On The Preposterousness Of 'Population-Centricity'

Abstract

This article argues against the hasty adoption of conceptually questionable ‘doctrine’ inspired by the notion of ‘population-centric operations’, and instead proposes that military professionals may be better served by reviewing the validity of earlier doctrinal precepts, and applying them to contemporary and future mission sets. The article cautions against a conceptual fallacy wherein the Army is considering developing doctrine that envisages a military force conducting either Joint Land Combat (one of the five lines of operation described in Army’s Adaptive Campaigning – Future Land Operating Concept 2009, or ‘population-centric operations’. It offers an alternative proposition of two inter-lapping categories of conventional or intervention operations.

Introduction

It should go without saying that military planners at all levels—but particularly those at the operational level—must retain great clarity of understanding of the type of operations they undertake, and the essence of why they are undertaking them in terms of national interests’ Yet the very nature of military operations—volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous—renders them elusive to a simple biology-like classification.

However, just as in biology where similar environments drive similarities in appearance between unrelated species through ‘convergent evolution’, so too can analysts and doctrine writers be fooled into miscategorising military operations into superficial groupings. This article refutes the validity of deeming an operation as either ‘enemy-centric’ or ‘population-centric’, as too simplistic and potentially misleading for both planners and operators. It offers an alternative— and arguably more orthodox—proposition of categorising operations as either inter-state (‘conventional’) conflict or intra-state (‘intervention’) conflict, noting that the latter may exist during and alongside the former, and the determining characteristic of these categories is the military force’s relationship to the host government.

As military professionals, we should be circumspect about the hasty adoption of conceptually questionable ‘doctrine’ inspired by the notion of ‘population-centric operations’, and instead we should consider reviewing the validity of earlier doctrinal precepts, and apply them to contemporary and future mission sets. This article cautions against what is regarded as a conceptual fallacy, wherein the Australian Defence Force (ADF) is considering developing doctrine that envisages a military force conducting either Joint Land Combat (one of the five lines of operation described in the Australian Army’s Adaptive Campaigning—Future Land Operating Concept (2009)¹), or ‘population-centric operations’.

The Problem

One of the real dangers of having a ‘long time between drinks’ in Australia’s doctrine writing is that the vernacular terms and shorthand descriptions used in debating military concepts and ideas start to take on a currency—and eventually an authority—that is untested, unwarranted and indeed misleading. A time-honoured example is the status given to Blitzkrieg, which in post-World War II decades attained legendary status as a fully developed operational concept adopted by the Wehrmacht. In actuality, most researchers now agree that the stunning successes attained by the Germans from 1939 to 1941 in Western Europe, North Africa and Russia were due almost solely to an overwhelming tactical-level superiority that prevailed despite major shortfalls in what we today know as operational design and planning.²

Today, we risk worshipping twin brazen idols defined by a mysterious quality of ‘centricity’, wherein we set ourselves a false dilemma and must choose—like a tempted Jedi—to describe the operation at hand as either ‘enemy-centric’ or ‘population-centric’. Of the former, we infer value—perhaps unconsciously—as a ‘real’ military force’s true purpose, while the latter ends up being a collective term for all other occasions where nefarious miscreants don’t have the decency to form up in uniforms—or even one unchanging team—and attrite us from within a ‘population’.

oday, we risk worshipping twin brazen idols defined by a mysterious quality of ‘centricity’ ...

This ‘population’, however, remains undescribed, metamorphic and unbounded by any agreed demographic taxonomy, and is thus unusable as a focus for designing, planning or conducting operations. Does it comprise just the ‘punters’? The peasants? Everyone in a given locale? Does it include the government? If so, to which levels? Does it include all the ‘strongmen’—negative and positive influencers—or just the meek, downtrodden and oppressed? If so, how do we determine who these ‘meek’ are? Do they stay ‘meek’ all the time? The answer to all these is alternately ‘who knows?’ or ‘it depends’.

When we as a warrior caste seem to have no hesitation in endlessly debating the military equivalent of angel numbers on pinheads, our mute acceptance of something so ill-defined as ‘population-centricity’ is bemusing. ‘Population-centric operations’ is unconvincing as a term that accurately describes the operations and actions it purports to portray in proposed publications; and, more importantly, this false doctrinal dilemma presents an insidious threat to our understanding of the true nature of conflict and our ability to determine, plan and conduct our future missions alongside our multi-agency partners.

In contrast, we can choose to renew the grasp of our doctrine’s ‘known knowns’, and to understand and apply terms and concepts to their fullest extent. In concert with a well-grounded analysis of the causes and pretexts of conflicts, we can arrive at an alternative suite of terminology; one that recognises the true focus of military operations across all forms of conflict, and even (if we dare to acknowledge the unmistakeable fundamental similarities) take inspiration from acknowledged extant domestic operational doctrine concepts and the terms ‘defence aid to the civil community’ and ‘defence aid to the civil authority’.³

... we can choose to renew the grasp of our doctrine’s ‘known knowns’, and to understand and apply terms and concepts to their fullest extent.

Intra-State Conflict/Dysfunction: 'Intervention' Operations

Like their foreign counterparts, the ADF and other Australian government agencies conduct intervention operations (military and civil) into foreign countries under a paradigm of intra-state conflict or dysfunction. They do so under two broad auspices described below, and both are prosecuted when and where the host state’s ongoing functionality and actions are in Australia’s direct or indirect sovereign interest:

• Aiding the civil community, when the scale, intensity and/or duration of a natural or anthropogenic (man-made) disaster or incident overwhelm a foreign state’s capacity, and Australia has intervened at the invitation of that state’s government.
• Aiding the civil authority of a government, in restoring or maintaining its sovereignty and state functionality (which can include curtailing transnational security threats therein, such as terrorism, piracy, crime and Weapons of Mass Destruction/Effect proliferation). This will ideally and generally occur at the invitation of the host government—though in extremis, and if of sufficient national interest, this may also involve autonomous conduct of tactical actions without the host government’s foreknowledge or permission, or may arise under international ‘responsibility to protect’ auspices.

Both these auspices can certainly overlap, and both are likely to arise in circumstances that the civil-military community characterise as ‘complex emergencies’— that is, where the foreign state’s society and state organs are failing and a humanitarian crisis is likely, imminent or ongoing.⁴ When described in this manner, the task similarities (even if not the legal or jurisdictional specifics) of non-domestic interventions with ADF domestic operations are clear, and provide an instructive comparison in thinking about civil-military roles and relationships in such missions. While particular Australian State and Federal legislation exists, and the legal status of force elements may differ, in principle there is very little difference in terms of outcomes sought either domestically or non-domestically in intervention operations.

These apparent task similarities between what a military (and civil) intervention force may conduct in a foreign context, and what may be required domestically in support of its own government and security poses both hazards and opportunity to force planners. Australia’s sovereign defence was the original and remains the primary raison d’être for its armed forces: military and strategic planners have therefore long been justifiably leery about a ‘mission creep’ that would enshrine domestic employment of the military, except in the direst circumstances where responsiveness, scale, intensity or duration would overwhelm domestic civil agencies. An overreliance on this role might see the ADF transformed into an armed and salaried federal version of the SES.

However, by recognising the task similarities in domestic and non-domestic settings, ADF planners can in good faith design and execute dual function (dare we use Dwifungsi?) doctrine, organisation and training that is rightfully focused at non-domestic missions, but is equally adaptable to domestic settings.

Inter-State Conflict: 'Conventional' Operations

Conversely, the ADF (supported by select Australian government agencies) conducts ‘conventional’⁵ military operations against foreign state(s) under a paradigm of inter-state conflict—a proposition comfortably supported by multiple United Nations (UN) and international instruments.⁶ These operations are prosecuted when the sovereign interests of Australia and a foreign state conflict, and continue until the interests of at least one belligerent are met (although it should be acknowledged that a regional or UN peacekeeping mission may be raised to attain a compromise outcome). These interests may involve either exacting concessions from the enemy state’s existing government, or the overthrow of that government and installation of a new state functionality that meets the victor’s interests.

These operations are prosecuted when the sovereign interests of Australia and a foreign state conflict ...

Both eventualities involve such jeopardy, disruption or destruction of the losing state’s societal contract—that is, the government’s delivery of law and order, sovereign defence, administrative and social services, and infrastructure supporting the society’s common wealth in return for state government taxation—between its society and government’s organs that ongoing conflict is deemed untenable. These operations will also arise—if not at the beginning, then very likely by the end—during those same ‘complex emergencies’ circumstances that are encountered in intervention operations during intra-state conflict.

The Unavoidable Existence of 'Populations' Regardless of Operation

In both inter-state (conventional) and intra-state (intervention) conflict as they are described above, there exist two important commonalities:

• There is every likelihood of ADF and other Australian government agencies operating in populated areas, and
• Regardless of a foreign government’s own declaratory policies and interests, various elements of that state’s society and state organs (ethnic, community, governmental, economic, judicial, political) may hold interests contrary to Australia’s, and may act aggressively to uphold their own.

The twin likelihoods of operating in a ‘complex emergency’ mission space and the need to counter hostile society and state actions effectively amount to what forces encounter during intra-state intervention operations. Therefore, we must anticipate conducting such operations in some form, in all mission spaces, regardless of whether the primary mission involves combating a conventional adversary or otherwise. Whenever and wherever people are present in the land and littoral domains, the notions of Population Support and Population Protection (as described within Adaptive Campaigning) arise, and link closely to the management of collateral damage. This is independent of whether operations are intervention (intra-state) or inter-state in basis; blatant ignorance of collateral damage in inter-state war will quickly result in previously acquiescent societal groups becoming aggressive, and state organs reacting strongly—and in turn precipitate intra-state conflict against perpetrating military forces and their partners.

In both inter-state (conventional) and intra-state (intervention) conflict as described above, ADF operations therefore do not centre around a ‘population’ but rather, on a state’s capacity (including willingness) to function and behave in a manner concordant with Australian sovereign national interest. Ultimately, this capacity derives from the coercive and persuasive power dynamics that exist inside the state and, in particular, how those dynamics influence the effectiveness of the state’s societal contract between its society and government.

Warfare's 'Intergenerational' Complexity

As military planners, we must fully acknowledge the recent changes to conflict’s actors and environment since last century: the rise in power and pervasiveness of international organisations including non-government organisations and intergovernmental organisations; seismic changes to world power balance; ever-growing capacity for individual-level lethality; and globally potent and interconnected media and communications. However, these changes describe an accentuation of pre-existing phenomena, not step-changes from one generational milieu to another. Transnational groups are in no way new, nor are their fundamental effects or attributes. What is changing is their application of recent technology to dramatically increase individual lethality and reach, and the speed of transposition of ideas and actions.

What is changing is their application of recent technology to dramatically increase individual lethality and reach, and the speed of transposition of ideas and actions.

As a result, there is significant risk in the use of ‘First generation to Fourth generation warfare’⁷ terms, and the attendant minimalist and superficial depiction of the complexity of warfare throughout history, as a basis for rationalising distinguishing conflict forms between enemy-centric and population-centric. Terminology of this type inexplicably omits past warfare and conflict in its most complex forms. Such examples include the incredibly intricate allegiances and counter-allegiances during the Roman Civil War; the role of the East India Company in the British ascendancy in India; actions of non-state or supra-state chivalric orders such as the Teutonic Knights and the Knights Templar; mercenary forces such as those of Demetrius in the post-Alexandrian wars of the Diadochi; the corsairs and privateers in the Caribbean; and the Hessians in the US War of Independence. Moreover, the idea infers some sort of increasing sophistication in the base nature of conflict; as military professionals, we need to steer away from such lowest-common-denominator notions, and be inspired by more carefully-considered concepts.

Centrality of the Society-State Relationship

The ‘population’ is therefore too simplistic and amorphous to use as an operational focus. Moreover, population-centric operations focus on only one component (inadequately defined and thus non-targetable) of the full problem. It also does not explain the diversity of actions and interests that societal sectors, groups and individuals may adopt in inter-state (conventional) operations, as opposed to purely intra-state (intervention) operations. We need only to consider the combatant or irregular forces throughout history—even just last century alone—that have participated in conflict between a host state’s conventional forces and a foreign state’s conventional forces. Yugoslav partisans, the Viet Cong, French Maquis, Faisal’s soldiers of the Arab revolt, Iraqi Fedayeen and Afghan Mujahedeen all have demonstrated such diversity of actions and interests. Once again, these examples depict how the central element in both forms of conflict is the power relationships between the society and its own sovereign state government that are at the heart of the state-societal contract.

In an intervention operation, the ADF or its equivalent is by definition an interloper, and should never be more than in a supporting position to the host state. Moreover, as such we should not seek the direct ‘support of the population’—only indirectly, as an agent of the host state—but instead seek to develop and empower the web of societal linkages to and from the host government. In contrast to the precepts of population-centric operations, we must regard the society-state relationship as central to mission success, and not the population as an entity. Thus (acknowledging that more tangible, mission-specific centres of gravity may be apparent at lower levels) it can be argued that at the strategic level at least:

• In intra-state (intervention) operations, the society-state relationship is the ‘friendly’ centre of gravity, which must be protected and/or rectified.
• In inter-state (conventional) operations, the society-state relationship is the ‘adversary’ centre of gravity, which must be defeated.

Leading from this recognition of the society-state relationship’s true centrality, it becomes clear that effective ‘hearts and minds’ campaigns can only be prosecuted directly by the host nation government, and only indirectly on their behalf by intervening forces. More importantly, the term ‘hearts and minds’ is simply a euphemism for prosecuting populist actions in support of development of an empowering relationship between the society and its own sovereign state government—but frequently missing the substance of development or governance that is more likely the solution to grievance. The term is frequently misused, hackneyed, and inferred to be a superficial ‘sodafountain morale’ approach to counterinsurgency, and is therefore considered with strong suspicion by most non-government organisations and media commentators. Given its lack of definition and its external opprobrium, adopting ‘hearts and minds’ as a doctrinal term would appear to offer nothing and potentially leave the ADF open for cynicism and derisory critique.

Different Levels, Different Models

A direct, and arguably impractical, corollary of adopting the notions of population—and enemy-centricity as acceptable terminology is their impact on developing doctrine and subsequent effects on organisation and training. Along with its international peers, the Australian Army is currently grappling with how best to prepare and posture itself against the vicissitudes of a post-Afghanistan world in terms of its doctrine, organisation and training. What the Army currently terms as ‘foundation warfighting’ is readily recognised as fundamental to its baseline mission agility and versatility, wherein the command, control and coordination challenges of combat against a contemporary peer adversary is the primary benchmark. The complexities of multidimensional manoeuvre, and the coordination of all manner of joint fires and effects are foreseen in this contested operating paradigm: but in seeking to focus land force efforts at the tactical level, there is a temptation to characterise this battlespace as necessitating ‘enemy-centric’ operations only.

By not describing a prospective operating environment under a broader notion—such as the way inter-state (conventional) operations is proposed in this article—the Army runs a serious risk of oversimplifying its potential battlespace, and thereby the comprehensiveness of its force design and preparedness. No matter how distracting or consuming in time, resources or commander’s attention, the future battlespace will be cluttered with humanity; however, it will not be simply an amorphous population, but structured societies of varying degrees of functionality and governance.

... the Army runs a serious risk of oversimplifying its potential battlespace, and thereby the comprehensiveness of its force design and preparedness.

That a military force operating in such a battlespace will have some relationship to that society-state construct is inescapable. However, as only one of the instruments of a warring state’s national power, the function played by the military force manifests differently at different levels of war. In the way that the ‘comprehensive approach’ is described well by DIME (diplomatic, information, military and economic) at the strategic level, and by the five lines of operation in Adaptive Campaigning at the operational (campaign) level, so we should be equally open to a tactical-level model that maintains the tenets of the higher-level models, but without direct transposition of terms.

Put another way, we don’t need to directly transpose the five lines of operation to the tactical level, because the notions don’t apply in the same way. Rather, the ubiquity of the society-state relationship necessitates a model for ADF tactics, techniques and procedures that views manoeuvre as intertwined with governance and development functions, to the same degree as it is with fires, sustainment, intelligence, protection, and command and control, with each afforded its consideration proportionate to its relevance to the mission.

Conclusion

There is deliberately little that is new in the conceptual fundamentals proposed here; but from these re-established and re-stated precepts, there is opportunity for the ADF to restore and build on its campaign design doctrinal platform, to ensure that we are thinking clearly and comprehensively about military operations along and across all forms of conflict. Coming out of what at this stage are inconclusive operations in Afghanistan is no reason to wish away a future similar conflict.

Moreover, we should not countenance a theoretical doctrinal approach that may encourage a consequent two-tier approach to organisation and training. The challenges ahead will be daunting enough; the ADF and indeed Australia cannot afford to further constrain its future operational effectiveness through deficient doctrine and an attendant misguided view of its shared mission space.

Endnotes

1     Adaptive Campaigning – Future Land Operating Concept, Department of Defence, Canberra, September 2009 <http://www.defence.gov.au/opEx/exercises/caex/publications/adaptive_cam…; accessed 11 July 2012.

2     See among others Rick Richardson, Fall Gelb and the German Blitzkrieg of 1940: Operational Art, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, 1999; Shimon Naveh, In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory, Cummings Centre, Portland, 1997; J P Harris, ‘Debate: The Myth of Blitzkrieg’, War in History, Vol 2, No 3, November 1995, pp. 348–52; Karl-Heinz Freiser and John T Greenwood, The Blitzkrieg Legend: The 1940 Campaign in the west, Naval Institute Press, Maryland, 2005.

3     Defence Instruction (General) OPS 05–1, Defence Assistance to the Civil Community - Policy and Procedures, 16 March 2004 <http://www.royalcommission.vic.gov.au/Documents/Document-files/Exhibits…; accessed 11 July 2012.

4     Same space—different mandates: A civil-military guide to Australian stakeholders in international disaster and conflict response, Australian Civil-Military Centre, 2012 <http://justreleasedblog.wordpress.com/2012/06/14/same-space-different-m…; accessed 29 June 2012.

5     The term ‘conventional’ is here used to describe conflicts that are between states, and for which the Laws of Armed Conflict and the Geneva Conventions were expressly crafted—that is, there are purpose-built conventions in place for such conflicts. Through application of the International Committee of the Red Cross’ Direct Participation in Hostilities construct and similar, less codified arrangements, we can apply the Laws of Armed Conflict to combatants that are not stated-based actors—but these are applications, as opposed to the circumstances for which those conventions were originally created.

6     See among others: Michelle Maiese, Jus ad Bellum, Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Colorado, Boulder, June 2003 <http://peacestudies.conflictresearch.org/essay/jus_ad_bellum/&gt; accessed 28 July 2012; Article 51, UN Charter <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml&gt; accessed 28 July 2012; Mark Rigstad, Just War Theory Project, Oakland University, 2012 <http://www.justwartheory.com/&gt; accessed 28 July 2012.

7     William S Lind, et al, ‘The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation’, Marine Corps Gazette, October 1989; Thomas X Hammes, ‘Insurgency: Modern warfare evolves into a fourth generation’, Strategic Forum, January 2005.