Australian instructors imparted basic skills on everything from the laws of armed conflict and basic individual soldier skills, to combat casualty care and instruction on complex urban operations.^[69] In doing so, they relied heavily on up to 20 interpreters. Unlike previous Australian TAA missions, Operation Kudu provides instruction in an entirely permissive environment outside the theatre of combat.^[70]

Table 4: 5 RAR-led rotations to Operation Kudu, 2023^[71] 

The Ukrainian trainees for Rotation 1 were, according to one instructor, older than anticipated, with ages estimated between mid-40s and late 60s.^[72] While the training was reportedly ‘very intense’,^[73] it was also extremely well received by AFU trainees fortified by their strong collective morale.^[74] The tempo of the training—packing intensive instruction into just over a month—was also demanding on Australian trainers, not least because of the sobering realisation that AFU recruits returning to the front line rely for survival on the skills taught to them by Australian instructors. As one 5 RAR Company Officer Commanding observed, ‘live fire is important to achieve battle inoculation—to prepare people for when they’re actually in a fight’.^[75] This observation is as true for AFU trainees as it was for ARVN troops 60 years earlier, and for Iraqi and Afghan military forces in more recent times.

The ADF contribution to Operation Kudu has provided a useful forum for reciprocal information exchange, with relevant lessons being fed back into Australian force preparation cycles. For example, as many Ukrainians are now accustomed to snowy combat conditions, one Australian platoon commander revealed that the AFU ‘[taught] us the best way to survive and to conceal our movement in snow’.^[76] Further, training the AFU revealed shortfalls in close combat and extended range shooting skills among some Australian instructors, thus generating an impetus for improvements within the ADF combat training continuum.^[77] At the time of writing, Operation Kudu is still underway, so deeper analysis of the total mission arc is unavailable. However, this operation diverges from experiences in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan as it does not provide in-country TAA to a host force as part of a coalition exit strategy. Instead it contributes to a broader international effort to support Ukraine conducted in a stable and secure training environment. 

The above sections have outlined a history of Australian practical TAA experience, showing that such efforts have historically involved tactical-level instruction in small to very small numbers proportionate to the training audience. TAA missions have frequently comprised ad hoc teams assembled at short notice, or small packets of personnel contributing as part of a larger multinational effort. While the Australian Army has made ad hoc methods work over a long period, the question arises as to whether there is benefit in the ADF generating a standing TAA capability. In making such an assessment, it is appropriate to consider the contemporary approaches taken to TAA by two of Australia’s closest partners: the US and the UK.

Security Force Assistance Brigades: a US and UK Preference

In contrast to the Australian Army experience, the US and British armies have recently generated standing TAA capabilities through the establishment of SFABs for the specific purpose of providing training specialisation to allies and partner forces. While mentoring has remained a part of military practice for as long as professional militaries have existed, acknowledging the complex political, cultural and social influences that affect mission success has led both countries to assess that a structured capacity is warranted. Their capacity to restructure specifically to generate such a capability speaks to the options available to militaries that can call upon greater ‘mass’ than Australia.

In the US, an SFAB is a purpose-built and resourced military structure with the mission to provide TAA capabilities to allied and partnered forces.^[78] Pioneered by the US and advocated forcefully by General Mark Milley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the United States, SFABs are dedicated to preparing and supporting small groups to conduct distributed mentoring programs.^[79] SFABs are built around the ‘head and shoulders’ of a brigade combat team and based on its officer and senior NCO cadre, with each member individually selected for their experience before undergoing eight weeks of training and vetting prior to acceptance into the 800-strong brigade. In its original concept, it was intended that SFAB personnel would have served at least one operational tour and be on their second appointment at rank—the first being a command appointment.^[80] The SFAB’s contribution to the order of battle arises from its emphasis on military-to-military mentoring tasks, thereby releasing conventional forces to focus on their core tasks. Further, SFABs become the centre of residual institutional memory for missions of this type. The US has six SFABs (one per combatant command), including one National Guard formation.

Table 5: United States SFABs, by command

Because US SFABs are oriented to operate in particular geographic regions, they bring targeted expertise and persistence in effort. The benefits of maintaining such organic TAA capacity are clear: with a workforce designed to be ‘entirely comfortable’ with joint, interagency, inter-government and/or multinational partner efforts,^[81] such a structured capability provides combatant commanders an extra line of effort able to engage with, and influence, the host/trainee nation. They are the repository of knowledge on engagement with host government, non-government and other security stakeholders, and they provide a further source if information to inform national security policy. The continuity of their embedded relationships across the entire training spectrum can also meet (and strengthen) bilateral security objectives. Persistence in presence also contributes to deterrence.^[82] The wealth of specialist institutional expertise provided by the SFABs cannot currently be replicated by the Australian Army. 

In 2017 the British Army established what it called Special Purpose Infantry Battalions (SPIBs) designed to ‘conduct Defence engagement and capacity building, providing training, assistance, advice and mentoring to our partners’.^[83] These elements are folded into the Army Special Operations Brigade to provide specialised skills mentoring to partner forces in complex and challenging security environments, and can ‘be authorised to operate at higher risks beyond the remit of conventional forces’.^[84] The Ranger Regiment is the home of four special operations battalions, in which (similar to the US SFAB model) specific SPIBs are allotted respective regional specialisations.

Table 6: UK Ranger Regiment special operations battalion alignments^[85]

^{* Indicates dual/multiple alignment}

^{^ Joint Counter Terrorist Training and Advisory Team}

The UK Ministry of Defence also established a conventional TAA capacity in late 2021 in which the 11th Infantry Brigade was redesignated the 11^th Security Force Assistance Brigade. As part of the British Army’s 1st Division, and headquartered in Aldershot, the 11^th SFAB—comprising four regular battalions and one reserve battalion^[86]—delivers tactical-level TAA to ‘improve the ability of partner nations to manage their security challenges’, which, in extremis, can ‘enable partner nation armies to be integrated effectively into UK and NATO forces’.^[87] The 11^th SFAB also deploys a global team to provide international TAA where required. The UK’s desire to use its SFAB to increase international interoperability with its own armed forces is a clear statement on coalition-building by military means, while simultaneously increasing British influence. Presently this brigade leads the multinational Operation Interflex mission under which Australian (and other international) advisors deliver combat training packages to Ukrainian recruits.

A Question of Strength

Given the US and UK decisions to generate a standing TAA capability, could or should the Australian Army follow suit?^[88] For the Australian Army to adopt a similar approach would require two significant changes to the way it has traditionally approached TAA taskings. Firstly, an institutional reorientation would be required so that TAA is viewed as a standalone mission in its own right—that is, as a ‘role’, rather than a ‘task’. As the historical examples illustrate, Army’s practice has instead been to ‘dual-hat’ existing troops to deliver mentoring tasks. A second, and more challenging, barrier is the size of Army’s total force. 

The Australian Army cannot call upon the same mass to establish a dedicated unit as can its US and UK allies. Indeed, aside from mass mobilisation during the two world wars, and a short boost from the national service scheme, the Australian Army has always been modest in size with a force structure intended to maximise the value of a comparatively small number of troops. However, while size has militated against Army generating a TAA capability in the past in the 2020 DSR the Australian Government signalled its intent to increase the size of the future force. In recognition of the rapid changes to the strategic environment, the Australian Government agreed, in March 2022, to increase the size of the ADF by 30 per cent by 2040.^[89] If this target can be realised, the increase in recruitment that will accompany expansion offers the potential for Army to raise a TAA formation at unit or even battalion size. 

There have been recent efforts to rationalise a discrete TAA formation within the Australian Army. Specifically, Major General Chris Field recently advocated that the Australian Army adopt a security force assistance battalion (SFABn) drawn from the Army Reserve ‘to preserve Regular Army combat power’ and contribute to the DSR’s demand for presence in the region.^[90] His argument proposes that an SFABn comprising approximately 265 experienced officers and NCOs, across ‘30 multifunctional teams’, could be a pathway for reserve and transitioning personnel to remain in service, while also meeting the DSR’s aims for greater regional engagement.^[91] The entire unit would be drawn, comprised, trained and resourced by the Australian Army Reserve. As Field argued, an SFAB-like model could support retention in the Australian Army if it provided an opportunity to retain operationally experienced officers and senior NCOs who might otherwise leave Army service. While the unit’s footprint and the duration and location of any SFAB-like deployments would be key factors in personnel decisions to continue serving, Field’s model is theoretically sound. If Army were determined to join the US and UK in configuring for future TAA missions, it would have the potential to provide a modest structured capability. So could the Australian Army adopt such a model in the contemporary environment?

Meeting the DSR’s expansion targets is proving to be a difficult task for the ADO, particularly in its efforts to generate sufficient personnel to deliver the range of directed tasks. As with a number of Western militaries, the ADF is facing what the DSR refers to as ‘significant workforce challenges’ with a combination of low unemployment and a competitive job market inhibiting recruitment rates.^[92] As of 1 January 2024, for example, the ADF as a whole was 4,308 people below authorised strength, or almost 9 per cent, while the Army’s size was almost 10 per cent below authorised strength—the worst figures of the three services (see Table 7).^[93] The Australian Army has been particularly affected and has seen consistent failure to meet recruitment targets. Meanwhile, elevated separation numbers contribute to a growing deficit in the overall strength of the force.

Table 7: ADF strength as at 1 January 2024^[94]

The former Chief of the Defence Force, General Angus Campbell, has explained that such personnel deficits place ‘stress [upon] the entire organisation in terms of being able to train and recruit, to conduct activity, to sustain our people, support their families, and continue our tempo of activity, both internationally and domestically’.^[95] Within this constrained workforce environment, the Australian Army must concurrently transform into a force optimised for littoral manoeuvre. Driven by the DSR’s directive to grow regional defence partnerships, it must simultaneously remain ready to contribute to whole-of-government and ADF-led regional relationship and capacity-building missions.^[96]

The ADF’s current inability to meet recruiting targets would make it extremely difficult for Army to raise and staff a standing TAA formation. If the US model were to be applied, experienced personnel with either deployed experience or time in rank would represent the most appropriate cohort to generate the best training outcomes for partner forces. Such an outcome may be possible if some cannibalisation of the current workforce is permitted to fill a TAA force structure, but Army has competing priorities. Raising the new 10th Brigade in Adelaide^[97] is already a DSR-directed priority, and on a much larger scale. 

A Model for Future Use?

As historical practice and the ADF’s ongoing recruiting challenges combine to make an SFAB solution unlikely, there is another approach that might serve to inform future options. Over 2017–2019 the Australian Army provided bespoke training teams to undertake tactical training under a bilateral framework. In terms of its political framing, duration and size, the Operation Augury—Philippines deployment was a TAA mission entirely unlike those conducted in Vietnam and Iraq. In light of the DSR’s direction for the ADF to deepen regional engagement, and the NDS’s dictate to focus ‘Defence’s international engagement efforts on enhancing interoperability and collective deterrence’,^[98] Army’s Operation Augury experience may provide a template for future training missions, without the need to establish a dedicated SFAB-like unit. 

To assist in determining its relevance to the current analysis, it is helpful to first outline the context within which Operation Augury—Philippines took place. On 23 May 2017, Islamist insurgents affiliated with ISIS took control of the Philippines city of Marawi. For five months the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) engaged the insurgents in close urban combat to regain control of the city. In September that year, facilitated by the DCP^[99] that was already in place in the country, the Australian Government offered support to the Philippines in the form of mobile training teams (MTTs) to provide training in a range of specialities to strengthen the AFP’s urban combat capability. The Australian Army dispatched a team to Manila to showcase Australian skills and demonstrate the range of training on offer—to essentially ‘sell the business’ of what the ADF could provide the AFP with regard to counterterrorism and urban operations training.^[100] The Philippines Government accepted. Despite the battle for Marawi formally concluding on 23 October 2017, the ADF’s Operation Augury—Philippines commenced with the deployment of MTTs two days later to advise and assist the AFP in developing its counterterrorism and counter violent extremism capabilities.

The mission objective of Operation Augury—Philippines was to establish and grow a Filipino training base with a modified training continuum capable of generating of a self-sustaining urban operations capability.^[101] This mission was achieved through four lines of effort: land, maritime, air and special operations.^[102] Instruction in skills related to the conduct of urban warfare included counterterrorism, engineering, airborne intelligence (uncrewed aerial systems (UAS)), electronic warfare, maritime and psychological operations. Army provided the land MTT, with selected personnel deploying as small elements factored around ‘capability bricks’ such as infantry platoons, joint fires teams or engineer teams.^[103]

Figure 5: Personnel from 2 RAR mentor soldiers from the Armed Forces of the Philippines on weapon-handling drills in Pagadian, Philippines, 27 July 2017. Small Australian teams deploying to deliver focused training packages, as occurred during Operation Augury—Philippines, may be a viable future TAA option. (Source: Defence image gallery)

Each land MTT ranged from 25 to 45 personnel and included infantry, combat engineers, joint fires teams and medics, who conducted training programs that lasted between 21 and 45 days. Each training iteration usually involved the delivery of seven courses: urban close combat; urban search and breach; sniper / counter sniper; joint fires and airspace deconfliction; tactical communications, command and control in the urban environment; and combat trauma management. Army’s MTT mission was limited to training and did not include direct participation or assistance in AFP combat operations.^[104] There was a degree of flexibility built into the instructional method depending on the training audience; one engineer MTT member recalled that the rank and corps of the various Filipino teams undertaking Australian training altered the emphasis of the training package.^[105] The learning that occurred was reciprocal, with the ADF benefiting from the Filipino experience in countering complex urban terrorist tactics. The training environment also improved military-to-military links, helped develop interoperability between the two countries’ forces through shared values,^[106] and enhanced regional cooperation in counterterrorism activities. The enhanced skills imparted through the training packages was valued by the AFP^[107] and also improved the quality of Australian Army instruction. Indeed, one land MTT officer reflected that Army’s TAA in the Philippines was ‘sort of like foreign aid: we’re investing in ourselves [by] doing it, you know?’.^[108]

Table 8: Land/advisor MTTs/Train the Trainers (TTT)s under Joint Task Force 629, October 2017 to June 2018^[109]

^ Training provided to the Philippines Army

* Training provided to the Philippines Marine Corps

In total, Joint Task Force (JTF) 629 personnel trained over 10,600 AFP members in urban combat, air coordination in urban operations, maritime security and joint operations. Army trainers constituted the vast majority of deployed MTT personnel and delivered the overwhelming bulk of the training.^[110]Army’s land training efforts, particularly, established useful networks and deep connections into the country and region. The Australian TAA mission also saw manifest improvements in Filipino urban operations capability (including sniper and counter-sniper skills, combat shooting, and joint fire missions), all achieved through short-duration deployments of small teams. Operation Augury was different from other TAA missions by virtue of its foundation and leverage from within an extant DCP, its bilateral (rather than multinational) nature, its joint design, and its streamlined command and control arrangements. As such, the mission was not affected by the inevitable political sensitivities and frictions that occur when operations are conducted with an overarching multinational headquarters (as in Iraq and Afghanistan) with associated command chains stretching back to Australia. Notwithstanding some of the peculiarities of the Operation Augury experience, the fly-in/fly-out nature of small discrete training teams could become a suitable model for the future, limiting the impost on units to generate a standing TAA capability. One JTF 629 commander reflected on the benefits of the Philippines example, noting that it ‘[allowed] us to get quickly onto the ground, impose[d] very little on our hosts and then provide[d] training that [was] tailored to the operational need and threat on the ground [which was] something that [was] extremely powerful and we should continue to develop’.^[111] The improvement in Filipino capacity, warm AFP reception of the Australian training packages, and trusted and authentic relationships that developed^[112] led Lieutenant General Greg Bilton, Australia’s Chief of Joint Operations at the time, to reflect that the Operation Augury—Philippines approach ‘has become a model for how we [Australia] approach partnered activities’.^[113]

Conclusion

Mentoring can be an extremely challenging task for a professional soldier to undertake. Such advising is often delivered in harsh climates, in uncertain or unstable security environments, with nebulous political objectives, while accommodating (and surmounting) the myriad issues generated by linguistic, cultural, ethnic and religious diversity. Lieutenant Colonel Shane Gabriel, the MRTF-1 commander, reflected on these challenges through training the ANA, observing that the work can be ‘difficult, frustrating and involves considerable risk—but that is the mission’.^[114] In South Vietnam, even at peak size in 1970, the number of AATTV personnel represented only a minute proportion of the more than 42,000 Australian Army troops who ultimately served in the theatre, and their achievements and reputation far outweighed the diminutive size of their aggregate strength. The Marawi insurgency and subsequent Operation Augury—Philippines mission demonstrated that even in an archipelagic environment, the land domain remains critical to projecting, establishing and maintaining regional influence. 

This article’s survey of Army’s historical deployments demonstrates the outsized influence and operational effect that a clearly defined and even modestly resourced TAA mission can achieve. Such missions validate the utility of deploying well-trained, specially selected and culturally aware personnel to deliver effective training packages to develop host nation capacity and ultimately to support Army’s partners to achieve self-reliance. Provided it is well led and supported (including with sufficient interpreters), a modest TAA contribution can realise a disproportionate benefit to military and government-to-government relationships. The empowerment that such mentoring and advisory work generates, via relationships based on trust, is the most enduring observation to take forward from Australia’s long history of TAA missions, irrespective of whether the capability is structured or ad hoc.^[115]

The question remains whether a future Australian Army should restructure for TAA missions. In the contemporary environment, and even exploring a Reserve-only model, it is difficult to see how Army can find the additional people it would need to staff an SFAB without risking hollowing out existing units by stripping personnel from them. Land power already represents value for money when juxtaposed against the boutique platforms procured for the air and maritime domains. So ‘dual-hatting’ existing units to deliver TAA missions improves the cost–benefit justification for land power even further. When the Australian Government directed a land force component to support the training of Ukrainian troops, Army could send a training team with comparatively little preparation to deliver focused and effective combat training. Modest-sized militaries must frequently make do, but in the Australian Army’s experience, that has never meant delivering outcomes to a lesser standard. It has historically been a key strength of Army’s individual and collective training system that it enables the organisation to do TAA missions ‘off the line of march’, leveraging extant establishments.^[116] This is a fortunate situation, as the ongoing challenges of limited force size, constrained resourcing and depressed national recruitment figures mean that Army’s current approach to generating TAA capacity is likely to remain unchanged for the foreseeable future.^[117] Based on history, that is perhaps no bad outcome.

Army’s combat brigades have developed deep partnerships with regional militaries, while government-to-government relationships have established and grown effective DCPs. The connections to a number of Australia’s regional neighbours are therefore already present and in alignment with DSR direction. One option may be to leverage this strong base to generate more regular, or a greater tempo of, regional TAA visits to further cement Army’s presence and enhance Australia’s reputation. Defence, and Army, should not forget that such enduring relationships in the Pacific and the wider region, via mature DCPs, already utilise MTTs deployed through Joint Operations Command. This is a ‘business-as-usual’ practice that builds enduring capacity, and maximising the existing policy and relationship framework could be the foundation for any increased regional TAA emphasis. Noting caveats around Army’s mass, a second option appropriate for the future Australian Army may be to reprise the Operation Augury—Philippines model. It meets the 2024 NDS injunction to focus ‘Defence’s international engagement efforts on enhancing interoperability and collective deterrence’.^[118] It has the added benefit of delivering TAA capability using existing units as Army has always done. By deploying small numbers of troops for discrete periods, it reduces manning impacts on units and delivers training packages that meet the requirements of the host force. In both scenarios, Army generates a persistent presence, continues to build trust, improves interoperability, and demonstrates its contribution to fulfilling the Australian Government’s objectives of a stable, secure and prosperous Indo-Pacific region.

About the Author

Dr Andrew Richardson is the Senior Academic Research Officer at the Australian Army Research Centre (AARC). He was awarded a PhD from the University of Tasmania in 2005, and contributed entries to The Companion to Tasmanian History (2005) during his postgraduate years. Between 2007 and 2018 Andrew was an historian at the Australian Army History Unit, Department of Defence. In 2018 he was seconded to the Official History Project at the Australian War Memorial, where he co-authored the (forthcoming) volume on Australian peacekeeping operations in East Timor 2000–2012 with Dr William Westerman. In May 2022 Andrew joined the AARC, where he has undertaken research and academic content review to support the work of Army’s Future Land Warfare Branch. Outside of research in the AARC, Andrew maintains an interest in the Great War to explore the lessons it continues to hold for modern military practitioners.

Commentary by Daniel Cassidy

Endnotes