Land Power Library - Holding Out

The German Army and Operational Command in 1917

by Tony Cowan

Cambridge University Press, 2023, 326 pp, 7 maps, 13 figures, 17 tables

Hard cover ISBN: 971108830232

Reviewed By: Roger Lee

Anyone interested in World War I is only too aware of the vast volume of relevant literature available: most of it is good, some of it is exceptional for its insight, explanations and analysis but, regrettably, some of it is indulgent, self-serving and, worst of all, wrong. Further, the tyranny of language has inevitably meant that the bulk of the available English literature has also focussed upon the English-speaking parts of that great conflict. Thus, works in English on the French, Russian, German or Austro-Hungarians—let alone the minor players—are comparatively rare. Unfortunately, this fact tends to generate a distorted understanding of World War I which fuels the growth of myths and misconceptions. 

Some excellent analysis of both the French and German armies has been produced by historians fortunate enough to be multi-lingual. In recent times, Jonathon Boff and the late Elizabeth Greenhalgh (among others) have added to the existing body of works by such eminent scholars as Jack Sheldon, Christopher Duffy and Robert Doughty. However, it is still a rare occurrence to find a new book about any aspect of these less-studied areas of the conflict. So it is particularly noteworthy when a new book emerges that examines a critical – if not core – component of how the war was fought. When it does so comprehensively, objectively and convincingly, it is worth the attention of everyone. As such, Tony Cowan’s new book, based on his PhD thesis, deserves to be read by every student of the Great War.

At first glance, Cowan’s book is merely an excellent German explanation of the events and outcomes of the great Entente offensives of 1917. Although the focus is primarily on the Western Front, the book also covers the British at Arras and later at Passchendaele, the French Nivelle attack at Chemin des Dames, and the Russian Kerensky offensive. To be clear, Cowan does not describe or analyse the tactical manoeuvring on either side of the wire, nor does he provide a detailed examination of German infantry tactics. Instead, the book’s focus is on how the German high command controlled and commanded these defensive battles. As Cowan states in his introduction, the work ‘explains the dramatic reversal of fortunes from the German side’ by using a case study of the five key tasks of the German operational command in the battles, looking deeply into the critical but complex world of command – particularly command under extreme pressure. Despite the horrendous casualties, the German high command regarded 1917 as a victory. They had met the full onslaught of the enemy and had (as the book’s title states) held on. For many analysts, this outcome provides proof that the German army was tactically the best of the war and the German general staff and its processes superior to the Entente. Fortunately, Cowan is much more nuanced, avoids broad sweeping generalisations and examines in considerable depth how the Germans managed to secure their ‘victory’. 

The concept of command has continually evolved under the pressures of technological change, radical changes in the size of forces, nature of combat, geographical context and a myriad of other influences. Nevertheless, the core purpose of command remains fundamentally the same: to ensure there is sufficient combat capability at the key point to achieve the desired outcome. In a study of the core components of command that are as relevant to leaders today as they were over a hundred years ago, Cowan’s book shows how the German high command of 1917 did achieve its desired outcome of resisting the Entente’s offensives. In this regard, Cowan identifies five key tasks (derived from both contemporary and current thinking on command) that were the framework of the German command process. They are summarised as (1) coordinating a mass army – decentralisation versus control, (2) selecting the right men – the role of personality, (3) reducing uncertainty – intelligence and communications, (4) learning – lessons learned, doctrine and training for combined arms battle, and (5) winning – preventing breakthrough and managing attrition. While all five of these tasks would be familiar to a modern-day commander, the solutions the Germans adopted is illustrative both of the universality of command tasks, and the diversity of challenges that can render their implementation difficult. For Germany during World War I, such challenges included: an enemy superior in numbers and materiel and growing in confidence, internal friction from the German Army’s own structure, societal influences (it was a federal army with unclear lines of authority at the senior levels), and (in some quarters) innate conservatism. 

While each task is analysed in some depth, Cowan further illustrates how they were also heavily intertwined and interrelated.  Personality had a significant impact on the efficacy of training and doctrinal development. As an example, Cowan examines how in Army Group Crown Prince, the use of short command courses (to prepare new divisional command teams) was never as valued or as well developed as in Army Group Rupprecht, and he catalogues the inevitable consequences for their respective battlefield performance. Further, Cowan clearly demonstrates that when intelligence, coordination and the ‘right men’ come together—as happened when facing the Nivelle offensive but not initially at Arras—the outcome for the Germans changed from potential defeat to a tactical victory.

Modern military thinkers will no doubt be reassured that the constant battle between centralisation versus mission control is not new and is no easier to resolve now than it was in 1917. Lessons around battlefield security similarly remain central to contemporary operations. Such lessons include those related to operational security such as arose when the whole scope of the Nivelle offensive was revealed in documents captured by German trench raids before the attack began. While one conclusion to be drawn from this incident should be the need to educate staff officers not to take such material forward, Cowan also uses this example to show how the true value of such intelligence lies in how it is used. At Chemin des Dames, the Germans were able to shape their defences around the French plans, strengthening the targeted areas and turning a potential catastrophe into a victory. One only has to look at how the war in Ukraine is progressing to realise that this principle is as valid now as it was in 1917.

Cowan’s approach and extensive use of private diaries and similar primary sources provides some insights into the minds and attitudes of the principal players at the top of the German army. Throughout his study, Cowan demonstrates his superb grasp of the German records and his excellent understanding of German ‘military-speak’. His explanation of the interrelationship between the commander and the principal staff officer at army, corps and division level—and the effect of this on the German decision-making process—will resonate with modern commanders. Similar issues persist over time: wrestling with the growth of military bureaucracy, promotion processes that favour ‘no decision-making’ over ‘decisive-but-wrong-decision-making,’ and the notion of ‘group punishment’ (the dismissal of an entire command team for the failure of one individual or of a subordinate unit or formation). 

For this reviewer at least, an unexpected bonus was found outside the scope of Cowan’s book—namely the evidence it provided to undermine a number of broad and unsavoury myths usually directed at the British and French high commands. For example, the pejorative dismissal by many popular historians of British generals as ‘Chateau warriors’ (because they were well behind the front line living in supposed luxury while their troops suffered privation in the front lines) is well-entrenched in popular understanding of World War I. Cowan proves such a description to be unfounded and unreasonable by describing how the same method of operating was forced on the Germans by the rapid increase in the complexity of the war (including increased demands on communications, staffs and the new dangers of long-range artillery and aircraft). Cowan also provides a similar explanation for the much-criticised requirement for trench raiding. Loathed by British and Australian soldiers alike (and used as evidence by critics to ‘prove’ British generals were dismissive of troop welfare), raiding was a critical component in local tactical and operational intelligence collection. Cowan shows how well this tactic worked for the Germans and how extensively it was used by both sides throughout the War.

Holding Out. The German Army and Operational Command in 1917 is a dense book – each page requires close attention. The references are both extensive and intimidating (for a non-German speaker). Consequently, any attempt to condense the book is doomed to failure. It is simply too focused and too analytical to be reduced to summary. A close study will, however, offer much insight into the process and challenge of battlefield command in time of war.