Memories, Myths and Reality
Edmund & Alexander, Maitland, ISBN 9780987535153, 310 pp
Author: Kevin O’Brien
Reviewed By: Chris Roberts
Accounts of Australian military history are replete with myths and hyperbole, expressing triumphalism through exaggerated claims of our contribution to campaigns and of Australian military prowess. The most prominent include that Australians were born soldiers, that General Sir John Monash invented modern combined arms tactics, and that the Anzacs landed at Gallipoli in the wrong place, against heavy opposition and under machine gun fire. In recent decades, academically trained historians and soldier scholars have refuted these myths through detailed research of primary sources, documents and accounts from the opposing forces, and a forensic analysis of events.[1] In this reassessment of the iconic Battle of Long Tan, retired Brigadier Kevin O’Brien, does just that. In 29 short chapters he challenges the widely accepted Australian narrative; untangling exaggerations, errors and mythology surrounding the event. He does this by analysing survivors’ witness statements, the infantry and artillery radio logs recorded during the battle, and plotting the artillery fire missions on the battlefield. Supporting this analysis, he uses translations of interviews with enemy commanders, and of the histories of the units opposing the Australians. The result is a compelling case that questions notable aspects of previous Australian accounts of the battle, including that of the Official History in Ian McNeill’s To Long Tan: The Australian Army and the Vietnam War 1950-1966 (1993).
O’Brien opens his account with the origins of the Vietnam War, how Australia came to be involved, the situation in Phouc Tuy Province before the 1st Australian Task Force deployed there in mid-1966, and the initial Task Force operations prior to the battle. He explores the enemy’s plans to lure an Australian force out of the base at Nui Dat in order to destroy it in a prepared ambush. This discussion is followed by a step-by-step account and analysis of the events leading up to and during the struggle on 18 August 1966. Here O’Brien questions not only the accepted narrative, but also the actions of certain Australian participants, and he presents options that might have been taken. While these observations are made with the benefit of hindsight, they are fair, sensible, and could have been considered at the time of the battle. He also acknowledges the psychological pressures on the commanders at all levels and the difficulties they worked under which would have affected decision making. In providing his perspective, O’Brien doesn’t criticise—he simply narrates what occurred, makes observations, questions certain decisions, provides options, and leaves readers to draw their own opinions.
In analysing the battle, O’Brien exposes several myths, presenting compelling evidence for each of his claims. Prominent among these myths is the size of the Vietnamese force, the casualties they incurred, and, more controversially, the number of assaults they made against the Australians. All of these figures were considerably less than generally believed. Indeed O’Brien argues there was only one assault, which was against 11 Platoon soon after it was ambushed some 800 to 900 metres ahead of the rest of D Company. This was destroyed by a regimental artillery fire mission that fell on the attackers just as it was being launched. The only other significant fighting was when 10 Platoon ran into a Vietnamese force while moving forward in an effort to relieve their isolated and beleaguered comrades. O’Brien’s most contentious argument is that at no time, towards the end of the battle, was the consolidated D Company subjected to the continuous assault waves that survivors recollected and described. Other myths he refutes include:
- D Company did not save the Task Force base from an attack;
- other than the isolated 11 Platoon (which could not be reached), the rest of the company was not running low on ammunition when the aerial resupply was requested; and
- the relieving force did not save D Company—the Vietnamese had already begun their withdrawal.
O’Brien is careful to ensure that the artillery contribution to the battle, and the aftermath of the battle itself, is not ignored. A chapter is devoted to the gunners, covering their training, equipment, duties, and how they provided a fire mission, together with their support during the action, and the incredible difficulties they worked under once the monsoonal storm descended on them. The various fire missions they provided are shown on several of the numerous coloured maps in the book that display the dispositions of both Australian and Vietnamese forces throughout the course of the battle.
Discussing the aftermath of the battle, O’Brien examines where the Vietnamese bodies were found when the field was swept the next day, the burial of the Vietnamese dead, and the implications of the political spin on the ‘victory’ for the audience in Australia. Further analysis is then provided on the number of Vietnamese casualties, the citations for bravery awards against the reality of what occurred, the presentation of gifts to selected members of A and D companies, and the ramifications of the hospital visits by local Vietnamese on the allegiances of the population.
Rounding out the book are two chapters on separate subjects. The first covers another Vietnamese attempt to lure the Australians into a prepared ambush, which resulted in Operation Bribie. The second provides a short biography and photograph of each of the 18 Australians who died, and a ‘Summary and Conclusions’. Here, O’Brien makes two criticisms. First is the failure of the Australian commanders to recognise the presence of the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) troops in the province despite the evidence presented to them. Second, he notes the undignified manner in which the Vietnamese were buried; which he places squarely on the shoulders of the Australian commanders.
Unfortunately, the book is marred by its disjointed and repetitive presentation. It is fragmented both within some of the chapters and in the sequence of others. For example, O’Brien’s analysis of the raising, organisation, and previous activities of the Viet Cong (VC) and PAVN units is sprinkled across multiple chapters rather than being consolidated into a single one. His chapters that discuss ancillary issues after the battle—such as the Vietnamese casualties, the citations, the gifts, and the biographies of those who died—would have been better relegated to appendices. Smith’s briefing to the world press, the narrative on Operation Bribie, together with the summary and conclusions would be better placed as part of the aftermath of the battle, and in chronological order. There is also significant repetition in the narrative of events, and an excessive duplication of information throughout the book. It would have benefitted from a thorough editing before going to publication, to provide a more succinct narrative. While O’Brien lists his secondary sources in the bibliography, he does not cite the primary sources and interviews he used to make key points in his case—these would have been helpful for those wishing to refer to them.
Long Tan offers a series of lessons to contemporary soldiers. First is the need for commanders to study and carefully evaluate the enemy they are facing, and not to allow preconceived ideas to cloud one’s judgement when contrary evidence is presented. All information relating to the enemy must be passed down the chain of command so subordinates can consider it and make their own judgements. A thorough knowledge of the enemy as is possible leads to better decisions and actions. Allied to this is to never underestimate the capabilities and performance of one’s enemy—this proved fatal to 11 Platoon. Second is the imprudence of dribbling into battle—committing sub-units alone and piecemeal. Allowing 11 Platoon to chase the PAVN sentry group resulted in it being ambushed and isolated from the rest of D Company. Then, in separate missions, sending 10 Platoon and later 12 Platoon (minus one of its rifle sections) forward in attempts to relieve 11 Platoon—against what was proving to be a substantial enemy force—achieved nothing and invited defeat in detail. Third is the absolute value of thorough training, rigorous practice and exercising under realistic conditions. This lesson was exemplified by the performance of the gunners at all levels, who provided accurate and timely fire support under very difficult conditions, responding and switching from one fire mission to another quickly. Their extensive technical and practical training, and regular practice in these skills enabled them to achieve this.
Importantly, the book also reinforces the value of combined arms tactics, especially the value of fire support (even in counter insurgency operations) and the need to regularly include this in all unit and formation level training. There is no place for corps tribalism in a modern army. Related to this is the need for realistic planning and provision of resources. Had not the Task Force Deputy Assistant Quartermaster General, Major Francis Crowe, argued for the first line holdings for each battery to be increased from 100 rounds per gun to 300 rounds, the gunners would not have been able to provide the level of fire support they did. Finally, effective counter insurgency operations depend on a thorough understanding of the views, allegiances, and needs of the local population. The destruction of two villages and the relocation of their inhabitants in earlier operations did nothing to enamour the locals to the newly arrived Australians. It was something that played into the enemy’s hands—an acceptance that the VC and PAVN were protecting the population from the wanton actions of the newcomers. Allowing Vietnamese locals to visit the wounded Australians in hospital served to reinforce the enemy’s pronouncements that they had inflicted a significant defeat on the foreigners. These actions, argues O’Brien, did little to help sway the locals’ allegiance away from the VC and PAVN to the South Vietnamese Government.
Long Tan: Memories, Myths and Reality makes a valuable contribution to the historiography of this iconic battle. It provides a contrary, and at times controversial, perspective based on compelling evidence, and it raises several awkward questions, including the conduct of the battle itself, the withdrawal of 11 Platoon, and the subsequent awards for gallantry. In doing so, O’Brien seeks to remind us to be discerning in the study of our military history. Witness accounts and memories from just one side of an action do not always reflect reality. Only a thorough study of all the source material including that of the opposing forces, and a forensic analysis of them in context, provides a closer representation of the reality of the event. This book should be studied as a counter to the widely accepted versions of the battle. Despite the flaws in its presentation, it is a worthy addition to our understanding of the events leading up to the action, its conduct, and its aftermath.
Endnotes
[1] For examples refuting these particular claims, see Craig Stockings (ed) Zombie Myths of Australian Military History, University of New South Wales, Sydney, 2010; Peter Pedersen, Monash As Military Commander, Big Sky Publishing, Newport, NSW, 2018 (first published 1985); Paddy Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Western Front: The British Army’s Art of Attack, 1916-18, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1994; Michel Goya, Flesh and Steel During the Great War: The Transformation of the French Army and the Invention of Modern Warfare, Pen & Sword, Barnsley, 2018; Chris Roberts The Landing at Anzac 1915, Big Sky Publishing, Newport, NSW, 2011 and 2nd Edition, 2015; Mesut Uyar, The Ottoman Defence Against the Anzac Landing 25 April 1915, Big Sky Publishing, Newport, NSW, 2015; Peter Hart Gallipoli, Profile Press, London, 2011. For an original account by the commander of the regiment that first opposed the Anzac landing see Sefik Aker, The Dardanelles: The Ari Burnu Battles and the 27th Regiment. Translated copy in the Australian War Memorial MS 1886.
