Knife, Can Opener Or Screwdriver?: Training Australia's Land force to be the Swiss Army Knife of the Future
Abstract
This article explores what kind of ‘Swiss Army Knife’ Australia’s future land force should look like in relation to its foundation warfighting capability. This discussion is crucial amid ongoing debates about the ‘Army After Afghanistan’. In one respect, developing a niche specialisation in Army’s skill sets is appealing for the potential monetary, time and other resource-efficiency savings. Yet, given a future operating environment that is generally predicted to be complex, uncertain and varied along the entire spectrum of conflict, Army’s small size also requires soldiers that can undertake a broad range of tasks. Through a consideration of Army’s strategic planning, this article argues that a resilient land force must avoid this ‘capability-resource dilemma’ and be frank about what kind of capability tradeoffs it is prepared to make.
Introduction
What should Australia’s future land force look like as it scales down operations in Afghanistan? A range of competing ideas have been put forward about what’s being called the ‘Army After Afghanistan.’ For Ross Babbage, Australia must maintain a strategic edge out to 2030 in response to China’s modernising People’s Liberation Army, though it would mean that operations, activities and capabilities would be costly.1 Hugh White has questioned whether the Army of the future will be expeditionary or focus on the defence of Australia.2 Alan Dupont has cautioned that Army risks facing a ‘period of drift and misplaced spending’.3 At the heart of these views is a much needed discussion about what warfighting capabilities the future land force will need and what resources it will require. The problem is that we can’t predict the future. We don’t know what actual issues are going to emerge, or what events will occur that government will ask Army to respond to.
In other words, what kind of ‘Swiss Army Knife’ does Australia need? A ‘specialised’ approach would see the land force maintain proficiencies in a niche area. This might be likened to a single blade pocket knife that is superb at cutting rope, but is not purpose built for other functions. A ‘generalised’ approach would train soldiers to acquire a broad skill set so that they are prepared to undertake a diverse range of activities. To continue the metaphor, a deluxe model Swiss Army Knife might contain everything from multiple blades, a corkscrew, a can opener, a screwdriver, a nail file, tweezers, scissors and a toothpick.
This article examines Army’s options for developing foundation warfighting capabilities in a resource constrained environment, and at a time when its future operations are likely to be complex in nature. To do so it first considers how Army is stuck in a capability-resource dilemma. It then explores the extent that ‘specialised’ or ‘generalised’ approaches to training could help address it. The article’s final section is devoted to considering whether a combined approach would allow Army to experience ‘the best of both worlds’ and if so, what capability tradeoffs would be needed in doing so.
The Future Land Force and its Capability-Resource Dilemma
The future land force faces a dilemma from the prospect that it will have to operate in a more complicated security environment with severely restricted resources. The Defence budget announcement of May 2012 indicated that the Department will have $5.45 billion less throughout the Forward Estimates period. Although Defence Minister Stephen Smith has been adamant that the spending cuts will not detract from the Australian Defence Force’s (ADF) overseas operations,4 Army has perhaps gotten the worst deal of the three services. The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) has seen $709 million allocated to sustaining the Collins Class submarines during the forward estimates period,5 as well as $214 million to research the Future Submarine’s design.6 Joint Strike Fighter acquisition was only delayed and the project’s later stages deferred.7 Yet Army’s self-propelled howitzer acquisition (worth between $500 million and $1 billion)8 was cancelled in favour of a cheaper ($200 million) towed artillery option; some of its M1A1 Abrams tanks and some one hundred of its M113AS4 armoured personnel carriers were announced to be warehoused; and, along with the RAN, has had its gap year program cancelled too.9 The Department’s Strategic Reform Program—which hopes to generate $20 billion in internal savings over the∂1 2009–19 timeframe to support Force 203010—has set Army on a path of internal reorganisation too.
The future land force faces a dilemma from the prospect that it will have to operate in a more complicated security environment with severely restricted resources.
At the same time, Australia will continue to face a multitude of challenges spread throughout the entire peace-conflict spectrum. The Defence White Paper 2009 broadly indicates what this might entail, whereby the ADF should contribute to global military contingencies relevant to Australia’s interests and in a manner proportionate to capacity.11 This is no revelation for Army. Its doctrinal publications recognise diversity in the future threat environment. The Army Modernisation Handbook underscores the importance of environmental scanning to ensure awareness of evolving challenges.12 The Army Objective Force 2030 predicts that ‘the enemy could range from a major power adversary to a collection of ad hoc and irregular forces’.13 Army’s capstone document Adaptive Campaigning – Future Land Operating Concept points out that Australia’s future land power must be able to operate in a complex security environment14 that will be influenced by globalisation, US military primacy, intra-state conflict, population growth, resource competition, urbanisation, technological advances and the global economic crisis.15
Army’s most senior figures reiterate this point. As Lieutenant General David Morrison explained in April this year, ‘future conflict will increasingly involve multiple, diverse actors and influences, all competing for the allegiances and behaviours of targeted populations’.16 Elsewhere he reflected:
Army has got to be able to provide the government of the day with the broadest range of options to meet military contingencies—everything from contributing to humanitarian disaster relief operations through to fighting against a peer or near-peer adversary.17
His predecessors have put forward much the same view. For Lieutenant General Ken Gillespie:
Precious resources must be utilised effectively and the Army must invest wisely in those future capabilities likely to provide the greatest utility across a broad range of scenarios.18
And, according to Lieutenant General Peter Leahy:
The Army after Afghanistan must continue to provide government with a wide range of defence and security options. Given a complex and volatile strategic environment which includes the rise of China, internal instability in many Asian states, uncertainty about the security implications of climate change, and food, water and energy shortages, it is not the time to adopt a narrow view of the Army’s future. The Army after Afghanistan must remain a balanced force, able to operate at short notice in joint and combined environments across a wide spectrum of defence and security contingencies.19
So while it is not news that non-conventional challenges have become more prominent in international security in a post-Cold War and even post-11 September 2001 world, it does mean that Army needs a capability spread to address them.
If, as the adage goes, the characteristics of war may change over time, even though its essential nature does not, then what is Army’s future foundation warfighting capability in a climate of fiscal uncertainty and reform? Foundation warfighting ‘is the core competency that the government demands of Army’20 and can be broadly described as the individual and force elements that form the basis of Army’s ability to conduct full spectrum operations.21 It is crucial that the issue receives greater attention. White, for example, has pointed out a need to better understand a defensive land force’s future requirements, arguing that ‘[too] little work has been done on what precisely that means for the nature and scale of capabilities needed in Army’.22 According to James Brown, ‘[there] should be arguments and critical analysis [...] about what kind of fighting the Australian Army will need to do in the next decade’.23 Given Army’s capability-resource dilemma, would it be better to train soldiers to have a broad skill set or focus on niche areas? In other words, is Australia’s future land force a knife, can opener or screwdriver?
... what is Army’s future foundation warfighting capability in a climate of fiscal uncertainty and reform?
A Specialised Warfighting Capability
A specialised approach to Army’s foundation warfighting capability would see the future land force proficient in a narrow skill set as a means to conduct particular activities. Characteristics of this approach can be seen in how Army has historically trained over time, such as the universal military training strategies employed early in the twentieth century. In 1909, Field Marshal Viscount Kitchener was invited to assess Army’s ‘adequacy’, after which he advocated the establishment of an 80,000 soldier-strong land force. Doing so was a precursor to the Defence Act 1909, which made training and service mandatory during peacetime.24 In 1911, a universal training strategy for Army applying to Australian males aged 18–60 was introduced, which lasted until 1929.25 Kitchener recommended in part that the land force be organised with an infantry focus of 84 battalions. Light horse troops were scaled to a supporting role, and General Edward Hutton’s field force brigades with integrated artillery were phased out.26
A specialised approach to Army’s foundation warfighting capability would see the future land force proficient in a narrow skill set ...
Universal military training was credited as a way to generate land force preparedness and address contingencies relevant to Australia’s position within the British Empire.27 At the time, these were focused on traditional security challenges associated with great power politics. As the then Quartermaster General of the Australian forces Lieutenant Colonel James Gordon Legge put it in 1911, universal training strategies were geared to address external military threats:
Nations apparently fight very often for but small excuses, but there are underlying reasons always that are not so apparent. The desire of larger territory, of increased lrade,...even the barefaced desires of the strong to impose his will upon the weak; these and many others decide the rulers of a nation to undertake a war. [...] That is why we want an army. We do not want war, and keeping an army fit for defense is the best preventive.28
Similarly, Lord Kitchener stressed that Home Forces should ‘compel an enemy contemplating an invasion to make the attempt on such a scale as to be unable to evade our Naval Forces’.29 This view was also held in the United States. George Creel, prior to becoming chairman of the US Committee on Public Information during the Wilson Presidency, argued that universal training was critical for US preparedness against ‘armed invasion or unbearable aggression’.30
Despite the utility of universal training strategy at the time, such an approach to foundation warfighting capability was not without its challenges. The accelerated expansion of Army saw a ‘continual turnover’ in personnel, whereby skills and experience were diluted to the detriment of the Australian Army Service Corps.31 Given that Australia’s contemporary strategic interests are, in comparison, much broader in scope and encompass both conventional and non-conventional matters, training to address a particular threat type is unlikely to be of much help today. The question is, then, whether a generalised approach to capability development would be any better.
A Generalised Warfighting Capability
A generalised approach to Army’s foundation warfighting would see military personnel trained to professional mastery in a range of skill areas. Here, a land force that has a wide capability scope could be expected to be more resilient and adaptable in undertaking varied operational tasks. Elements of generalised warfighting are evident in how Army was positioned in the aftermath of the Vietnam War. As Major General John Caligari has argued, the post-Vietnam Army sought to have ‘in its response “golf bag” as many different types of “clubs” as it could’, so it could ‘cover the full spectrum of operations’.32 With light, mechanised, parachute and motorised forces, as well as amphibious, jungle and airmobile operations, Major General Caligari has reflected that it meant Army had force elements that were ‘pretty close to being perfect for the designated mission’.33
The problem of this approach, however, lies in having to maintain numerous niche capabilities at once. This has been difficult enough during times of peace, but an order of magnitude more challenging during times of crisis. Post-Vietnam, substantial resources were required to train soldiers to be as effective as they were diverse in capability.34 Army’s battalions were reduced, its skill base ‘hollowed out’ and counterinsurgency capabilities lost.35 For Lieutenant General Morrison, Army became ‘a force of single capabilities’ that was ‘too light’ and ‘too dependent on wheeled vehicles’.36 With assumptions that there would be enough notice to mobilise and meet future contingencies, Army was pressed to respond to violence in Timor-Leste following its declaration of independence in 1999 and develop from ‘a light leg infantry towards a medium weight force’.37
Post-Vietnam, substantial resources were required to train soldiers to be as effective as they were diverse in capability.
Given that Army faces serious fiscal uncertainty, it would probably not be wise for the future land force to maintain a very broad capability spread. That is, the problem of a generalised approach to training the future land force lies in the potential for Army to become a ‘jack of all trades but master of none’. After all, Army’s small size places a limit on how many niche capabilities it might practicably be able to sustain at once. As US Defense Secretary Robert Gates remarked in 2010 when reflecting on the consequences of reduced US military spending cuts, it means that ‘a smaller military, no matter how superb, will be able to go to fewer places and be able to do fewer things’.38 With this in mind, government needs to ask some difficult questions about which ‘places’ and ‘things’ are the most important. Eyes will be on the Defence White Paper 2013 for some answers.
Managing Army's Capability-Resource Dilemma through a Balanced Approach
An examination of whether similarity or diversity would be best for the future land force’s foundation warfighting capability has indicated that Army will still be stuck in its dilemma no matter which of the two approaches is adopted. One would require a gamble as to whether a specific skill set is actually going to be required in practice, and the other incredibly expensive. A third option whereby Army balances its capability scope offers the greatest potential to maximise operational resilience while being conscious of resource constraints. The challenge, then, is to work out which skills and in what intensities are important. It may be easy to make a shopping list of desirable functions but it’s far harder to allocate them priorities.
A glance at some of Army’s major conceptual and practical initiatives suggests that it’s already well on the way to realising a balanced capability. The Army Training Continuum, for example, sets out a conceptual pathway for how the land force should build foundation warfighting skills. It depicts soldiers’ career-long training and education, as well as a process integrating individual, unit, sub-unit, brigade and formation level training from force generation to force preparation.39 The Army Training Continuum’s value lies in its ability to link individual and collective training mechanisms,40 which in turn allows Forces Command, as Army’s primary personnel manager, to respond to deployment needs with a required land force capability.41 Army’s Adaptive Campaigning envisages five ‘lines of operation’ that exist in all forms of conflict and include joint land combat, population protection, information actions, population support and indigenous capacity building.42 Here, Army’s success against operational uncertainty depends on its flexibility, agility, resilience, responsiveness and robustness.43 While these terms are widely used throughout Army’s conceptual publications—the notion of resilience, for instance, is given as ‘the capacity to sustain loss, damage and setbacks and still maintain essential levels of capability across core functions’44—it is not entirely clear how they could translate into useful measurements, performance benchmarks, or otherwise apply in practice.
A glance at some of Army’s major conceptual and practical initiatives suggests that it’s already well on the way to realising a balanced capability.
Other indications of Army’s efforts to realise a balanced force are evident within Plan BEERSHEBA. Announced in December 2011, the Plan takes its name from the Battle of Beersheba of October 1917 and during which the Australian 4th Light Horse Brigade charged Turkish defences as part of the British offensive northeast of the Sinai Peninsula in what is today southern Israel.45 Three components of Plan BEERSHEBA stand out in particular.
Other indications of Army’s efforts to realise a balanced force are evident within Plan BEERSHEBA.
The first is Army’s restructuring of the 1st, 3rd and 7th brigades (currently organised with mechanised, light infantry and motorised focuses respectively) into three multi-role combat brigades that will consist of armour, artillery, communication, engineer, infantry and logistics force elements.46 Official policy statements argue that this will better position Army to train as it fights.47 It is also intended to simplify Army’s logistics and enable a force preparedness that is targeted to missions.48 However, this approach risks doing ‘less with less’, which was the charge levelled at the British government’s 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review in light of its army’s restructuring plan to develop five alike multi-role brigades.49 It is early days yet to tell whether the same implications necessarily hold for Australia’s land force. If anything, the Army is in an even more difficult position, since Lieutenant General Morrison has stated that it will, in fact, have ‘to do more with less’.50 If this is the case, then it further underlines the need to understand the implications of a reconfigured land force’s capability tradeoffs.
A second component encompassed by Plan BEERSHEBA is Total Force, which aims to develop an integrated Army workforce comprising Regular and Reserve Army personnel. At a broader level the term incorporates the other services, allies, contractors and government bodies too. Here, the balance of each party’s involvement within the Total Force depends on the nature of the tasks at hand. Regular Army personnel are to have prominence during an operation’s initial period. At later stages, Reserve personnel and others will have greater roles.51 This approach, according to Lieutenant General Morrison, will benefit both full-time and part-time soldiers. Reserve personnel can obtain greater experiences in training and exercises.52 As Senator the Hon. David Feeney, Parliamentary Secretary for Defence has explained, Reserve’s roles within Total Force are to be fourfold: to provide 1) specified warfighting capabilities, especially in humanitarian stabilisation operations in which they have excelled (Lieutenant General Morrison also argues that Reserves have been especially successful at conducting stabilisation activities in the Solomon Islands and Timor-Leste);53 2) aid during humanitarian activities and domestic emergencies; 3) specialist individual capabilities; and 4) surge capabilities.54
Plan SUAKIN further supports Reserves’ roles and capabilities within Total Force through an employment model that is being revised in line with the Strategic Reform Program.55 These efforts make sense. It certainly appears to offer a means for Army to make the most of its capability-resource dilemma. But it will come down to long term calculations as to whether the capability gained outweighs the overhead costs of reform—again, no easy feat to measure.
A third component within Plan BEERSHEBA is the role of a land force in a maritime context—in particular, in relation to Army’s development of an amphibious capability and acquisition of two Landing Helicopter Docks (LHDs). This, too, is to be balanced throughout Army. The 2nd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (2 RAR) has been designated to take the initial lead in developing amphibious capability. In turn, these skills are to be spread throughout and beyond 3 Brigade, within which 2 RAR sits. Here, Army’s interoperability within itself, as well as the other services, is going to be crucial. Lieutenant General Morrison has recognised this as far as emphasising joint activity is concerned, stating that ‘Australia needs its ADF more than it needs its Navy, its Army or its Air Force if it is to possess robust military options now and in the future.’56
A problem, though, is that there is no clear indication just yet of how Army might proceed in doing this. As early as 1998, Michael Evans pointed out that Army had a diminishing ‘corporate knowledge’ of amphibious operations, sea based expeditionary warfare and the littoral environment, which has been overshadowed by its adherence to tenets of continental defence.57 Commander Robert Moyse has pointed out that Australia lacks a joint operational concept for an archipelagic region. Granted, Army has developed relevant concept documents such as Manoeuvre Operations in the Littoral Environment and Entry by Air and Sea. But while these may be useful for promoting an ADF amphibious capability, they have been criticised from a joint viewpoint for smacking of an expeditionary strategy.58 Lieutenant General Morrison’s answer thus far is that ‘we’re going to learn that as we go’.59 If we’re lucky, this will occur ahead of time and in practice, and not on the day when the capability is suddenly needed. Given that Marines Corps personnel—the US’s specialists in conducting amphibious operations—are now being deployed to northern Australia as part of a new initiative in the Australia-US relationship, there is tremendous opportunity for Army to learn from the experts and do exactly this.
Conclusion
Army has the opportunity to decide right now what type of ‘Swiss Army Knife’ it’s going to be. Given its capability-resource dilemma, this would ideally be somewhere in between a basic pocket knife as one extreme and a deluxe model behemoth as another. All signs indicate that Army is set on a mission to develop a balanced force that can respond to future challenges as directed by government—even though the road is fraught with difficulties. Army’s size means that it does not have the luxury of developing as diverse a capability set as it might like. Yet at the same time, it is in a position to realise a future land force that is as adaptable as it is resilient. If this doesn’t eventuate, then the alternative is bleak. It runs the risk of being caught out one day and having to open a can with a toothpick.
Author's Note
Lieutenant Colonel Michael Scott, Lieutenant Colonel Robert Calhoun and Commander Rodney Cameron-Tucker provided valuable advice for earlier drafts of this article. However, the responsibility for its content remains my own.
About the Author
Allison Casey is a Department of Defence employee through the 2012 Graduate Development Program. Her work placements have included the Directorate of Army Research and Analysis, Maritime Development in Capability Development Group, and Science International Relations in the Defence Science and Technology Organisation. She is also a PhD candidate with the School of Government at the University of Tasmania. Her thesis is entitled ‘Securing Transnational Oil in Southeast Asia: the Malacca Strait’s Energy Transit States’.
Endnotes
1 Ross Babbage, Australia’s Strategic Edge in 2030, Kokoda Paper No. 15, February 2011 <http://www.kokodafoundation.org/Resources/Documents/KP15StrategicEdge.p…;
2 Hugh White, ‘The Future of the Australian Army’, Security Challenges, Vol. 7, No. 2, Winter 2011, pp. 27-32 <http://www.securitychallenges.org.au/ArticlePDFs/vol7no2White.pdf>
3 Alan Dupont, ‘Inflection Point: The Australian Defence Force After Afghanistan’, Lowy Institute Policy Brief, March 2012, p. 1 <http://lowyinstitute.cachefly.net/files/dupont_inflection_point_web.pdf…;
4 Minister for Defence Stephen Smith, ‘Budget 2012–13 Defence Budget Overview’, 8 May 2012 <http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2012/05/08/minister-for-defence-budg…;; Minister for Defence Stephen Smith, ‘Budget 2012–13 Defence Operations Funding’, 8 May 2012 <http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2012/05/08/minister-for-defence-budg…;
5 Defence Portfolio Budget Statements 2012–2013, Budget Related Paper No. 1.5A, p. 18 <http://www.defence.gov.au/budget/12-13/pbs/2012-2013_Defence_PBS_comple…;
6 Nicole Brangwin, Australia’s Future Submarines, Department of Parliamentary Services Background Note, 24 May 2012, p. 4 <http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/library/prspub/1656968/upl…;
7 ‘Budget 2012–13 Defence Budget Overview.’
8 Defence Capability Plan 2011, Department of Defence, 2011, p. 216 <http://www.defence.gov.au/dmo/id/dcp/html_aug11/wp-content/uploads/2011…;
9 ‘Budget 2012–13 Defence Budget Overview’; Defence Portfolio Budget Statements 2012–2013; Budget Related Paper No. 1.5A, p. 49; Chief of the Defence Force, ‘Opening Statement 2012–13 Budget Estimates Hearing’, 28 May 2012 <http://news.defence.gov.au/2012/05/28/chief-of-the-defence-force-%E2%80…;
10 The Strategic Reform Program – Making it Happen, Department of Defence, 2010, p. 2 <http://www.defence.gov.au/SRP/docs/srp.pdf>
11 Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030, Department of Defence, 2009, p. 56, para 7.19 <http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/docs/defence_white_paper_2009.pdf&…;
12 The Army Modernisation Handbook 2011, Department of Defence, 2011, p. 7 <http://www.army.gov.au/Our-future/~/media/Files/Our%20future/Publicatio…;
13 Army Objective Force 2030 Primer, Land Warfare Development Centre, 2011, pp. 9–10, para 1.14 <http://www.army.gov.aU/Our-future/~/media/Files/Our%20future/Publicatio…;
14 Adaptive Campaigning – Future Land Operating Concept, Department of Defence, 2009, p. iii <http://www.army.gov.au/Our-future/~/media/Files/Our%20future/DARA%20Pub…;
15 Ibid., pp. 8–13.
16 Lieutenant General David Morrison, Speech to the Australian Strategic Policy Institute by the Chief of the Australian Army, 11 April 2012 <http://www.army.gov.au/Our-work/Speeches-and-transcripts/Australian-Str…;
17 John Welfare, ‘Beersheba’s Battle Plan’, Army, 2 February 2012, pp. 18–19 <http://www.army.gov.au/Our-future/Plan-BEERSHEBA/~/media/Files/Our%20fu…;
18 Lieutenant General Ken Gillespie, ‘The Adaptive Army Initiative’, Australian Army Journal, Vol. 6, No. 3, 2009, p. 8 <http://www.army.gov.au/Our-future/DARA/Our-publications/Australian-Army…;
19 Lieutenant General Peter Leahy, ‘The Army after Afghanistan’, Security Challenges, Vol. 7, No. 2, Winter 2011, p. 7 <http://www.securitychallenges.org.au/ArticlePDFs/vol7no2Leahy.pdf>
20 Morrison, Speech to the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.
21 ‘Forces Command’, Army.gov.au <http://www.army.gov.au/Who-we-are/Divisions-and-Brigades/Forces-Command…;; Major General John Caligari, ‘Army Modernisation’, Chief of Army Exercise Presentation, 16 November 2010, p. 14 <http://www.defence.gov.au/opEx/exercises/caex/pdf/caligar.pdf>
22 White, ‘The Future of the Australian Army’, p. 31.
23 James Brown, ‘The Challenge of Innovation in the Australian Army’, Security Challenges, Vol. 7, No. 2, Winter 2011, p. 17 <http://www.securitychallenges.org.au/ArticlePDFs/vol7no2Brown.pdf>
24 ‘Universal Military Training in Australia, 1911–29’, Fact Sheet No. 160, National Archives of Australia <http://www.naa.gov.au/collection/fact-sheets/fs160.aspx>
25 John Laffin, The Australian Army at War 1899–1975, Osprey, London, 1982, p. 8; ‘Universal Military Training in Australia, 1911–29’, National Archives of Australia.
26 Jean Bou, Light Horse: A History of Australia’s Mounted Arm, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 2009, p. 99.
27 Jeffrey Grey, A Military History of Australia, 3rd ed., Cambridge University Press, Port Melbourne, 2008, p. 75.
28 EN Johnston, ‘The Australian System of Universal Training for Purposes of Military Defense’, Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science in the City of New York, Vol. 6, No. 4, July 1916, p. 114.
29 Sir George Arthur, Life of Lord Kitchener, Vol. 2, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1920, p. 294.
30 George Creel, ‘Universal Training and the Democratic Ideal’, Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science in the City of New York, Vol. 6, No. 4, July 1916, p. 150.
31 Neville Lindsay, Equal to the Task: The Royal Australian Army Service Corps, Vol. 1, 1991 <http://books.historia.com.au/equal-to-the-task_v1-raasc/e1-p1_btoe/e1-c…;
32 Major General John Caligari, ‘The Adaptive Army Post-Afghanistan: The Australian Army’s Approach Towards Force 2030’, Security Challenges, Vol. 7, No. 2, Winter 2011, pp. 2–3.
33 Ibid., p. 3.
34 Ibid.
35 Dupont, ‘Inflection Point’, p. 1.
36 Morrison, Speech to the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.
37 Lieutenant General Peter Leahy, ‘The Medium Weight Force: Lessons Learned and Future Contributions to Coalition Operations’, Australian Army Journal, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2006, pp. 1–8, cited in Graeme Dobell, ‘The “Arc of Instability”: The History of an Idea’ in Ron Huisken and Meredith Thatcher (eds), History as Policy: Framing the Debate on the Future of Australia’s Defence Policy, ANU E Press, Canberra, 2007 <http://epress.anu.edu.au/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/ch0640.pdf>
38 ‘Gates: Defense Spending Cuts will Reduce US Influence’, USA Today, 24 May 2011.
39 The Army Modernisation Handbook, p. 86.
40 Tony Dunne, ‘A Focus on War Skills’, Army, 4 February 2010, p. 28 <http://digital.realviewtechnologies.com/?iid=32909&startpage=page000002…;
41 ‘Output Group 1.3: Army Capabilities’ in Defence Annual Report 2008–2009, Vol. 1, Department of Defence <http://www.defence.gov.au/budget/08-09/dar/vol1/ch08_05.htm>
42 See Adaptive Campaigning, Chapter 5.
43 Ibid., p. 30.
44 Ibid.
45 ‘Plan BEERSHEBA’, Army.gov.au <http://www.army.gov.au/Our-future/Plan-BEERSHEBA>
46 The Hon. Jason Clare Minister for Defence Materiel, ‘Minister for Defence, Minister for Defence Materiel and Parliamentary Secretary for Defence – New Structure and Capability for Army’, 12 December 2011 <http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2011/12/12/minister-for-defence-mini…;
47 ‘Defence Announces Major Army Restructure’, ABC News, 12 December 2012 <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2011-12-12/defence-announces-major-army-rest…;; Army Objective Force 2030 Primer, Land Warfare Development Centre, p. 14.
48 Major General John Caligari, Transcript of Presentation at Defence Reserves Association 2011 <www.dra.org.au/files/J8UGXN9H7R/MAJGEN_Caligari_-_Transcript.doc>
49 However, on 7 June 2012 the Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Peter Wall, announced a new structural direction consisting of ‘Adaptable Force’ and ‘Reaction Force’ for Army 2020. Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review, HM Government, October 2010, p. 20 <http://www.direct.gov.uk/prod_consum_dg/groups/dg_digitalassets/@dg/@en…;; Stephen Flanagan, Heather A Conley, Stephanie Sanok and Nathan Freier, ‘Doing Less with Less? Assessing the Impact of the UK Strategic Defense and Security Review’, CISS.org, 19 October 2010 <http://csis.org/publication/doing-less-less-assessing-impact-uk-strateg…;; General Sir Peter Wall, ‘Opening Keynote Address: Army 2020’, Land Warfare Conference 2012, RUSI.org <http://www.rusi.org/events/past/ref:E4F197749D21C6/info:public/infoID:E…;
50 Lieutenant General David Morrison, Army Reserve Forces Day Speech, 30 June 2012 <http://www.army.gov.au/Our-work/Speeches-and-transcripts/Army-Reserve-F…;
51 Army Objective Force 2030 Primer, p. 12.
52 Welfare, ‘Beersheba’s Battle Plan’, pp. 18–19.
53 Lieutenant General David Morrison, Senior Officer Brief to Defence Graduate Development Program, 7 June 2012.
54 The Hon. Senator David Feeney, Parliamentary Secretary for Defence, ‘ADF Reserves Capability: Where to Now?’ Speech to Defence Reserves Association National Conference, Keswick Barracks, 20 August 2011 <http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2011/08/20/speech-to-defence-reserve…;
55 Major General J E Barry, ‘ADF Reserves Capability: Where to now?’ Presentation to the Royal United Services Institute of Victoria Inc, 29 March 2012, p. 6 <https://www.rusi.org.au/states/vic/Documents/transcripts/Barry_Reserves…;; Feeney, ‘ADF Reserves Capability: Where to Now?’
56 Morrison, Speech to the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.
57 Michael Evans, The Role of the Australian Army in a Maritime Concept of Strategy, Working Paper, No. 101, Land Warfare Studies Centre, September 1998.
58 Commander Robert Moyse, ‘Manoeuvre Operations in the Littoral Environment’ in Glenn Kerr (ed), Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs: Peter Mitchell Essay Competition, Sea Power Centre Australia, 2003, p. 73 <http://www.navy.gov.au/w/images/PIAMA14_7.pdf>
59 Welfare, ‘Beersheba’s Battle Plan’, pp. 18–19.
