Train Better, Fight Best

Abstract

The Australian Army is on the cusp of its most challenging period since the end of the Vietnam War. Following twelve years of unprecedented operational tempo, Army is steadily shifting towards a ‘peacetime army’. Its training focus has shifted from attaining expertise in counterinsurgency operations towards achieving mastery in combined arms warfare. It has entered a period of fiscal austerity. The future will not be easy. This article will argue that Army can readily, confidently and successfully confront its forthcoming challenges through the implementation of a training regimen that emulates the one which transformed the Reichswehr in the years following the First World War.

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Arguably, our Army is on the cusp of its most challenging period since the end of the Vietnam War. A generation of officers and soldiers, whose service experience has been characterised by multiple operational deployments, will be forced to adjust to life in a ‘peacetime Army’.¹ Many of Army’s combat veterans will have to accept that their operational experience gained during counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan does not automatically equate to expertise in the execution of conventional warfighting.² Compounding these issues is the increasingly constrained financial constraints imposed on Army by a government and nation seeking to reap their ‘peace dividend’ following a decade of war.³ The 2012 Federal budget cuts, coupled with the ongoing demands of the Strategic Reform Program, have already impinged on the raising, training and sustaining of Army.⁴ To many, these adversities will appear overwhelming. To some, these challenges will seem insurmountable.

Historical precedence of another military force triumphing over similar challenges offers our Army cause for hope. The rapid transformation of Germany’s army, the Reichswehr, from its vanquished post First World War state to become, arguably, the most potent military force in history, provides a pertinent case study for our Army in how it can overcome its immediate and future challenges.⁵ The radical conversion of the defeated, dejected and impoverished Reichswehr was engineered by the esteemed, resolute and irrepressible Generalobelast (Colonel General) Hans Von Seeckt. In spite of significant adversity, in the space of six years, Von Seeckt revamped the Reichswehr. Underpinning this revival was Von Seeckt’s development and implementation of a rigorous, inventive, cost-effective and transformative ‘train better, fight best’ philosophy.⁶

Underpinning this revival was Von Seeckt’s development and implementation of a rigorous, inventive, cost-effective and transformative ‘train better, fight best’ philosophy.

This article will argue that Army can readily, confidently and successfully confront its forthcoming challenges through the implementation of a training regimen that emulates the one which transformed the Reichswehr in the years following the First World War. To validate this thesis, this article will describe the challenges confronting Von Seeckt when he assumed command of the Reichswehr in December 1919. Broad comparisons will be drawn between these constraints, and those confronting the Australian Army. Subsequently the inventive, cost-effective and highly successful training methods applied by Von Seeckt to transform the Reichswehr will be analysed. In addition, and by way of warning, the uninspired, self-limiting and ultimately disastrous approach to training adopted by the British army during the interwar years will be contrasted with that of Von Seeckt. Finally, this article will conclude by articulating the key lessons the Australian Army can draw from this apposite case study in confronting its forthcoming challenges.

The Challenges Confronting Von Seeckt and the Reichswehr

Germany’s army emerged from the detritus of the First World War in a dejected state. In addition to its ignominious defeat and extraordinary loss in blood and treasure, it was debilitated by the exigencies of the Treaty of Versailles.⁷ To appreciate the severe challenges confronted and subsequently overcome by Generalobelast Hans Von Seeckt, it is necessary to review the melancholy situation he inherited upon being appointed head of the postwar Reichswehr.⁸

The German army was in a wretched state at the conclusion of the First World War. According to the official German medical war history, the German military suffered over two million dead and four million wounded by war’s end.⁹ Germany’s well earned and hard won reputation as the leading army in Europe, which pioneered many contemporary operational concepts throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century under Von Moltke the Elder, was lost in the humiliation of its defeat.¹⁰

Compounding the Reichswehr’s miserable post First World War situation were the severe dictates imposed on it by the Treaty of Versailles. The architects of this peace treaty sought to emasculate the German nation and its military forces.¹¹ Versailles further debilitated the Reichswehr through a series of mandates that constrained its role and professional ethos, force structure and equipment, and funding.

The architects of this peace treaty sought to emasculate the German nation and its military forces.

The Treaty of Versailles sought to reduce the German army to a constabulary function.¹² In doing so, it aimed to eliminate its traditional warfighting role, ethos and professionalism. According to military theorist Michael Vianeuva, ‘the treaty practically eliminated the German imperial army, and its long list of restrictions left but a specter of the once massive force.’¹³ Article V of the Treaty prevented Germany from maintaining ‘an offensive military capability and the essential institutions of a modern, major power’.¹⁴ The German General Staff, the custodians of many of the revolutionary concepts conceived during the nineteenth century, was disbanded.¹⁵ The acclaimed Kriegsakademie (War College), the staple of German officer training and professionalism since 1810, whose graduates included Karl Von Clausewitz, Von Moltke the Elder, and Von Steimetz—all of whom assume prominent positions in the pantheon of strategic thinkers—was abolished.¹⁶

In keeping with its intent of emasculating the traditional warfighting role and ethos of the German Army, the Versailles Treaty imposed significant limitations on the Reichswehr’s force structure. The Treaty reduced the Reichswehr to a mere fraction of its post First World War strength. The number of officer positions within its 100,000-man force was capped at 4000.¹⁷ Conscription was banned.¹⁸ Moreover, Versailles prevented the army from acquiring, training with or employing tanks, armoured cars, aircraft and heavy artillery.¹⁹ Finally, restrictions were imposed on the manufacture of certain types of machine guns and rifles.²⁰ These prohibitions on the Reichswehr’s force structure sought to render any attempt to train for and attain professional mastery in its traditional warfighting role unachievable.

The onerous financial penalties imposed on Germany by Versailles impoverished the nation—and its military. The 2012 value of Germany’s reparations totalled US$442 billion.²¹ At the time, prominent economists such as John Maynard Keynes argued that such penalties were both excessive and counterproductive.²² The fact that it took until October 2010, almost 92 years following the end of the First World War, for Germany to make its final reparation payment validates Keynes’ initial assessment.²³ The impact of these financial penalties on Germany’s fiscal position, and the amount of funding allocated to the raising, training and sustaining of the Reichswehr was severe. Indeed, Germany’s dire fiscal situation and morose economic forecast critically threatened the Reichswehr’s capacity to acquire leading equipment to train for and attain professional mastery in its traditional warfighting role. Enter Generalobelast Hans Von Seeckt.

The onerous financial penalties imposed on Germany by Versailles impoverished the nation—and its military.

Von Seeckt had fought the majority of the First World War on the Eastern Front.²⁴ Consequently, he witnessed the advantages of manoeuvre warfare over the static trench deadlock characteristic of the Western Front. His First World War experiences convinced him ‘that smaller armies, thoroughly trained in aspects of joint operations and combined arms tactics, could use technology to outmanoeuvre and decisively defeat mass armies’.²⁵ Throughout the war, Von Seeckt achieved tactical and operational acclaim. He was perceived as a dynamic and irrepressible visionary who fervently believed that the only constraints on the human mind were self-imposed. From his appointment as the head of the Reichswehr in December 1919, Von Seeckt resolved to transform the vanquished post World War I German army into a leading professional military force—no matter the constraints and/or challenges—via a dynamic, inventive and transformative training philosophy.

While the scale of adversity confronting Von Seeckt and his Army is difficult to comprehend, there are some broad parallels that can be drawn between the challenges he confronted and those facing the Australian Army. Firstly, comparisons can be made between the difficulties faced by Von Seeckt in transforming the post First World War Reichswehr into a leading, professional warfighting army and the Australian Army’s contemporary challenge of reorientating from its focus on counterinsurgency operations to that of conventional warfighting. Secondly, broad parallels can be drawn between the severe fiscal constraints faced by Von Seeckt in reviving the Reichswehr and those confronting the Australian Army in the foreseeable future. It is because of these broad parallels that the highly successful training philosophy employed by Von Seeckt to transform the Reichswehr could serve as a viable antidote to the Australian Army’s forthcoming challenges.

Von Seeckt's Response

Over a six-year period, Hans Von Seeckt transformed a defeated, dejected and impoverished 100,000-man military force into an ‘army of excellence’.²⁶ The seemingly overwhelming challenges that he faced did not diminish his resolve to achieve his goal of re-establishing the prestige and superior capability of the German army. He achieved this by adapting Generalissimo Alexandre Suvarov’s eighteenth century aphorism, ‘train hard, fight easy’, into a training philosophy that sought to ‘train better, fight best’.²⁷ To combat the Reichswehr’s herculean challenges, Von Seeckt implemented a rigorous, inventive, cost-effective and transformative approach to training. The key features of this approach included an unwavering focus on making the most of the time and limited material resources he had available for training, the reformation of the Reichswehr as a leader’s army and inculcating an organisational obsession for learning.

Over a six-year period, Hans Von Seeckt transformed a defeated, dejected and impoverished 100,000-man military force into an ‘army of excellence’.

The cornerstone of Von Seeckt’s training philosophy was a determination to optimise the time and limited material resources with which he could train. It is a testament to his strength of character and leadership that he was preoccupied with making the most of what resources he did have available—as opposed to lamenting the absence of those that he lacked. By all accounts, Von Seeckt had cause to complain. His nation was on the verge of bankruptcy and civil war.²⁸ Moreover, he was not allowed to acquire or train with the very equipment he needed to transform the Reichswehr into a leading exponent of combined arms warfare.²⁹ Like Suvarov before him, Von Seeckt appreciated that his most precious resource, which the Allies could not deprive him of, was time.³⁰ Indeed, Suvarov argued that ‘Money is dear; human life is still dearer; but time is the dearest [resource] of all’.³¹ Throughout his tenure as head of the Reichswehr, Von Seeckt implemented a number of highly successful techniques to ensure that time accorded to training was optimised.

Von Seeckt was conscious of the tendency within the Reichswehr to squander time available in the barracks environment for the conduct of demanding training. This resulted in an unacceptable waste of the one resource that the Allies could not deprive him of. Moreover, it contributed to a sense of boredom amongst the soldiers and junior leaders of the Reichswehr’s combat units. Von Seeckt understood the insidious influence that boredom had on an army.³² His response was to direct the conduct of up to two periods of physical training per day, forced marches to training areas—which compensated for a lack of vehicles and fuel—and, most importantly, the conduct of ‘sand table’ (‘mud model’) exercises.³³

These ‘mud model’ exercises were conducted on a regular basis, from battalion to fire team level.³⁴ The only resource expended was time. Company level activities normally involved every member surrounding the ‘mud model’ and contributing to the wargaming of tactical scenarios. Every member of the company was represented on the ‘mud model’, along with scaled models of buildings and terrain. Each participant had a speaking role—even the privates. A United States Defense attaché observing the conduct of such training was astonished that all ranks were expected to show a capacity to understand and critique the tactical problem being wargamed.³⁵ He was amazed by the ‘understanding and capacity to rapidly appreciate a situation and react decisively’ evinced by all ranks within the Reichswehr companies who he observed conducting these ‘mud model’ activities.³⁶ Based on these observations, he warned US officials that the Reichswehr was rapidly re-emerging from the First World War as a highly capable and tactically adept military force.³⁷

... all ranks were expected to show a capacity to understand and critique the tactical problem being wargamed.

Von Seeckt implemented various other measures to ensure that time and material resources accorded to the training of the Reichswehr were optimised. He demanded that field exercises were conducted in a manner that ensured that all ranks were tested.³⁸ He shunned the conduct of large-scale manoeuvres that resulted in soldiers standing ‘idle while their superior commanders grappled with the challenge of manoeuvring large units’.³⁹ His solution was to reduce the scale of major exercises to the point where all ranks were engaged. He would test commanders in large-scale manoeuvres via map and other simulation exercises.⁴⁰ Finally, he would personally verify that this key feature of his training philosophy was being applied by regularly visiting units conducting training. According to military historian James Corum, Von Seeckt’s top priority was visiting units and subunits undertaking training. He would allocate one third of his annual calendar for such visits.⁴¹ These initiatives, combined with diligent oversight, yielded ‘cutting edge [and realistic] ... peacetime training’ within the Reichswehr.⁴²

It was during the conduct of field exercises that Von Seeckt’s astute employment of time and other material resources was most evident. In order to derive the greatest learning from field manoeuvres, Von Seeckt insisted that they be stringently umpired.⁴³ He even produced his own rulebook for field umpiring, which enhanced the training realism achieved and insights into tactics and doctrine gained.⁴⁴ He did not allow the limited material resources accorded to him, nor the prohibition on tanks, aircraft and heavy artillery, stymie his ambition of transforming the Reichswehr into the world’s leading combined arms warfare exponent.⁴⁵ In response to these constraints, he directed that simulation be employed to facilitate the same training outcome that would be achieved if tanks, aircraft and heavy artillery were available.⁴⁶

It was during the conduct of field exercises that Von Seeckt’s astute employment of time and other material resources was most evident.

Consequently, Reichswehr formations and units employed innovative techniques to simulate these platforms. Vianueva notes that the ‘Germans employed “dummy tanks” that appeared as camouflaged canvasses over a steel framework’ mounted on small automobiles or bicycles when conducting combined arms training.⁴⁷ Aircraft were simulated by umpires using coloured balloons.⁴⁸ While the employment of such techniques may seem somewhat bizarre, if not contemptible, there is no disputing their effectiveness. The trail of destruction achieved by the Wehrmacht’s combined arms teams in Poland, France and Russia validate this assessment.

A pillar of Von Seeckt’s transformation of the Reichswehr was developing it as a ‘leader’s Army’, or Fuhrerarmee.⁴⁹ Due to the constraints imposed by Versailles on the limited number of officers within the Reichswehr, Von Seeckt had little choice but to craft a ‘leader’s army’ from its noncommissioned officers and privates. From the outset, Von Seeckt aimed to ensure that the Reichswehr’s ‘100,000 soldiers were to be leaders or capable of leadership’.⁵⁰ Von Seeckt maintained that ‘it is of fundamental significance that junior leaders are taught to be independent-thinking and acting men’.⁵¹ He also regularly reminded his division, formation and unit commanders that ‘even the youngest leaders’ in their respective organisations needed to understand ‘the many-sided problems of the combined efforts of all arms’.⁵² He achieved his ambition of a Fuhrerarmee by demanding that training activities, of all types and scale, practice and test all ranks in fulfilling the role and appointment of their superior.⁵³

Von Seeckt’s emphasis on developing a Führerarmee accrued both immediate and longer-term dividends. From the outset, the Von Moltkean command principle of Auftragstaktik (Mission Command) was reinstituted within the Reichswehr.⁵⁴ By 1925, American observers of the Reichswehr remarked that even their most junior ranks possessed an ‘extraordinary alertness’ and a superior capacity to understand complex tactical problems.⁵⁵ Some fifteen years later during the Second World War it was common for Wehrmacht privates to be rapidly promoted to first sergeants and sergeants promoted to the appointment of company and even battalion commander. A French writer alleged that Von Seeckt’s ‘leader’s army’ concept sought ‘to create a grand army in miniature’.⁵⁶ He was right. Von Seeckt’s investment in the leadership potential of every German soldier and officer generated a superb cadre force that enabled the rapid expansion of the Wehrmacht prior to the commencement of the Second World War.⁵⁷

An obsession for learning was the second pillar underpinning Von Seeckt’s transformative training philosophy. Von Seeckt sought to establish a critical link between the training conducted by the Reichswehr, the insights and lessons learned derived from this training, and the production of relevant and timely doctrine. Within one week of being appointed as the head of the German army, Von Seeckt directed the creation of fifty-seven committees, comprised of soldiers and officers from all corps, to study and improve the ‘tactics, regulations, equipment and doctrine’ of the Reichswehr.⁵⁸ According to Vianueva, by the ‘mid 1920s there were over 400 German officers working to analyse and compile information [or lessons learned] on World War I’ that could be incorporated into the Reichswehr’s training and approach to warfighting.⁵⁹ This investment reintroduced the concept of Bewegungskrieg, the antecedent of manoeuvre warfare, into the Reichswehr.⁶⁰

An obsession for learning was the second pillar underpinning Von Seeckt’s transformative training philosophy.

Imbuing an enthusiasm for both critical reflection and intellectual development were fundamental to Von Seeckt’s training philosophy. Soldiers and officers were actively encouraged to challenge and critique training techniques and doctrine. Vianueva contends that ‘debate was [constantly] encouraged and new ideas were welcomed’.⁶¹ Journals and forums were established to facilitate such discourse.⁶² Officers were expected to be avid students of history and strategy.⁶³ Military historian Robert Citino notes that no army in the world to that point ‘had taken wargames, exercises and manoeuvres as seriously as the German Army’.64 Due to Von Seeckt’s drive to inculcate an obsession for learning within the Reichswehr’s training philosophy, by 1921 ‘a solid outline of combined arms concepts and manoeuvre warfare’ had been crafted.⁶⁵ These concepts served as the foundation of the devastating Blitzkrieg, which cut a swathe of destruction through Poland, France and Russia during the initial years of the Second World War.

Reichswehr and British Army Interwar Training Philosophies Juxtaposed

Contrasting Von Seeckt’s training philosophy with the detrimental approach adopted by the British army during the interwar years is instructive in identifying the implications of both approaches. The Australian Army can, and must, take heed of the legacies of both methodologies. Unlike Germany, during the interwar years the British did not suffer under the severe dictates of Versailles. Moreover, they ended the First World War as the victor, not the vanquished. In short, its nation and army confronted a better set of circumstances than Von Seeckt did. Despite these advantages, the British army atrophied during the interwar years. A negative, lackadaisical and incoherent approach towards training was the underlying reason for this decline.

In contrast to the approach adopted by the Reichswehr, the British failed to take advantage of the time and resources available to them to train their army to a competent standard. British military historian David French notes that the British ‘failed to train [its army] ... adequately’ during the interwar years.⁶⁶ Fundamental to this failure was the defeatist attitude evinced by leaders within the British army concerning the impact of resource constraints and deprivation on their capacity to execute challenging, relevant and creative training. Instead of adopting Von Seeckt’s approach of making the most of the resources that were available, British army leaders focused on lamenting the resources that they lacked. The training delivered within the British army suffered because of it. Consequently, ‘troops taking part [in military exercises] became disheartened because of their lack of realism’.⁶⁷ French argues that the inability of the British army to exploit the time and resources accorded to them resulted in the degradation of its combat capability.⁶⁸

... the inability of the British army to exploit the time and resources accorded to them resulted in the degradation of its combat capability.

The British army’s approach to fostering leadership and initiative in their army was diametrically opposed to the approach implemented by Von Seeckt. In stark contrast to the Reichswehr’s Führerarmee, the British actively discouraged both qualities. In many cases, initiative was spurned as ‘heresy’.⁶⁹ French notes that ‘the rank and file never thought for themselves and all including warrant officers and NCOs lacked initiative’.⁷⁰ A telling observation substantiating this assessment is provided elsewhere by David French when describing the manifold differences between British and German officer training. He notes that while Reichswehr officer cadets ‘learned everything an infantry battalion commander had to know in any kind of pre-combat or combat situation’, British army officer cadets were barely taught platoon tactics.⁷¹

While an obsession for knowledge was a pillar underpinning Von Seeckt’s transformative approach to training, the British were dismissive of organisational learning. Where it did occur, it was incoherent. Unlike the Reichswehr, British army doctrine stagnated during the interwar years. French accuses them of adopting a ‘laissez-faire’ approach to deriving lessons learned and doctrine development.⁷² In contrast to the 57 committees and 400 officers that Von Seeckt devoted to doctrine and training development, the British appointed a single captain to the same task. Consequently, infantry tactics by 1940 had ‘advanced little from the standards of 1916’.⁷³ When attempting to explain the British army’s string of comprehensive defeats during the initial years of the Second World War, acclaimed military historian Williamson Murray contends that:

the real cause of such as state of affairs lay in the failure of the army leadership to enunciate a clearly thought-out doctrine and then to institute a thorough training program to insure its acceptance throughout the army.⁷⁴

Von Seeckt constantly sought to increase the physical and mental robustness of his soldiers in preparation for close combat. Indeed, he sought to make ‘the training standards of the Reichswehr the toughest in the world’.⁷⁵ By contrast, the British ‘tended to wet nurse the men’.⁷⁶ This approach was a derivative of the British army’s leadership pursuing a warfighting approach that eschewed close combat, sought to achieve tactical victories ‘quickly and cheaply’, relied on overwhelming artillery and air support and emphasised the ‘overriding importance of avoiding casualties’.⁷⁷ This approach to training proved disastrous during the initial years of the Second World War. In 1933 this training philosophy provoked an exasperated former British Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir George Milne, to plea ‘how are you going to succeed without causing losses?’⁷⁸ In 1942, following venomous criticism from Churchill of the British army’s latest round of defeats, the Chief of the General Staff, Sir Alan Brooke, admitted the following:

we are not anything like as tough as we were in the last war. There has been far too much luxury, safety first, red triangle, etc., in this country. Our one idea is to look after our comforts and avoid being hurt in any way.⁷⁹

Perhaps the clearest evidence of the divergent approaches pursued by Von Seeckt and the British was the sense of hopelessness exhibited by leaders within the British army towards the challenges and constraints that they confronted. It was noted earlier that the British did not suffer the punitive confinements of Versailles imposed on Von Seeckt. Yet the leadership within the British army chose to blame, rather than make the most of, circumstance. Common complaints included not being able to ‘attract enough good quality volunteers’ and having insufficient resources to implement realistic field exercises.⁸⁰ French lays the blame for this sense of hopelessness with the British army’s ‘interwar regular officer corps ... [which contained only] a few men who took their profession seriously’.⁸¹

... the leadership within the British army chose to blame, rather than make the most of, circumstance.

The verdict of history is clear on the legacy of the dichotomous training philosophies adopted by Von Seeckt and the British Army during the interwar years. In 1939, the successor of the Reichswehr, the Wehrmacht, cut a swathe through Poland in what has been described as ‘10 days that shook the world’.⁸² It ranks as one of the most successful military operations ever recorded. The Wehrmacht repeated, if not eclipsed, this lightning action in 1940 when they crushed the superior French army and routed the British Expeditionary Force. One year later, the Wehrmacht executed its extraordinary advance through Russia as part of Operation BARBAROSSA, defeating Soviet forces equal in size to the entire British and French armies in a combined arms maelstrom.⁸³ The tactical brilliance of the Wehrmacht was an enduring feature of the war—in spite of Hitler’s ruinous political and strategic impetuousness.

The foundation of this brilliance was the transformation of the Reichswehr engineered by Generaloblast Hans Von Seeckt through his rigorous, inventive, cost-effective, transformative and highly successful ‘train better, fight best’ philosophy. By contrast, the performance of the British army during the war was lackluster. Admittedly, the British army’s proficiency at warfighting improved throughout the conflict. However, historian Timothy Place notes that this improvement ‘emerged despite, rather than because of, the[ir] training system’.⁸⁴ Of course, Germany lost the Second World War. However, it did not lose to the superior tactical performance of other armies, least of all the British. According to French, it was a combination of blockades, air power and the 480 divisions of the massive Red Army that broke the combat power of the Wehrmacht—not the British Army’s thirteen divisions fighting under General Montgomery.⁸⁵

History confirms the superiority of Von Seeckt’s ‘train better fight best’ training philosophy in transforming a defeated, dejected and impoverished 100,000-man military force into an ‘army of excellence’.⁸⁶ It also provides warning against emulating the apathetic, and ultimately deleterious, approach exhibited by the British army. The question is: can we leverage Von Seeckt’s philosophy in empowering the Australian Army to confront its forthcoming challenges? Indeed, we can. We have already established the broad parallels in the adversities confronting Von Seeckt in December 1919 and those confronting the Australian Army in the coming years. We know also from acclaimed historians such as Williamson Murray that ‘the past can suggest how to think about new contexts and different challenges’.⁸⁷ Therefore, it is towards identifying how Von Seeckt’s training philosophy can illuminate the Australian Army’s approach to confronting its future challenges that we now turn.

... can we leverage Von Seeckt’s philosophy in empowering the Australian Army to confront its forthcoming challenges?

Lessons Relevant to the Australian Army

The Australian Army can successfully confront its forthcoming challenges through the implementation of a ‘train better, fight best’ philosophy that emulates the one that transformed the Reichswehr in the years following the First World War. Like Von Seeckt’s approach, this methodology must incorporate an unwavering focus on making the most of the time and limited material resources available for training, determinedness towards enhancing the depth and breadth of leadership and initiative within Army and the relentless pursuit of learning, improvement and physical and mental robustness.

Without doubt, the Australian Army comprehends the vital role that an effective training philosophy plays in developing ‘an army of excellence’.⁸⁸ Army’s capstone doctrine, Land Warfare Doctrine (LWD) 1.0 states that ‘Land forces require high-quality personnel moulded by training ... [to be] professional, innovative, [and] adaptive individuals’.⁸⁹ Elsewhere it reminds the reader that ‘in order to win battles ... [the Australian Army needs] knowledgeable, respected and capable commanders need to lead skilled and well-trained soldiers as part of combined arms teams’.⁹⁰ Finally, LWD 1.0 mandates that ‘training their soldiers for war remains the most important task entrusted to Australian officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) when not deployed on operations’.⁹¹

There is also ample evidence that the Australian Army has been seeking to promote the key characteristics of Von Seeckt’s highly successful training philosophy for some time. Army’s capstone doctrine for training, LWD 7-0, promotes numerous techniques that encourage time and material resource optimisation, the development of leadership and initiative, the pursuit of learning and the strengthening of our soldiers’ bodies and minds.⁹² Similarly, numerous corps specific doctrinal publications, some which are quite dated, endorse the key features of Von Seeckt’s approach. One of the better exemplars is the prescient 1984 Infantry Battalion Pamphlet, which offers the following counsel:

Today, as the lives of people become more civilised, more comfortable and more ordered, so does it become more than ever necessary to develop among soldiers, throughout their training, the qualities and spirit which will spur them, willingly, to make great efforts, endure hardship and face danger, when called upon to do so as soldiers.⁹³

and

If prepared with imagination ... exercises can have a great effect in raising morale and creating interest in training as a whole among officers and men. With a little ingenuity, exercises can be devised which require only a very simple setting and which do not, at this stage, tax the machine too highly.⁹⁴

More recent than 1984, the 2006 ‘I’m an Australian soldier’ initiative emulates key features of Von Seeckt’s philosophy. Key amongst these is the initiative’s aspiration that ‘every soldier [is] an expert in close combat’, ‘every soldier [is] a leader’, ‘every soldier [is] physically tough’ and ‘every soldier [is] committed to continuous learning and self development’.⁹⁵ The Chief of Army expresses similar direction in the Adaptive Campaigning Design Rules.⁹⁶ It should come as no surprise that the intent of both documents is ‘developing our soldiers for the challenges of the future’.⁹⁷

... the 2006 ‘I’m an Australian soldier’ initiative emulates key features of Von Seeckt’s philosophy.

While the Australian Army’s doctrine reflects the key features of Von Seeckt’s highly successful ‘train better, fight best’ philosophy, more can be done to emulate his innovative, transformative and costeffective training techniques. Although Army has done well to enhance the realism of its large scale exercises through umpiring and encouraging debate through professional forums such as the Future Land Warfare Group blog, more must be done to emulate the pillars underpinning Von Seeckt’s training approach at the formation, unit, subunit, platoon and section levels.

Firstly, like Suvarov and Von Seeckt, leaders at all levels must recognise that their most important resource is time. It is not their perceived lack of ammunition, petroleum, helicopters, tanks or any other material resource. Shortfalls in material resources can be mitigated; time cannot. At the end of a training year, no one laments the lack of ammunition, fuel or rationing; however, almost everyone regrets that they did not have more time. Leaders cannot afford to be perfunctory about time. They must value and respect it. They must be diligent in preventing its wastage. As was identified by Von Seeckt, time is often wasted in the barracks environment and inevitably leads to the emergence of corrosive boredom. Aside from the conduct of ‘mud model’ exercises, and other techniques implemented by the Reichswehr, LWD 7-0 and corps specific doctrine are replete with options for optimising training in barracks. They merely need to be read and applied by motivated officers and non-commissioned officers.

Secondly, leaders at all levels must possess the ability and drive to implement highly effective training irrespective of the lack or plenty of material resources. This is particularly the case within unit, subunit, platoons and troop organisations. At no stage did Von Seeckt’s training philosophy rely on an abundance of material resources. On the contrary, a deprivation of material resources was a constant constraint for both he and the Reichswehr. While this challenge generated a sense of apathy and hopelessness within the British army during the interwar years, it failed to dampen Von Seeckt’s ambition of establishing the Reichswehr as the world’s leading exponent of combined arms warfare. Indeed, this constraint only encouraged Reichswehr leaders to develop more innovative, effective and ultimately transformative training techniques to compensate for their lack of material resources. It also yielded a level of maturity of thought concerning the essence of exceptional training that eludes the majority of military leaders. These techniques included the conduct of combined arms training with coloured balloons representing aircraft and simulating tanks with wood and hessian models resting on top of small vehicles or bicycles.⁹⁸ While these methods may be contemptible to some, the verdict of history reveals that they proved highly successful for the Wehrmacht during the Second World War.

... leaders at all levels must possess the ability and drive to implement highly effective training irrespective of the lack or plenty of material resources.

Thirdly, more can be done at the lower levels to develop the leadership of Army’s soldiers through a ‘train better, fight best’ philosophy. Officer/non-commissioned officer training, which is invariably the first component of a unit/subunit training program to be cut when time pressures impinge, is arguably the component of training that should be the last to be compromised. Such training has the added bonus of accruing positive second and third order effects as a unit’s leaders are empowered to deliver better training outcomes to their respective subordinates. Such training can often be conducted with minimal material resources. All that is required is time and effort towards developing that leadership case study, organising that visiting lecturer, preparing and executing that Tactical Exercise Without Troops, or conducting that ‘mud model’ activity. When contemplating this key feature of Von Seeckt’s approach, Army would do well to recall General Westmoreland’s post Vietnam War comment that ‘small in numbers and well trained, particularly in antiguerrilla warfare, the Australian Army was much like the post-Versailles German army in which even men in the ranks might have been leaders in some less capable force’.⁹⁹

Finally, leaders within Army must do more to emulate Von Seeckt’s example of encouraging an obsession for learning and imbuing physical and mental robustness. The aspirations expressed in the ‘I’m an Australian Soldier’ campaign and Army doctrine concerning the attainment of these attributes is worthy.¹⁰⁰ However, in the absence of these goals being implemented by leaders at unit, subunit, platoon/troop and section level, they quickly become hollow catch phrases affixed to squadron and battalion noticeboards. Many inventive, transformative and cost-effective techniques can be employed to realise these features of Von Seeckt’s training philosophy. ‘Mud model’ exercising is one. The study of military books, academic/ military case studies and articles is another. The critical review of films provides a third option.¹⁰¹ The options are many. They are only constrained by the imagination and motivation of the leader designing the training.

... leaders within Army must do more to emulate Von Seeckt’s example of encouraging an obsession for learning and imbuing physical and mental robustness.

Conclusion

This article has argued that the Australian Army is well positioned to overcome its forthcoming challenges through applying the ‘train better, fight best’ philosophy implemented by Generalobelast Hans Von Seeckt. This philosophy transformed the Reichswehr from its post First World War doldrums into what was, arguably, the most adept fighting army that the world has ever witnessed.

This article analysed the key features of the innovative, cost-effective and transformational training philosophy that Von Seeckt leveraged to transform the Reichswehr from its post First World War wretchedness to its Second World War warfighting brilliance. It profiled how Von Seeckt optimised the time and limited material resources that he had available for training, reformed the Reichswehr as a leader’s army and inculcated an obsession for learning amongst his officers and soldiers as the pillars underpinning his training methodology. The superiority of Von Seeckt’s ‘train better, fight best’ philosophy was validated by contrasting it with the deleterious approach to training adopted by the British army prior to the Second World War. Finally, this article concluded by articulating the key lessons that leaders at all levels within the Australian Army can draw from Von Seeckt’s example when confronting adversity.

The Australian Army is on the cusp of its most challenging period since the end of the Vietnam War. Following twelve years of unprecedented operational tempo, Army is steadily shifting towards a ‘peacetime army’. Its training focus has reoriented from attaining expertise in stability and counterinsurgency operations towards achieving mastery in combined arms warfare. It has entered a period of fiscal austerity. The future will not be easy. Despite these challenges, Von Seeckt’s inspiring example in overcoming adversity empowers us to conquer our own.

About the Author

Major Ben McLennan graduated from the Royal Military College – Duntroon in June 1999. He has served a variety of regimental appointments in the 2nd Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment (2 RAR). He has undertaken training appointments at the School of Infantry and the Canadian Infantry School. He is an ADF trained French linguist. He has deployed on five occasions—all with 2 RAR. He is currently completing the Australian National University Masters Program at the Australian Command and Staff College. This article is not part of the Masters curriculum.

Endnotes

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1     Alan Dupont, ‘Inflection Point: The Australian Defence Force After Afghanistan’, Lowy Institute Policy Brief, March, 2012, p. 1.

2     David Morrison, ‘Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century, Force 2030’, Speech, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 11 April 2012, p. 6.

3     Max Blenkin, ‘Army Chief warns on Afghan peace dividend’, The Age, 12 April 2012 <http://news.theage.com.au/breaking-news-national/army-chief-warns-on-af…; accessed 30 July 2012.

4     Jim Molan, ‘Cut-rate military funding leaves defence in tatters’, The Australian, 30 July 2012, <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/opinion/cut-rate-milit…; accessed 30 July 2012; Paul Dibb, ‘Defence cuts put ADF size at stake’, The Australian, 27 July 2012 <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/opinion/defence-cuts-p…; accessed 30 July 2012.

5     RD Brown, Reichswehr, US Army War College, 1986, p. 1; Michael Vianueva, ‘Unleashing the Blitzkrieg: Precursors of a Tactical Revolution’, Senior Honors Thesis, Eastern Michigan University, 2002, p. 39.

6     While this article will focus on the lessons that the leader at the tactical level can leverage from Von Seeckt’s example, it is important to note that both the Reichswehr and Wehrmacht failed to adequately reflect on the operational and strategic lessons of the First World War during the interwar years. This would prove calamitous during the Second World War. Megargee contends that many of these lessons ‘escaped the Germans completely’ and ‘would come back to haunt the Germans’ in the Second World War; Geoffrey P Megargee, ‘The German Army after the Great War: A Case Study in Selective Self-Deception’ in Peter Denis and Jeffrey Grey (eds), Victory or Defeat: Armies in the Aftermath of Conflict, Big Sky Publishing, pp. 111–12). Millett et al similarly contend that by 1942, the tactical brilliance of the Wehrmacht had been nullified by a stream of strategic and operational blunders: AR Millett, W Murray and K Watman, ‘The Effectiveness of Military Organizations’, International Security, Vol. 11, No. 1, 1986, p. 70.

7     Robert M Citino, The Path to Blitzkrieg: Doctrine and Training in the German Army, 1920–1939, Lynne Reiner Publishers, Colorado, 1999, p.7.

8     It should be noted that Von Seeckt was also confronted by a civil war in Germany with the communists seeking to seize control in Bavaria, Berlin and other areas. James Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg, University Press of Kanas, 1992, p. 25.

33    Citino, The Path to Blitzkrieg, p. 105; Skinner, Transformation of the German Reichsheer, p. 58.

67    Ibid., p. 173.

97    ‘I’m an Australian Soldier’.

98    Vianueva, ‘Unleashing the Blitzkrieg: Precurors of a Tactical Revolution’, p. 18.

99    General C Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, Doubleday and Company, New York, 1976, p. 258.

100  ‘I’m an Australian Soldier’.

101  The Chief of Army has recently released his recommendations for film and literature. In addition to this excellent list, commanders would do well to consider Peter Ford’s Fear Drive My Feet and Osmar White’s Green Armour as mandatory reading for those under their command. Both books previously featured on the Penguin Australian Military Classics List. Both profile the stoicism of Australian Army soldiers fighting the Japanese during the Pacific War of the Second World War. Other worthy titles include: Road to Mandalay – a must for any staff officer; Glendon Swarthout’s They Came to Cordura – a study in true leadership; and Cormac McArthy’s sobering description of the true nature of war in The Blood Meridian. Concerning film recommendations, movies such as 12 O’Clock High, The Caine Mutiny, Patton and Tunes of Glory provide apposite leadership case studies.